Sorry. Repost from the correct mail-address. --- The article on Webwereld states: (http://webwereld.nl/nieuws/108523/nederlandse-politie-bevriest-ip-toegang-dn... ) Tegelijk met het oprollen van de bende heeft de Nederlandse politie vier blokken van ip-adressen laten 'bevriezen' bij het in Amsterdam gevestigde RIPE. Die Europese beheerder van ip-adressen, heeft op last van de politie vier blokken van IPv4-adressen geblokkeerd. Dit houdt in dat de eigenaar van de ip-adressen geen wijzigingen kan doorvoeren in de registratiegegevens bij RIPE. Which translates in English into: Together with the roll-up of the gang, the Dutch police had 4 subnets of IP addresses frozen at the in Amsterdam based RIPE. The European manager of IP addresses has based on a police order 4 subnets of IPv4 addresses locked. This means that the owner of the IP addresses couldn't make any changes in the registration information at RIPE. --- As far as I'm aware (but I'm not a lawyer) the international gratified ComputerCrime II ACT, provides the authority to ask for a freeze (secure) of administrative and technical (logging) information known to a certain database / website holder about someone, to prevent it from being purged. What RIPE did is just that, if I read this correctly. Comparing this to RPKI: The difference of a cert being revoked by RIPE in an RPKI situation, was that routing by itself wasn't changed. Nor that the assigned IP's where revoked or something similar. Perhaps someone from RIPE can provide some more insight beside the posting on the website (http://www.ripe.net/internet-coordination/news/about-ripe-ncc-and-ripe/ripe-... ) Regards, Erik Bais