UA IP transfers situation Askochenskaya Alexandra
Thank you, Ms. Oleksandra, for mentioning me in your letter. Unfortunately, we don't know you personally, but I'm sure that if you want to get a transparent answer, I can treat you to coffee and give you answers. Now about that, about: 1) the question of how to protect Ukrainian Internet resources from theft, and to avoid coordination monopolization of the IP transfers by one state body, which is a direct path to corruption. I fully support your p1! But in order to protect Ukrainian Internet resources from theft, it is necessary to recognize that these Ukrainian Internet resources are located on IP addresses that belong to someone. And precisely because we do not understand and do not know to whom they belong, and the mechanisms of influence, we all propose that RIPE NCC develop security mechanisms. And at that time there are no such mechanisms, any transfers should be frozen, especially those transfers on which Ukrainian Internet resources are located. Another problem is state Ukrainian Internet resources. And it will be a very unfortunate situation when, for example, state Ukrainian Internet resources will be located on IP addresses of LIRs that are not under the jurisdiction of Ukraine. But taking into account cyberattacks, and believe me, they happen all the time on our information Ukrainian Internet resources, the state will make decisions on protection. It is also a battlefield. I hope that RIPE NCC will still create a group and develop new transfer policies. p2 Regarding the alleged spam from me :) If you carefully read the letters that I wrote, ONE letter, and not a typed text from Mr. Maksym, I hope you will draw conclusions. That immediately in my first letter, as well as in the letter of the Internet Association of Ukraine, I appealed to RIPE NCC to start making policies. But I did not expect that I would affect Maxim Tulyev's business interests, and he would start such an informational attack. I fully support you in the part that EVERY Ukrainian, REGARDLESS of where he lives, should make efforts for our victory against Russia. Glory to Ukraine.
Hi Alexander, I disagree with you. The statement that we don't know whom belongs resources isn't true, because RIPE NCC reflects changes of the resources holder in the RIPE database. And do the best to keep this database up to date. Also RIPE NCC checks if a resource holder is legitimate or not before transfer. Could you please clarify, did you mean by below that RIPE NCC doesn't do work properly?
But in order to protect Ukrainian Internet resources from theft, it is necessary to recognize that these Ukrainian Internet resources are located on IP addresses that belong to someone. And precisely because we do not understand and do not know to whom they belong, and the mechanisms of influence, we all propose that RIPE NCC develop security mechanisms. And at that time >>>there are no such mechanisms, any transfers should be frozen, especially those transfers on which Ukrainian Internet resources are located.
The transfer frize might lead to the situation that you described, that soon we will not know whom actually belongs resources. On Tue, Nov 1, 2022 at 10:32 AM Федієнко Олександр Павлович via ncc-services-wg <ncc-services-wg@ripe.net> wrote:
Thank you, Ms. Oleksandra, for mentioning me in your letter.
Unfortunately, we don't know you personally, but I'm sure that if you want to get a transparent answer, I can treat you to coffee and give you answers.
Now about that, about:
1) the question of how to protect Ukrainian Internet resources from
theft, and to avoid coordination monopolization of the IP transfers by
one state body, which is a direct path to corruption.
I fully support your p1!
But in order to protect Ukrainian Internet resources from theft, it is necessary to recognize that these Ukrainian Internet resources are located on IP addresses that belong to someone.
And precisely because we do not understand and do not know to whom they belong, and the mechanisms of influence, we all propose that RIPE NCC develop security mechanisms. And at that time there are no such mechanisms, any transfers should be frozen, especially those transfers on which Ukrainian Internet resources are located.
Another problem is state Ukrainian Internet resources. And it will be a very unfortunate situation when, for example, state Ukrainian Internet resources will be located on IP addresses of LIRs that are not under the jurisdiction of Ukraine.
But taking into account cyberattacks, and believe me, they happen all the time on our information Ukrainian Internet resources, the state will make decisions on protection. It is also a battlefield.
I hope that RIPE NCC will still create a group and develop new transfer policies.
p2 Regarding the alleged spam from me :)
If you carefully read the letters that I wrote, ONE letter, and not a typed text from Mr. Maksym, I hope you will draw conclusions.
That immediately in my first letter, as well as in the letter of the Internet Association of Ukraine, I appealed to RIPE NCC to start making policies.
But I did not expect that I would affect Maxim Tulyev's business interests, and he would start such an informational attack.
I fully support you in the part that EVERY Ukrainian, REGARDLESS of where he lives, should make efforts for our victory against Russia.
Glory to Ukraine.
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Dear Fedyenko It can be concluded from the letter that a person who writes about himself in the second person ("he") is a narcissistic and self-centered person who is concerned about his own interests. In confirmation of this, I can add the fact that you were on the board of InAU for 5 years and did nothing to save the companies that fell under the occupation. Let me remind you that the war in our country did not start 8 months ago, but more than 8 years ago. And for some reason you did not protect the companies in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian Crimea, parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions. And for 5 years as head of InAU, you did not think that the Russians could steal the Internet resources of Ukrainian companies in the occupied territories. For some reason, this has not been such a problem for you in these 8 years. And now, when martial law has been declared in the country, this is a great opportunity for you, taking advantage of the restrictions on freedom of speech, to grab into your own hands the opportunity to dispose of all the IP resources of Ukraine, setting up Internet communism in the best traditions of Russia. You are very wrong about the country, you need to go to Russia, and in Ukraine we value freedom the most, which is what we are actually fighting for now. Best regards, Alexandr
01.11.22 12:31, Федієнко Олександр Павлович via ncc-services-wg пише:
Unfortunately, we don't know you personally, but I'm sure that if you want to get a transparent answer, I can treat you to coffee and give you answers.
You know she personally.
And precisely because we do not understand and do not know to whom they belong, and the mechanisms of influence, we all propose that RIPE NCC develop security mechanisms.
What? Because YOU (as the government? mafia? whoever?) do not understand and do not know, you push RIPE NCC to develop some mechanism? What is it, if not a government intrusion in RIPE self-regulation? Let's stop this manipulation. NCC knows their customers well. I do not have any doubts in it.
And at that time there are no such mechanisms, any transfers should be frozen, especially those transfers on which Ukrainian Internet resources are located.
And for your point of view, you have such serious problem that you need to stop and kill a number of companies by the ban? Oh, well... Ukrainian government do not care about any business, especially small.
Another problem is state Ukrainian Internet resources. And it will be a very unfortunate situation when, for example, state Ukrainian Internet resources will be located on IP addresses of LIRs that are not under the jurisdiction of Ukraine.
So open a LIR and get/buy enough address space for the state companies, what a deal?
But taking into account cyberattacks, and believe me, they happen all the time on our information Ukrainian Internet resources, the state will make decisions on protection. It is also a battlefield.
Manipultaion. Cyberattacks has nothing to do with IP transfers.
I hope that RIPE NCC will still create a group and develop new transfer policies.
New transfer policies? Together with the world cleanest and honest Ukrainian government? Really?
p2 Regarding the alleged spam from me :)
If you carefully read the letters that I wrote, ONE letter, and not a
Lie. Before the last RIPE meeting, every Ukrainian LIR got a lot of letters to the listed contacts from you asking to register to GM (?! for what reason for GM?) and support your initiative. This is not only a SPAM, but a clear violation of RIPE Database policy.
But I did not expect that I would affect Maxim Tulyev's business interests, and he would start such an informational attack.
In fact, closing Ukrainian market will be good for my IPv4 business. At first it will raise the global price for IPv4 as the offer shrinks. At second, it will be probably possible for me to buy IPv4 for cheap inside Ukraine (but I'm afraid I will be kicked out from that very quickly by your, let's said, non-market methods).
I fully support you in the part that EVERY Ukrainian, REGARDLESS of where he lives, should make efforts for our victory against Russia.
Lie. Previous letter you said I can't interfere as I do not live in Ukraine physically.
participants (4)
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Alexander Buzaev -
Max Tulyev -
Olha Sira -
Федієнко Олександр Павлович