I've already explained why this had been happened at all first hand. RIRs have different rules and principles and constantly invents new methods of complicating the situation in exchanging information between them. Second thought: the "concern" was raised in presumption that the route

objects "authorize" something to a provider. It is NOT. The absence of

the routing objects would change nothing in the situation. A lot of providers do not build any filters based on a RIR routing policy at all.

Yes. This was also the case with the providers of the rogue AS that started this discussion. There were even prefixes in the RIR db with a different origin AS than the one being announced on the internet. The data in the RIR db seem to have no influence on the routes being announced. You could however argue that a more correct RIR db would make LIRs use this db for actual filtering. ---------------- Absolutely agreed with the last sentence! Maybe not so clear, but I tried to say it earlier. We need internal integrity of the DBs from different RIRs first hand and a way of exchanging the information between them (reliably). It will solve the problem completely. Regards, Vladislav