It is indeed good to start considering doing ROV “invalid is reject” on both ingress and egress EBGP routing policy attachment points.

Operators will want to consider punching holes in the policy for things like (selective) blackholing so those “invalid” more-specifics can be propagated to others.

On Mon, Oct 8, 2018 at 20:27 nusenu <nusenu-lists@riseup.net> wrote:

Sebastian Wiesinger:
> I just wanted to let you know that noris network (AS12337) is now
> validating RPKI information with invalid == reject in our upstream &
> IXP eBGP sessions. First impression (and impact analysis before the
> deployment) suggests no customer impact by this. I'll let you know if
> this changes in the coming weeks. :)

great!
thanks for deploying ROV.

I'm wondering what that means for RPKI invalids originating from AS12337
https://rpki-validator.ripe.net/announcement-preview?asn=AS12337&prefix=2001:67c:1933::%2F48

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