Great to hear it works for you, but the potential unfortunate collateral from such a blanket action is not really RIPE Atlas' problem. There are more fine-grained methods against bruteforce attempts and open relay probes, than triggering on a few connections. What _objective_ risk/benefit analysis are you basing your opinions upon? Are you a systems administrator? My responsibility is to avoid unnecessary costs incurred from disruption of service, excessive traffic, annoyances using up *my* time, and countless other reasonable rationale from *my*
Some webmasters ban IP's for simply visiting a domain, I know one that even dispatches an email to your ISP's abuse@ address upon visit. Should RIPE Atlas probes then not probe any HTTP servers? The answer is obviously no, they shouldn't care. Making arguments based upon extreme cases, assumptions, or
On 9/20/2022 10:45 AM, Avamander wrote: point of view. You suggest that it is "not really RIPE Atlas' problem". That's very true. And it is not really my problem if I bounce yoinky, pointless probes of my server, and ruthlessly block them from contacting my server ever again. My server, my choice, my wallet, nobody's business but my own. potential-for-collateral-damage is not scientific. "I know one that even [...]" Anecdotal evidence isn't scientific. Note, I run a probe myself. I don't block any RIPE Atlas traffic on my separate servers hosted on AWS, Oracle, and GCE. -- Paul Theodoropoulos anastrophe.com <https://www.anastrophe.com>