This can be fixed by generating your own fake routes that would effectively blackhole all the unassigned traffic, using the publicated RIPE Invalid ROAs.

Maria

On November 3, 2019 5:12:54 PM GMT+01:00, Alexander Azimov <a.e.azimov@gmail.com> wrote:

Hi,

Let discuss the next scenario: there are two prefixes: x.x.0.0/24 and x.x.1.0/24, first one assigned to an ISP, second - unallocated. The proposal suggests that RIPE should create ROA with AS0 for x.x.1.0/24. Will it stop an attacker from squatting this address space? 

The answer will be No. An attacker will still be able to hijack x.x.0.0/23, which will have an 'unknown' status and will be passed on, as a result finally capturing traffic for x.x.1.0/24.

While I support the goals behind this proposal, it seems that ROA with its current model of use is not applicable for this purpose.

сб, 2 нояб. 2019 г. в 14:15, Tim Bruijnzeels <tim@nlnetlabs.nl>:

Hi all,

I am not opposed to this in principle. I see some value. However, I think it would be good to take an impact analysis into account in order to prioritise this relative to other rpki improvements. I agree with others who have said that there may be more valuable things for the ripe ncc to focus on, eg:

- rpki ta key rolls
- robustness wrt abuse of the system (producing thousands or millions of objects)
- aspa path validation with rpki

Tim


> On 2 Nov 2019, at 10:52, Carlos Friaças via routing-wg <routing-wg@ripe.net> wrote:
>
>
>
> Hi,
> (please see inline)
>
>
>> On Fri, 1 Nov 2019, Gert Doering wrote:
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>>> On Fri, Nov 01, 2019 at 07:09:42AM +0100, Job Snijders wrote:
>>> So we really have to wonder whether this is worth it, or whether a few
>>> emails or phone calls can also solve the issue.
>>
>> Isn't that the whole question underlying RPKI deployment?
>>
>> What is it that we want to stop with RPKI?  Only classic "prefix hijacking"
>> (announcing space that is formally delegated somewhere)
>
> With RPKI alone, mistakes.
>
> But when in doubt if network X has rights over network Y, it's rather simple to ask network X to create a proper ROA for network Y.
>
> If that *doesn't* happen, maybe some conclusions can be drawn.
> (there is a recent thread on the NANOG list where someone raised that "feature"...)
>
>
>> or other misuses
>> of BGP, like "announce unallocated space, use that for spamming or other
>> sorts of network attacks, withdraw announcement before people can track
>> things back to you".
>
>> From *one* computer security emergency response team's angle:
> RPKI is a good first step. Then, hopefully, ASPA can be added at some point.
>
> Playing the quick withdraw game will only work (and it is working, i suspect!) until people start understanding they need to log who announces what to them (24/7/365).
>
> Speaking about "network attacks" -- there is a lot of focus about the address space being hijacked, while major focus should be on those who receive the announcements. While it's terrible for the people/networks being impersonating, the potential targets are really everyone...
>
> ps: i wish to express support for 2019-08 in its current form.
>
> Cheers,
> Carlos
>
>
>
>> Gert Doering
>>       -- NetMaster
>> --
>> have you enabled IPv6 on something today...?
>>
>> SpaceNet AG                      Vorstand: Sebastian v. Bomhard, Michael Emmer
>> Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14        Aufsichtsratsvors.: A. Grundner-Culemann
>> D-80807 Muenchen                 HRB: 136055 (AG Muenchen)
>> Tel: +49 (0)89/32356-444         USt-IdNr.: DE813185279
>>

--

Best regards,

Alexander Azimov

--
Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.