Job Snijders wrote:
On Tue, Aug 14, 2018 at 07:58:00PM +0000, nusenu wrote:
I'm currently estimating how "vulnerable" certain IP addresses are to BGP hijacking.
To do that, I put them into different categories (multiple can apply):
a) RPKI validity state is "NotFound" (no ROA) and IP located in a prefix shorter than /24 (IPv4) or /48 (IPv6) b) Valid ROA but weak maxlength c) Valid ROA with proper maxlength d) is announced in a /24 prefix (IPv4) or /48 (IPv6) e) = (c) + (d)
Interesting approach! This is the first time I've seen someone phrase it this formally, but you are correct I think.
thanks for the feedback, I'm glad it made some sense. context: I wrote that email while putting together this post: https://medium.com/@nusenu/how-vulnerable-is-the-tor-network-to-bgp-hijackin... (specifically the "what properties do we consider?" section) In the end I went ahead with "Approach 2" and used the following definition: 'we consider all ASes with an AS rank <= 10000 to be “better connected than the attacking AS”' which split the /24 prefixes I looked at in about half (10 vs. 9 as seen in Figure 3). kind regards, nusenu -- https://twitter.com/nusenu_ https://mastodon.social/@nusenu