May 2011 - address-policy-wg - mailman.ripe.net

Re: [address-policy-wg] 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) going to Last Call
by Malcolm Hutty 10 May '11

10 May '11

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I am afraid I don't believe this policy should be adopted at this time. My reason is that I think it creates a legal and political risk that is substantial and as yet uninvestigated in the PDP, but which may in the long term reduce the overall robustness of Internet infrastructure to an extent that greatly outweigh the security benefits of the policy. This is not a minor, administrative policy. It is (even if not intended as such) the first step in a process the end result of which would be a major change to the Internet architecture. I am afraid that the ultimate outcome could be that the Internet becomes more fragile as a consequence. True, it's only the first step. But if it's a step in the wrong direction, let's not do it. I don't think we should approve this policy until we are certain that this approach is necessary, worth the risk, that no acceptable alternative solutions (or partial solutions) to the problem exist, and that we've also established all appropriate measures to mitigate the foreseeable risks. The complete argument about why I fear a bad outcome will be too long and complex for a first post on this subject, so let me try to give the briefest summary I can manage instead: I believe that if this policy is adopted, and if it is taken up significantly be operators, it will encourage a dramatic increase in the number of demands from law enforcement and private litigants to the RIPE NCC to revoke both allocation of resources and their certificates, without the consent of the person to whom the resource is delegated. Once legislators realise that the NCC has a more effective power to revoke allocations than previously existed, and has become more capable of making networks appear to "go offline" than it currently is able, legislators will likely respond by creating new powers for law enforcement to oblige the NCC to revoke resource allocations as a tool to address undesired behaviour by network users. In short, in a world where reachability is significantly affected by the ability to produce a valid certificate under this policy, the RIPE NCC will be seen as a "one-stop-shop" for knocking networks offline, to control illicit content and online activity. (Perhaps reachability will not be affected because network operators will ignore these certificates, but if we believe that then isn't this policy a waste of time and effort? And operators may not have a free choice: new legal powers were created by the EU last year that could easily be used to compel adoption). Thus, the RIPE NCC would be gradually transformed into a much more political body; indeed, I think at least as political as ICANN currently is. My concerns are not merely academic, they are immediate and practical. We know that many countries, including the EU, have adopted or are actively considering adopting legal requirements for network operators to block packet transit to/from network addresses outside their network in order to inhibit illicit content or activity (e.g. copyright infringement). LEAs already attend RIPE meetings (Co-operation WG) to ask the community to develop policies to transfer allocations of network blocks to the LEA following an allegation by the LEA that the netblock is being used for illicit purposes, the idea being to seize control of routing. Earlier this year the RIPE NCC attended at least one meeting that I know of to discuss this with EU officials. So far the NCC has fended off such requests, I understand, on the grounds that it doesn't have control over routing. If this policy proceeds, is adopted and successful, that argument will be greatly weakened. Would making RIPE NCC such an attractive single point of failure really make the Internet more secure and robust? I believe that before this policy is adopted the community should consider in depth: i) whether these concerns are at least potentially valid (I am convinced they are); ii) If so, whether the problem that this policy addresses is sufficiently serious to warrant accepting these new risks [1]; and iii) Even if the problem is serious enough, whether alternative means to address it could be found that would mitigate these risks [2]. (For example, if the problem could be 80% solved using a model that does not give RIRs a power to revoke and expire certificates "needed" for routing, is the residual 20% of the problem really serious enough to warrant creating the risks I describe). iv) Even if the problem still justifies adopting the approach taken in this policy proposal, what other steps should be taken simultaineously to mitigate these risks. For myself, I am convinced about (i). I have serious doubts about (ii) and (iii) myself, and perhaps more importantly can see no evidence on the list archive that the community has actively assessed whether (ii) is true, and no evidence that other potential architectures or system designs have been considered as a possible alternative that might better mitigate the risks I describe. Nor has there been any visible discussion of (iv). Even if I've missed something, do we really think the community has considered these issues in depth? Or have they been shunted off as a problem to be looked at later, or elsewhere? The presentation at yesterdays RIPE meeting plenary by Randy Bush and the discussion that followed convinced me that there is much more for the community to discuss. I have raised this issue at previous RIPE meetings but only recently become aware that to affect the PDP it was necessary to post on this list, for which my apologies. However I now see such objections are the explicit purpose of the Last Call, so I hope you'll consider this objection carefully. There is much more I could say, but for a first post on the subject I'll leave it at that; I don't want to create a bigger "wall of text" than absolutely necessary. I would be grateful if those who agree with me that this discussion warrants delaying adoption of the proposal would say so now, so that the WG Chair can see whether there is a "serious objection" that prevents a rough consensus being declared at this time. My apologies to those who have worked so long and hard on this, with only the best of motives, on the assumption that there was general support for this approach. But I'm afraid this issue is too important to let this pass without raising my concerns, and asking the community to stand with me. Malcolm. [1] Yes, route hijacking does happen, sometimes by mistake and sometimes by malice. But how often? Are current responses sufficient to deal with it proportionately? Could they be made more effective without any kind of certification scheme? Would something new, that's not a certification scheme suffice? [2] For example, could we creates "webs of trust" rather than a single hierarchy? Would that be "good enough" or is a hierarchy essential? Could a PKI for address allocations work sufficiently well without investing the hierarchy with authority to revoke certificates? Should we consider an architecture with a distributed issuer/revoker, spread across multiple jurisdictions? What other models exist? - -- Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd Maya House, 134-138 Borough High Street, London SE1 1LB Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.14 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iEYEARECAAYFAk2/56YACgkQJiK3ugcyKhTdwgCgp02ZpOj7XhT1TlN5xk7vOF9l ZdAAoIe+LF1Dt70q9Gonk2/CsoLG6N2O =z7io -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) going to Last Call
by Sander Steffann 09 May '11

09 May '11

Hello working group, The review period for the new RIPE Document described in proposal 2008-08 has ended. During the review phase we have seen on the mailing list: - one positive comment (Bais) - one comment to go forward in the PDP with some extra comments intended for the future evolution of a more comprehensive certification policy (Volk) Based on this feedback we (the address policy working group chairs) have decided to move this policy proposal to the Concluding Phase and start the Last Call for Comments. The documents on the website will be updated to reflect this and an official announcement will be sent out once this is done. Thank you all for your contributions, Sander Steffann RIPE Address Policy WG co-chair

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2008-08 Most recent version of the CPS?
by Wilfried Woeber, UniVie/ACOnet 09 May '11

09 May '11

Folks, is the document RIPE NCC RPKI (without a ripe document ID :-/ ), labelled "Last updated December 2010" the most recent addition? If it is, I do have quite some issues with this text, in particular in its formal relationship to the 2008-08 draft policy text. If there's a more recent version I'd be grateful to be given a pointer or a reference. Tnx, Wilfried.

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PP - 2011-02 - Removal of multihomed requirement for IPv6
by Adil H. Baghir 07 May '11

07 May '11

Hi, I highly support the policy... Adil H. Baghir Chief Engineer, Internet Development Data & Solutions Planning and Design P.O.Box 69179 Riyadh 11423 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Tel: +966 56 031 3263 Fax: +966 56 041 3263 Mobile: +966 542 33 66 00 eMail: a.baghir(a)mobily.com.sa<mailto:a.baghir@mobily.com.sa> [cid:image002.jpg@01CC0D02.F7D02210] ------Disclaimer------ This email and any files transmitted with are classified as confidential unless otherwise specified. This e-mail is intended solely for the use of the individual or entity to whom this e-mail is addressed. If you have received this email by mistake, please notify the sender and delete this e-mail immediately and permanently. Although measures were taken to free this e-mail and its attachments from any malicious code infection, it is the responsibility of the recipient to check this email and any attachments for the presence of such infection. The use of EEC(Mobily) e-mail service is limited for EEC(Mobily) business use only.

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Removal of multihomed requirement for IPv6
by ABS EMEA NIC - IPA Support AT&T 07 May '11

07 May '11

Hi All, I support this proposal. To have 2 ISPs is not a cheap solution. What in case if you have 2-ISPs and you are not satisfied with offered services with one of them and decide to have only 1-ISP. You cannot use IPv6 PI space. What in case if you want to change another ISP ? You have to renumber a lot of ip addresses and update firewalls and more. I think that keeping multihoming requirement for IPv6 PI space prevent to deploy of IPv6 especially for small end users (customers). Mikael Abrahamsson, Why do you think: "50 EUR PI with no technical requirements for multihoming or other is a recipe for longterm disaster in my book." ? 50 Eur works today for IPv4 PI space as well. Thank you Best regards _____________________________________ Pavol Kovac -----Original Message----- From: address-policy-wg-admin(a)ripe.net [mailto:address-policy-wg-admin@ripe.net] On Behalf Of address-policy-wg-request(a)ripe.net Sent: Friday, May 06, 2011 12:00 PM To: address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net Subject: address-policy-wg digest, Vol 1 #1313 - 14 msgs Send address-policy-wg mailing list submissions to address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://www.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/address-policy-wg or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to address-policy-wg-request(a)ripe.net You can reach the person managing the list at address-policy-wg-admin(a)ripe.net When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of address-policy-wg digest..." Today's Topics: 1. On the agenda for tomorrow: 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) (Sander Steffann) 2. Re: 2011-02 New Policy Proposal (Removal of multihomed requirement for IPv6) (Mikael Abrahamsson) 3. Legal counsel on 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) (Sander Steffann) 4. RE: 2011-02 New Policy Proposal (Removal of multihomed requirement for IPv6) (poty(a)iiat.ru) 5. Re: Legal counsel on 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) (Mikael Abrahamsson) 6. Re: 2011-02 New Policy Proposal (Removal of multihomed requirement for IPv6) (=?ISO-8859-1?Q?Vegar_L=F8v=E5s?=) 7. Re: Legal counsel on 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) (Malcolm Hutty) 8. pointer to ietf sidr wg (Randy Bush) 9. Re: Legal counsel on 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) (boggits) --__--__-- Message: 1 From: Sander Steffann <sander(a)steffann.nl> Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 16:44:41 +0200 To: "address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net Working Group" <address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net> Subject: [address-policy-wg] On the agenda for tomorrow: 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) Hello WG, We will have a discussion about 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in = the RIPE NCC Service Region) on the agenda for tomorrow's address policy = session at RIPE 62. We also will have a short presentation there about = the issues that have been discussed on this mailing list over the last = couple of days. The session is from 9:00 to 10:30 and remote = participation is possible at http://ripe62.ripe.net/live/main. Thank you, Sander Steffann APWG co-chair --__--__-- Message: 2 Date: Thu, 5 May 2011 19:30:27 +0200 (CEST) From: Mikael Abrahamsson <swmike(a)swm.pp.se> To: address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net cc: policy-announce(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [address-policy-wg] 2011-02 New Policy Proposal (Removal of multihomed requirement for IPv6) Organization: People's Front Against WWW On Fri, 15 Apr 2011, Emilio Madaio wrote: > We encourage you to review this proposal and send your comments to > <address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net> before 13 May 2011. As has been stated by me before, 50 EUR PI with no technical requirements for multihoming or other is a recipe for longterm disaster in my book. I strongly oppose. -- Mikael Abrahamsson email: swmike(a)swm.pp.se --__--__-- Message: 3 From: Sander Steffann <sander(a)steffann.nl> Date: Fri, 6 May 2011 08:43:56 +0200 To: "address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net Working Group" <address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net> Subject: [address-policy-wg] Legal counsel on 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) Hello WG, I asked the RIPE NCC to get legal counsel on the possibilities of a = court ordering the RIPE NCC to revoke or confiscate RPKI certificates. = Here is the full answer we received: =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D The RIPE NCC is an association under Dutch law and therefore subject to = the Dutch legislation. RIPE NCC has consulted several external lawyers, = and has obtained an analysis of the legal situation based on current, = existing Dutch legislation. This analysis takes into account Dutch = Criminal, Civil and Administrative law. Certificates are directly linked to the registration of the Internet = number resources. There is no specific Dutch legislation that can be used to order the = deregistration of Internet number resources or change the registration = details of Internet number resources. Nor is there any legislation that = applies to the revocation of certificates over Internet number = resources. In the absence of such legislation, a court cannot order the revocation = of certificates. It is the RIPE NCC=92s view, based on this analysis, that the RIPE NCC = cannot be ordered to revoke resource certificates. =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D Of course laws can change, but the advice above may address some of the = concerns raised about the RPKI infrastructure. Sander Steffann APWG co-chair --__--__-- Message: 4 Subject: RE: [address-policy-wg] 2011-02 New Policy Proposal (Removal of multihomed requirement for IPv6) Date: Fri, 6 May 2011 10:59:44 +0400 From: <poty(a)iiat.ru> To: <swmike(a)swm.pp.se>, <address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net> Cc: <policy-announce(a)ripe.net> According to my messages to the WG earlier and taking into good consideration of the point of view of Mikael Abrahamsson I oppose the policy too. Vladislav Potapov IIAT, Ltd. -----Original Message----- From: address-policy-wg-admin(a)ripe.net [mailto:address-policy-wg-admin@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Mikael Abrahamsson Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 9:30 PM To: address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net Cc: policy-announce(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [address-policy-wg] 2011-02 New Policy Proposal (Removal of multihomed requirement for IPv6) On Fri, 15 Apr 2011, Emilio Madaio wrote: > We encourage you to review this proposal and send your comments to=20 > <address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net> before 13 May 2011. As has been stated by me before, 50 EUR PI with no technical requirements=20 for multihoming or other is a recipe for longterm disaster in my book. I strongly oppose. --=20 Mikael Abrahamsson email: swmike(a)swm.pp.se --__--__-- Message: 5 Date: Fri, 6 May 2011 09:01:27 +0200 (CEST) From: Mikael Abrahamsson <swmike(a)swm.pp.se> To: Sander Steffann <sander(a)steffann.nl> cc: "address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net Working Group" <address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net> Subject: Re: [address-policy-wg] Legal counsel on 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) Organization: People's Front Against WWW On Fri, 6 May 2011, Sander Steffann wrote: > In the absence of such legislation, a court cannot order the revocation > of certificates. In several countries, we've seen courts ordering ISPs to block accessibility to certain sites involving not using DNS names (denmark and thepiratebay.org for instance, or the domain names transferred to US authorities just a few months ago) or block access IP-wise (Black Internet in Sweden). I am sure there was no specific law handling this, but the laws at least in these countries are flexible enough that other laws can be used to order things around. > Of course laws can change, but the advice above may address some of the > concerns raised about the RPKI infrastructure. It's good that it has been answered for dutch law, I wonder what equivalent question would have been answered in Sweden and Denmark or the US 5 years ago. -- Mikael Abrahamsson email: swmike(a)swm.pp.se --__--__-- Message: 6 Date: Fri, 06 May 2011 09:13:49 +0200 From: =?ISO-8859-1?Q?Vegar_L=F8v=E5s?= <vegar(a)rentarack.no> To: address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [address-policy-wg] 2011-02 New Policy Proposal (Removal of multihomed requirement for IPv6) I agree with this proposal. --=20 Best regards Vegar L=F8v=E5s Rent a Rack AS On 15.04.2011 11:22, Emilio Madaio wrote: > Dear Colleagues, > > A proposed change to the RIPE Document ripe-512,"IPv6 Address > Allocation and Assignment Policy", is now available for discussion. > > > You can find the full proposal at: > > http://www.ripe.net/ripe/policies/proposals/2011-02 > > We encourage you to review this proposal and send your comments to > <address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net> before 13 May 2011. > > Regards > > Emilio Madaio > Policy Development Officer > RIPE NCC > --__--__-- Message: 7 Date: Fri, 06 May 2011 08:28:44 +0100 From: Malcolm Hutty <malcolm(a)linx.net> To: address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [address-policy-wg] Legal counsel on 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 On 06/05/2011 07:43, Sander Steffann wrote: > There is no specific Dutch legislation that can be used to order the > deregistration of Internet number resources or change the > registration details of Internet number resources. Nor is there any > legislation that applies to the revocation of certificates over > Internet number resources. >=20 > In the absence of such legislation, a court cannot order the > revocation of certificates. >=20 > It is the RIPE NCC=92s view, based on this analysis, that the RIPE NCC > cannot be ordered to revoke resource certificates. There are a couple of other possible current vectors, as well as the question of future legislation. 1. Legal counsel referred to the lack of legislation that specifically mentioned revocation of certificates. Most of the existing and draft legislation I know of (not Dutch, but some EU) refers instead to "preventing access to Internet [locations/sites/content]". As a generalisation, courts will not normally order someone to do something utterly outside their power, but may order someone to take such steps as they are able to achieve an end if they are seen as being able to make a significant contribution, even if that contribution won't be wholly successful. For example, courts sometimes order newspapers and broadcasters not to publish information, even though they know the information may end up being published online. Right now it is commonly said that RIPE NCC does not have control over routing, so a court would be unlikely to order the RIPE NCC to prevent access to an Internet location. If, as a result of this policy, RIPE NCC is seen to have the capability to significantly reduce the reachability of an Internet location, a court might be willing to order it to "prevent access to the location" to the extent that it is able. No explicit mention need be made of certificate revocation. 2. Within some jurisdictions LEAs argue that Internet intermediaries are themselves criminally liable if they "facilitate" criminal activity by refusing to prevent access to an Internet location where criminal activity is ongoing, once they have been informed of the criminal activity. Intermediaries are thus induced to block access without a court order being necessary. Within the EU, network operators have special protection against this threat from the E-Commerce Directive as "mere conduits", but unfortunately registries like the RIPE NCC probably do not fit the definition of "mere conduit". In the UK, Nominet (the .uk ccTLD registry) has been induced to suspend domain registrations using this argument. RIPE NCC might in future be exposed to the same pressure. 3. Finally, new legislation not only /could/ be created, but most certainly will. The Netherlands is subject to EU law. Whether such new law would affect the RIPE NCC we cannot be certain, but I am certain that the only thing restraining lobbyists is a lack of awareness of the existence of RIPE NCC (and awareness is increasing), and a belief that the RIPE NCC has no relevant technical capability, which this policy would change. - --=20 Malcolm Hutty | tel: +44 20 7645 3523 Head of Public Affairs | Read the LINX Public Affairs blog London Internet Exchange | http://publicaffairs.linx.net/ London Internet Exchange Ltd Maya House, 134-138 Borough High Street, London SE1 1LB Company Registered in England No. 3137929 Trinity Court, Trinity Street, Peterborough PE1 1DA -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v2.0.14 (MingW32) Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org/ iEYEARECAAYFAk3DoywACgkQJiK3ugcyKhSlSACdGyEFtxJUai+xrWtGB/vwZjoJ VnUAoLpgRXaghPiUTTDwF3SIoQxgCEa+ =3DeFIF -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- --__--__-- Message: 8 Date: Fri, 06 May 2011 10:23:36 +0200 From: Randy Bush <randy(a)psg.com> To: RIPE address policy WG <address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net> Subject: [address-policy-wg] pointer to ietf sidr wg as requested by gert, here are pointers to the work of the sidr wg of the ietf main page of wg == documents http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/sidr/ charter of sidr wg http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/sidr/charter/ mailing list http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sidr/current/maillist.html if i can be of help in navigation or interpretation, feel free to write to me randy, just another bozo on the routing security bus --__--__-- Message: 9 Date: Fri, 6 May 2011 11:06:44 +0200 Subject: Re: [address-policy-wg] Legal counsel on 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) From: boggits <boggits(a)gmail.com> Cc: "address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net Working Group" <address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net> On 6 May 2011 08:43, Sander Steffann <sander(a)steffann.nl> wrote: > Of course laws can change, but the advice above may address some of the concerns raised about the RPKI infrastructure. > This is indeed true but misses the point that laws tend to exist either when there is an actual 'thing' to make laws about or are framed in such a way to allow the courts the latitude to include 'new things' in the same piece of legislation. Since RPKI is not currently a 'thing' but rather a 'new thing' I would be wary of relying on legal opinion that says: "There is no specific Dutch legislation that can be used to order the deregistration of Internet number resources or change the registration details of Internet number resources. Nor is there any legislation that applies to the revocation of certificates over Internet number resources." What you are looking for is legislation (as pointed out by Malcom) that can be used to restrict/control access to the internet which appears to exist at least at a European level J -- James Blessing 07989 039 476 End of address-policy-wg Digest

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2011-02 New Policy Proposal (Removal of multihomed requirement for IPv6)
by Emilio Madaio 06 May '11

06 May '11

Dear Colleagues, A proposed change to the RIPE Document ripe-512,"IPv6 Address Allocation and Assignment Policy", is now available for discussion. You can find the full proposal at: http://www.ripe.net/ripe/policies/proposals/2011-02 We encourage you to review this proposal and send your comments to <address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net> before 13 May 2011. Regards Emilio Madaio Policy Development Officer RIPE NCC

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Re: [address-policy-wg] 2011-02 New Policy Proposal (Removal of multihomed requirement for IPv6)
by Sascha Luck 06 May '11

06 May '11

I support this proposal. rgds, sascha Luck

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pointer to ietf sidr wg
by Randy Bush 06 May '11

06 May '11

as requested by gert, here are pointers to the work of the sidr wg of the ietf main page of wg == documents http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/sidr/ charter of sidr wg http://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/sidr/charter/ mailing list http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/sidr/current/maillist.html if i can be of help in navigation or interpretation, feel free to write to me randy, just another bozo on the routing security bus

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RE: [address-policy-wg] 2011-02 New Policy Proposal (Removal of multihomed requirement for IPv6)
by poty＠iiat.ru 06 May '11

06 May '11

According to my messages to the WG earlier and taking into good consideration of the point of view of Mikael Abrahamsson I oppose the policy too. Vladislav Potapov IIAT, Ltd. -----Original Message----- From: address-policy-wg-admin(a)ripe.net [mailto:address-policy-wg-admin@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Mikael Abrahamsson Sent: Thursday, May 05, 2011 9:30 PM To: address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net Cc: policy-announce(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [address-policy-wg] 2011-02 New Policy Proposal (Removal of multihomed requirement for IPv6) On Fri, 15 Apr 2011, Emilio Madaio wrote: > We encourage you to review this proposal and send your comments to > <address-policy-wg(a)ripe.net> before 13 May 2011. As has been stated by me before, 50 EUR PI with no technical requirements for multihoming or other is a recipe for longterm disaster in my book. I strongly oppose. -- Mikael Abrahamsson email: swmike(a)swm.pp.se

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On the agenda for tomorrow: 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region)
by Sander Steffann 05 May '11

05 May '11

Hello WG, We will have a discussion about 2008-08 (Initial Certification Policy in the RIPE NCC Service Region) on the agenda for tomorrow's address policy session at RIPE 62. We also will have a short presentation there about the issues that have been discussed on this mailing list over the last couple of days. The session is from 9:00 to 10:30 and remote participation is possible at http://ripe62.ripe.net/live/main. Thank you, Sander Steffann APWG co-chair

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