It could also be that all 5 RIRs have trust roots for 0/0, so if you get a different RIR to sign with a different origin (including AS 0), that network is going to be unreachable at a lot of locations. Rubens On Fri, Feb 18, 2022 at 7:09 AM Job Snijders via routing-wg <routing-wg@ripe.net> wrote:
Hi all,
It might be the case that the vulnerability is in the realm of disagreement with some design choices of the past, rather than a traditional CVE hole in one or more software packages.
I found the following paper which touches upon the “assumed trust” aspect of RPKI in the relationship between Relaying Party and Trust Anchor(s).
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/349045074_Privacy_Preserving_and_Re...
I’m very interested in discussion about cross-signing schemes.
Kind regards,
Job --
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