RIPE NCC and the geopolitical situation
All, the recent discussion about moving the NCC and the relative political stability of countries in the service region has caused me to think about the RIPE NCC in the current political context. THere appears to be an incipient issue here: 1) Problem statement the current geopolitical situation in the RIPE service region has, unfortunately, greatly degraded in the recent past. There are territorial conflicts (Ukraine/Russia), there are outright civil wars (Syria, Afghanistan) and, perhaps closest to "home", the cold war is back between "The West" and Russia as well as Iran (both in the RIPE service region). The rhetoric in both the EU and NATO (both of which NL is a member of) is becoming increasingly belligerent and there is an increasing likelihood of this stance leading to unilateral sanctions against those seen as "enemies". Since "internet propaganda", "Russian Trolls", etc are now often taking the blame for every ill in Europe, I should be surprised if those didn't also include internet resources. I would not see it without the realm of the possible, that increasing political/legal pressure would be brought on the RIPE NCC to deny service and perhaps revoke resources allocated to these enemies-du-jour. 2) Possible outcomes - Sanctioned countries might take their ball and go elsewhere (another RIR?) - Sanctioned countries might take their resources and set up their own RIR, approved by IANA or, more likely, not. - They might refuse (or be prohibited from) cooperation with the original IANA/RIR/LIR system. - In a worst-case scenario this could lead to the same resources used by "opposing" RIRs and a fracturing of the internet. - In such a case, it is hard to imagine the ITU (as an UN body) *not* taking control of resource management to prevent such a fracture. 3) Mitigations - The only one I can think of is relocating the NCC to a country - if that exists- which is neutral and does not participate in these block fights (Switzerland?, Sweden?). As a question to the board: does the RIPE NCC have any contingency plans to mitigate this situation when it occurs? Kind Regards, Sascha Luck - resources
On wtorek, 17 kwietnia 2018 17:37:23 CEST Sascha Luck [ml] wrote:
All, [words]
Let me be the first to say: thank you. For taking the time and effort to try to define problems and ask questions instead of spewing "solutions" to unspecified issues and "answers" to unstated concerns, that accomplish little more than aggravate the already completely disorganized discussion. I'm not even sure right now whether you defined the problem correctly (or defined *the* correct problem in the first place) or asked the right questions, but the fact that you tried has a value in and of itself. Ladies, Gentlemen, PLEASE, keep in mind that: - in order to solve a problem, FIRST we have to define this problem - to solve a defined problem, we have to agree that the problem actually exists - to come up with possible solutions to a real and well-defined problem, we need to establish a metric that evaluates whether the problem is solved or not - to compare the submitted solutions, we need to determine the actual effects of a given solution, including unintended side effects. This needs to be done in the above order, as explicitly as possible. Skipping any of those steps usually leads to a completely pointless exchange of mutually unintelligible statements that only make sense within the context of their author's personal understanding of some problem that they never properly shared with anyone else. In other words: if the other guy is talking nonsense, that's because you think they're talking about something you're thinking about, but they're not, they're talking about something THEY are thinking about and you have no idea what it is. Neither they have any idea what you're thinking about and why YOU are talking nonsense. Stop right there and establish some basic shared facts. Above all else, when discussing technology, finances, effect of changes on members, etc., the single most important thing to base all these things on is COLD, HARD DATA. There, sorry for sort-of-hijacking the thread. And thank you again, Sasha. Please try to keep any comments related to the above, and not to Sasha's message, in a separate thread. Regards, Remigiusz Marcinkiewicz Warsaw Hackerspace // https://bgp.wtf/ // https://hackerspace.pl/ -- Remigiusz Marcinkiewicz, remigiusz@marcinkiewicz.me
Afghanistan is in APNIC - only problem child in RIPE at this time is Syria (and possibly Crimean LIRs). RIPE is generally neutral (with a tendency to Western thinking) and member based (which at times were proportionally more vocal in East) which works well for balance. NL is working well albeit not neutral in traditional terms; by the costs alone a change is in my opinion (and the few i can speak for) not needed and just a waste of money and resources - relocation costs a LOT and some people need to stay at least for now within, migrate, and get compensated for this. However, spinning this on there are other EU neutral options without NATO (notably Austria) and EEA (Switzerland) but they are in not really cheaper. More economical power of the host country is also useful and the NL government traditionally is more progressive and well equipped while both Austria and Switzerland are more traditional which for our use case is worse (but is good for UN institutions that pool in both). If anything options have to be put up for vote and then likely fail to receive enough support for a single location IMO. ---- The sanctioned countries (or anyone for that matter) do not really have a choice to change to another RIR (especially if that RIR does not want them); we distributed this system on them - they did not pick it and by lack of IANA resources they cannot really change this. They can also simply use NAT or build a local internet based on internal space/v6 - our Iranian LIRs here can tell you interesting stories on the progress ITC has with this there. Aside this any large entity (both gov & corp) could buy legacy resources off the market and form a NIR (or even paid RIR) but this is no concern to us as RIPE members, it is just a part of legacy business in larger scale and will happen at some point anyway. Sanctions are, at this time, not an issue by RIPEs location as far as i am aware - the few Syrian LIRs paid their invoices, anyone else is not really relevant sanctioned on EU/UN scale or relevant to RIPE (eg. North Korea). Being in the Netherlands i am also sure being the key entity RIPE is and their technological understanding this could be dealt out or at least discussed with the relevant government dept. -- William Weber On Tue, Apr 17, 2018 at 18:01, Sascha Luck [ml] wrote: All, the recent discussion about moving the NCC and the relative political stability of countries in the service region has caused me to think about the RIPE NCC in the current political context. THere appears to be an incipient issue here: 1) Problem statement the current geopolitical situation in the RIPE service region has, unfortunately, greatly degraded in the recent past. There are territorial conflicts (Ukraine/Russia), there are outright civil wars (Syria, Afghanistan) and, perhaps closest to "home", the cold war is back between "The West" and Russia as well as Iran (both in the RIPE service region). The rhetoric in both the EU and NATO (both of which NL is a member of) is becoming increasingly belligerent and there is an increasing likelihood of this stance leading to unilateral sanctions against those seen as "enemies". Since "internet propaganda", "Russian Trolls", etc are now often taking the blame for every ill in Europe, I should be surprised if those didn't also include internet resources. I would not see it without the realm of the possible, that increasing political/legal pressure would be brought on the RIPE NCC to deny service and perhaps revoke resources allocated to these enemies-du-jour. 2) Possible outcomes - Sanctioned countries might take their ball and go elsewhere (another RIR?) - Sanctioned countries might take their resources and set up their own RIR, approved by IANA or, more likely, not. - They might refuse (or be prohibited from) cooperation with the original IANA/RIR/LIR system. - In a worst-case scenario this could lead to the same resources used by "opposing" RIRs and a fracturing of the internet. - In such a case, it is hard to imagine the ITU (as an UN body) *not* taking control of resource management to prevent such a fracture. 3) Mitigations - The only one I can think of is relocating the NCC to a country - if that exists- which is neutral and does not participate in these block fights (Switzerland?, Sweden?). As a question to the board: does the RIPE NCC have any contingency plans to mitigate this situation when it occurs? Kind Regards, Sascha Luck - resources _______________________________________________ members-discuss mailing list members-discuss@ripe.net (mailto:members-discuss@ripe.net) https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss (https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss) Unsubscribe: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/william%40william.si (https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/william%40william.si)
* Sascha Luck [ml] <ripe-md@c4inet.net> [2018-04-17 18:11]:
All,
the recent discussion about moving the NCC and the relative political stability of countries in the service region has caused me to think about the RIPE NCC in the current political context. THere appears to be an incipient issue here:
As the RIPE NCC has shown in the past, it tries its best to remain neutral and not interfere in political conflicts. I also assume that sanctions blocking or revoking resources would conflict with efforts to declare access to the internet a human right on EU and UN levels. Therefore I don't think it's very likely this will happen. *If* such sanctions would be implemented I expect them to be implemented on an ISP level, e.g. forcing big (national) telcos to block communication with the sanctioned country. Revoking resources in a database like RIPE NCC's has no direct technical impact. Also if there should be a time when this happens, moving the RIPE NCC to Switzerland or Sweden would probably not change anything as these countries regularly implement non-military EU sanctions. As most people before me I'm against any relocation of the RIPE NCC as there is no clear indication that this would improve anything from the status quo. Regards Sebastian -- Sebastian Wiesinger Principal Network Architect Network & Security (ONS) noris network AG Thomas-Mann-Straße 16-20 90471 Nürnberg Deutschland Tel +49 911 9352 1335 Fax +49 911 9352 100 sebastian.wiesinger@noris.de https://www.noris.de - Mehr Leistung als Standard Vorstand: Ingo Kraupa (Vorsitzender), Joachim Astel, Jürgen Städing - Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrats: Stefan Schnabel - AG Nürnberg HRB 17689
I *don't* support such ideas. RIPE (and IANA on top level) has to be strictly *apolitical* organisation. We're not here to judge goverments within our service region. There's no rule forcing (global) rechability of LIR-allocated addres space. In general, it's not a good idea to force that now - this may cause problems, which are'nt advertising their allocated address space for some technical purpose. With regards, Daniel On 04/17/2018 05:37 PM, Sascha Luck [ml] wrote:
All,
the recent discussion about moving the NCC and the relative political stability of countries in the service region has caused me to think about the RIPE NCC in the current political context. THere appears to be an incipient issue here:
1) Problem statement
the current geopolitical situation in the RIPE service region has, unfortunately, greatly degraded in the recent past. There are territorial conflicts (Ukraine/Russia), there are outright civil wars (Syria, Afghanistan) and, perhaps closest to "home", the cold war is back between "The West" and Russia as well as Iran (both in the RIPE service region). The rhetoric in both the EU and NATO (both of which NL is a member of) is becoming increasingly belligerent and there is an increasing likelihood of this stance leading to unilateral sanctions against those seen as "enemies". Since "internet propaganda", "Russian Trolls", etc are now often taking the blame for every ill in Europe, I should be surprised if those didn't also include internet resources. I would not see it without the realm of the possible, that increasing political/legal pressure would be brought on the RIPE NCC to deny service and perhaps revoke resources allocated to these enemies-du-jour.
2) Possible outcomes
- Sanctioned countries might take their ball and go elsewhere (another RIR?)
- Sanctioned countries might take their resources and set up their own RIR, approved by IANA or, more likely, not.
- They might refuse (or be prohibited from) cooperation with the original IANA/RIR/LIR system.
- In a worst-case scenario this could lead to the same resources used by "opposing" RIRs and a fracturing of the internet.
- In such a case, it is hard to imagine the ITU (as an UN body) *not* taking control of resource management to prevent such a fracture.
3) Mitigations
- The only one I can think of is relocating the NCC to a country - if that exists- which is neutral and does not participate in these block fights (Switzerland?, Sweden?).
As a question to the board: does the RIPE NCC have any contingency plans to mitigate this situation when it occurs?
Kind Regards, Sascha Luck - resources _______________________________________________ members-discuss mailing list members-discuss@ripe.net https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss Unsubscribe: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members-discuss/danny%40danysek.cz
Not to mention Lebanon, haven’t started providing or anything, doing the p2p to servers in UK and other offices, had lots of from getting the right equipments, shipping, getting the right provider to begin with fast and secure! Not government army tried to help and other law agencies but the fact of third parties using you for personal gains and too much barriers that keeps you go slowly, and barely can find hrhtrusted help , doing new technology that could help the country maybe confronted and hard to reach if not in partnership with government, problem is different geopolitical diversity factor is a major constraints! Not to mention the safest place is in-house but keeps neighbors having to bare noises of fans and stuff. Giving more indépendant and power from the government and Law agencies policies and empowerment to LIR’s would be grearly healpful.vwith more freedom in resources can enhance and benefit both country and organisation! Regards, Mohamed An idea and comm On Wednesday, 18 April 2018, Daniel Suchy <danny@danysek.cz> wrote:
I *don't* support such ideas. RIPE (and IANA on top level) has to be strictly *apolitical* organisation. We're not here to judge goverments within our service region.
There's no rule forcing (global) rechability of LIR-allocated addres space. In general, it's not a good idea to force that now - this may cause problems, which are'nt advertising their allocated address space for some technical purpose.
With regards, Daniel
On 04/17/2018 05:37 PM, Sascha Luck [ml] wrote:
All,
the recent discussion about moving the NCC and the relative political stability of countries in the service region has caused me to think about the RIPE NCC in the current political context. THere appears to be an incipient issue here:
1) Problem statement
the current geopolitical situation in the RIPE service region has, unfortunately, greatly degraded in the recent past. There are territorial conflicts (Ukraine/Russia), there are outright civil wars (Syria, Afghanistan) and, perhaps closest to "home", the cold war is back between "The West" and Russia as well as Iran (both in the RIPE service region). The rhetoric in both the EU and NATO (both of which NL is a member of) is becoming increasingly belligerent and there is an increasing likelihood of this stance leading to unilateral sanctions against those seen as "enemies". Since "internet propaganda", "Russian Trolls", etc are now often taking the blame for every ill in Europe, I should be surprised if those didn't also include internet resources. I would not see it without the realm of the possible, that increasing political/legal pressure would be brought on the RIPE NCC to deny service and perhaps revoke resources allocated to these enemies-du-jour.
2) Possible outcomes
- Sanctioned countries might take their ball and go elsewhere (another RIR?)
- Sanctioned countries might take their resources and set up their own RIR, approved by IANA or, more likely, not.
- They might refuse (or be prohibited from) cooperation with the original IANA/RIR/LIR system.
- In a worst-case scenario this could lead to the same resources used by "opposing" RIRs and a fracturing of the internet.
- In such a case, it is hard to imagine the ITU (as an UN body) *not* taking control of resource management to prevent such a fracture.
3) Mitigations
- The only one I can think of is relocating the NCC to a country - if that exists- which is neutral and does not participate in these block fights (Switzerland?, Sweden?).
As a question to the board: does the RIPE NCC have any contingency plans to mitigate this situation when it occurs?
Kind Regards, Sascha Luck - resources _______________________________________________ members-discuss mailing list members-discuss@ripe.net https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/members-discuss Unsubscribe: https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/members- discuss/danny%40danysek.cz
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participants (6)
-
Daniel Suchy -
Mo B -
Remigiusz Marcinkiewicz -
Sascha Luck [ml] -
Sebastian Wiesinger -
William