FYI and apologies for duplicate mails. ----- Forwarded message from k claffy <kc@caida.org> ----- Date: Thu, 16 Oct 2003 12:26:15 -0700 From: k claffy <kc@caida.org> Subject: requesting hard data sources on ramifications of verisign wildcard To: nanog@nanog.org as already mentioned, fascinating public policy theatre is going on in DC on the verisign wildcard issue, see http://secsac.icann.org/ [all video and even transcripts of both meetings online. go icann.] you are encouraged to read through all of it before making public comments on this issue at nanog. (or, hope springs eternal, to this list.) caida has the following request on behalf of icann's secsac committee [an exceptionally competent group who is approaching this issue with impressive speed, equaniminity, and integrity. http://www.icann.org/committees/security/ i believe we're in good hands here. let's give the process a chance and constructively contribute where we can.] a common theme over the last week is an admitted lack of hard data [rather than lists of theoretical breakages, and anecdotal evidence, and predictions] from the operational community on actual loss of stability in Internet performance or functionality. david from XO gave an outstanding talk on 7 oct, http://www.icann.org/presentations/shairer-secsac-dc-07oct03.ppt but, as with many other providers, he deployed the bind patch within 24 hours so he didn't really have useful hard data to put on the table. i get similar comments from others. ben from harvard also gave some hard alexa data, fwiw http://www.icann.org/presentations/edelman-secsac-dc-15oct03.ppt but from a specific vantage point. we need more of these. icann's secsac committee is in a much stronger position to provide technically sound and equitable guidance if we can provide them with as specific, concrete examples (*hard data*) that indicate extent of various types of breakage. please save the arguments regarding the legitimacy and short notice of this request until you've read the hours of discussion about it that has already occurred among many qualified folks in DC (and in any case the meta-issue still stretches AUP of nanog list). the inconvenient reality is that the secsac committee needs concrete data (imagine), in addition to bulleted lists of things that break, for the policy process to work most effectively here. and nanog is in a position to make a difference. you are hereby encouraged to do so. please send any hard data reflecting observed ramifications on security and stability of Internet infrastructure to secsac-comment@icann.org no hard data will be refused service k ----- End forwarded message -----