![](https://secure.gravatar.com/avatar/fbf7209ba6a751a4416c0df24e150dab.jpg?s=120&d=mm&r=g)
Hi Job, Thanks for your email and explanation to give an example of a once legitimate user (me) in the case of 154.50.194.0/23 we were assigned from Cogent, at the time I requested support for a route object to be created, they just told us to use the generic password to add route objects in the ripe database, (AFRINIC manged legacy space) I have, since the implementation of the RIPE-NONAUTH change recently asked cogent to create routeobjects in RADB. (it should have been requested sooner by myself) so this data that was once legitimately used is still in the ripe database (and probably should have been dealt with by us already) now that it is being removed it I think a reminder to the creator of the object, that they should find an alternative would be helpful. I hope this helps clarify what I ment in relation to Legitimate users of the RIPE-NONAUTH objects Thanks Tom Smyth On Tue, 16 Oct 2018 at 13:38, Job Snijders <job@instituut.net> wrote:
Hi Tom,
On Tue, Oct 16, 2018 at 2:35 PM Tom Smyth <tom.smyth@wirelessconnect.eu> wrote:
I understand but there were legitimate users, of the RIPE-NONAUTH objects (those in reciept of Legacy address space) and it would serve as full and final reminder to those who legitimately used the legacy RIPE-NONAUTH objects, to get the resource holders to update / create new route objects that are authenticated and in line with best current practice. I think the risk of emailing an adversary is minimal when they cannot do much about the pending object deletion.
Resource holders that can create RPKI ROAs for LEGACY space can create IRR route objects in the RIPE IRR (and as such are not considered out-of-region, those objects are not in the RIPE-NONAUTH dataset).
Resource holders that have legacy space anchored in the ARIN region can't create RPKI ROAs - so those objects would not be affected in any way anyhow.
Kind regards,
Job