- cooperation-wg - mailman.ripe.net

Why Russia is Building Its Own Internet
by Gordon Lennox 16 Feb '18

16 Feb '18

<< Last November, news emerged that Russian president Vladimir Putin had approved a plan to create an independent Internet by 1 August 2018, first reported by the Russian news agency, RT. The alternate Internet would be used by BRICS nations—Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa—and shield them from “possible external influence,” the Kremlin’s press secretary, Dmitry Peskov, told RT. “We all know who the chief administrator of the global Internet is,” Peskov said. “And due to its volatility, we have to think about how to ensure our national security.” Putting aside for the moment Peskov’s insinuation that the chief administrator of the Internet, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which abides by California’s state laws, would mess around with Russia’s access to the network, the question remains: Could Russia create its own alternate Internet? “The answer to your question is yes,” says David Conrad, chief technology officer for ICANN. The Internet’s protocols are openly available and, because it’s a network of interconnected networks, it’s entirely possible to recreate a different network of interconnected networks, he says. . . . >> https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/telecom/internet/could-russia-really-bu…

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New on RIPE Labs: How We're Implementing the GDPR - the RIPE Database
by Mirjam Kuehne 01 Feb '18

01 Feb '18

Dear colleagues, This is our second in a series of articles discussing the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) implementation. Here we are looking at the purpose for which personal data is collected and publicly accessed through the RIPE Database, as well as other aspects of the data protection legislation, such as the legal basis for this processing, data removal procedures, and so on: https://labs.ripe.net/Members/Athina/how-we-re-implementing-the-gdpr-the-ri… Kind regards, Mirjam Kühne RIPE NCC

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RIPE NCC Roundtable Meeting for Governments & Regulators Held in Brussels
by Chris Buckridge 24 Jan '18

24 Jan '18

Dear colleagues, Earlier this week, on 22 January 2018, we held a Roundtable Meeting for Governments and Regulators in Brussels. Around 50 representatives from governments, regulators and law enforcement agencies attended the meeting. A range of topics were covered over the course of the day, including the impact of the GDPR on the RIPE NCC, law enforcement’s recent engagement with the RIPE Policy Development Process, the use of address-sharing technologies (CGN) across Europe, and a run-down of key issues ahead of the ITU Plenipotentiary 2018 in October. The RIPE NCC has run Roundtable Meetings since 2005. They have proven to be an effective way of stimulating dialogue with and between regulators, and updating them on issues affecting the RIPE community. We also plan to hold Roundtable Meetings in the Middle East and Russian/CIS regions in 2018. You can find more information, including presentation slides, on our website (click on the agenda items): https://www.ripe.net/participate/meetings/roundtable/january-2018 Best regards, Chris Buckridge External Relations Manager RIPE NCC

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DMARC Solution Applied to this Mailing List
by Adam Castle 19 Dec '17

19 Dec '17

Dear Working Group, As more email providers enable Domain Message Authentication Reporting & Conformance (DMARC), some people find they can no longer receive emails from the mailing lists they are subscribed to. We have deployed a Mailman setting change to address this problem. After consultation with the RIPE Working Group Chairs, we have enabled the DMARC "Munge From" setting on all RIPE mailing lists. This means that if your email service provider has DMARC enabled, you will continue to receive all emails sent to this mailing list, but the "From" part of the header will change. If you don't have DMARC enabled, you won't see any change to the emails you receive from this mailing list. You can find more information about how we have been handling DMARC in the following RIPE Labs articles: https://labs.ripe.net/Members/adam_castle/dmarc-and-the-ripe-ncc https://labs.ripe.net/Members/adam_castle/ripe-mailing-lists-and-dmarc To ensure all working group participants are aware of the changes, I am sending this mail to all working groups. If you have any questions or encounter any issues on this mailing list, please let me know. Many thanks. Adam Castle Web Services Manager RIPE NCC

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CENTR and RIPE NCC Sign MoU at IGF 2017
by Paul Rendek 19 Dec '17

19 Dec '17

Dear colleagues, Yesterday we signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the (CENTR). The agreement was signed alongside the 2017 Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in Geneva. The agreement formalises the existing relationship between the RIPE NCC and CENTR. CENTR agreed to invite RIPE NCC staff to its General Assemblies and to participate within its Technical Working Group, while the RIPE NCC agreed to invite CENTR staff to its Roundtable Meetings. Both parties agreed to involve one another in areas of mutual interest, and also agreed to promote the use of IPv6 among their respective memberships. The RIPE NCC and CENTR will also continue to jointly organise trainings and promote capacity building in Europe, with a specific focus on providing training to European policy-makers and other stakeholders. You can learn more in the news announcement: https://www.ripe.net/publications/news/announcements/ripe-ncc-and-centr-sig… You can also find the MoU itself, along with the other agreements we have with external organisations, on our website: https://www.ripe.net/about-us/what-we-do/engagement-external-organisations The signing of this MoU is a good opportunity to revisit some of the shared history between the RIPE NCC and CENTR, which goes back almost 20 years. We have outlined some of these early beginnings in an article on RIPE Labs: https://labs.ripe.net/Members/mirjam/centr-and-the-ripe-ncc-two-organisatio… Regards Paul Rendek Director of External Relations RIPE NCC

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RIPE NCC blogging @ IGF 2017
by Chris Buckridge 17 Dec '17

17 Dec '17

Dear colleagues, It’s that time of year again (or a little later, but who’s counting) - the annual Internet Governance Forum is taking place this week in Geneva, with a huge range of workshops, main sessions and other meetings, kicking off with today’s “Day 0” events. https://igf2017.swiss/ The RIPE NCC has a number of staff at the event, and has some community members to participate, and we will be collectively writing a “live” blog on RIPE Labs. See the latest posts here: https://labs.ripe.net/Members/chrisb/igf-2017-liveblog We’d love to hear your comments on the blog, or on the issues being discussed at the IGF, or on issues that you think should get a bit more attention at the IGF! And of course, we’re looking forward to catching up with some RIPE community members in town this week. Best regards, Chris ——— Chris Buckridge External Relations Manager RIPE NCC

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Training at IGF: Incident Response for Policy Makers
by Mirjam Kuehne 07 Dec '17

07 Dec '17

Hi, For those of you who will attend the upcoming Internet Governance Forum in Geneva, please note this free training on 18 December: "Incident Response for Policy Makers". https://www.first.org/events/training/geneva2017/ This half-day course is targeted at policy makers interested in cyber security and the operations of incident response teams (CSIRTs). Kind regards, Mirjam Kühne RIPE NCC

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Re: [cooperation-wg] cooperation-wg Digest, Vol 71, Issue 1
by Corinne Cath 06 Dec '17

06 Dec '17

Hi, Dr. Starosielski wrote a good book about undersea cables and their vulnerability. https://www.dukeupress.edu/the-undersea-network Might be of interest. best, On Wed, Dec 6, 2017 at 11:00 AM, <cooperation-wg-request(a)ripe.net> wrote: > Send cooperation-wg mailing list submissions to > cooperation-wg(a)ripe.net > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/cooperation-wg > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > cooperation-wg-request(a)ripe.net > > You can reach the person managing the list at > cooperation-wg-owner(a)ripe.net > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of cooperation-wg digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Undersea cables (Gordon Lennox) > 2. Re: Undersea cables (Julius ter Pelkwijk) > 3. Re: Undersea cables (Jim Reid) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2017 19:35:17 +0100 > From: Gordon Lennox <gordon.lennox.13(a)gmail.com> > To: Cooperation WG <cooperation-wg(a)ripe.net> > Subject: [cooperation-wg] Undersea cables > Message-ID: <9FE1E343-ECD0-42CE-9B7E-03F731903423(a)gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 > > A new report on an old problem. > > << We must do more to protect the indispensable yet insecure internet > infrastructure provided by undersea cables, urges Rishi Sunak MP in a new > report published by Policy Exchange, Undersea Cables: Indispensable, > insecure. > > 97% of global communications and $10 trillion in daily financial > transactions are transmitted not by satellites in the skies, but by cables > lying deep beneath the ocean. Undersea cables are the indispensable > infrastructure of our time, essential to our modern life and digital > economy, yet they are inadequately protected and highly vulnerable to > attack at sea and on land, from both hostile states and terrorists. > > US intelligence officials have spoken of Russian submarines ?aggressively > operating? near Atlantic cables as part of its broader interest in > unconventional methods of warfare. When Russia annexed Crimea, one of its > first moves was to sever the main cable connection to the outside world. > > Undersea cables come ashore in just a few remote, coastal locations. These > landing sites are critical national infrastructure but often have minimal > protection, making them vulnerable to terrorism. A foiled Al-Qaeda plot to > destroy a key London internet exchange in 2007 illustrates the credibility > of the threat. >> > > See: > > https://policyexchange.org.uk/publication/undersea-cables- > indispensable-insecure/ > > And so governments must now do something? > > Gordon > > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Tue, 05 Dec 2017 18:51:16 +0000 > From: Julius ter Pelkwijk <pelkwijk(a)gmail.com> > To: Gordon Lennox <gordon.lennox.13(a)gmail.com> > Cc: Cooperation WG <cooperation-wg(a)ripe.net> > Subject: Re: [cooperation-wg] Undersea cables > Message-ID: > <CAAiMRCT3K=_9MAL18r=jo+2CJ=JTMNKfQ23k51-McqozvmxgtQ@mail. > gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > Hi Gordon, > > You mean this one? > > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transatlantic_communications_cable > > All you need is a shovel and a big axe, and a lot of patience. If you give > me enough time I might even be able to find one of those endpoints. Yes, > the problem exists, and yes, when the internet goes slower than usual there > will be panic, but from what I know is that these "connections" are more > robust than people actually think. Its a storm in a glass of water. > > Julius > > On Tue, Dec 5, 2017 at 7:35 PM Gordon Lennox <gordon.lennox.13(a)gmail.com> > wrote: > > > A new report on an old problem. > > > > << We must do more to protect the indispensable yet insecure internet > > infrastructure provided by undersea cables, urges Rishi Sunak MP in a new > > report published by Policy Exchange, Undersea Cables: Indispensable, > > insecure. > > > > 97% of global communications and $10 trillion in daily financial > > transactions are transmitted not by satellites in the skies, but by > cables > > lying deep beneath the ocean. Undersea cables are the indispensable > > infrastructure of our time, essential to our modern life and digital > > economy, yet they are inadequately protected and highly vulnerable to > > attack at sea and on land, from both hostile states and terrorists. > > > > US intelligence officials have spoken of Russian submarines ?aggressively > > operating? near Atlantic cables as part of its broader interest in > > unconventional methods of warfare. When Russia annexed Crimea, one of its > > first moves was to sever the main cable connection to the outside world. > > > > Undersea cables come ashore in just a few remote, coastal locations. > These > > landing sites are critical national infrastructure but often have minimal > > protection, making them vulnerable to terrorism. A foiled Al-Qaeda plot > to > > destroy a key London internet exchange in 2007 illustrates the > credibility > > of the threat. >> > > > > See: > > > > > > https://policyexchange.org.uk/publication/undersea-cables- > indispensable-insecure/ > > > > And so governments must now do something? > > > > Gordon > > > > > > >

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New on RIPE Labs: From RIPE 75 to IGF 2017
by Mirjam Kuehne 06 Dec '17

06 Dec '17

Dear colleagues, Please find this report by Elif Sert on RIPE Labs in which she describes how being a fellow at RIPE 75 improved her understanding of what the multistakeholder model actually means, and how it will help her when attending the IGF in Geneva later this month: https://labs.ripe.net/Members/elif_sert_1/from-ripe-75-to-igf-2017 Kind regards, Mirjam Kühne RIPE NCC

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Undersea cables
by Gordon Lennox 05 Dec '17

05 Dec '17

A new report on an old problem. << We must do more to protect the indispensable yet insecure internet infrastructure provided by undersea cables, urges Rishi Sunak MP in a new report published by Policy Exchange, Undersea Cables: Indispensable, insecure. 97% of global communications and $10 trillion in daily financial transactions are transmitted not by satellites in the skies, but by cables lying deep beneath the ocean. Undersea cables are the indispensable infrastructure of our time, essential to our modern life and digital economy, yet they are inadequately protected and highly vulnerable to attack at sea and on land, from both hostile states and terrorists. US intelligence officials have spoken of Russian submarines “aggressively operating” near Atlantic cables as part of its broader interest in unconventional methods of warfare. When Russia annexed Crimea, one of its first moves was to sever the main cable connection to the outside world. Undersea cables come ashore in just a few remote, coastal locations. These landing sites are critical national infrastructure but often have minimal protection, making them vulnerable to terrorism. A foiled Al-Qaeda plot to destroy a key London internet exchange in 2007 illustrates the credibility of the threat. >> See: https://policyexchange.org.uk/publication/undersea-cables-indispensable-ins… And so governments must now do something? Gordon

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