Re: [members-discuss] Effective countermeasures against BGP hijacking
Hi, And how you can detect if an AS is hijacking a prefix? RPKI does not check if entire path is correct and the attacker can bypass it by adding the origin AS at the end of AS-PATH. BGPsec is there to address the BGP hijacking, but creating a black-list and some policies to list/delist ASNs just making things more complex (starting with who is going to manage the list) Regards, Arash From: members-discuss <members-discuss-bounces@ripe.net> On Behalf Of Dominic Schallert Sent: Wednesday, 1 August 2018 7:59 PM To: members-discuss@ripe.net Subject: [members-discuss] Effective countermeasures against BGP hijacking Dear colleagues, I’m sure some of you have read about this recent incident; https://bgpstream.com/event/144058 . Nowadays we’re talking about transport security, https-per-default, etc. but the most fundamental parts of the internet such as BGP, are basically broken from a security perspective. While RPKI/ROA/ROV could fix most of the current security-related struggles, their deployment currently competes somewhat with IPv6 - or even worse - and therefore won’t be a practical solution in the forseeable future. Strict IRRDB and route object filtering is complicated (or almost impossible) as well. So I’m wondering, why can't we just have an automated blacklist like RBL's for mailservers, where all AS'es detected for hijacking prefixes are automatically blacklisted, similiar to Team Cymru's fullbogons feed? The list combined with some scripting could then be used for realtime AS-path filtering at border routers. Delisting of blacklisted ASNs should happen only after a pre-defined amount of time (eg. 14 days) or after paying a fee to a charity/non-profit and providing a statement on the issue which is publicy released. The idea is to hurt those who can’t get their stuff - especially prefix filtering - together. I still remember the days where everyone complained about RBLs, nowadays almost every mailserver setup relies on them. Sometimes extreme problems require extrem solutions. Mit besten Grüßen Kind Regards Dominic Schallert, BA schallert.com e.U. | Hauptstraße 35b, 6800 Feldkirch, Austria FN: 440372g | UID: ATU66209211 | Gerichtsstand: Feldkirch Tel.: +43 680 146 1947 | Fax: +43 134 242 642 616 <http://www.schallert.com> www.schallert.com | <mailto:office@schallert.com> office@schallert.com --- This email has been checked for viruses by AVG. https://www.avg.com
Hi, I think that the RPKI/ROA/ROV solution is the right way to go about this. The fact that it's run by RIPE allows members to trust in the system provided by the same organisation that provides the IP space; and there's no additional fees because it's included with membership. Instead of re-inventing the wheel, I think it would be a better use of time to push forward ensuring that your networks and all of your upstreams are implementing RPKI/ROA/ROV. It's almost like saying the adoption of IPv6 has been awfully slow, so let's skip to IPv7. All the best, Iain Iain Kay Consider IT Limited Superior IT Support On 1 August 2018 at 14:04, Arash Naderpour <arash_mpc@parsun.com> wrote:
Hi,
And how you can detect if an AS is hijacking a prefix? RPKI does not check if entire path is correct and the attacker can bypass it by adding the origin AS at the end of AS-PATH.
BGPsec is there to address the BGP hijacking, but creating a black-list and some policies to list/delist ASNs just making things more complex (starting with who is going to manage the list)
Regards,
Arash
*From:* members-discuss <members-discuss-bounces@ripe.net> *On Behalf Of *Dominic Schallert *Sent:* Wednesday, 1 August 2018 7:59 PM *To:* members-discuss@ripe.net *Subject:* [members-discuss] Effective countermeasures against BGP hijacking
Dear colleagues,
I’m sure some of you have read about this recent incident; https://bgpstream.com/event/144058 . Nowadays we’re talking about transport security, https-per-default, etc. but the most fundamental parts of the internet such as BGP, are basically broken from a security perspective. While RPKI/ROA/ROV could fix most of the current security-related struggles, their deployment currently competes somewhat with IPv6 - or even worse - and therefore won’t be a practical solution in the forseeable future. Strict IRRDB and route object filtering is complicated (or almost impossible) as well.
So I’m wondering, why can't we just have an automated blacklist like RBL's for mailservers, where all AS'es detected for hijacking prefixes are automatically blacklisted, similiar to Team Cymru's fullbogons feed? The list combined with some scripting could then be used for realtime AS-path filtering at border routers. Delisting of blacklisted ASNs should happen only after a pre-defined amount of time (eg. 14 days) or after paying a fee to a charity/non-profit and providing a statement on the issue which is publicy released. The idea is to hurt those who can’t get their stuff - especially prefix filtering - together.
I still remember the days where everyone complained about RBLs, nowadays almost every mailserver setup relies on them. Sometimes extreme problems require extrem solutions.
Mit besten Grüßen Kind Regards
Dominic Schallert, BA
*schallert.com <http://schallert.com> e.U.* | Hauptstraße 35b, 6800 Feldkirch, Austria
FN: 440372g | UID: ATU66209211 | Gerichtsstand: Feldkirch
Tel.: +43 680 146 1947 | Fax: +43 134 242 642 616
www.schallert.com | office@schallert.com
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participants (2)
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Arash Naderpour -
Iain Kay