Angela Dall'Ara wrote on 13/10/2026 12:08:
This proposal suggests a contractual mechanism to hold resource holders accountable for systematically failing to address infrastructure-level network abuse.
From a brief reading, my take-away is that this proposal has a number of fundamental structural issues, not least an almost complete lack of clarity about what the policy is going to mean in practice, a suggestion that the RIPE NCC ought to execute a substantial change in strategic organisational direction from being a registry to using registry data to impose business consequences on RIPE NCC members, and not least, an unstated implication that by outsourcing some of the input process decision-making to third parties, that the RIPE NCC could somehow disclaim responsibility for operational outcomes of the policy. These are all disturbing problems, any one of which should be sufficient to justify rejecting the proposal in their own right. The Rationale section includes the following:
Operational Dependency: This policy will only be effective with strong, well-defined restrictions agreed by the community and codified into a separate RIPE document. The logic of those restrictions needs to be discussed in parallel with the policy to prevent administrative ambiguity or unworkable deployment workflows.
A good starting point would be to understand exactly what the author has in mind for "strong, well-defined restrictions". Can this proposal document be published first, so that the working group can at least have some idea what the author is asking the community agree to? Nick