- members-discuss - mailman.ripe.net

Re: [members-discuss] Mass emailing towards LIRs contacts, from a Board candidate
by Terrence Koeman 13 May '20

13 May '20

Since ipv4 will run out one way or another, the short version is that RIPE/membership has decided not to waste resources aggressively reclaiming ipv4 (and only stay certain execution a short time), but to put those towards getting ipv6 adopted. Ipv4 is left to the market (the profiteers), so buying/selling & renting/leasing space one has acquired legitimately is allowed. -- Regards, Terrence Koeman, PhD/MTh/BPsy Darkness Reigns (Holding) B.V. Please quote relevant replies. Spelling errors courtesy of my 'smart'phone. ________________________________ From: Bill Lewis <Bill.lewis(a)kijoma.co.uk> Sent: Wednesday, 13 May 2020 05:11 To: members-discuss(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [members-discuss] Mass emailing towards LIRs contacts, from a Board candidate > Hi, > > Not getting this at least but have had an email from a company that leases IP4 space, sent to the email address used for our Ripe account (not on any of our IP records). > > Apparently has /22 blocks they would like to rent out, surely unused blocks should be in Ripe's hands, not profiteers? > > just a thought and how they gained the email address too. Anybody else had this? > > Bill > > On 08/05/2020 07:53, Benjamin Collet wrote: > > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 08:57:28AM +0200, Clement Cavadore wrote: > >> I have received multiple times (to many of the LIRs I manage contact > >> emails), this night, an e-mail coming from a RIPE NCC Board candidate, > >> who promotes his candidacy. Be his candidacy admissible and decent or > >> not, is not the point. But, is that kind of mass-mailing correct ? > > I also got this email (have a guess whom it was from…). I believe this > > kind of mass-mailing is in direct violation of article 4 - section 4 of > > RIPE DB terms and conditions > > (https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/db/support/documentation/terms) > > > > > _______________________________________________ > members-discuss mailing list > members-discuss(a)ripe.net > https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss > Unsubscribe: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/terrence%40darkness-…

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Re: [members-discuss] Mass emailing towards LIRs contacts, from a Board candidate
by Stuart Willet (primary) 11 May '20

11 May '20

I have a default reply for these... Hi, If you have unused IPv4 it should be returned to the pool. RIPE own the IP addresses, not you. I have informed RIPE of your position. Best regards, I then forward the email off to RIPE. Nothing ever seems to happen though, which is odd given that RIPE are the actual owners of the IP addresses it should be simple for them to reclaim any listed as for sale or lease? Best, Stuart Willet -----Original Message----- From: members-discuss [mailto:members-discuss-bounces@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Bill Lewis Sent: 08 May 2020 19:59 To: members-discuss(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [members-discuss] Mass emailing towards LIRs contacts, from a Board candidate Hi, Not getting this at least but have had an email from a company that leases IP4 space, sent to the email address used for our Ripe account (not on any of our IP records). Apparently has /22 blocks they would like to rent out, surely unused blocks should be in Ripe's hands, not profiteers? just a thought and how they gained the email address too. Anybody else had this? Bill On 08/05/2020 07:53, Benjamin Collet wrote: > On Thu, May 07, 2020 at 08:57:28AM +0200, Clement Cavadore wrote: >> I have received multiple times (to many of the LIRs I manage contact >> emails), this night, an e-mail coming from a RIPE NCC Board >> candidate, who promotes his candidacy. Be his candidacy admissible >> and decent or not, is not the point. But, is that kind of mass-mailing correct ? > I also got this email (have a guess whom it was from…). I believe this > kind of mass-mailing is in direct violation of article 4 - section 4 > of RIPE DB terms and conditions > (https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/db/support/documentation/terms) > _______________________________________________ members-discuss mailing list members-discuss(a)ripe.net https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss Unsubscribe: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/ripe%40metroswitch.c…

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Re: [members-discuss] Placing Members-Discuss in Moderation
by Terrence Koeman 11 May '20

11 May '20

"freedom of expression" and not having "censorship" are not just legal issues restraining governments, but principles that we should strive for at any level of communication in a free society. That "most counties" have places limits on it is in no way an argument for whether it's a good idea to do so by governments or elsewhere (nor of whether they had the right to do it or if even had the intended effect). That there is no legal right to not be censored "on some mailinglist" (by RIPE or anyone else) doesn't mean there's not a moral right or that it isn't a good idea in general to allow maximum free expression. Consider that the fact that Elad had the opportunity to show us all what kind of person he is almost certainly caused people (including me) to register to vote to prevent him from getting any kind of power in RIPE. This is free expression directly leading to more democracy, the fact that some people may have been annoyed, offended or hurt doesn't, in my opinion, weigh up to that result at all. Reacting to free expression functioning as intended by applying censorship is the exact wrong thing to do, both morally and practically. -- Regards, Terrence Koeman, PhD/MTh/BPsy Darkness Reigns (Holding) B.V. Please quote relevant replies. Spelling errors courtesy of my 'smart'phone. ________________________________ From: Sebastian Wiesinger <sebastian.wiesinger(a)noris.net> Sent: Thursday, 7 May 2020 17:33 To: members-discuss(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [members-discuss] Placing Members-Discuss in Moderation > > > > On 4. May 2020, at 10:06, Chris Izzard <chris.izzard(a)imcisland.is> wrote: > > > > Dear Piotr, > > Reading this it sounds great at first but whatever you do to stop such huge email chains will always look like censorship whatever you like to call it. Such email lists do depend on the behaviour of everyone to follow a code but in practice this is usually not 100% possible. > > Yes it seemed that the email list was mostly in favour of censoring one person but the reality is that the vast majority just watched on and said nothing. In practice censoring damages the democratic credentials of this group because a small number of people have made the decision to do this and an even smaller number of people will police it. > > This action has put the Executive Board in a dangerous position open to all kinds of criticism and the email chain contained some pretty bad claims like Anti-Semitism. > > > > Hello, > > I see no dangerous position right now. > > 1) The moderation is for a limited time > 2) You can still see all moderated mails at https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/members-discuss-unmoderated/ <https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/members-discuss-unmoderated/> so there is no censorship > 3) Multiple calls to adhere to the code of conduct and the topic of the mailinglist were completely ignored on purpose (in my opinion with malicious intent) > 4) The "small group of people" is the executive board that we democratically voted on, so I don't see how this is undemocratic. I would even say this is exactly the type of issue that the board should decide > > On the contrary I (and expect other people) did not say anything as to not contribute to the flood of mails. I'm very grateful that this list is now moderated and I hope that this can be lifted after the election. > > Also, just make to make it clear: "freedom of expression" should prevent the government from censoring you, it does not prevent you from getting moderated on some mailinglist. On the contrary most countries have rules that limit freedom of expression and this mailinglist has rules as well. > > > Best Regards > > Sebastian > >

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Mass emailing towards LIRs contacts, from a Board candidate
by Clement Cavadore 10 May '20

10 May '20

Fellow members, I have received multiple times (to many of the LIRs I manage contact emails), this night, an e-mail coming from a RIPE NCC Board candidate, who promotes his candidacy. Be his candidacy admissible and decent or not, is not the point. But, is that kind of mass-mailing correct ? Is there an abuse contact for such a behaviour ? Thanks ! -- Clément Cavadore

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Placing Members-Discuss in Moderation
by Piotr Strzyżewski 08 May '20

08 May '20

Dear members, Today, the Executive Board held a formal meeting in order to officially resolve the appointment of Hans Petter Holen as Managing Director of the RIPE NCC. In light of recent activity on the members-discuss mailing list, we also resolved to place the members-discuss mailing list in moderation until 1 June. This follows numerous complaints that have been made about mails that are off-topic and/or contain material that does not show tolerance or respect for fellow members of the list. The resolution and accompanying text is contained in the draft minutes: https://www.ripe.net/about-us/executive-board/minutes/2020/minutes-134th-ex… With this resolution, the principles of the RIPE Mailing List/RIPE Forum Code of Conduct will be applied to the members-discuss list. Emails that do not meet the requirements of that code of conduct will not be approved to be posted to the list. Mails that do not meet the intended purpose of providing members with a means to discuss membership issues among themselves will also not be approved to be posted to the list. The moderators of the list will be the Executive Board Secretary and one senior member of RIPE NCC staff. Mails will be moderated during office hours. A separate archive of all mails including those rejected by the moderators is available for all members to view should they wish to do so: https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/members-discuss-unmoderated/ The Board is obviously aware that there is an election taking place at the General Meeting and there are also matters of importance to discuss such as the RIPE NCC Financial Report 2019 and the RIPE NCC Charging Scheme 2021. We are determined to ensure that we remain neutral in facilitating this membership discussion list, and we also hope that members will abide by the purpose of the list and the principles of the code of conduct. Regards, Piotr Strzyżewski RIPE NCC Executive Board Secretary

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Technical solution to resolve ELAD-19 related spam and harassment in mailboxes
by Dominic Schallert 01 May '20

01 May '20

Dear community, today I want to present you with our technical solution to prevent ELAD-19 related spam and harassment from flooding inboxes. This technical solution is minimal invasive and can be implemented on all mail servers running spamassassin with ease. Please find the following spamassassin header and body rules below: header SC_HEADER_100 From =~ /Elad Cohen/ describe SC_HEADER_100 ELAD-19 Campagin score SC_HEADER_100 100 header SC_HEADER_101 From =~ /elad\(a)netstyle.io/ describe SC_HEADER_101 ELAD-19 Campagin score SC_HEADER_101 100 body SC_BODY_102 /Elad Cohen/i describe SC_BODY_102 ELAD-19 Campagin score SC_BODY_102 100 While I really appreciate encouraged people coming up with innovative ideas and proposals within the network operators community, this particular discussion including repeated harassment against members of the community - from my personal point of view - is just not the culture we should establish within this community. Please note that the solution presented above is just our new way of dealing with this matter, it’s neither a proposal nor a recommendation for others. All the best and wish you a happy (and hopefully spam free) weekend!

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Re: [members-discuss] Elad / His Ideas ?
by Ali Vargonen 01 May '20

01 May '20

* Sorry to take anyone's valuable time, but I think this is necessary. Hello Elad, Please read my email carefully I would be very happy if you can answer my questions, this way it would be much clear for everyone in the list to understand, what you are trying to achieve. 1) VERY Important, I am not attacking you. I am going to ask questions to learn more about your idea and yourself. 2) I don't support any candidate so I am not voting for anyone else or you. So; don't tell me that I will support someone else, thus I am asking you questions. 3) I don't have a hidden agenda about IP V4 or V6, and I personally don't sell them. Let's start with questions; I will share your answers with my friends who work in the network field. We have a small group of 40 people and our total experince in routing is 650 years. - You have an idea, OK. 1) Did you make any research about to implement your idea, in regards to economics, and adaptation rates around the globe? 2) Do you personally or worked with a team of people who designed the chips on the routers or the software runs on them, I want to learn this very much, maybe you have designed a software which we don't know, that is running currently and you want to improve it. 3) Do you personally own or work with a team of people who have patents for the current protocols including the ones you mention and try to improve? 4) Do you have a team to implement your idea work together, if yes please share their names with details on a website, so we could understand how good you structure your team to make your ideas true? 5) Do you or your "maybe" existing team know how routers work, if you wish we can choose cisco, juniper, extreme, brocade anything you wish, I want to learn did you studied about their current working software setup dealing with BGP and how they manage the traffic and do you have a blueprint of the changes that you want to be implemented in regards to packet processing and cam/fib tables? 6) Did you contact any vendor about your idea before implementing your changes to their equipment via hardware or software solution? 7) If you contacted them what kind of replies did you get? ( You tell us nobody understands your idea, maybe they understand, so I want to learn) or did they attack you also? 8) Did you ever worked in a network ecosystem with more than 5+ BGP peers and also 100G + network traffic before, if yes could you please explain me how does your idea fit with the ack of the source in this amount of traffic, you can calculate the number of packets per seconds yourself if you know. 9) How do you plan to run the backend do you have any kind of blueprint, design or project about that, let us see that also? It can be just your notes, can you give an URL that we can read about it? 10) Do you have a working model of this "idea" in any kind of test lab you have or rented that works on software-based routing devices? Virtual Routers? What are the results you get there? Any information on this? I am asking all these questions to you to learn more about you and your project. My notes for you; - You don't need to be a ripe chair if you want to change the world in regards to networking to a better place, you don't need titles Elad, you just need really good ideas that people respect and which you could provide with more detailed information. - Also please don't tell everyone is attacking you, if you think they are, why you are saying this" they are attacking me because of"; instead fight with your ideas, bright thoughts, what you bring on the table? But also please don't forget that, as a leader or a chair, whatever you call, you must; - Respect people, if they agree or disagree with you; - Listen and understand why they are reacting to you that way; - Always try to be co-operative, and you may answer them like this, "I respect your answer but we don't agree on this topic." This is better than writing "They are attacking me 100x times" If you want to be successful in your campaign, you must not do it over member's forum, you can lunch a website, do it over twitter, create a blog, or what you think fits you; fill it with content, and share as much as possible information. Please let us know you and your ideas more. If we have questions about it we could ask it over there, don't take people's valuable time with these arguments. Respecting your community must be your rule number one if you plan to lead them. Don't worry, If people have an interest in your ideas they will contact you. As I told you while starting this email, I am not attacking you, just trying to know more about yourself and your idea. IF; You answer this email with; 1) You are attacking me. 2) I don't have to provide any detailed information about my idea. 3) I don't have to respect anyone and will just answer like before. 4) I don't need to explain anything you will see how I achive them when I am the chair of RIPE. Sorry, but as lots of people do I will choose not to answer you back again. Please think 2-3 times and then answer. Show us that why we must vote for you because of your intelligence, personality, interpersonal skills, leadership and also way you communicate with your community? Regards, Ali.

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Mailing List Purpose and Request for Consideration
by Piotr Strzyżewski 01 May '20

01 May '20

Dear all, I would like to remind you of the purpose of this list. It is to allow members to discuss matters of importance relating to their membership of the RIPE NCC. All other topics should be considered not relevant for this list. The Board is always pleased to see good discussion on the list, and we realise this can become heated at times. However, thousands of members are subscribed to the list and receive these emails. Therefore, I ask you to be considerate of your fellow members in terms of both content and frequency of mails. For those who wish to unsubscribe, please read the information available at: https://www.ripe.net/participate/member-support/membership-mailing-lists/su… Kind regards, Piotr Strzyżewski RIPE NCC Executive Board Secretary

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Good to know
by ivaylo 01 May '20

01 May '20

Hello, Even all of us to seeing this discussion as spam. I think it is useful and all candidates for election must write their ideas and point of views too. Now I can clearly make my judgment if to give my vote for mr Elad Khoen or not. PS: The spamming come from all who try to respond to these technical ideas. So please stop ! Just read make your mind and lets hear the others candidates.

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Re: [members-discuss] Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs
by Melchior Aelmans 01 May '20

01 May '20

LOL On Fri, May 1, 2020 at 1:08 AM Thilo <inbox(a)tmo.sh> wrote: > IAB is also having open chair positions if this is something out of > interest. > > Am Fr., 1. Mai 2020 um 00:53 Uhr schrieb Melchior Aelmans < > melchior(a)aelmans.eu>: > >> As this idea is talking about BGP implementations I think this would >> belong in the IDR WG in IETF? >> >> On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 10:32 PM Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io> wrote: >> >>> Hello Ripe Members! >>> >>> I will share the following solution in the near General Meeting and I'm >>> interested to share the following technical solution with you as well, it >>> will completely resolve: Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS >>> attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking. And will dramatically lower: IoT botnet >>> infections and Botnet C&Cs. >>> >>> By a single update to any BGP router, not any router needs to be >>> updated, only active BGP routers. If I will have the honor of being elected >>> to the Ripe Board I will harness all the power of Ripe and all of the 5 >>> RIR's and all of the LIR's in the 5 RIR's so routing manufacturing >>> companies will implement the below processes and methods with a single >>> firmware update to their BGP routers. >>> >>> I'm asking for your support in electing me so I will be able to enter >>> the Ripe Board and then I will be able to make everything which is written >>> in this post to come true. >>> >>> >>> Regarding the bgp-anycasted infrastructure written below, ICANN is >>> written but the global bgp-anycasted infrastructure can be managed by the 5 >>> RIR's and/or by the ccTLDs registries (my main point is that who will >>> operate the bgp-anycasted infrastructure is not important for now, as long >>> as it will be an agreed authoritative non-governmental non-commercial >>> global entity/ies) >>> >>> With new tracking protocol over ip, routers will be able to confirm that >>> source ip came from the network of the announcing ASN, and hence spoofed >>> amplification DDoS attacks will be completely annihilated. >>> >>> >>> The Process: >>> >>> At the source BGP router, for any ip packet with a source address that >>> is from the network of the source BGP router (lets call it original ip >>> packet) - the source BGP router will create a new ip packet (lets call it >>> tracking ip packet) with a new transport layer protocol and with the same >>> source address and with the same destination address and with the same >>> IP-ID such as the original ip packet. >>> >>> In the new tracking ip packet there will be a new transport layer >>> protocol (tracking protocol) with the following fields: >>> AS number of source BGP router in clear text >>> AS number of source BGP router encrypted with the private key of the >>> source BGP router >>> >>> The destination BGP router (a BGP router that the destination address is >>> in its network) whenever it receive a 'tracking ip packet' will check if >>> its have the internal boolean 'Check tracking flag' in it - 'on' or 'off': >>> If 'off' then the destination BGP router will drop that 'tracking ip >>> packet' >>> >>> If 'on' then the destination BGP router will decrypt the 'encrypted AS >>> number' with the public key of the specific AS number >>> and after decryption the AS number need to be the result: >>> if not then to drop the tracking ip packet and the original ip packet >>> related to it >>> if yes then to drop the tracking ip packet and to forward the related >>> original ip packet to destination but only if the source address is >>> originated from the specific ASN (according to the local ASNs+ranges table >>> in the BGP router, such table will be received from ICANN) >>> >>> >>> If the 'Check tracking flag' is set to 'on' then any original ip packet >>> that arrive to the destination BGP router will wait for the related >>> tracking ip packet (in case the related tracking ip packet didn't already >>> arrived to the destination BGP router). The destination BGP router will >>> manage such waiting for X number of seconds. >>> >>> The destination BGP router will match between a tracking ip packet and >>> an original ip packet - based on their source address and their destination >>> address and their IP-ID which will all be identical. >>> >>> >>> >>> More Aspects: >>> >>> - The end-devices will not need to be updated, any router will not need >>> to be updated, only all the BGP routers will need to be updated. >>> - Any BGP router in the routing path, which the original ip packet and >>> the tracking ip packet are not destined to an ip address in its own network >>> - will not check the content of the tracking ip packet and will forward >>> both the tracking ip packet and the original ip packet as they are. >>> - Each BGP router will have all the public keys (of all the ASN's) >>> locally. >>> - Each BGP router will have a full list of all the ASN's and all the >>> route objects ranges which are related to them locally. >>> >>> >>> >>> How BGP routers will receive all the ranges in all the route objects of >>> all the ASNs (in the 5 RIRs) and all the public keys of all the ASNs (for >>> decrypting the encrypted strings in 'tracking ip packets'): >>> >>> - Each BGP router will create a tcp session with ICANN backend >>> infrastructure (the backend infrastructure of ICANN will use BGP anycast >>> and will be available from many locations worldwide with automatic syncing) >>> - At this stage there will be a handshake process between the BGP router >>> and the ICANN backend infrastructure in order for ICANN to know the correct >>> ASN which is operating the BGP router - the BGP router will send its ASN in >>> cleartext and also its ASN encrypted with its >>> ICANN-communication-private-key , ICANN will know the related public key >>> for the specific ASN from the specific ASN object in the RIR (the public >>> key for communication with ICANN will be displayed there) - after >>> decryption ICANN will compare the decrypted string to the AS Number for >>> successful authentication. >>> - After successful authentication, all the communication will be >>> encrypted, ICANN will notify the BGP router about its public key and ICANN >>> will use the public key of the ASN for the communication with ICANN - from >>> the ASN object in the RIR. >>> - The BGP router will send over the session its public key to be used by >>> other BGP routers in order to decrypt the encrypted string in the tracking >>> ip packets that it will originate (that private key and public key will be >>> managed in the BGP router GUI or CLI). >>> - ICANN will notify all the other BGP routers through the sessions with >>> them about a newly updated such public key of any other BGP router. >>> - ICANN will also receive in real-time any route object >>> creation/modification/deletion notification from any of the 5 RIRs and will >>> then update all the BGP routers through all of their sessions. >>> >>> - In case a BGP router doesn't have an active session to ICANN backend >>> infrastructure (for any reason, might be due to networking issue) - then >>> temporarily the internal 'Check tracking flag' of it will be set to 'off'. >>> After the session with ICANN backend infrastructure will be re-established >>> and the BGP router will receive all the meantime updates - the boolean >>> value of 'Check internal flag' will return to initial state. >>> - Any update from ICANN backend infrastructure to a BGP router (such as >>> a public key of another BGP router, or a routing object update) - will be >>> confirmed that the update was received well by the BGP router side. >>> >>> >>> >>> 'Check tracking flag' in BGP Routers: >>> >>> - BGP routers, in their GUI and CLI interfaces - will not allow the >>> end-user to set the boolean value of 'Check tracking flag', in order to >>> avoid misconfiguration. >>> - The ICANN backend infrastructure through the session with the BGP >>> router - will be able to set the boolean value of the 'Check tracking flag'. >>> - The reason for it, is that if 'Check tracking flag' will be set on >>> some destination BGP routers while some other source BGP routers weren't >>> upgraded yet (and will not send the 'tracking ip packet' due to it) - then >>> 'tracking ip packet' will never reach the destination BGP router and the >>> internet will break. >>> - Central setting of 'Check tracking flag' through ICANN backend >>> infrastructure - will allow ICANN to inform all the BGP routers at once to >>> switch 'on' the 'Check tracking flag' >>> - ICANN, in the session to any BGP router, will also receive the >>> percentage of ip packets that were destained to that BGP router network - >>> that also had ip tracking packets, in this way ICANN will know when all the >>> BGP routers were properly globally updated and when it is time to enable >>> the 'Check tracking flag' in all the BGP routers. >>> - ICANN will know if all the BGP routers in the world were upgraded >>> based on keeping the full BGP table and comparing it to all the BGP routers >>> that did and that did not open a session to ICANN backend infrastructure. >>> >>> >>> >>> Automatic preventation of IoT botnet infections: >>> >>> - IoT botnets are based on default credentials, if we can block default >>> credentials of IoT devices then these kind of botnets (such as >>> Mirai-variants and similar) will stop to have an impact in the internet. >>> - The data field in an ip packet - will always be the same for an access >>> attempt to a IoT device with default credentials - hence these kind of "IP >>> protocol data fingerprints" which are related to specific "IP protocol >>> numbers" will be provided by ICANN backend infrastructure to each BGP >>> router through the opened session with it. >>> - There are two issues with matching incoming ip packets to the "locally >>> stored IP protocol data fingerprints" - the first one is that ip packets >>> can be sent by fragments (so not all the data field will be sent at once in >>> order to be able to be compared with the locally stored data fingerprints) >>> and the second is that usernames (or url's) or any other textual data in >>> the incoming ip packet data field can be in uppercase or in lowercase. In >>> order to overcome the possibility of the existence of a single data >>> fingerprint in multiple incoming ip packet fragments - then in case the BGP >>> router is recognizing the incoming fragmented ip packet data value as part >>> of an existing fingerprint data in its local database then it will keep >>> track of the arrival ip packet fragments based on their specific IP-ID >>> identifier and the BGP router will not forward the last ip packet fragment >>> if the last ip packet fragment will cause all the related ip packet >>> fragments to match a specific ip fingerprint data (last ip packet doesn't >>> have to be the last fragmented part but it is the last ip packet that >>> arrived with that IP-ID identifier, so the BGP router will keep track of >>> the specific fragmented IP packets that arrived and their indexes in order >>> to know when the last one of them arrived). Regarding the second issue - >>> the stored data fingerprints in the local BGP router will be stored in a >>> way that some bytes of them (in specific indexes) will not be compared and >>> in case all the other bytes will match - then the bytes in these indexes - >>> will first be lowered case - and only then comparison will be made to the >>> specific indexed bytes in the specific ip packet data fingerprint. >>> - In case a IoT device behind a BGP router will be infected somehow (for >>> example when a specific fingerprint data with default credentials for a >>> specific device wasn't updated yet through ICANN backend infrastructure), >>> it will be able to infect all the other IoT devices in the local network >>> when the connectivity to them is not through the BGP router, that kind of >>> impact will be much much lower than infected IoT device which can infect >>> any other IoT device in the internet and then massive botnets in the >>> internet are created which are being used for DDoS. >>> >>> >>> >>> Automatic prevention of botnet C&C ip addresses: >>> >>> - Botnets C&C are also a problem in the internet. >>> - This problem can be overcome using the following technical addition: >>> the 5 RIR's will operate end-users honeypots machines all over the world >>> (it will be implemented by a single physical machine in each location, for >>> example in each datacenter and in each major ISP, each single physical >>> machine will emulate a virtual router and virtual VM's, the virtual VM's >>> will emulate many different kinds of 'real world machines', any kind of >>> automatic updating (in the operating system configurations) will be >>> disabled, these honeypots machines are not intended to make any outgoing >>> connection, the virtual routers will monitor if any outgoing connection is >>> made and if yes then it is to a botnet C&C, the virtual router will update >>> the ICANN backend infrastructure regarding it and the ICANN backend >>> infrastructure will update all the BGP routers (in their open sessions) >>> regarding it to completely block any communication to that botnet C&C ip >>> address. There will be a web-based system and only the related Law >>> Enforcement Agency of that C&C ip address region - will be able to remove >>> that C&C ip address from being blocked after their manual check. >>> - Honeypot machines will be deployed using 'templates' - these templates >>> must be signed and not anyone can create them, they should be created and >>> signed by an agreed Law Enforcement Agency such as Interpol in order to >>> make sure that these templates are by-design not making any outgoing >>> connection. The templates will be deployed in an automatic way (major ISP's >>> and datacenters will be able to easily add a 'physical honeypot' server in >>> their network, that will be shipped to them), the re-initiation of a >>> compromised 'virtual machine' that made an outgoing connection - will also >>> be automatic through the system in the physical server. >>> >>> >>> Respectfully, >>> Elad >>> >>> _______________________________________________ >>> members-discuss mailing list >>> members-discuss(a)ripe.net >>> https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss >>> Unsubscribe: >>> https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/ripe-members-discuss… >>> >> _______________________________________________ >> members-discuss mailing list >> members-discuss(a)ripe.net >> https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss >> Unsubscribe: >> https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/ripe%40tmo.sh >> >

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Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs
by Elad Cohen 01 May '20

01 May '20

Hello Ripe Members! I will share the following solution in the near General Meeting and I'm interested to share the following technical solution with you as well, it will completely resolve: Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking. And will dramatically lower: IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs. By a single update to any BGP router, not any router needs to be updated, only active BGP routers. If I will have the honor of being elected to the Ripe Board I will harness all the power of Ripe and all of the 5 RIR's and all of the LIR's in the 5 RIR's so routing manufacturing companies will implement the below processes and methods with a single firmware update to their BGP routers. I'm asking for your support in electing me so I will be able to enter the Ripe Board and then I will be able to make everything which is written in this post to come true. Regarding the bgp-anycasted infrastructure written below, ICANN is written but the global bgp-anycasted infrastructure can be managed by the 5 RIR's and/or by the ccTLDs registries (my main point is that who will operate the bgp-anycasted infrastructure is not important for now, as long as it will be an agreed authoritative non-governmental non-commercial global entity/ies) With new tracking protocol over ip, routers will be able to confirm that source ip came from the network of the announcing ASN, and hence spoofed amplification DDoS attacks will be completely annihilated. The Process: At the source BGP router, for any ip packet with a source address that is from the network of the source BGP router (lets call it original ip packet) - the source BGP router will create a new ip packet (lets call it tracking ip packet) with a new transport layer protocol and with the same source address and with the same destination address and with the same IP-ID such as the original ip packet. In the new tracking ip packet there will be a new transport layer protocol (tracking protocol) with the following fields: AS number of source BGP router in clear text AS number of source BGP router encrypted with the private key of the source BGP router The destination BGP router (a BGP router that the destination address is in its network) whenever it receive a 'tracking ip packet' will check if its have the internal boolean 'Check tracking flag' in it - 'on' or 'off': If 'off' then the destination BGP router will drop that 'tracking ip packet' If 'on' then the destination BGP router will decrypt the 'encrypted AS number' with the public key of the specific AS number and after decryption the AS number need to be the result: if not then to drop the tracking ip packet and the original ip packet related to it if yes then to drop the tracking ip packet and to forward the related original ip packet to destination but only if the source address is originated from the specific ASN (according to the local ASNs+ranges table in the BGP router, such table will be received from ICANN) If the 'Check tracking flag' is set to 'on' then any original ip packet that arrive to the destination BGP router will wait for the related tracking ip packet (in case the related tracking ip packet didn't already arrived to the destination BGP router). The destination BGP router will manage such waiting for X number of seconds. The destination BGP router will match between a tracking ip packet and an original ip packet - based on their source address and their destination address and their IP-ID which will all be identical. More Aspects: - The end-devices will not need to be updated, any router will not need to be updated, only all the BGP routers will need to be updated. - Any BGP router in the routing path, which the original ip packet and the tracking ip packet are not destined to an ip address in its own network - will not check the content of the tracking ip packet and will forward both the tracking ip packet and the original ip packet as they are. - Each BGP router will have all the public keys (of all the ASN's) locally. - Each BGP router will have a full list of all the ASN's and all the route objects ranges which are related to them locally. How BGP routers will receive all the ranges in all the route objects of all the ASNs (in the 5 RIRs) and all the public keys of all the ASNs (for decrypting the encrypted strings in 'tracking ip packets'): - Each BGP router will create a tcp session with ICANN backend infrastructure (the backend infrastructure of ICANN will use BGP anycast and will be available from many locations worldwide with automatic syncing) - At this stage there will be a handshake process between the BGP router and the ICANN backend infrastructure in order for ICANN to know the correct ASN which is operating the BGP router - the BGP router will send its ASN in cleartext and also its ASN encrypted with its ICANN-communication-private-key , ICANN will know the related public key for the specific ASN from the specific ASN object in the RIR (the public key for communication with ICANN will be displayed there) - after decryption ICANN will compare the decrypted string to the AS Number for successful authentication. - After successful authentication, all the communication will be encrypted, ICANN will notify the BGP router about its public key and ICANN will use the public key of the ASN for the communication with ICANN - from the ASN object in the RIR. - The BGP router will send over the session its public key to be used by other BGP routers in order to decrypt the encrypted string in the tracking ip packets that it will originate (that private key and public key will be managed in the BGP router GUI or CLI). - ICANN will notify all the other BGP routers through the sessions with them about a newly updated such public key of any other BGP router. - ICANN will also receive in real-time any route object creation/modification/deletion notification from any of the 5 RIRs and will then update all the BGP routers through all of their sessions. - In case a BGP router doesn't have an active session to ICANN backend infrastructure (for any reason, might be due to networking issue) - then temporarily the internal 'Check tracking flag' of it will be set to 'off'. After the session with ICANN backend infrastructure will be re-established and the BGP router will receive all the meantime updates - the boolean value of 'Check internal flag' will return to initial state. - Any update from ICANN backend infrastructure to a BGP router (such as a public key of another BGP router, or a routing object update) - will be confirmed that the update was received well by the BGP router side. 'Check tracking flag' in BGP Routers: - BGP routers, in their GUI and CLI interfaces - will not allow the end-user to set the boolean value of 'Check tracking flag', in order to avoid misconfiguration. - The ICANN backend infrastructure through the session with the BGP router - will be able to set the boolean value of the 'Check tracking flag'. - The reason for it, is that if 'Check tracking flag' will be set on some destination BGP routers while some other source BGP routers weren't upgraded yet (and will not send the 'tracking ip packet' due to it) - then 'tracking ip packet' will never reach the destination BGP router and the internet will break. - Central setting of 'Check tracking flag' through ICANN backend infrastructure - will allow ICANN to inform all the BGP routers at once to switch 'on' the 'Check tracking flag' - ICANN, in the session to any BGP router, will also receive the percentage of ip packets that were destained to that BGP router network - that also had ip tracking packets, in this way ICANN will know when all the BGP routers were properly globally updated and when it is time to enable the 'Check tracking flag' in all the BGP routers. - ICANN will know if all the BGP routers in the world were upgraded based on keeping the full BGP table and comparing it to all the BGP routers that did and that did not open a session to ICANN backend infrastructure. Automatic preventation of IoT botnet infections: - IoT botnets are based on default credentials, if we can block default credentials of IoT devices then these kind of botnets (such as Mirai-variants and similar) will stop to have an impact in the internet. - The data field in an ip packet - will always be the same for an access attempt to a IoT device with default credentials - hence these kind of "IP protocol data fingerprints" which are related to specific "IP protocol numbers" will be provided by ICANN backend infrastructure to each BGP router through the opened session with it. - There are two issues with matching incoming ip packets to the "locally stored IP protocol data fingerprints" - the first one is that ip packets can be sent by fragments (so not all the data field will be sent at once in order to be able to be compared with the locally stored data fingerprints) and the second is that usernames (or url's) or any other textual data in the incoming ip packet data field can be in uppercase or in lowercase. In order to overcome the possibility of the existence of a single data fingerprint in multiple incoming ip packet fragments - then in case the BGP router is recognizing the incoming fragmented ip packet data value as part of an existing fingerprint data in its local database then it will keep track of the arrival ip packet fragments based on their specific IP-ID identifier and the BGP router will not forward the last ip packet fragment if the last ip packet fragment will cause all the related ip packet fragments to match a specific ip fingerprint data (last ip packet doesn't have to be the last fragmented part but it is the last ip packet that arrived with that IP-ID identifier, so the BGP router will keep track of the specific fragmented IP packets that arrived and their indexes in order to know when the last one of them arrived). Regarding the second issue - the stored data fingerprints in the local BGP router will be stored in a way that some bytes of them (in specific indexes) will not be compared and in case all the other bytes will match - then the bytes in these indexes - will first be lowered case - and only then comparison will be made to the specific indexed bytes in the specific ip packet data fingerprint. - In case a IoT device behind a BGP router will be infected somehow (for example when a specific fingerprint data with default credentials for a specific device wasn't updated yet through ICANN backend infrastructure), it will be able to infect all the other IoT devices in the local network when the connectivity to them is not through the BGP router, that kind of impact will be much much lower than infected IoT device which can infect any other IoT device in the internet and then massive botnets in the internet are created which are being used for DDoS. Automatic prevention of botnet C&C ip addresses: - Botnets C&C are also a problem in the internet. - This problem can be overcome using the following technical addition: the 5 RIR's will operate end-users honeypots machines all over the world (it will be implemented by a single physical machine in each location, for example in each datacenter and in each major ISP, each single physical machine will emulate a virtual router and virtual VM's, the virtual VM's will emulate many different kinds of 'real world machines', any kind of automatic updating (in the operating system configurations) will be disabled, these honeypots machines are not intended to make any outgoing connection, the virtual routers will monitor if any outgoing connection is made and if yes then it is to a botnet C&C, the virtual router will update the ICANN backend infrastructure regarding it and the ICANN backend infrastructure will update all the BGP routers (in their open sessions) regarding it to completely block any communication to that botnet C&C ip address. There will be a web-based system and only the related Law Enforcement Agency of that C&C ip address region - will be able to remove that C&C ip address from being blocked after their manual check. - Honeypot machines will be deployed using 'templates' - these templates must be signed and not anyone can create them, they should be created and signed by an agreed Law Enforcement Agency such as Interpol in order to make sure that these templates are by-design not making any outgoing connection. The templates will be deployed in an automatic way (major ISP's and datacenters will be able to easily add a 'physical honeypot' server in their network, that will be shipped to them), the re-initiation of a compromised 'virtual machine' that made an outgoing connection - will also be automatic through the system in the physical server. Respectfully, Elad

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Re: [members-discuss] [SPAM] Re: Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs
by Elad Cohen 01 May '20

01 May '20

I agree with you, let us all keep with the ddos attacks and not resolve them. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: info(a)cowmedia.de Sent: Friday, May 01, 2020 12:27 AM To: Elad Cohen; 'Stuart Willet (primary)'; members-discuss(a)ripe.net Subject: AW: [SPAM] Re: [members-discuss] Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs Elad, 1st: Again a „technical“ idea from your side that is not thought trough to the end. 2nd: If you will be elected (what i don’t think because of you annoying mostly everyone here) you don’t have the power to do what you expect. Still you need to convince other and still you need to create an RfC an so on, you are not able to convince other because you are rude and don’t accept others oppinions 3rd: because you are rude you also do not have any requirements for the election and we should suggest RIPE to remove you from the list because of missing soft skills 4th: You wrote „bgp routers need to wait for X-number of seconds“. Have you ever thought about what that means with 100 gbit/s devices? 5th: In addition again for mostly every packet you will ask a central service (that again communicates wich means packets are doubled, which result in overflooding of the network. 6th: i don’t want to read any word from you here personally because it just annoyes me. Michael Stenz Von: members-discuss <members-discuss-bounces(a)ripe.net> Im Auftrag von Elad Cohen Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. April 2020 22:59 An: Stuart Willet (primary) <stu(a)safehosts.co.uk>; members-discuss(a)ripe.net Betreff: [SPAM] Re: [members-discuss] Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs Stuart, The costs will be much much lower than the impacts of the following: Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs If you prefer to stay with all the above ok lets stay with it all. If I will be elected you can be sure that I will do everything in my power to implement my solution that will resolve for all of it for all internet users. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: Stuart Willet (primary) <stu(a)safehosts.co.uk<mailto:stu@safehosts.co.uk>> Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 11:54 PM To: Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io<mailto:elad@netstyle.io>>; members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> <members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net>> Subject: RE: Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs Elad, Please show me the costing for your solution. In short, how much will it cost to update every piece of hardware and software used in BGP sessions. How will you update all the END OF LIFE hardware and software? Stuart Willet. From: Elad Cohen [mailto:elad@netstyle.io] Sent: 30 April 2020 21:50 To: Stuart Willet (primary) <stu(a)safehosts.co.uk<mailto:stu@safehosts.co.uk>>; members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> Subject: Re: Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs Stuart, Not anyone can afford DDoS mitigation service and many in the Internet don't have such service including in the Ripe region, and even for the ones that are paying for expensive DDoS mitigation service - DDoS attacks are using internet traffic, are using electrical power, interfering to access services, generating crime. If I will have the honor of being elected then I will implement it all for the best of everyone including negative members like you. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: Stuart Willet (primary) <stu(a)safehosts.co.uk<mailto:stu@safehosts.co.uk>> Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 11:44 PM To: Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io<mailto:elad@netstyle.io>>; members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> <members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net>> Subject: RE: Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs Elad, I have not attacked you, just pointing out the incredibly impossible task you wish to be undertaken. As for costs, we currently use a DDoS mitigation service. Your solution is not feasible, full stop. Respectfully, Stuart Willet. From: Elad Cohen [mailto:elad@netstyle.io] Sent: 30 April 2020 21:42 To: Stuart Willet (primary) <stu(a)safehosts.co.uk<mailto:stu@safehosts.co.uk>>; members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> Subject: Re: Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs Stuart, You are willing to sacrifice the good of the community for a personal attack against me. Regarding what you wrote: do you know how many compute time is wasted for all the current DDoS attacks that this solution will not resolve ? do you know how many costs involved for organizations and companies which are under DDoS attacks ? when you compare the current to the state of this solution then this solution is by far better than the current state. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: Stuart Willet (primary) <stu(a)safehosts.co.uk<mailto:stu@safehosts.co.uk>> Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 11:39 PM To: Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io<mailto:elad@netstyle.io>>; members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> <members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net>> Subject: RE: Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs In fairness, I couldn’t even be bothered reading further than the worlds BGP routers needing a firmware update to DOUBLE packet count whilst adding compute time at an individual packet level. Another idea, slightly marred by the unfathomable costs involved, along with its logistic impossibility. /me sits back and grabs the popcorn….. From: members-discuss [mailto:members-discuss-bounces@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Elad Cohen Sent: 30 April 2020 21:31 To: members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> Subject: [members-discuss] Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs Hello Ripe Members! I will share the following solution in the near General Meeting and I'm interested to share the following technical solution with you as well, it will completely resolve: Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking. And will dramatically lower: IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs. By a single update to any BGP router, not any router needs to be updated, only active BGP routers. If I will have the honor of being elected to the Ripe Board I will harness all the power of Ripe and all of the 5 RIR's and all of the LIR's in the 5 RIR's so routing manufacturing companies will implement the below processes and methods with a single firmware update to their BGP routers. I'm asking for your support in electing me so I will be able to enter the Ripe Board and then I will be able to make everything which is written in this post to come true. Regarding the bgp-anycasted infrastructure written below, ICANN is written but the global bgp-anycasted infrastructure can be managed by the 5 RIR's and/or by the ccTLDs registries (my main point is that who will operate the bgp-anycasted infrastructure is not important for now, as long as it will be an agreed authoritative non-governmental non-commercial global entity/ies) With new tracking protocol over ip, routers will be able to confirm that source ip came from the network of the announcing ASN, and hence spoofed amplification DDoS attacks will be completely annihilated. The Process: At the source BGP router, for any ip packet with a source address that is from the network of the source BGP router (lets call it original ip packet) - the source BGP router will create a new ip packet (lets call it tracking ip packet) with a new transport layer protocol and with the same source address and with the same destination address and with the same IP-ID such as the original ip packet. In the new tracking ip packet there will be a new transport layer protocol (tracking protocol) with the following fields: AS number of source BGP router in clear text AS number of source BGP router encrypted with the private key of the source BGP router The destination BGP router (a BGP router that the destination address is in its network) whenever it receive a 'tracking ip packet' will check if its have the internal boolean 'Check tracking flag' in it - 'on' or 'off': If 'off' then the destination BGP router will drop that 'tracking ip packet' If 'on' then the destination BGP router will decrypt the 'encrypted AS number' with the public key of the specific AS number and after decryption the AS number need to be the result: if not then to drop the tracking ip packet and the original ip packet related to it if yes then to drop the tracking ip packet and to forward the related original ip packet to destination but only if the source address is originated from the specific ASN (according to the local ASNs+ranges table in the BGP router, such table will be received from ICANN) If the 'Check tracking flag' is set to 'on' then any original ip packet that arrive to the destination BGP router will wait for the related tracking ip packet (in case the related tracking ip packet didn't already arrived to the destination BGP router). The destination BGP router will manage such waiting for X number of seconds. The destination BGP router will match between a tracking ip packet and an original ip packet - based on their source address and their destination address and their IP-ID which will all be identical. More Aspects: - The end-devices will not need to be updated, any router will not need to be updated, only all the BGP routers will need to be updated. - Any BGP router in the routing path, which the original ip packet and the tracking ip packet are not destined to an ip address in its own network - will not check the content of the tracking ip packet and will forward both the tracking ip packet and the original ip packet as they are. - Each BGP router will have all the public keys (of all the ASN's) locally. - Each BGP router will have a full list of all the ASN's and all the route objects ranges which are related to them locally. How BGP routers will receive all the ranges in all the route objects of all the ASNs (in the 5 RIRs) and all the public keys of all the ASNs (for decrypting the encrypted strings in 'tracking ip packets'): - Each BGP router will create a tcp session with ICANN backend infrastructure (the backend infrastructure of ICANN will use BGP anycast and will be available from many locations worldwide with automatic syncing) - At this stage there will be a handshake process between the BGP router and the ICANN backend infrastructure in order for ICANN to know the correct ASN which is operating the BGP router - the BGP router will send its ASN in cleartext and also its ASN encrypted with its ICANN-communication-private-key , ICANN will know the related public key for the specific ASN from the specific ASN object in the RIR (the public key for communication with ICANN will be displayed there) - after decryption ICANN will compare the decrypted string to the AS Number for successful authentication. - After successful authentication, all the communication will be encrypted, ICANN will notify the BGP router about its public key and ICANN will use the public key of the ASN for the communication with ICANN - from the ASN object in the RIR. - The BGP router will send over the session its public key to be used by other BGP routers in order to decrypt the encrypted string in the tracking ip packets that it will originate (that private key and public key will be managed in the BGP router GUI or CLI). - ICANN will notify all the other BGP routers through the sessions with them about a newly updated such public key of any other BGP router. - ICANN will also receive in real-time any route object creation/modification/deletion notification from any of the 5 RIRs and will then update all the BGP routers through all of their sessions. - In case a BGP router doesn't have an active session to ICANN backend infrastructure (for any reason, might be due to networking issue) - then temporarily the internal 'Check tracking flag' of it will be set to 'off'. After the session with ICANN backend infrastructure will be re-established and the BGP router will receive all the meantime updates - the boolean value of 'Check internal flag' will return to initial state. - Any update from ICANN backend infrastructure to a BGP router (such as a public key of another BGP router, or a routing object update) - will be confirmed that the update was received well by the BGP router side. 'Check tracking flag' in BGP Routers: - BGP routers, in their GUI and CLI interfaces - will not allow the end-user to set the boolean value of 'Check tracking flag', in order to avoid misconfiguration. - The ICANN backend infrastructure through the session with the BGP router - will be able to set the boolean value of the 'Check tracking flag'. - The reason for it, is that if 'Check tracking flag' will be set on some destination BGP routers while some other source BGP routers weren't upgraded yet (and will not send the 'tracking ip packet' due to it) - then 'tracking ip packet' will never reach the destination BGP router and the internet will break. - Central setting of 'Check tracking flag' through ICANN backend infrastructure - will allow ICANN to inform all the BGP routers at once to switch 'on' the 'Check tracking flag' - ICANN, in the session to any BGP router, will also receive the percentage of ip packets that were destained to that BGP router network - that also had ip tracking packets, in this way ICANN will know when all the BGP routers were properly globally updated and when it is time to enable the 'Check tracking flag' in all the BGP routers. - ICANN will know if all the BGP routers in the world were upgraded based on keeping the full BGP table and comparing it to all the BGP routers that did and that did not open a session to ICANN backend infrastructure. Automatic preventation of IoT botnet infections: - IoT botnets are based on default credentials, if we can block default credentials of IoT devices then these kind of botnets (such as Mirai-variants and similar) will stop to have an impact in the internet. - The data field in an ip packet - will always be the same for an access attempt to a IoT device with default credentials - hence these kind of "IP protocol data fingerprints" which are related to specific "IP protocol numbers" will be provided by ICANN backend infrastructure to each BGP router through the opened session with it. - There are two issues with matching incoming ip packets to the "locally stored IP protocol data fingerprints" - the first one is that ip packets can be sent by fragments (so not all the data field will be sent at once in order to be able to be compared with the locally stored data fingerprints) and the second is that usernames (or url's) or any other textual data in the incoming ip packet data field can be in uppercase or in lowercase. In order to overcome the possibility of the existence of a single data fingerprint in multiple incoming ip packet fragments - then in case the BGP router is recognizing the incoming fragmented ip packet data value as part of an existing fingerprint data in its local database then it will keep track of the arrival ip packet fragments based on their specific IP-ID identifier and the BGP router will not forward the last ip packet fragment if the last ip packet fragment will cause all the related ip packet fragments to match a specific ip fingerprint data (last ip packet doesn't have to be the last fragmented part but it is the last ip packet that arrived with that IP-ID identifier, so the BGP router will keep track of the specific fragmented IP packets that arrived and their indexes in order to know when the last one of them arrived). Regarding the second issue - the stored data fingerprints in the local BGP router will be stored in a way that some bytes of them (in specific indexes) will not be compared and in case all the other bytes will match - then the bytes in these indexes - will first be lowered case - and only then comparison will be made to the specific indexed bytes in the specific ip packet data fingerprint. - In case a IoT device behind a BGP router will be infected somehow (for example when a specific fingerprint data with default credentials for a specific device wasn't updated yet through ICANN backend infrastructure), it will be able to infect all the other IoT devices in the local network when the connectivity to them is not through the BGP router, that kind of impact will be much much lower than infected IoT device which can infect any other IoT device in the internet and then massive botnets in the internet are created which are being used for DDoS. Automatic prevention of botnet C&C ip addresses: - Botnets C&C are also a problem in the internet. - This problem can be overcome using the following technical addition: the 5 RIR's will operate end-users honeypots machines all over the world (it will be implemented by a single physical machine in each location, for example in each datacenter and in each major ISP, each single physical machine will emulate a virtual router and virtual VM's, the virtual VM's will emulate many different kinds of 'real world machines', any kind of automatic updating (in the operating system configurations) will be disabled, these honeypots machines are not intended to make any outgoing connection, the virtual routers will monitor if any outgoing connection is made and if yes then it is to a botnet C&C, the virtual router will update the ICANN backend infrastructure regarding it and the ICANN backend infrastructure will update all the BGP routers (in their open sessions) regarding it to completely block any communication to that botnet C&C ip address. There will be a web-based system and only the related Law Enforcement Agency of that C&C ip address region - will be able to remove that C&C ip address from being blocked after their manual check. - Honeypot machines will be deployed using 'templates' - these templates must be signed and not anyone can create them, they should be created and signed by an agreed Law Enforcement Agency such as Interpol in order to make sure that these templates are by-design not making any outgoing connection. The templates will be deployed in an automatic way (major ISP's and datacenters will be able to easily add a 'physical honeypot' server in their network, that will be shipped to them), the re-initiation of a compromised 'virtual machine' that made an outgoing connection - will also be automatic through the system in the physical server. Respectfully, Elad

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Re: [members-discuss] Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs
by Elad Cohen 01 May '20

01 May '20

Gert, Let me summarize what you just wrote: "I'm so afraid and I'm a big big coward that IPv4+ will be implemented and then I will have less work with my IPv6 and the deployment of IPv6 will be slower and then the community will earn more 4,294,967,296 IPv4+ addresses but who cares because I like this state that companies must switch to IPv6 and we can overcharge them" Did I got it right ? Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: Gert Doering Sent: Friday, May 01, 2020 12:21 AM To: Elad Cohen Cc: members-discuss(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [members-discuss] Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs Hi, On Thu, Apr 30, 2020 at 08:30:48PM +0000, Elad Cohen wrote: > I'm asking for your support in electing me so I will be able to enter the Ripe Board and then I will be able to make everything which is written in this post to come true. "Vote for me, and you shall have bread and circuses - and if not, you will have to stay miserable forever!" Am I summarizing this correctly? (This approach worked brilliantly in the past, but in the long run, the roman empire fell...) Gert Doering -- NetMaster -- have you enabled IPv6 on something today...? SpaceNet AG Vorstand: Sebastian v. Bomhard, Michael Emmer Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14 Aufsichtsratsvors.: A. Grundner-Culemann D-80807 Muenchen HRB: 136055 (AG Muenchen) Tel: +49 (0)89/32356-444 USt-IdNr.: DE813185279

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Re: [members-discuss] Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs
by Elad Cohen 01 May '20

01 May '20

Both of you supporting another candidate and that is perfectly fine, you can just say it clearly. We can keep being with DDoS attacks if you wish. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: Tulp Solutions (O. Verheijen) <o.verheijen(a)tulpsolutions.com> Sent: Friday, May 1, 2020 12:27 AM To: Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io> Cc: Stuart Willet (primary) <stu(a)safehosts.co.uk>; members-discuss(a)ripe.net <members-discuss(a)ripe.net> Subject: Re: [members-discuss] Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs Elad, Please stop! There were no personal attacks, just different opinions. We clearly have a different opinion on what qualities one should have to get elected board member, but that's just fine, I don't feel attacked or offended by you. 'much much lower' is not a number, it does not work for me, especially when the only real requirement is that we should elect you first... @Stuart, is that sweet or salty popcorn you have there? Regards, Olof Op do 30 apr. 2020 om 22:59 schreef Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io<mailto:elad@netstyle.io>>: Stuart, The costs will be much much lower than the impacts of the following: Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs If you prefer to stay with all the above ok lets stay with it all. If I will be elected you can be sure that I will do everything in my power to implement my solution that will resolve for all of it for all internet users. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: Stuart Willet (primary) <stu(a)safehosts.co.uk<mailto:stu@safehosts.co.uk>> Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 11:54 PM To: Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io<mailto:elad@netstyle.io>>; members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> <members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net>> Subject: RE: Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs Elad, Please show me the costing for your solution. In short, how much will it cost to update every piece of hardware and software used in BGP sessions. How will you update all the END OF LIFE hardware and software? Stuart Willet. From: Elad Cohen [mailto:elad@netstyle.io<mailto:elad@netstyle.io>] Sent: 30 April 2020 21:50 To: Stuart Willet (primary) <stu(a)safehosts.co.uk<mailto:stu@safehosts.co.uk>>; members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> Subject: Re: Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs Stuart, Not anyone can afford DDoS mitigation service and many in the Internet don't have such service including in the Ripe region, and even for the ones that are paying for expensive DDoS mitigation service - DDoS attacks are using internet traffic, are using electrical power, interfering to access services, generating crime. If I will have the honor of being elected then I will implement it all for the best of everyone including negative members like you. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: Stuart Willet (primary) <stu(a)safehosts.co.uk<mailto:stu@safehosts.co.uk>> Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 11:44 PM To: Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io<mailto:elad@netstyle.io>>; members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> <members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net>> Subject: RE: Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs Elad, I have not attacked you, just pointing out the incredibly impossible task you wish to be undertaken. As for costs, we currently use a DDoS mitigation service. Your solution is not feasible, full stop. Respectfully, Stuart Willet. From: Elad Cohen [mailto:elad@netstyle.io] Sent: 30 April 2020 21:42 To: Stuart Willet (primary) <stu(a)safehosts.co.uk<mailto:stu@safehosts.co.uk>>; members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> Subject: Re: Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs Stuart, You are willing to sacrifice the good of the community for a personal attack against me. Regarding what you wrote: do you know how many compute time is wasted for all the current DDoS attacks that this solution will not resolve ? do you know how many costs involved for organizations and companies which are under DDoS attacks ? when you compare the current to the state of this solution then this solution is by far better than the current state. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: Stuart Willet (primary) <stu(a)safehosts.co.uk<mailto:stu@safehosts.co.uk>> Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 11:39 PM To: Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io<mailto:elad@netstyle.io>>; members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> <members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net>> Subject: RE: Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs In fairness, I couldn’t even be bothered reading further than the worlds BGP routers needing a firmware update to DOUBLE packet count whilst adding compute time at an individual packet level. Another idea, slightly marred by the unfathomable costs involved, along with its logistic impossibility. /me sits back and grabs the popcorn….. From: members-discuss [mailto:members-discuss-bounces@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Elad Cohen Sent: 30 April 2020 21:31 To: members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> Subject: [members-discuss] Technical solution to resolve Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking, IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs Hello Ripe Members! I will share the following solution in the near General Meeting and I'm interested to share the following technical solution with you as well, it will completely resolve: Spoofed IP traffic, Spoofed amplification DDoS attacks, BGP&RIR hijacking. And will dramatically lower: IoT botnet infections and Botnet C&Cs. By a single update to any BGP router, not any router needs to be updated, only active BGP routers. If I will have the honor of being elected to the Ripe Board I will harness all the power of Ripe and all of the 5 RIR's and all of the LIR's in the 5 RIR's so routing manufacturing companies will implement the below processes and methods with a single firmware update to their BGP routers. I'm asking for your support in electing me so I will be able to enter the Ripe Board and then I will be able to make everything which is written in this post to come true. Regarding the bgp-anycasted infrastructure written below, ICANN is written but the global bgp-anycasted infrastructure can be managed by the 5 RIR's and/or by the ccTLDs registries (my main point is that who will operate the bgp-anycasted infrastructure is not important for now, as long as it will be an agreed authoritative non-governmental non-commercial global entity/ies) With new tracking protocol over ip, routers will be able to confirm that source ip came from the network of the announcing ASN, and hence spoofed amplification DDoS attacks will be completely annihilated. The Process: At the source BGP router, for any ip packet with a source address that is from the network of the source BGP router (lets call it original ip packet) - the source BGP router will create a new ip packet (lets call it tracking ip packet) with a new transport layer protocol and with the same source address and with the same destination address and with the same IP-ID such as the original ip packet. In the new tracking ip packet there will be a new transport layer protocol (tracking protocol) with the following fields: AS number of source BGP router in clear text AS number of source BGP router encrypted with the private key of the source BGP router The destination BGP router (a BGP router that the destination address is in its network) whenever it receive a 'tracking ip packet' will check if its have the internal boolean 'Check tracking flag' in it - 'on' or 'off': If 'off' then the destination BGP router will drop that 'tracking ip packet' If 'on' then the destination BGP router will decrypt the 'encrypted AS number' with the public key of the specific AS number and after decryption the AS number need to be the result: if not then to drop the tracking ip packet and the original ip packet related to it if yes then to drop the tracking ip packet and to forward the related original ip packet to destination but only if the source address is originated from the specific ASN (according to the local ASNs+ranges table in the BGP router, such table will be received from ICANN) If the 'Check tracking flag' is set to 'on' then any original ip packet that arrive to the destination BGP router will wait for the related tracking ip packet (in case the related tracking ip packet didn't already arrived to the destination BGP router). The destination BGP router will manage such waiting for X number of seconds. The destination BGP router will match between a tracking ip packet and an original ip packet - based on their source address and their destination address and their IP-ID which will all be identical. More Aspects: - The end-devices will not need to be updated, any router will not need to be updated, only all the BGP routers will need to be updated. - Any BGP router in the routing path, which the original ip packet and the tracking ip packet are not destined to an ip address in its own network - will not check the content of the tracking ip packet and will forward both the tracking ip packet and the original ip packet as they are. - Each BGP router will have all the public keys (of all the ASN's) locally. - Each BGP router will have a full list of all the ASN's and all the route objects ranges which are related to them locally. How BGP routers will receive all the ranges in all the route objects of all the ASNs (in the 5 RIRs) and all the public keys of all the ASNs (for decrypting the encrypted strings in 'tracking ip packets'): - Each BGP router will create a tcp session with ICANN backend infrastructure (the backend infrastructure of ICANN will use BGP anycast and will be available from many locations worldwide with automatic syncing) - At this stage there will be a handshake process between the BGP router and the ICANN backend infrastructure in order for ICANN to know the correct ASN which is operating the BGP router - the BGP router will send its ASN in cleartext and also its ASN encrypted with its ICANN-communication-private-key , ICANN will know the related public key for the specific ASN from the specific ASN object in the RIR (the public key for communication with ICANN will be displayed there) - after decryption ICANN will compare the decrypted string to the AS Number for successful authentication. - After successful authentication, all the communication will be encrypted, ICANN will notify the BGP router about its public key and ICANN will use the public key of the ASN for the communication with ICANN - from the ASN object in the RIR. - The BGP router will send over the session its public key to be used by other BGP routers in order to decrypt the encrypted string in the tracking ip packets that it will originate (that private key and public key will be managed in the BGP router GUI or CLI). - ICANN will notify all the other BGP routers through the sessions with them about a newly updated such public key of any other BGP router. - ICANN will also receive in real-time any route object creation/modification/deletion notification from any of the 5 RIRs and will then update all the BGP routers through all of their sessions. - In case a BGP router doesn't have an active session to ICANN backend infrastructure (for any reason, might be due to networking issue) - then temporarily the internal 'Check tracking flag' of it will be set to 'off'. After the session with ICANN backend infrastructure will be re-established and the BGP router will receive all the meantime updates - the boolean value of 'Check internal flag' will return to initial state. - Any update from ICANN backend infrastructure to a BGP router (such as a public key of another BGP router, or a routing object update) - will be confirmed that the update was received well by the BGP router side. 'Check tracking flag' in BGP Routers: - BGP routers, in their GUI and CLI interfaces - will not allow the end-user to set the boolean value of 'Check tracking flag', in order to avoid misconfiguration. - The ICANN backend infrastructure through the session with the BGP router - will be able to set the boolean value of the 'Check tracking flag'. - The reason for it, is that if 'Check tracking flag' will be set on some destination BGP routers while some other source BGP routers weren't upgraded yet (and will not send the 'tracking ip packet' due to it) - then 'tracking ip packet' will never reach the destination BGP router and the internet will break. - Central setting of 'Check tracking flag' through ICANN backend infrastructure - will allow ICANN to inform all the BGP routers at once to switch 'on' the 'Check tracking flag' - ICANN, in the session to any BGP router, will also receive the percentage of ip packets that were destained to that BGP router network - that also had ip tracking packets, in this way ICANN will know when all the BGP routers were properly globally updated and when it is time to enable the 'Check tracking flag' in all the BGP routers. - ICANN will know if all the BGP routers in the world were upgraded based on keeping the full BGP table and comparing it to all the BGP routers that did and that did not open a session to ICANN backend infrastructure. Automatic preventation of IoT botnet infections: - IoT botnets are based on default credentials, if we can block default credentials of IoT devices then these kind of botnets (such as Mirai-variants and similar) will stop to have an impact in the internet. - The data field in an ip packet - will always be the same for an access attempt to a IoT device with default credentials - hence these kind of "IP protocol data fingerprints" which are related to specific "IP protocol numbers" will be provided by ICANN backend infrastructure to each BGP router through the opened session with it. - There are two issues with matching incoming ip packets to the "locally stored IP protocol data fingerprints" - the first one is that ip packets can be sent by fragments (so not all the data field will be sent at once in order to be able to be compared with the locally stored data fingerprints) and the second is that usernames (or url's) or any other textual data in the incoming ip packet data field can be in uppercase or in lowercase. In order to overcome the possibility of the existence of a single data fingerprint in multiple incoming ip packet fragments - then in case the BGP router is recognizing the incoming fragmented ip packet data value as part of an existing fingerprint data in its local database then it will keep track of the arrival ip packet fragments based on their specific IP-ID identifier and the BGP router will not forward the last ip packet fragment if the last ip packet fragment will cause all the related ip packet fragments to match a specific ip fingerprint data (last ip packet doesn't have to be the last fragmented part but it is the last ip packet that arrived with that IP-ID identifier, so the BGP router will keep track of the specific fragmented IP packets that arrived and their indexes in order to know when the last one of them arrived). Regarding the second issue - the stored data fingerprints in the local BGP router will be stored in a way that some bytes of them (in specific indexes) will not be compared and in case all the other bytes will match - then the bytes in these indexes - will first be lowered case - and only then comparison will be made to the specific indexed bytes in the specific ip packet data fingerprint. - In case a IoT device behind a BGP router will be infected somehow (for example when a specific fingerprint data with default credentials for a specific device wasn't updated yet through ICANN backend infrastructure), it will be able to infect all the other IoT devices in the local network when the connectivity to them is not through the BGP router, that kind of impact will be much much lower than infected IoT device which can infect any other IoT device in the internet and then massive botnets in the internet are created which are being used for DDoS. Automatic prevention of botnet C&C ip addresses: - Botnets C&C are also a problem in the internet. - This problem can be overcome using the following technical addition: the 5 RIR's will operate end-users honeypots machines all over the world (it will be implemented by a single physical machine in each location, for example in each datacenter and in each major ISP, each single physical machine will emulate a virtual router and virtual VM's, the virtual VM's will emulate many different kinds of 'real world machines', any kind of automatic updating (in the operating system configurations) will be disabled, these honeypots machines are not intended to make any outgoing connection, the virtual routers will monitor if any outgoing connection is made and if yes then it is to a botnet C&C, the virtual router will update the ICANN backend infrastructure regarding it and the ICANN backend infrastructure will update all the BGP routers (in their open sessions) regarding it to completely block any communication to that botnet C&C ip address. There will be a web-based system and only the related Law Enforcement Agency of that C&C ip address region - will be able to remove that C&C ip address from being blocked after their manual check. - Honeypot machines will be deployed using 'templates' - these templates must be signed and not anyone can create them, they should be created and signed by an agreed Law Enforcement Agency such as Interpol in order to make sure that these templates are by-design not making any outgoing connection. The templates will be deployed in an automatic way (major ISP's and datacenters will be able to easily add a 'physical honeypot' server in their network, that will be shipped to them), the re-initiation of a compromised 'virtual machine' that made an outgoing connection - will also be automatic through the system in the physical server. Respectfully, Elad _______________________________________________ members-discuss mailing list members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss Unsubscribe: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/olof%40tulpsolutions…

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Fw: You have my vote!
by Elad Cohen 30 Apr '20

30 Apr '20

Thank you Gabriel. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________________ From: Gabriel VOITIS <voitis(a)infinitytelecom.ro> Sent: Thursday, April 30, 2020 11:42 PM To: Elad Cohen Subject: You have my vote! -- Sent from mobile Mulțumesc, Gabriel VOITIS

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UNSUBSCRIBE
by David Simmons 27 Apr '20

27 Apr '20

UNSUBSCRIBE

13 12

ban4flood
by Christian Rodler 27 Apr '20

27 Apr '20

Before most of us unsubscribe from this list: Would be nice if the "responsible" of this mailing list could find a way to ban a member for lets say one week if >x% of subscibers complain about (off-topics- coconuts or whatever). I never thought membes-discuss mailing list == Kindergarden Best regards, Christian Rodler -- El software de antivirus Avast ha analizado este correo electrónico en busca de virus. https://www.avast.com/antivirus

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Re: [members-discuss] Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and emails
by Elad Cohen 27 Apr '20

27 Apr '20

Ed is lying, I'm not harassing him or anyone else off the list, Ed is the one keep emailing me directly when I asked him to stop doing it. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: Ed Campbell Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 4:47 PM To: Elad Cohen Cc: Chris Lawrence; Cynthia Revström; members-discuss(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [members-discuss] Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and emails All, This guy doesn’t know how to shut up. I would not normally do this but he is harassing me directly “off-list” and “off-topic”. The unprofessional approach he has taken to his responses should be enough to turn anyone away from him but he is now harassing me when asked not to. I have made an official complaint against him and will let the NCC deal with him. Kind regards, Ed On 27 Apr 2020, at 14:43, Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io<mailto:elad@netstyle.io>> wrote: Chris, This wasn't my conversation, this was my response to an attack on me. Take your fake messages off the list. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: Chris Lawrence <chris.lawrence(a)nomical.com<mailto:chris.lawrence@nomical.com>> Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 3:44 PM To: Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io<mailto:elad@netstyle.io>>; Cynthia Revström <me(a)cynthia.re<mailto:me@cynthia.re>>; members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> <members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net>> Subject: Re: [members-discuss] Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and emails Elad Enough now this is beyond a joke.. Please take your conversations off the list. Regards Chris Chris Lawrence Senior Solutions Architect +44 344 384 3000<tel:+44%20344%20384%203000> +44 7775 871094<tel:+44%207775%20871094> nomical.com<http://nomical.com/> Mezzanine Floor, No.1 Spinningfields, Quay Street, Manchester M3 3JE This email and any attachments are intended for the named recipient only. Its unauthorised use, distribution, disclosure, storage or copying is not permitted. If you have received it in error, please destroy all copies and notify the sender. In messages of a non-business nature, the views and opinions expressed are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect those of the organisation from which it is sent. All emails may be subject to monitoring. Nomical Ltd - Registered in England No: 06035958, VAT Reg No: 900363074, Registered Office: Mezzanine Floor, No.1 Spinningfields, Quay Street, Manchester M3 3JE From: members-discuss <members-discuss-bounces(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss-bounces@ripe.net>> on behalf of Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io<mailto:elad@netstyle.io>> Date: Monday, 27 April 2020 at 13:43 To: Cynthia Revström <me(a)cynthia.re<mailto:me@cynthia.re>>, "members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net>" <members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net>> Subject: Re: [members-discuss] Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and emails This is amazing how the illegal anonymous "The Spamhaus Project" members keep twisting the facts. Cynthia, Zero evidence was provided, not even a single proof, but still you claim "lots of evidence" I didn't say that anyone is part of "The Spamhaus Project" because disagree with me, I said that anyone is part of the illegal anonymous organization "The Spamhaus Project" because he is part of the illegal anonymous organization "The Spamhaus Project" - see how much you are personally targeting me - see how much you are protecting your sick friend RFG. Please don't interpret me - coconut means coconut - RFG is a coconut by anyone that knows him personally. Here is what your sick friend wrote: https://imgur.com/AcmgwEX (his opinion on all Dutch people as a whole - "Dutch are any more inclined toward cybercrime") https://imgur.com/WUZvdNJ (his opinion on all Colombian Network Operators usage of the internet as a whole - "Undoubtedly drug smuggling over HTTP") https://imgur.com/a/1ULfVEC (his opinion on the City of Chicago including all of its citizens as a whole - "American city most known for its high ideals and consistantely ethical behavior, Chicago") https://imgur.com/AQCmZlk (RFG being identified as racist in Nanog) https://imgur.com/a/Rzrbxkz (RFG being identified as antisemitic in Nanog) RFG called me in two names that one of them you wrote, you can keep with your lies and to defend a racist and an antisemitic person - but there is something which is called context, you can see in the first link above that RFG quoted Shakespeare regarding the Netherlands, when he called me in the name that you mentioned he did it after not providing not even a single proof against me and he specially used that name - which also in Shakespeare being referred to jews - you are defending a person which is a racist and an antisemitic according to all the above links. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: Cynthia Revström <me(a)cynthia.re<mailto:me@cynthia.re>> Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 2:50 PM To: Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io<mailto:elad@netstyle.io>>; members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> <members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net>> Subject: Re: [members-discuss] Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and emails Hi Elad, There are 3 major differences I see here, 1. rfg presents lots of evidence that you would have been involved in shady things (I am not sure if they are true and frankly I don't have time currently to look at all of the documents) Meanwhile you are saying that people are part of "The illegal anonymous Spamhaus Project" just because they disagree with you, and as you have said that I am involved in Spamhaus, I would like for you to give me any proof that I am involved with spamhaus in any way (which I am not). 2. rfg called you a "crook", which means dishonest or illegal, which would be true if the things rfg stated are in fact true. Meanwhile you called rfg a "coconut" which can't be anything other than an insult referring to you thinking he is dumb. 3. rfg called you a "crook" once in a long email after describing why he thinks you are a "crook", meanwhile you sent an email that I have posted in its entirety below. > START Michael, Ronald didn't insult me because he is mentally-illed, and he is doing it only because I found out who are the real people behind the illegal anonymous organization "The Spamhaus Project" which Coconut Guilmette and Cheerleader Nussbacher are part of. Respectfully, Elad > END Please just stop it Elad. Now I still think it was wrong of rfg to use that word, but it is not at all the same thing in my eyes. - Cynthia On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 1:36 PM Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io<mailto:elad@netstyle.io>> wrote: https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/anti-abuse-wg/2019-September/005301… These are all complete lies only because I found out who are the real people behind "The Spamhaus Project" You can see how he is calling me there Everything there are lies and fake, the "source" for the fake media report is a member of "The Spamhaus Project" and also an employee of a direct competitor (that enjoyed from that fake media report) of a company which used the netblock, and the "source" is also the owner of that criminal twitter account:https://twitter.com/UnderTheBreach , he is a master of cyber influence operations according to his own words in his criminal twitter account and also a member of your cyber-security community. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: Cynthia Revström <me(a)cynthia.re<mailto:me@cynthia.re>> Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 2:14 PM To: Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io<mailto:elad@netstyle.io>> Cc: members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> <members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net>> Subject: Re: [members-discuss] Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and emails Elad, please send me an archive link to the specific email on a RIPE/RIPE NCC mailing list where RFG called you a rude name. - Cynthia On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 1:12 PM Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io<mailto:elad@netstyle.io>> wrote: He called me with antisemitic names many times and on many working groups and you said nothing, you claim not to see his messages, but you clearly saw all of my messages and you are monitoring me pretty well. I'm sorry but I don't believe you, specially when you are attacking me personally so heavily with distorting the facts. You clearly so the word coconut - so you also saw what I shared on the same post that he wrote on other groups of people and that he was called a racist and an antisemitic - but you decided to ignore this as well, so you didn't read my whole post - you read only the word 'coconut' and you decided to jump in ? Cynthia, please spread your lies somewhere else. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: Cynthia Revström <me(a)cynthia.re<mailto:me@cynthia.re>> Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 2:05 PM To: Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io<mailto:elad@netstyle.io>> Cc: members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> <members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net>> Subject: Re: [members-discuss] Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and emails Elad, first of all, I am not an employee or in any way related to Spamhaus, and I doubt many of the people you have suggested are part of it have anything to do with it either. And because I have things to do that are not spending my entire days on RIPE mailing lists I guess I missed RFG calling you names, but I will assure you that if I was on those discussions I would call him out if he called you a "coconut" or similar. Also just because someone has called you names on mailing lists doesn't mean you get to call them names on mailing lists. - Cynthia On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 12:58 PM Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io<mailto:elad@netstyle.io>> wrote: Cynthia, The sick person which you are referring to and is your colleague from "The Spamhaus Project", defamed me for many many months, here in Ripe and in Nanog, he called me by many names without a single proof. He was called an antisemitic and a racist not by me - but by people which are not related to me in Nanog. After many months I provided an official response in Ripe. I didn't hear your voice when he defamed me for many many months with him calling me by many names. So obviously your interests are hidden. In the other working groups - I only replied to him, and I didn't hear your voice regarding your sick colleague initial message with name callings towards me when I only replied to his attack on me. And his personal attack on me is exactly like your personal attack on me now - you are afraid that an alternative solution to "The Spamhaus Project" will be implemented if I will be elected. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: members-discuss <members-discuss-bounces(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss-bounces@ripe.net>> on behalf of Cynthia Revström <me(a)cynthia.re<mailto:me@cynthia.re>> Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 1:50 PM To: Sascha Luck [ml] <ripe-md(a)c4inet.net<mailto:ripe-md@c4inet.net>> Cc: members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> <members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net>> Subject: Re: [members-discuss] Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and emails > The RIPE *NCC* has no business either enforcing "professionality" on the *community* mailing lists - this is the WG chairs' responsibility. AFAIK there are no WG chairs of members-discuss and members-discuss is a mailing list that the RIPE NCC hosts to let RIPE NCC members discuss RIPE NCC membership related topics, so I think they certainly have business enforcing people to be professional on this mailing list. I would also like to add that Elad has multiple times on different mailing lists ignored the WG chairs. Also this is happening across a variety of RIPE/RIPE NCC mailing lists that are all hosted by the RIPE NCC and as such I think it is their business to keep them to a professional standard. > If I'm wrong, where do I submit the list of people I'd like to see excluded from the community? There should not be a long list of people, but when someone is behaving unprofessionally, calling people "coconut", being defamatory towards the RIPE NCC, ignoring WG chairs, I do think that they have gone too far and everything has a limit. Like we wouldn't allow someone to send sales emails to the mailing list as an example, aka limits on what is allowed. - Cynthia On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 12:43 PM Sascha Luck [ml] <ripe-md(a)c4inet.net<mailto:ripe-md@c4inet.net>> wrote: On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 12:02:59AM +0200, Cynthia Revstrm wrote: >I would like to propose that the RIPE NCC ban Elad Cohen from interacting >with the RIPE Community (via Meetings or mailing lists) due to his blatant >disregard for the Code of Conduct and for being hostile towards others in >the community. As the RIPE NCC hosts and manages these lists I think the >RIPE NCC has a responsibility to keep the lists professional and to remove >those who repeatedly ignore what the WG chairs are saying. The RIPE *NCC* has no business either enforcing "professionality" on the *community* mailing lists - this is the WG chairs' responsibility. Nor do I think the NCC should determine who can be a member of the RIPE community or not. If I'm wrong, where do I submit the list of people I'd like to see excluded from the community? I think this proposal is the most out-of-order thing I've yet seen in this thread. rgds, Sascha Luck > >- Cynthia >_______________________________________________ >members-discuss mailing list >members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> >https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss >Unsubscribe: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/ripe-md%40c4inet.net _______________________________________________ members-discuss mailing list members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss Unsubscribe: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/me%40cynthia.re _______________________________________________ members-discuss mailing list members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss Unsubscribe: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/campbell%40inca.ie

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Re: [members-discuss] Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and emails
by Cynthia Revström 27 Apr '20

27 Apr '20

Hi Elad, There are 3 major differences I see here, 1. rfg presents lots of evidence that you would have been involved in shady things (I am not sure if they are true and frankly I don't have time currently to look at all of the documents) Meanwhile you are saying that people are part of "The illegal anonymous Spamhaus Project" just because they disagree with you, and as you have said that I am involved in Spamhaus, I would like for you to give me any proof that I am involved with spamhaus in any way (which I am not). 2. rfg called you a "crook", which means dishonest or illegal, which would be true if the things rfg stated are in fact true. Meanwhile you called rfg a "coconut" which can't be anything other than an insult referring to you thinking he is dumb. 3. rfg called you a "crook" once in a long email after describing why he thinks you are a "crook", meanwhile you sent an email that I have posted in its entirety below. > START Michael, Ronald didn't insult me because he is mentally-illed, and he is doing it only because I found out who are the real people behind the illegal anonymous organization "The Spamhaus Project" which Coconut Guilmette and Cheerleader Nussbacher are part of. Respectfully, Elad > END Please just stop it Elad. Now I still think it was wrong of rfg to use that word, but it is not at all the same thing in my eyes. - Cynthia On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 1:36 PM Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io> wrote: > > https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/anti-abuse-wg/2019-September/005301… > > These are all complete lies only because I found out who are the real > people behind "The Spamhaus Project" > > You can see how he is calling me there > > Everything there are lies and fake, the "source" for the fake media report > is a member of "The Spamhaus Project" and also an employee of a direct > competitor (that enjoyed from that fake media report) of a company which > used the netblock, and the "source" is also the owner of that criminal > twitter account: https://twitter.com/UnderTheBreach , he is a master of > cyber influence operations according to his own words in his criminal > twitter account and also a member of your cyber-security community. > > Respectfully, > Elad > ------------------------------ > *From:* Cynthia Revström <me(a)cynthia.re> > *Sent:* Monday, April 27, 2020 2:14 PM > *To:* Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io> > *Cc:* members-discuss(a)ripe.net <members-discuss(a)ripe.net> > *Subject:* Re: [members-discuss] Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and > emails > > Elad, please send me an archive link to the specific email on a RIPE/RIPE > NCC mailing list where RFG called you a rude name. > > - Cynthia > > On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 1:12 PM Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io> wrote: > > He called me with antisemitic names many times and on many working groups > and you said nothing, you claim not to see his messages, but you clearly > saw all of my messages and you are monitoring me pretty well. I'm sorry but > I don't believe you, specially when you are attacking me personally so > heavily with distorting the facts. You clearly so the word coconut - so you > also saw what I shared on the same post that he wrote on other groups of > people and that he was called a racist and an antisemitic - but you decided > to ignore this as well, so you didn't read my whole post - you read only > the word 'coconut' and you decided to jump in ? > > Cynthia, please spread your lies somewhere else. > > Respectfully, > Elad > ------------------------------ > *From:* Cynthia Revström <me(a)cynthia.re> > *Sent:* Monday, April 27, 2020 2:05 PM > *To:* Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io> > *Cc:* members-discuss(a)ripe.net <members-discuss(a)ripe.net> > *Subject:* Re: [members-discuss] Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and > emails > > Elad, first of all, I am not an employee or in any way related to > Spamhaus, and I doubt many of the people you have suggested are part of it > have anything to do with it either. > > And because I have things to do that are not spending my entire days on > RIPE mailing lists I guess I missed RFG calling you names, but I will > assure you that if I was on those discussions I would call him out if he > called you a "coconut" or similar. > Also just because someone has called you names on mailing lists doesn't > mean you get to call them names on mailing lists. > > - Cynthia > > On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 12:58 PM Elad Cohen <elad(a)netstyle.io> wrote: > > Cynthia, > > The sick person which you are referring to and is your colleague from "The > Spamhaus Project", defamed me for many many months, here in Ripe and in > Nanog, he called me by many names without a single proof. He was called an > antisemitic and a racist not by me - but by people which are not related > to me in Nanog. After many months I provided an official response in Ripe. > I didn't hear your voice when he defamed me for many many months with him > calling me by many names. So obviously your interests are hidden. > > In the other working groups - I only replied to him, and I didn't hear > your voice regarding your sick colleague initial message with name callings > towards me when I only replied to his attack on me. And his personal attack > on me is exactly like your personal attack on me now - you are afraid that > an alternative solution to "The Spamhaus Project" will be implemented if I > will be elected. > > Respectfully, > Elad > ------------------------------ > *From:* members-discuss <members-discuss-bounces(a)ripe.net> on behalf of > Cynthia Revström <me(a)cynthia.re> > *Sent:* Monday, April 27, 2020 1:50 PM > *To:* Sascha Luck [ml] <ripe-md(a)c4inet.net> > *Cc:* members-discuss(a)ripe.net <members-discuss(a)ripe.net> > *Subject:* Re: [members-discuss] Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and > emails > > > The RIPE *NCC* has no business either enforcing "professionality" > on the *community* mailing lists - this is the WG chairs' > responsibility. > > AFAIK there are no WG chairs of members-discuss and members-discuss is a > mailing list that the RIPE NCC hosts to let RIPE NCC members discuss RIPE > NCC membership related topics, so I think they certainly have business > enforcing people to be professional on this mailing list. > > I would also like to add that Elad has multiple times on different mailing > lists ignored the WG chairs. > Also this is happening across a variety of RIPE/RIPE NCC mailing lists > that are all hosted by the RIPE NCC and as such I think it is their > business to keep them to a professional standard. > > > If I'm wrong, where do > I submit the list of people I'd like to see excluded from the > community? > > There should not be a long list of people, but when someone is behaving > unprofessionally, calling people "coconut", being defamatory towards the > RIPE NCC, ignoring WG chairs, I do think that they have gone too far and > everything has a limit. > Like we wouldn't allow someone to send sales emails to the mailing list as > an example, aka limits on what is allowed. > > - Cynthia > > On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 12:43 PM Sascha Luck [ml] <ripe-md(a)c4inet.net> > wrote: > > On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 12:02:59AM +0200, Cynthia Revstrm wrote: > >I would like to propose that the RIPE NCC ban Elad Cohen from interacting > >with the RIPE Community (via Meetings or mailing lists) due to his blatant > >disregard for the Code of Conduct and for being hostile towards others in > >the community. As the RIPE NCC hosts and manages these lists I think the > >RIPE NCC has a responsibility to keep the lists professional and to remove > >those who repeatedly ignore what the WG chairs are saying. > > The RIPE *NCC* has no business either enforcing "professionality" > on the *community* mailing lists - this is the WG chairs' > responsibility. Nor do I think the NCC should determine who can > be a member of the RIPE community or not. If I'm wrong, where do > I submit the list of people I'd like to see excluded from the > community? > I think this proposal is the most out-of-order thing I've yet > seen in this thread. > > rgds, > Sascha Luck > > > > >- Cynthia > > >_______________________________________________ > >members-discuss mailing list > >members-discuss(a)ripe.net > >https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss > >Unsubscribe: > https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/ripe-md%40c4inet.net > > > _______________________________________________ > members-discuss mailing list > members-discuss(a)ripe.net > https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss > Unsubscribe: > https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/me%40cynthia.re > >

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Re: [members-discuss] Unsubscribing
by Hans Govenius 27 Apr '20

27 Apr '20

Hello I promised, nothing more on the topic. And there aint. Many are trying to unsubscribe and many are accusing someone trying to unsubscribe them without permission/to do harm etc. I think this is simply a simple misunderstanding. When there people who say they hit time and time again the unsubscribe button and nothing helps I think you are pressing these links on the emails for example: >_______________________________________________ >members-discuss mailing list >members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> >https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss >Unsubscribe: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/ripe-md%40c4inet.net _______________________________________________ members-discuss mailing list members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss Unsubscribe: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/me%40cynthia.re This is now the last rows on this matter. If I would just press this and hope to be unsubscribed, it would maybe not happen. I would try to unsubscribe Cyntia I guess? I would be left wondering that I didn’t get out of the list and Cynthia would be sending Spy´s and police after my IP 😊 Atleast im quite sure those both cant work. Either both are not working for *ME* or only one of them is working… Or then I can only unsubscribe after I have actually sent a message and I might then get this unsub link which would work for me? br. Hans Lähettäjä: members-discuss <members-discuss-bounces(a)ripe.net> Puolesta Elad Cohen Lähetetty: maanantai 27. huhtikuuta 2020 13.59 Vastaanottaja: Cynthia Revström <me(a)cynthia.re>; Sascha Luck [ml] <ripe-md(a)c4inet.net> Kopio: members-discuss(a)ripe.net Aihe: Re: [members-discuss] Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and emails Cynthia, The sick person which you are referring to and is your colleague from "The Spamhaus Project", defamed me for many many months, here in Ripe and in Nanog, he called me by many names without a single proof. He was called an antisemitic and a racist not by me - but by people which are not related to me in Nanog. After many months I provided an official response in Ripe. I didn't hear your voice when he defamed me for many many months with him calling me by many names. So obviously your interests are hidden. In the other working groups - I only replied to him, and I didn't hear your voice regarding your sick colleague initial message with name callings towards me when I only replied to his attack on me. And his personal attack on me is exactly like your personal attack on me now - you are afraid that an alternative solution to "The Spamhaus Project" will be implemented if I will be elected. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: members-discuss <members-discuss-bounces(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss-bounces@ripe.net>> on behalf of Cynthia Revström <me(a)cynthia.re<mailto:me@cynthia.re>> Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 1:50 PM To: Sascha Luck [ml] <ripe-md(a)c4inet.net<mailto:ripe-md@c4inet.net>> Cc: members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> <members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net>> Subject: Re: [members-discuss] Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and emails > The RIPE *NCC* has no business either enforcing "professionality" on the *community* mailing lists - this is the WG chairs' responsibility. AFAIK there are no WG chairs of members-discuss and members-discuss is a mailing list that the RIPE NCC hosts to let RIPE NCC members discuss RIPE NCC membership related topics, so I think they certainly have business enforcing people to be professional on this mailing list. I would also like to add that Elad has multiple times on different mailing lists ignored the WG chairs. Also this is happening across a variety of RIPE/RIPE NCC mailing lists that are all hosted by the RIPE NCC and as such I think it is their business to keep them to a professional standard. > If I'm wrong, where do I submit the list of people I'd like to see excluded from the community? There should not be a long list of people, but when someone is behaving unprofessionally, calling people "coconut", being defamatory towards the RIPE NCC, ignoring WG chairs, I do think that they have gone too far and everything has a limit. Like we wouldn't allow someone to send sales emails to the mailing list as an example, aka limits on what is allowed. - Cynthia On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 12:43 PM Sascha Luck [ml] <ripe-md(a)c4inet.net<mailto:ripe-md@c4inet.net>> wrote: On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 12:02:59AM +0200, Cynthia Revstrm wrote: >I would like to propose that the RIPE NCC ban Elad Cohen from interacting >with the RIPE Community (via Meetings or mailing lists) due to his blatant >disregard for the Code of Conduct and for being hostile towards others in >the community. As the RIPE NCC hosts and manages these lists I think the >RIPE NCC has a responsibility to keep the lists professional and to remove >those who repeatedly ignore what the WG chairs are saying. The RIPE *NCC* has no business either enforcing "professionality" on the *community* mailing lists - this is the WG chairs' responsibility. Nor do I think the NCC should determine who can be a member of the RIPE community or not. If I'm wrong, where do I submit the list of people I'd like to see excluded from the community? I think this proposal is the most out-of-order thing I've yet seen in this thread. rgds, Sascha Luck > >- Cynthia >_______________________________________________ >members-discuss mailing list >members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> >https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss >Unsubscribe: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/ripe-md%40c4inet.net _______________________________________________ members-discuss mailing list members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss Unsubscribe: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/me%40cynthia.re

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Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and emails
by Cynthia Revström 27 Apr '20

27 Apr '20

Hello, I would like to request that Elad Cohen be blocked from sending to the members-discuss mailing lists after multiple offtopic threads started by Elad and the personal attacks and ignoring WG chairs telling Elad to stop. I would further like to point out that as he is a confirmed candidate for the Exec Board, one of his key responsibilities would be to have the "Ability to communicate effectively", which he has shown that he is not capable of. I would personally say that elad lacks most of the expectations listed on https://www.ripe.net/about-us/executive-board/ripe-ncc-executive-board-func… . I would like to propose that the RIPE NCC ban Elad Cohen from interacting with the RIPE Community (via Meetings or mailing lists) due to his blatant disregard for the Code of Conduct and for being hostile towards others in the community. As the RIPE NCC hosts and manages these lists I think the RIPE NCC has a responsibility to keep the lists professional and to remove those who repeatedly ignore what the WG chairs are saying. - Cynthia

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Re: [members-discuss] Technical solution to resolve the IPv4 Exhaustion problem and to add more 4, 294, 967, 296 IPv4 addresses that are needed in the world
by Elad Cohen 27 Apr '20

27 Apr '20

Gert, It is completely repulsive what you are doing here, me sharing an idea and the implementation of it and you wrote what you wrote. To the community: Anyone that knows me know that everything I write can be implemented, Gert didn't say that it cannot be implemented - just that modifying the networking stacks is hard - if it it is hard then better developers are needed that it will be easy for them - I'm not going to waste my time on implementing the patches to the networking stacks for Microsoft/Google/Apple/etc - they have their own engineers. I have enough experience in development to know that the reserved bit activation and ipv4 packet modification in the networking stack will not be time consuming such as creating a complete new protocol family, any operating system vendor have enough engineers that can together do it quickly. If after reading everything that I wrote you are calling it a cheap shot then you are not a professional and your background mean nothing (professional people will be able to read algorithems and methods and to know if they works or not, with implementing them in their heads, without to see it in their eyes the electrical signals flowing between machines). Keep on Gert to defame me after I explained this idea and implementation to the community, the difference between us is that I have the decency to know that I know nothing and I always strive to learn, you will not see me pat my ego like you just did, if you don't have something useful to say then go back to your two-threads working group. I didn't promise anything, as long there are hateful people like - nothing good will happen. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: Gert Doering Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2020 12:09 PM To: Bruno Cordioli Cc: Elad Cohen; members-discuss(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [members-discuss] Technical solution to resolve the IPv4 Exhaustion problem and to add more 4, 294, 967, 296 IPv4 addresses that are needed in the world Hi, On Sun, Apr 26, 2020 at 10:51:13AM +0200, Bruno Cordioli wrote: > I think it is appropriate to close this discussion here. > Elad will eventually submit his proposed al RIPE meeting or he'll write a > RFC. Basically, this. The Internet (and the address distribution towards IANA and the RIRs) operates based on IETF standards, and as long as there is no IETF standard for IPv4+, it cannot be implemented in an interoperable way, and can not be deployed. Elad, this is your avenue: you need to demonstrate two working and interoperating implementations for two host stacks and two router stacks. Just claming "it is easy" is not sufficient. I'm with Christian here: this can not work without significant changes to the BSD socket API, to applications using this API - basically, everything on Unix/Linux - to the Windows networking API, and to routers in the ISP networks that need to decide "which customer is this packet sent to?" based on the extra bit. And I speak with a certain background on implementing network applications, running an ISP network, and debugging TCP/IP stacks. Overall, as long as no implementations can be provided (source code on github etc) this sounds like a somewhat cheap shot to make people believe you're going to solve their IPv4 problems if they just vote you to the NCC executive board. And I hope the NCC members are smart enough to not vote based on glorious promises, but on track record, provable background, etc. Gert Doering -- RIPE member -- have you enabled IPv6 on something today...? SpaceNet AG Vorstand: Sebastian v. Bomhard, Michael Emmer Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14 Aufsichtsratsvors.: A. Grundner-Culemann D-80807 Muenchen HRB: 136055 (AG Muenchen) Tel: +49 (0)89/32356-444 USt-IdNr.: DE813185279

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Re: [members-discuss] Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and emails
by Elad Cohen 27 Apr '20

27 Apr '20

Hello, Is it possible for anyone with hidden intentions not to post on this list ? Henrik, you could just write "I don't vote for Elad" - no need to try to spread lies to the community - can you provide a single proof to the lies that you wrote about me ? as I already wrote - the "source" in the fake media report is a person in "The Spamhaus Project" and an employee of a direct business competitor and also the owner of that criminal twitter account: https://twitter.com/underthebreach The "source" of the fake media report as you can see in his "anonymous" twitter account linked above - is a master of cyber influence operations - and this is exactly what being done here - spreading of lies and conspiracies and fake theories about me without a single proof. I didn't share any conspiracies, I only provided a link to a presentation of "The Spamhaus Project" that they wrote on themselves and they presented in a private event - According to their own words they are an illegal anonymous organization. "The Spamhaus Project" is related to the cyber-security community mainly in Western countries - so indeed Henrik is from the cyber-security community, expect more wannabe "security researchers" to write lies about me. "The Spamhaus Project" keeps attacking me because they know that if I will be elected I will make sure that they will not hurt anymore any Ripe LIR member. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: members-discuss <members-discuss-bounces(a)ripe.net> on behalf of hlk via members-discuss <members-discuss(a)ripe.net> Sent: Monday, April 27, 2020 1:25 PM To: Filip Hruska <fhr(a)fhrnet.eu>; members-discuss(a)ripe.net <members-discuss(a)ripe.net> Subject: Re: [members-discuss] Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and emails Hello all, and sorry for top posting mobile device. The amount of noise generated by Elad Cohen and unwillingness to listen has degraded the lists. Polite rejections of his proposals have quickly degenerated into name calling and conspiracy theories by him. I am not affiliated with RIPE NCC other than being a LIR, I do not know Elad Cohen before these threads. Quick searches on his name show dubious business practices, as seen with regards to prefix hijacking. I consider his actions on the list very close to overstepping Code of Conduct, and good intentions. I fully support both him being moderated on the list, and not being eligble for a position as RIPE chair or similar for the moment. Best regards Henrik Kramselund Jereminsen, owner of dk.zencurity -------- Original message -------- From: Filip Hruska <fhr(a)fhrnet.eu> Date: 4/27/20 01:05 (GMT+01:00) To: members-discuss(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [members-discuss] Regarding Elad Cohen's nomination and emails Hello all, I would like to voice my support for this. The amount of unprofessional conduct in the past 2 or 3 email chains is simply ridiculous and completely unacceptable. Thank you, Filip On 4/27/20 12:44 AM, Joseph Marsden wrote: I support Cynthia's request for a formal investigation. Best Joseph On 26/04/2020 23:24, Cynthia Revström wrote: I would also like to formally request that the RIPE NCC investigate if Elad Cohen has breached A.1.2.2.B of RIPE-716. https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-716#a122b This is with regards to statements like this: "Ripe have 30 millions euros of expenses each year that are hidden and now shown to where exactly they are paid, instead of that corruption" I believe that he does indeed make unreasonable allegations towards the RIPE NCC to damage it's reputation. - Cynthia On Mon, Apr 27, 2020 at 12:02 AM Cynthia Revström <me(a)cynthia.re<mailto:me@cynthia.re>> wrote: Hello, I would like to request that Elad Cohen be blocked from sending to the members-discuss mailing lists after multiple offtopic threads started by Elad and the personal attacks and ignoring WG chairs telling Elad to stop. I would further like to point out that as he is a confirmed candidate for the Exec Board, one of his key responsibilities would be to have the "Ability to communicate effectively", which he has shown that he is not capable of. I would personally say that elad lacks most of the expectations listed on https://www.ripe.net/about-us/executive-board/ripe-ncc-executive-board-func…. I would like to propose that the RIPE NCC ban Elad Cohen from interacting with the RIPE Community (via Meetings or mailing lists) due to his blatant disregard for the Code of Conduct and for being hostile towards others in the community. As the RIPE NCC hosts and manages these lists I think the RIPE NCC has a responsibility to keep the lists professional and to remove those who repeatedly ignore what the WG chairs are saying. - Cynthia _______________________________________________ members-discuss mailing list members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss Unsubscribe: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/joseph%40arctarus.co… _______________________________________________ members-discuss mailing list members-discuss(a)ripe.net<mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net> https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss Unsubscribe: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/fhr%40fhrnet.eu

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Technical Solution to resolve the global "Email Spam" problem
by Elad Cohen 27 Apr '20

27 Apr '20

Hello Everyone, I want to share with you my technical solution to resolve the global world "Email Spam" problem and in addition it will also resolve the spreading of illegal links (phishing/malware/etc , once the sites are known) through electronic mail and will stop email spoofing (that part using current technologies). Email spam problem was not being able to be defeated since the beginning of electronic mail, as long as email spam will be profitable to email spammers - it will exist, email spam caused the illegal anonymous organization "The Spamhaus Project" to exist, "The Spamhaus Project" is hurting and damaging many businesses worldwide in their way to fight email spam, "The Spamhaus Project" is an illegal anonymous organization according to the following presentation that they wrote on themselves, they are violating laws in their way to fight email spam and still they don't win in the battle against email spam. "The Spamhaus Project" is keeping their anonymity because they are afriad of justified lawsuits due to their criminal actions in their way to fight email spam. The following technical solution will resolve the world email spam problem without to hurt and to damage many businesses worldwide that have nothing to do with email spam like "The Spamhaus Project" does, the following implementation can remove the need for an illegal anonymous organization such as "The Spamhaus Project". The presentation that the illegal anonymous organization "The Spamhaus Project" wrote on themselves: https://www.scribd.com/document/445894312/Spamhaus-Illegal-Private-Data-Vio… The Implementation: There will be a site (lets call it NoSpam.org) - the site will be owned by the 5 RIRs, the site will use bgp anycast and will be deployed in each of the 5 RIRs (the site will also be able to be deployed by the ccTLD registries in each country), the site in all the locations will be synced automatically. Each domain owner will be able to register at the site (an email message will be sent to the domain owner email address in the domain name WHOIS details in order to verify that the domain owner is the one registering). After being logged in, a domain owner will be able to add his email addresses (of the specific domain name) that will be used to send newsletters / mailing lists / one-to-many email messages, lets call these kind of email addresses as 'mailing list' email addresses. The domain owner will not be able to see the list of 'mailing list' email addresses that he added - because when he added each 'mailing list' email address it will be saved with hash in the NoSpam.org backend infrastructure (due to privacy and security reasons) - hence only if the domain owner will manually type the 'mailing list' email address he will be able to enter it in order to manage it (to see the total number of subscribers email addresses, to see the subscribers email addresses but only with their hashes due to security and privacy reasons, to remove a subscriber from the list, to add a sub-user with permissions to manage that specific 'mailing list' email address). In his site, the domain owner will be able to integrate an iframe from NoSpam.org (or to connect to NoSpam.org with ajax) regarding a subscriber registration form to his specific 'mailing list' email address, the subscriber will receive an email message with a link to confirm his subscription. The domain owner will need to create a callback file in his website, for example in the path: "/nospam-notification-callback" (http://example.com/nospam-notification-callback) - that url will receive encrypted post notifications (encryption key will be provided by the domain owner in his NoSpam.org logged in account) from NoSpam.org regarding any new end-user that will subscribe or that will unsubscribe from a 'mailing address' email address which is related to the domain of the domain owner (unsubscribe functionality by the user later below). The subscriber email address and that 'mailing list' email address (that was subscribed to) will be sent by NoSpam.org to "/nospam-notification-callback" not in the hashed format but in cleartext (so the domain owner will be able to save it in his system for future email messages from the specific 'mailing list' email address to the specific subscriber email address). The domain owner will also have an API to NoSpam.org backend infrastructure in order to remove a specific subscriber email address from a specific 'mailing list' email address (the domains owner will send the values through the API - hashed). The domain owner will also provide a web interface in his site for the end-user to remove himself from the specific 'mailing list' email address. The above is the backend implementation (no upgrade is needed to any email server in the internet), the following is the upgrade that will needed for any email client (that upgrade is not mandatory, without the following upgrade the email client will work exactly as it is now without the added no-spam features, electronic mail will not break if some email users will upgrade their email clients and some will not): - There will not be 'mark as spam' button, that kind of functionality will stop to exist because spam is not a boolean value, 'spam' to one person is valuable to another 'person', specially when the internet is global and different people from different countries will consider spam content differently. One user can consider an email message as spam and another user can consider the same message as not spam, 'Spam' is subjective and any kind of 'mark as spam' functionality is useless in the battle against email spam. - There will be blacklists and whitelists (just like there are now, but they will be more prominent): blacklist email addresses , blacklist domains , whitelist email addresses , whitelist domains. - The end-user should be able to easily enter each email message to whitelist or to blacklist (meaning the 'from' email address of the email message), and will be able to search in the 'Spam' folder easily for an email address (these features can exist today, but they should be given more visibility, so end-users will use them more). - The end-user will be able to import/export his whitelists and blacklists using an xml format to any other upgraded email client, the blacklists and whitelists will be local (end-user will be able to pass the local whitelists and blacklists to another email client of his with the click of a button in the upgraded email client - the upgraded email client will just send them to itself - without to download them from the email server so the end-user will be able to download it with another upgraded email client - or the end-user will be able to send the whitelists and blacklists to another email address of him, the usage will not be like sending regular email message with attachments - the upgraded email clients will take care to sending and receiving of the blacklists and whitelits - in the background, these are custom formatted email messages that the two upgraded email clients will know how to act upon them). - The email client will be able to display with GUI with buttons any 'mailing-list registration confirmation email' in a specific section related to registration to new 'mailing list' email addresses for the end-user to choose with buttons if he accept or refuse to register to a specific 'mailing list' email address. - For any email message that was received: in case a received 'from' email address was found in the whitelist email addresses or in the whitelist domains - then it will be moved to the 'Inbox' folder, in case the 'from' email address of the email message was found in the blacklist email addresses or in the blacklist domains - then the email message will be moved to the 'Trash' folder. - In case the 'from' email address or domain was not found in the whitelists and in the blacklists, then the upgraded email client will send the 'from' email address and the 'from' domain and the current user email address and the external links that exist in the email message (but all of these data will be sent in a hashed way, and not in cleartext) with a query to NoSpam.org backend infrastructure, NoSpam.org will perform the following algorithem after it: - If the hashed 'from' domain (or any other 'hashed' domain from the external links) exist in a list of criminals hashed domains (of phishing/malware/viruses/etc) then NoSpam.org will respond to the email client to delete the email message, otherwise the hashed 'from' email address will be checked against a list of hashed 'mailing list' email addresses - if found then the sender is a 'mailing list' email address and there will be a check by NoSpam.org backend infrastructure if the hashed 'receiver' email address is a subscriber of that specific 'mailing list' email address , if the hashed 'receiver' was found then NoSpam.org will send a response to the email client that the email message can be displayed in the 'Inbox' folder and in the response NoSpam.org will also include an unsubscribe key - the email client will be able to display an unsubscribe button to the email client and if clicked the email client will send an https request to NoSpam.org with the specific unsubscribe key, NoSpam.org backend infrastructure will remove the end-user email address from the 'mailing list' email address and will notify the domain owner at the domain owner callback url "/nospam-notification-callback" that the specific user unsubscribed. In case the hashed 'receiver' wasn't found then NoSpam.org will respond to the email client to delete the email message and NoSpam.org will also notify the callback url of the related domain owner that he shouldn't send email messages from the specific 'mailing list' email address to the specific subscriber email address. - In case when NoSpam.org backend infrastructure searched the hashed 'from' email address and it wasn't found in the list of all hashed 'mailing list' email addresses, it mean that the email address was sent from a 'personal' email address and NoSpam.org backend infrastructure will notify the email client that the email message is from a 'personal' email address - the email client in that stage will need to decide if to move the email message to the 'Inbox' folder or to the 'Spam' folder based on the following - the email client will check if the email message include links/images/plain-url's - and if yes then the email message will be moved to the 'Spam' folder, otherwise it will be moved to the 'Inbox' folder. Whitelist Handshake: - In order to facilitate the adding of new email address to the local whitelist, a process of 'Whitelist Handshake' exist , a 'Whitelist Handshake' is a GUI representation in two email clients regarding background email messages between them (that the two end-users don't see), "end-user A" with a click of a button will be able to send 'add me to whitelist' request to "end-user B" which will be able to accept or deny and if accepted then "end-user B" will be able to automatically send the same "add me to whitelist" request to "end-user A" , all of this communication will be done behind the scenes, these special email messages will not be visible to the end-users, end-users will see popups with GUI that email address X is asking to be added to whitelist. In order for spammers not to abuse this option - the email client will keep only one 'whitelist request' from each requester email address (there will be a 'whitelist requests' section in the upgraded email client). A repeated 'whitelist request' that came from a specific email address can never be raised in the list (unless the end-user will specifically search for it) even when the sender will send more and more 'add me to whitelist' requests - no priority will given to them, and once an end-user refused an 'add me to whitelist' request - no new 'add me to whitelist' request will be shown from the specific sender email address in the specific email client. - There can be a case that an upgraded email client will send 'add me to whitelist' request to a not-upgraded email client and then the receiver will see the request as it is - as an email message in the inbox folder - due to it the content of that message will be in the language of the domain TLD of the receiver email address and the content in the email message will explain what is NoSpam.org and how to upgrade the email client and supported upgraded email clients, etc - In the 'whitelist requests section' in the upgraded email client - the whitelist requests will appear in a list - there should be preference so some requests will appear upper and other lower (so requests from spammers will appear lower) - whitelist requests from email addresses of domains which are older (according to their WHOIS details) will appear upper than whitelist requests from email addresses of domains which are newer. Whitelist requests from a list of a more-trusted-domains (domains of known webmails service, universities, governments, etc) will have preference over other domains, specific TLDs that not anyone can purchase will also have preference over other TLDs that anyone can purchase (upgraded email clients will retrieve the list of trusted TLD's and Domains each day from NoSpam.org backend infrastructure). Notification of spam emails: - An additional feature in the upgraded email client is that whenever an email message will reach the 'Spam' folder - the email client will send in the background a known-format email message to the sender and will notify him about it, if the sender is using an upgraded email client then it will be able to automatically send a 'add me to whitelist' request to the receiver in the background (once an email address is whitelisted - all the email messages from it will move from 'Spam' to 'Inbox'). Email Spoofing: - In an upgraded email client, email messages from 'personal' email addresses cannot arrive from email relay server, in case it happen the message will be deleted and the email client will send an automatic email message in the background to the sender with the text (in the language of the sender domain TLD) that email messages from 'email relay servers' cannot be received from him. - In an upgraded email client, email messages from 'mailing list' email addresses can arrive from email relay servers - but they must be encrypted with DKIM. - In an upgraded email client, the email client should check the SPF txt dns record of the sender domain, and will drop the email message if it is a spoofed email message. - DNS servers developers will need to make the SPF txt dns record to be a mandatory field for every domain, in order for email spoofing to be annihilated. Security Aspects: - All stored data in NoSpam.org Backend infrastructure is hashed. - The criminals domains list in NoSpam.org Backend Infrastructure will be managed only by regulated supervised Law Enforcement Agency (for example: Interpol) and not by an internet organization such as the RIRs or ccTLD registries. - Domains owners will have 'forgot password' functionality to their NoSpam.org account, the password reset link will be sent to the email address of the owner of the domain according to the domain WHOIS details. - Communication between email clients to NoSpam.org backend infrastructure will be over https, there will only be an handshake process in the beginning over electronic mail between email client and NoSpam.org backend infrastructure - the email client will send an email message with a chosen key to an email address of @nospam.org (that key will be used in further communication between the email client and the NoSpam.org backend infrastructure over https, it will be used for NoSpam.org backend infrastructure to identify the specific email address over https, so anyone will not be able to query NoSpam.org backend infrastructure to know which hashed email address belongs to which hashed 'mailing list' email address, besides the email client user with the right key to query NoSpam.org Backend infrastructure only on himself). - Any email client will download once per day 'spam-rules' file from NoSpam.org backend infrastructure, 'spam-rules' file will be an xml formatted file that include rules of when to move an email message that was received from 'personal' email address which is not whitelisted to the 'Spam' folder (for example, when email have at least 1/2/3 links, when email format is rich text or html and not plaintext, etc), in case future adjustments will be needed to win the battle against email spam - email clients will not need to be upgraded, the new 'spam-rules' will be updated in this daily file. To make it short: - Any email message from a subscribed mailing list / newsletter / etc - will reach to the inbox (that kind of email messages can contain any kind of content without any restrictions, because the user subscribed to it and the user can unsubscribe from it at anytime). - Any email message from an email address or domain in whitelist - will reach the inbox. - Whitelist Handshake process is easy to use and being implemented with clicks of a button, nothing to type. - In case an email message will the 'Spam' folder - an automatic email message will be sent from the receiver to sender and sender can automatically ask to be added to the receiver's whitelist. - Any email message without links/images/plain-url's (plain email messages, like electronic email was) - will reach the inbox. - Any other email will reach the 'Spam' folder - if needed the user will be able to easily whitelist the email message in the 'Spam' folder. Spammers need links in their email messages for monetization, above solution blocks it and also block criminal domains links in email message and implement email spoofing blocking at client-side. We will all stop to receive more than 100 spam email messages per day with the above solution. Respectfully, Elad

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Re: [members-discuss] Technical solution to resolve the IPv4 Exhaustion problem and to add more 4, 294, 967, 296 IPv4 addresses that are needed in the world
by Elad Cohen 26 Apr '20

26 Apr '20

Sander is taking part in an illegal cyber influence operation against me. Sander, instead of lying and acting like a coward with other interests, go ahead and ask me publicly any question that you would like regarding IPv4+ and you will be answered. Respectfully, Elad ________________________________ From: Sander Steffann Sent: Sunday, April 26, 2020 12:40 PM To: Elad Cohen Cc: Gert Döring; members-discuss(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [members-discuss] Technical solution to resolve the IPv4 Exhaustion problem and to add more 4, 294, 967, 296 IPv4 addresses that are needed in the world Hi, > What being done here is a cyber influence operation against me, after I'm only trying to do good to the community. > > Sander, you didn't mention any flaws, can you please write them here and I will answer each and every one of them ? This is not the place Elad. Many flaws have been pointed out to you already, but you just dismiss them. Take this to the IETF, you'll feel right at home… * Cheers, Sander * for those who don't follow the IETF, there is an appeal ongoing about IETF chairs and ADs ignoring inconvenient questions and objections

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