October 2022 - ncc-services-wg

Protecting Resource Holders in Distressed Areas
by Athina Fragkouli 28 Oct '22

28 Oct '22

Dear colleagues, We have recently seen people raising concerns about the risk of illegitimate registry update requests in Ukraine being submitted to the RIPE NCC. We have published an article on RIPE Labs that explains what we have been doing to minimise this risk so far and looks at some additional measures we could implement: https://labs.ripe.net/author/athina/protecting-resource-holders-in-distress… <https://labs.ripe.net/author/athina/protecting-resource-holders-in-distress…> We will also be presenting on this topic in the RIPE NCC Services Working Group at RIPE 85. We are interested in hearing any feedback or suggestions from the RIPE community on this issue. Regards, Athina Fragkouli Chief Legal Officer RIPE NCC

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Re: [ncc-services-wg] IP adress transferring in Ukraine
by Petryk Pyatochkin 28 Oct '22

28 Oct '22

Sergey, > On 27 Oct 2022, at 18:13, Sergey Myasoedov via ncc-services-wg <ncc-services-wg(a)ripe.net> wrote: > > Viktoriia, > >> We have to re-build telecom and internet infrastructure, and yes, we could bring new equipment there, but if the IP addresses of local Internet Providers will be transferred to other parties, we will not be able to restore even our critical infrastructure there, and there is no place to get new IPv4 addresses. > > You don't need IPv4 addresses for rebuilding IT infrastructure. There are lot of equipment supplied with Keep Ukraine Connected project, the equipment list is public and I'm pretty sure all of this equipment support IPv6. If that would be possible, we would not have this discussion at all, and the transfer of resources would not exist as such. Everybody would just get a fresh block of IPv6 addresses and we would forget about IPv4. And I'm pretty sure you know that, so let's not diverge the discussion. Cheers, Petryk Pyatochkin > -- > Kind regards, > Sergey Myasoedov > >> On 27. 10. 2022, at 17:44, Viktoriia Opanasiuk <viktoriia.opanasiuk(a)gmail.com> wrote: >> >> Dear Mattias, >> >> responding on «As this only affects LIRs, I doubt there will be significant participation by non-LIRs» I must say that it affects all internet service providers that use IP resources. In Ukraine there are more than 5 000 registered ISPs, but not all of them are LIRs. >> >> The situation that we have now is that when russian troops withdraw from our territory, they dismantle and take with them not only washing machines, but also telecom equipment, TV- and radio-transmitters, leaving people who live there without any information channels and means of communication. We have to re-build telecom and internet infrastructure, and yes, we could bring new equipment there, but if the IP addresses of local Internet Providers will be transferred to other parties, we will not be able to restore even our critical infrastructure there, and there is no place to get new IPv4 addresses. >> >> Therefore any solutions that involve allowing transfers now and somehow reverting them later are not solving this immediate problem that we have. >> >> Viktoriia Opanasiuk >> >> чт, 27 окт. 2022 г. в 16:59, Matthias Merkel <matthias.merkel(a)staclar.com>: >> Hi Viktoriia, >> >> RIPE operates on consensus policies. A new policy cannot be adopted if there is a meaningful number of objections like clearly there is here. >> >> As has been explained in the in-person meetings, a freeze cannot be implemented until a corresponding policy is in place, as this may otherwise open up the RIPE NCC to civil liability. Of course, there is also a risk that a freeze could negatively impact Ukrainian LIRs (for example ones who may want to sell parts of their IP space to fund continued operations). >> >> For the reasons above, I personally don’t think that a blanket ban will be a good solution. Instead, the RIPE NCC should conduct increased due diligence on transfers from Ukraine and other high-risk regions. From what I understand, the NCC has already implemented these measures. >> >> Most of the recent emails have already identified themselves as Ukrainian, some including a reg-id or at least mentioning they were an LIR as well. As this only affects LIRs, I doubt there will be significant participation by non-LIRs. >> >> Matthias Merkel >> >> Staclar, Inc. >> >> From: ncc-services-wg <ncc-services-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net> on behalf of Viktoriia Opanasiuk <viktoriia.opanasiuk(a)gmail.com> >> Date: Thursday, 27. October 2022 at 15:51 >> To: ncc-services-wg(a)ripe.net <ncc-services-wg(a)ripe.net> >> Subject: [ncc-services-wg] IP adress transferring in Ukraine >> >> Hi everyone! >> >> Looking at such a broad discussion around the issue of the decision to protect Ukrainian IP resources, I want to add a comment and a wish. >> >> First of all, I would like to clarify the issue a little. We are only talking about temporarily freezing the transfer of IP addresses until a solution to correctly identify and prohibit risky transfers is found and implemented. >> >> And in order to understand who exactly is against the temporary freeze or who supports it , it would be very good if you wrote a few words about who exactly those who express their position represent. >> For example, does the company have LIR status, is the company an ISP provider, and if so, in which regions of Ukraine does it provide services. If the LIR is not a ISP provider, does it continue its work in Ukraine? This is purely to understand whether the position of the participant in the discussion is from a representative of the Ukrainian community and what part of this community he represents. >> >> Otherwise, this discussion may slightly distort the real problems that exist in Ukraine today. >> >> -- >> >> Viktoriia Opanasiuk >> >> -- >> З повагою, >> Вікторія Опанасюк >> -- >> >> To unsubscribe from this mailing list, get a password reminder, or change your subscription options, please visit: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/ncc-services-wg > > -- > > To unsubscribe from this mailing list, get a password reminder, or change your subscription options, please visit: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/ncc-services-wg

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UA IP transfer
by Олена Кушнір 27 Oct '22

27 Oct '22

Hi all! before writing any thoughts here, write your RegID so that it is clear who you represent. are related to the Ukrainian LIR community. Registry ID: ua.webpro We are the member of Internet association of Ukraine, We ask you to temporarily freeze IR transfers from the territory of Ukraine. We are sure that this will make IP resources of UA holders not attractive for theft and transfer and therefore will protect its holders. _______________ Best regards, Olena Kushnir +38(097)748-33-33 www.webpro.ua

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IP adress transferring in Ukraine
by Viktoriia Opanasiuk 27 Oct '22

27 Oct '22

Hi everyone! Looking at such a broad discussion around the issue of the decision to protect Ukrainian IP resources, I want to add a comment and a wish. First of all, I would like to clarify the issue a little. We are only talking about temporarily freezing the transfer of IP addresses until a solution to correctly identify and prohibit risky transfers is found and implemented. And in order to understand who exactly is against the temporary freeze or who supports it , it would be very good if you wrote a few words about who exactly those who express their position represent. For example, does the company have LIR status, is the company an ISP provider, and if so, in which regions of Ukraine does it provide services. If the LIR is not a ISP provider, does it continue its work in Ukraine? This is purely to understand whether the position of the participant in the discussion is from a representative of the Ukrainian community and what part of this community he represents. Otherwise, this discussion may slightly distort the real problems that exist in Ukraine today. -- Viktoriia Opanasiuk

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Transfer of IP addresses
by ТзОВ "Інтелект Груп" 27 Oct '22

27 Oct '22

Hi community! I represent Intelekt Group company from Ukraine. Registry ID 224. I support the solution of temporary frozen any IP transferring from Ukraine, including the occupied territories. Best regards, Oleksii Tykhenkiy

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transfer UA
by marina＠lir-ukraine.com 27 Oct '22

27 Oct '22

Hi,I am against blocking the transfer for Ukraine. Improved checkout system - Exit ♥

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blocking of UA IP transfer
by Konstantin Lesovoy 27 Oct '22

27 Oct '22

Hello all, We are against!!! Why block the entire transfer of Ukraine? Better block Russia Thanks -- реклама ----------------------------------------------------------- Поспішай зареєструвати найкоротшу поштову адресу @i.ua https://mail.i.ua/reg - і отримай 1Gb для зберігання листів

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ip blocking UA
by Victor Stolyarchuk 27 Oct '22

27 Oct '22

Hi, Our team is against blocking UA ip transfers. It will be bad for our economy and people Best regards, Viktor -- реклама ----------------------------------------------------------- Поторопись зарегистрировать самый короткий почтовый адрес @i.ua https://mail.i.ua/reg - и получи 1Gb для хранения писем

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UA IP block
by marina＠lir-ukraine.com 27 Oct '22

27 Oct '22

Hi, NO! I am against the transfer UA ban. Block Russia! This will help protect the owners of the annexed territories.

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many passwords
by Telnet 27 Oct '22

27 Oct '22

Given that if RIPE can help someone to regain stolen objects that's good, there is no solution about spoils of war, even in cyberspace. What about a list of passwords? The first one for normal operations and the remaining ones to let RIPE know that you are acting against your will. The passwords could also carry some information in advance, maybe a password could mean a particular threat. RIPE will transfer the object and will also collect evidence about what secondary password was used. This evidence could be later used in court. This point is important because those secondary passwords will open the doors to all sorts of scams (and potentially solve the IPv4 address exhaustion problem), but RIPE is a registry, not a court. We may also discuss about who can request this evidence: * a court * any * only a particular kind (e.g. war, criminal, geographically restricted) * the original owner * always * after some amount of time after the transfer * after a geopolitical event is over * someone else * never * some kind of representative (e.g. a new CEO) And what evidence can be requested: * only pertaining a particular case (I'm not a fan of partial information, it often leads to manipulation) * full list of the member, from the dawn of time, no omissions (I like this one very much as scam deterrent) Regards, -- Nik Soggia - TELNET S.r.l. Phone: +39-0382-529751 Via Buozzi, 5 - 27100 Pavia, Italy Fax: +39-0382-528074

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