At 04:02 AM 4/03/2005, Jeroen Massar wrote:
On Thu, 2005-03-03 at 20:27 +1100, Geoff Huston wrote:
On 2005-03-02, at 19.38, James A. T. Rice wrote:
This seems to suggest that you are just picking ASns at random to inject into the paths, and that you don't have a set of ASs which you have the assignees permission to use.
Would't this then actually equate to resource hijacking along the lines of prefix hijacking? Who will be the first to hit the RIRs?
Isn't this a case of illustrating how easy it is to tell lies in BGP today? I don't see what hitting the RIRs has do to with this. The problem appears to be more basic than that - its just too easy to tell lies in BGP and get the lies propagated globally.
I am probably telling you what you already know, but for the ones who don't know it yet:
Secure BGP (S-BGP): http://www.ir.bbn.com/projects/s-bgp/ http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/pdf/bellovinsbgp.pdf http://www.nwfusion.com/details/6484.html?def
and of course the sister by amongst others Cisco:
Secure Origin BGP (SO-BGP): http://bgp.potaroo.net/ietf/idref/ draft-ng-sobgp-bgp-extensions/ http://www.nwfusion.com/details/6485.html http://www.nanog.org/mtg-0306/pdf/alvaro.pdf
precisely - I think we've now managed to reach a common understanding that looking for "lies" in BGP is a difficult and expensive task and more often than not the "lies" get through anyway. The approaches above clearly flag what is intended to be "truth", with the inference that what is not clearly traceable back to originating attestations is a potential lie. We really should be moving in this direction now! Geoff