Antitrust investigation into RIPE NCC may expose members to tens of millions in potential legal costs for defending actions that violate members’ rights.
*Hi colleagues:* *Below are finding from law firm:* *RIPE NCC qualifies as an association of undertakings in the sense of EU competition law. In view of its activities, such as the allocation and registration of Internet number resources, RIPE NCC itself may also be regarded as an undertaking under EU competition law. The same applies to the other four regional Internet registries (RIRs). It follows that RIPE NCC is obliged to act in line with EU competition law: * - *as an association of undertakings, it must comply with Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which prohibits decisions by associations of undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market of the European Union. This is also known as the cartel prohibition;* - *as an undertaking, it must comply with Article 101(1) TFEU, which also prohibits agreements between undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market of the European Union;* - *as an undertaking, it must also comply with Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position within the internal market of the European Union.* *As regards the applicability of this Article 102 TFEU to RIPE NCC, it is important to note that the current standard service agreement of RIPE NCC, as well as the proposed new model, in conjunction with the RIR Governance Document, grants RIPE NCC complete territorial exclusivity to allocate and register Internet number resources in its own service area. Consequently, RIPE NCC holds a monopoly in its service area and should therefore be considered subject to the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position as set out in Article 102 TFEU.* *We have been advised by Loyens & Loeff that several restrictions in the current and the proposed service agreement of RIPE NCC and the RIR Governance Document may raise concerns under EU competition law, and could be contrary to the cartel prohibition and/or the prohibition of abuse of dominance.* *Firstly, the allocation of exclusive territorial service areas to each of the five RIRs could possibly be interpreted as a market sharing agreement. In general, market sharing agreements are considered to constitute serious hard core infringements of the cartel prohibition. These types of agreements only very rarely escape the applicability of the cartel prohibition, and usually do not qualify for an exemption from this prohibition.* *In addition, the current and the proposed service agreement of RIPE NCC excludes the portability of rights to number resources. The fact that these rights are not portable is likely to restrict potential competitors of RIPE NCC (both existing RIRs as well as companies desirous to become RIRs) to offer their services to users in RIPE NCC’s service area. Therefore, to the extent that the current and proposed regime does not allow for number portability, this could be regarded as a decision of an association of undertakings which is contrary to the cartel prohibition, as well as an abuse of RIPE NCC’s dominant position in its service area.* *The consequences of an infringement of the cartel prohibition or of an abuse of a dominant position can be extremely severe. Perhaps most importantly:* - *the European Commission may impose very high fines, which may go up to 10% of the worldwide annual group turnover;* - *parties that have suffered damages as a result of the infringement of EU competition law, may ask for compensation of these damages in civil court proceedings.* *** We hope the above is helpful. Happy to discuss. -- Kind regards. Lu
Hi Lu, Thanks for your entertaining performance at the GM. I'm grateful for the mail below. Please allow me to share a few comments with you and the community: selection of lawfirm: Loyens & Loeff is a well regarded tax law firm, however their Competition Law department is only Band3/4 on the Chambers Ranking so would it be correct for me to surmise the top-tier Competition Law firms in The Netherlands declined to respresent you (for instance due to lack of substance of your claim)? internally incoherent argumentation: you state all 5 RIR's fall under the EU Competition Law, however if that is the case how can RIPE have a monopoly (there is choice then)? As you are well aware law firms add loads of disclaimers to their opinions, but these are not listed below. Would you be so kind as the share the whole opinion, so the wider community can also see the disclaimers the law firm wrote in the opinion and come to a better appriciation of your claim? Thanks, Alex-- IDGARA | Alex de Joode | alex@idgara.nl | +31651108221 On Thu, 15-05-2025 8h 21min, Lu Heng <h.lu@anytimechinese.com> wrote:
Hi colleagues:
Below are finding from law firm:
RIPE NCC qualifies as an association of undertakings in the sense of EU competition law. In view of its activities, such as the allocation and registration of Internet number resources, RIPE NCC itself may also be regarded as an undertaking under EU competition law. The same applies to the other four regional Internet registries (RIRs). It follows that RIPE NCC is obliged to act in line with EU competition law: * as an association of undertakings, it must comply with Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which prohibits decisions by associations of undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market of the European Union. This is also known as the cartel prohibition; * as an undertaking, it must comply with Article 101(1) TFEU, which also prohibits agreements between undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market of the European Union; * as an undertaking, it must also comply with Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position within the internal market of the European Union. As regards the applicability of this Article 102 TFEU to RIPE NCC, it is important to note that the current standard service agreement of RIPE NCC, as well as the proposed new model, in conjunction with the RIR Governance Document, grants RIPE NCC complete territorial exclusivity to allocate and register Internet number resources in its own service area. Consequently, RIPE NCC holds a monopoly in its service area and should therefore be considered subject to the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position as set out in Article 102 TFEU. We have been advised by Loyens & Loeff that several restrictions in the current and the proposed service agreement of RIPE NCC and the RIR Governance Document may raise concerns under EU competition law, and could be contrary to the cartel prohibition and/or the prohibition of abuse of dominance. Firstly, the allocation of exclusive territorial service areas to each of the five RIRs could possibly be interpreted as a market sharing agreement. In general, market sharing agreements are considered to constitute serious hard core infringements of the cartel prohibition. These types of agreements only very rarely escape the applicability of the cartel prohibition, and usually do not qualify for an exemption from this prohibition. In addition, the current and the proposed service agreement of RIPE NCC excludes the portability of rights to number resources. The fact that these rights are not portable is likely to restrict potential competitors of RIPE NCC (both existing RIRs as well as companies desirous to become RIRs) to offer their services to users in RIPE NCC’s service area. Therefore, to the extent that the current and proposed regime does not allow for number portability, this could be regarded as a decision of an association of undertakings which is contrary to the cartel prohibition, as well as an abuse of RIPE NCC’s dominant position in its service area. The consequences of an infringement of the cartel prohibition or of an abuse of a dominant position can be extremely severe. Perhaps most importantly: * the European Commission may impose very high fines, which may go up to 10% of the worldwide annual group turnover; * parties that have suffered damages as a result of the infringement of EU competition law, may ask for compensation of these damages in civil court proceedings. *** We hope the above is helpful. Happy to discuss.
-- Kind regards. Lu
-----
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Hi Alex: The assertion that I have manufactured this issue, rather than acknowledging it as a serious matter requiring attention from RIPE NCC and the RIPE community, represents a fundamentally flawed approach. Nonetheless, in the interest of complete community transparency, I will address your question below. -- Kind regards. Lu On Thu, May 15, 2025 at 16:06 Alex de Joode <adejoode@idgara.nl> wrote:
Hi Lu,
Thanks for your entertaining performance at the GM.
I'm grateful for the mail below. Please allow me to share a few comments with you and the community:
selection of lawfirm: Loyens & Loeff is a well regarded tax law firm, however their Competition Law department is only Band3/4 on the Chambers Ranking so would it be correct for me to surmise the top-tier Competition Law firms in The Netherlands declined to respresent you (for instance due to lack of substance of your claim)?
Attacking the person not the merit? Also your assumption is simply factually wrong, no law firm have declined the case due to lack of substance. But Full transparency from my internal legal team send to me as I equire, and yes, we had “higher band” law firm actually sent the letter to RIPE, but we find Loyens & Loeff simply more capable: “Dear Mr. Lu, 1) Respectfully, the band rankings of law firms, such as those by Chambers&Partners or Legal 500, are not entirely objective. While these platforms claim that their rankings are free, nominations often require a fee, including in Malaysia. In practice, they function more as branding/marketing tools rather than genuine merit-based assessments. For example, the first lawyer we spoke with, and sent our first letter to RIPE NCC, Bird&Bird Law firm, is ranked Band 2 for EU Competition by Legal 500. However, based on our experience, we found her approach lacking in both capability and ability in handling instructions. 2) Given that RIPE is based in the Netherlands, it is most appropriate to engage a Dutch law firm, both for jurisdictional and geographical reasons for the summons to issue. This ensures that we can seek remedies not just under EU competition law, but also under Dutch tort law, where relevant. In this context, Marc and the firm Loyens & Loeff were mentioned a couple times when we are sourcing. He was recommended by many other EU lawyers in their emails as working partners in the Amsterdam when realising RIPE is in Amsterdam. (screenshots below) Ultimately, the quality of service depends more on the individual lawyer than the firm. (i) Marc has showed expertise and experience, as well as a willingness to understand and accommodate our concerns. (ii) Hence, Marc can be said to be truly and well recognised in the eyes of other EU lawyers and he has the capability to sort this out. Hope that explains.”
internally incoherent argumentation: you state all 5 RIR's fall under the EU Competition Law, however if that is the case how can RIPE have a monopoly (there is choice then)?
We will publish full review report in due course for community to view. For clarity, below are the member rights I previously shared in the Telegram group to avoid anti trust claims—particularly since the RIPE Board appears to dismiss the legitimacy of those discussions, labeling them as “unofficial.” Summary of Key Rights and Their Importance: • Portability of IP Addresses: Members can move their IP allocations to another provider or registry if needed, similar to phone number portability. This prevents lock-in and ensures RIRs cannot trap members in an unfair situation, addressing monopoly concerns directly. • Transferability and Ownership Rights: Members may transfer or sell addresses under transparent rules. This creates an open market for IP resources and avoids RIR over-control. Members retain value in their addresses, and supply can meet demand without RIR interference, reducing incentives for antitrust claims . • Equal Access (Non-Discrimination): All qualifying members receive services on equal terms – no favoritism or unjust exclusions. This upholds neutrality. With open membership and uniform policies, RIRs demonstrate they aren’t picking winners or reinforcing dominance of any one player. • Due Process in Sanctions: Clear procedures for any resource revocation or membership closure, including notice and chance to remedy. This fairness in enforcement shows that any resource reclamation is policy-driven, not arbitrary. It prevents scenarios where a member feels wronged without being heard, which often lead to lawsuits. • Appeal and Conflict Resolution: Mechanisms (arbitration, appeals committee) for independent review of RIR decisions. This gives members confidence that they can challenge decisions internally. It helps resolve disputes amicably and demonstrates accountability, making regulatory intervention less necessary. • Transparency and Accountability: Open publication of registries, policies, and decision-making processes, plus member governance of the RIR. This sunlight deters anti-competitive behavior and ensures community oversight. An RIR that is transparent about its actions is far less likely to be accused of conspiratorial or abusive conduct.
As you are well aware law firms add loads of disclaimers to their opinions, but these are not listed below. Would you be so kind as the share the whole opinion, so the wider community can also see the disclaimers the law firm wrote in the opinion and come to a better appriciation of your claim?
Nope, what I posted is the entirety of their email, with header I omitted in which I am going to share here: Dear all, As agreed yesterday, please find below some speaker notes that could be used by Mr. Lu at the RIPE NCC conference. Please have a close look if the proposed argumentation correctly reflects your thoughts as to why the decisions of RIPE NCC may restrict competition. Since we have successfully completed the KYC process, please feel free to refer to the name of Loyens & Loeff as your advisors in this matter. Please note, however, that our comments are still of a rather general nature at this stage because we have not yet been able to do any profound research or in depth analysis on this matter.
Thanks, Alex -- IDGARA | Alex de Joode | alex@idgara.nl | +31651108221
On Thu, 15-05-2025 8h 21min, Lu Heng <h.lu@anytimechinese.com> wrote:
*Hi colleagues:*
*Below are finding from law firm:*
*RIPE NCC qualifies as an association of undertakings in the sense of EU competition law. In view of its activities, such as the allocation and registration of Internet number resources, RIPE NCC itself may also be regarded as an undertaking under EU competition law. The same applies to the other four regional Internet registries (RIRs). It follows that RIPE NCC is obliged to act in line with EU competition law: *
- *as an association of undertakings, it must comply with Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which prohibits decisions by associations of undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market of the European Union. This is also known as the cartel prohibition;* - *as an undertaking, it must comply with Article 101(1) TFEU, which also prohibits agreements between undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market of the European Union;* - *as an undertaking, it must also comply with Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position within the internal market of the European Union.*
*As regards the applicability of this Article 102 TFEU to RIPE NCC, it is important to note that the current standard service agreement of RIPE NCC, as well as the proposed new model, in conjunction with the RIR Governance Document, grants RIPE NCC complete territorial exclusivity to allocate and register Internet number resources in its own service area. Consequently, RIPE NCC holds a monopoly in its service area and should therefore be considered subject to the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position as set out in Article 102 TFEU.*
*We have been advised by Loyens & Loeff that several restrictions in the current and the proposed service agreement of RIPE NCC and the RIR Governance Document may raise concerns under EU competition law, and could be contrary to the cartel prohibition and/or the prohibition of abuse of dominance.*
*Firstly, the allocation of exclusive territorial service areas to each of the five RIRs could possibly be interpreted as a market sharing agreement. In general, market sharing agreements are considered to constitute serious hard core infringements of the cartel prohibition. These types of agreements only very rarely escape the applicability of the cartel prohibition, and usually do not qualify for an exemption from this prohibition.*
*In addition, the current and the proposed service agreement of RIPE NCC excludes the portability of rights to number resources. The fact that these rights are not portable is likely to restrict potential competitors of RIPE NCC (both existing RIRs as well as companies desirous to become RIRs) to offer their services to users in RIPE NCC’s service area. Therefore, to the extent that the current and proposed regime does not allow for number portability, this could be regarded as a decision of an association of undertakings which is contrary to the cartel prohibition, as well as an abuse of RIPE NCC’s dominant position in its service area.*
*The consequences of an infringement of the cartel prohibition or of an abuse of a dominant position can be extremely severe. Perhaps most importantly:*
- *the European Commission may impose very high fines, which may go up to 10% of the worldwide annual group turnover;* - *parties that have suffered damages as a result of the infringement of EU competition law, may ask for compensation of these damages in civil court proceedings.*
***
We hope the above is helpful. Happy to discuss.
-- Kind regards. Lu
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Hi Lu, The fact that Larus is attempting to go after the RIPE NCC, alleging anti-competitive behaviour, demonstrates that Larus has a fundamental misunderstanding around how the RIR system works. IP address space is portable between RIRs so long as the transfer request is compliant with both the losing and gaining RIR’s policies. This addresses the first point under your “Summary of Key Rights and Their Importance”. If anything, the RIPE NCC is one of the most accommodating with fees fixed at €1,800 per LIR, regardless of the space of IP space held by an LIR. Secondly, while the five RIRs do acknowledge that there is a secondary market for the transfer and utilisation of INRs, they are not obligated to ensure their systems will support the commercial transactions behind the transfer of the rights to INRs. To be clear – members do not own their INRs, rather they are granted an exclusive use rights license to the INRs so long as the member LIR is current with their membership fees. RIRs do not interfere with transfers, while they may prevent transfers for a number of reasons (such as the INRs being delegated within a certain period of time, fees not being current, etc.) this is not to be construed as interference. All members do have equal access to RIR services. The only ones that may not are those who hold legacy space delegated prior to the formation of the RIR system. The only services they may not have access to (by choice for at least one large global T1 transit provider) are services such as RPKI. On the topic of Due Process when it comes to sanctions against members in certain economies, if an RIR is required by law to revoke resources or close a member’s account, they must take this action. For example, if the Dutch government passes a law that says that organisations based in The Netherlands can no longer provide goods or services to an organisation located within an economy that is on an OFAC sanctions list, then I believe that this would mean that the RIPE NCC would need to revoke resources and/or close a member’s account. This wouldn’t be RIR policy; this would be the law. To the best of my knowledge, ARIN, RIPE NCC, APNIC and LACNIC all have both formal and informal internal dispute resolution processes which a member has access to if they do not agree with a decision that has been made or believe something should have been done differently. Unfortunately, I’m not sure of what the current situation is with IDR processes within AFRINIC due to their circumstances at the moment. And finally, on the topic of transparency and accountability, I am aware that at least APNIC is fully transparent in their operations, in that they publicly publish delegation records, their policies are open for all to see, and they publish their corporate governance documents all on their website. I can’t speak to the other RIRs as I haven’t done a deep-dive yet into them, however, I am confident that they would be very similar. To allege that the RIPE NCC (or any other RIR for that matter) is engaging in anti-competitive behaviour or that its undertakings/activities are similar in nature to that of a cartel arrangement is nothing short of abhorrent. And to consider legal action for rejecting a sponsorship offer is disrespectful toward the RIR community. I’m confident in saying that if the RIPE NCC (or any other RIR) had the option to choose between funding from Larus or another organisation, it is quite clear based on the reaction at the RIPE 90 General Meeting what the decision would be… Regards, Christopher Hawker From: Lu Heng <h.lu@anytimechinese.com> Sent: Friday, 16 May 2025 3:54 PM To: Alex de Joode <adejoode@idgara.nl> Cc: RIPE List <ripe-list@ripe.net> Subject: [ripe-list] Re: Antitrust investigation into RIPE NCC may expose members to tens of millions in potential legal costs for defending actions that violate members’ rights. Hi Alex: The assertion that I have manufactured this issue, rather than acknowledging it as a serious matter requiring attention from RIPE NCC and the RIPE community, represents a fundamentally flawed approach. Nonetheless, in the interest of complete community transparency, I will address your question below. -- Kind regards. Lu On Thu, May 15, 2025 at 16:06 Alex de Joode <adejoode@idgara.nl<mailto:adejoode@idgara.nl>> wrote: Hi Lu, Thanks for your entertaining performance at the GM. I'm grateful for the mail below. Please allow me to share a few comments with you and the community: selection of lawfirm: Loyens & Loeff is a well regarded tax law firm, however their Competition Law department is only Band3/4 on the Chambers Ranking so would it be correct for me to surmise the top-tier Competition Law firms in The Netherlands declined to respresent you (for instance due to lack of substance of your claim)? Attacking the person not the merit? Also your assumption is simply factually wrong, no law firm have declined the case due to lack of substance. But Full transparency from my internal legal team send to me as I equire, and yes, we had “higher band” law firm actually sent the letter to RIPE, but we find Loyens & Loeff simply more capable: “Dear Mr. Lu, 1) Respectfully, the band rankings of law firms, such as those by Chambers&Partners or Legal 500, are not entirely objective. While these platforms claim that their rankings are free, nominations often require a fee, including in Malaysia. In practice, they function more as branding/marketing tools rather than genuine merit-based assessments. For example, the first lawyer we spoke with, and sent our first letter to RIPE NCC, Bird&Bird Law firm, is ranked Band 2 for EU Competition by Legal 500. However, based on our experience, we found her approach lacking in both capability and ability in handling instructions. 2) Given that RIPE is based in the Netherlands, it is most appropriate to engage a Dutch law firm, both for jurisdictional and geographical reasons for the summons to issue. This ensures that we can seek remedies not just under EU competition law, but also under Dutch tort law, where relevant. In this context, Marc and the firm Loyens & Loeff were mentioned a couple times when we are sourcing. He was recommended by many other EU lawyers in their emails as working partners in the Amsterdam when realising RIPE is in Amsterdam. (screenshots below) Ultimately, the quality of service depends more on the individual lawyer than the firm. (i) Marc has showed expertise and experience, as well as a willingness to understand and accommodate our concerns. (ii) Hence, Marc can be said to be truly and well recognised in the eyes of other EU lawyers and he has the capability to sort this out. Hope that explains.” internally incoherent argumentation: you state all 5 RIR's fall under the EU Competition Law, however if that is the case how can RIPE have a monopoly (there is choice then)? We will publish full review report in due course for community to view. For clarity, below are the member rights I previously shared in the Telegram group to avoid anti trust claims—particularly since the RIPE Board appears to dismiss the legitimacy of those discussions, labeling them as “unofficial.” Summary of Key Rights and Their Importance: • Portability of IP Addresses: Members can move their IP allocations to another provider or registry if needed, similar to phone number portability. This prevents lock-in and ensures RIRs cannot trap members in an unfair situation, addressing monopoly concerns directly. • Transferability and Ownership Rights: Members may transfer or sell addresses under transparent rules. This creates an open market for IP resources and avoids RIR over-control. Members retain value in their addresses, and supply can meet demand without RIR interference, reducing incentives for antitrust claims . • Equal Access (Non-Discrimination): All qualifying members receive services on equal terms – no favoritism or unjust exclusions. This upholds neutrality. With open membership and uniform policies, RIRs demonstrate they aren’t picking winners or reinforcing dominance of any one player. • Due Process in Sanctions: Clear procedures for any resource revocation or membership closure, including notice and chance to remedy. This fairness in enforcement shows that any resource reclamation is policy-driven, not arbitrary. It prevents scenarios where a member feels wronged without being heard, which often lead to lawsuits. • Appeal and Conflict Resolution: Mechanisms (arbitration, appeals committee) for independent review of RIR decisions. This gives members confidence that they can challenge decisions internally. It helps resolve disputes amicably and demonstrates accountability, making regulatory intervention less necessary. • Transparency and Accountability: Open publication of registries, policies, and decision-making processes, plus member governance of the RIR. This sunlight deters anti-competitive behavior and ensures community oversight. An RIR that is transparent about its actions is far less likely to be accused of conspiratorial or abusive conduct. As you are well aware law firms add loads of disclaimers to their opinions, but these are not listed below. Would you be so kind as the share the whole opinion, so the wider community can also see the disclaimers the law firm wrote in the opinion and come to a better appriciation of your claim? Nope, what I posted is the entirety of their email, with header I omitted in which I am going to share here: Dear all, As agreed yesterday, please find below some speaker notes that could be used by Mr. Lu at the RIPE NCC conference. Please have a close look if the proposed argumentation correctly reflects your thoughts as to why the decisions of RIPE NCC may restrict competition. Since we have successfully completed the KYC process, please feel free to refer to the name of Loyens & Loeff as your advisors in this matter. Please note, however, that our comments are still of a rather general nature at this stage because we have not yet been able to do any profound research or in depth analysis on this matter. Thanks, Alex -- IDGARA | Alex de Joode | alex@idgara.nl<mailto:alex@idgara.nl> | +31651108221 On Thu, 15-05-2025 8h 21min, Lu Heng <h.lu@anytimechinese.com<mailto:h.lu@anytimechinese.com>> wrote: Hi colleagues: Below are finding from law firm: RIPE NCC qualifies as an association of undertakings in the sense of EU competition law. In view of its activities, such as the allocation and registration of Internet number resources, RIPE NCC itself may also be regarded as an undertaking under EU competition law. The same applies to the other four regional Internet registries (RIRs). It follows that RIPE NCC is obliged to act in line with EU competition law: * as an association of undertakings, it must comply with Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which prohibits decisions by associations of undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market of the European Union. This is also known as the cartel prohibition; * as an undertaking, it must comply with Article 101(1) TFEU, which also prohibits agreements between undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market of the European Union; * as an undertaking, it must also comply with Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position within the internal market of the European Union. As regards the applicability of this Article 102 TFEU to RIPE NCC, it is important to note that the current standard service agreement of RIPE NCC, as well as the proposed new model, in conjunction with the RIR Governance Document, grants RIPE NCC complete territorial exclusivity to allocate and register Internet number resources in its own service area. Consequently, RIPE NCC holds a monopoly in its service area and should therefore be considered subject to the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position as set out in Article 102 TFEU. We have been advised by Loyens & Loeff that several restrictions in the current and the proposed service agreement of RIPE NCC and the RIR Governance Document may raise concerns under EU competition law, and could be contrary to the cartel prohibition and/or the prohibition of abuse of dominance. Firstly, the allocation of exclusive territorial service areas to each of the five RIRs could possibly be interpreted as a market sharing agreement. In general, market sharing agreements are considered to constitute serious hard core infringements of the cartel prohibition. These types of agreements only very rarely escape the applicability of the cartel prohibition, and usually do not qualify for an exemption from this prohibition. In addition, the current and the proposed service agreement of RIPE NCC excludes the portability of rights to number resources. The fact that these rights are not portable is likely to restrict potential competitors of RIPE NCC (both existing RIRs as well as companies desirous to become RIRs) to offer their services to users in RIPE NCC’s service area. Therefore, to the extent that the current and proposed regime does not allow for number portability, this could be regarded as a decision of an association of undertakings which is contrary to the cartel prohibition, as well as an abuse of RIPE NCC’s dominant position in its service area. The consequences of an infringement of the cartel prohibition or of an abuse of a dominant position can be extremely severe. Perhaps most importantly: * the European Commission may impose very high fines, which may go up to 10% of the worldwide annual group turnover; * parties that have suffered damages as a result of the infringement of EU competition law, may ask for compensation of these damages in civil court proceedings. *** We hope the above is helpful. Happy to discuss. -- Kind regards. Lu ----- To unsubscribe from this mailing list or change your subscription options, please visit: https://mailman.ripe.net/mailman3/lists/ripe-list.ripe.net/ As we have migrated to Mailman 3, you will need to create an account with the email matching your subscription before you can change your settings. More details at: https://www.ripe.net/membership/mail/mailman-3-migration/
Hi, On Fri, May 16, 2025 at 06:54:26AM +0100, Lu Heng wrote:
Since we have successfully completed the KYC process, please feel free to refer to the name of Loyens & Loeff as your advisors in this matter. Please note, however, that our comments are still of a rather general nature at this stage because we have not yet been able to do any profound research or in depth analysis on this matter.
Yep. Quite obviously so. Gert Doering -- NetMaster -- have you enabled IPv6 on something today...? SpaceNet AG Vorstand: Sebastian v. Bomhard, Karin Schuler, Sebastian Cler Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14 Aufsichtsratsvors.: A. Grundner-Culemann D-80807 Muenchen HRB: 136055 (AG Muenchen) Tel: +49 (0)89/32356-444 USt-IdNr.: DE813185279
Hi Lu, Thanks for your entertaining performance at the GM. I'm grateful for the mail below. Please allow me to share a few comments with you and the community: selection of lawfirm: Loyens & Loeff is a well regarded tax law firm, however their Competition Law department is only Band3/4 on the Chambers Ranking so would it be correct for me to surmise the top-tier Competition Law firms in The Netherlands declined to respresent you (for instance due to lack of substance of your claim)? internally incoherent argumentation: you state all 5 RIR's fall under the EU Competition Law, however if that is the case how can RIPE have a monopoly (there is choice then)? As you are well aware law firms add loads of disclaimers to their opinions, but these are not listed below. Would you be so kind as the share the whole opinion, so the wider community can also see the disclaimers the law firm wrote in the opinion and come to a better appriciation of your claim? Thanks, Alex-- IDGARA | Alex de Joode | alex@idgara.nl | +31651108221 On Thu, 15-05-2025 8h 21min, Lu Heng <h.lu@anytimechinese.com> wrote:
Hi colleagues:
Below are finding from law firm:
RIPE NCC qualifies as an association of undertakings in the sense of EU competition law. In view of its activities, such as the allocation and registration of Internet number resources, RIPE NCC itself may also be regarded as an undertaking under EU competition law. The same applies to the other four regional Internet registries (RIRs). It follows that RIPE NCC is obliged to act in line with EU competition law: * as an association of undertakings, it must comply with Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which prohibits decisions by associations of undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market of the European Union. This is also known as the cartel prohibition; * as an undertaking, it must comply with Article 101(1) TFEU, which also prohibits agreements between undertakings which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market of the European Union; * as an undertaking, it must also comply with Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position within the internal market of the European Union. As regards the applicability of this Article 102 TFEU to RIPE NCC, it is important to note that the current standard service agreement of RIPE NCC, as well as the proposed new model, in conjunction with the RIR Governance Document, grants RIPE NCC complete territorial exclusivity to allocate and register Internet number resources in its own service area. Consequently, RIPE NCC holds a monopoly in its service area and should therefore be considered subject to the prohibition of abuse of a dominant position as set out in Article 102 TFEU. We have been advised by Loyens & Loeff that several restrictions in the current and the proposed service agreement of RIPE NCC and the RIR Governance Document may raise concerns under EU competition law, and could be contrary to the cartel prohibition and/or the prohibition of abuse of dominance. Firstly, the allocation of exclusive territorial service areas to each of the five RIRs could possibly be interpreted as a market sharing agreement. In general, market sharing agreements are considered to constitute serious hard core infringements of the cartel prohibition. These types of agreements only very rarely escape the applicability of the cartel prohibition, and usually do not qualify for an exemption from this prohibition. In addition, the current and the proposed service agreement of RIPE NCC excludes the portability of rights to number resources. The fact that these rights are not portable is likely to restrict potential competitors of RIPE NCC (both existing RIRs as well as companies desirous to become RIRs) to offer their services to users in RIPE NCC’s service area. Therefore, to the extent that the current and proposed regime does not allow for number portability, this could be regarded as a decision of an association of undertakings which is contrary to the cartel prohibition, as well as an abuse of RIPE NCC’s dominant position in its service area. The consequences of an infringement of the cartel prohibition or of an abuse of a dominant position can be extremely severe. Perhaps most importantly: * the European Commission may impose very high fines, which may go up to 10% of the worldwide annual group turnover; * parties that have suffered damages as a result of the infringement of EU competition law, may ask for compensation of these damages in civil court proceedings. *** We hope the above is helpful. Happy to discuss.
-- Kind regards. Lu
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participants (5)
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Alex de Joode -
Alex de Joode -
Christopher Hawker -
Gert Doering -
Lu Heng