1. Candidate count not turnout driver
The piece links low participation to “only three” board candidates. Historical data do not support a linear relationship:

May 2017 had 3 candidates and 1 ,070 ballots (7 % turnout).

May 2020 had 8 candidates yet turnout slumped because COVID forced an extra-ordinary online format.
Candidate numbers correlate with controversy, not automatically with turnout. Causality is implied but not demonstrated.

2. Charging-scheme fatigue, not just a “boring” ballot

The article blames low turnout on the fact that the May 2025 GM only offered a “no-change” fee option. What it omits is that in 2023-24 hundreds of members demanded a real overhaul—pay-per-IPv4, tiered categories, bigger differentials. Some accused the Board of “ignoring the elephant in the room” when those options never reached the ballot.

The Board’s answer was to spin up the Charging Scheme Task Force 2024, a purely consultative group whose charter explicitly says it cannot set prices. Later the task-force has produced no concrete fee model, and the May 2025 GM again rubber-stamped the flat-rate scheme for 2026.

After watching their earlier protests parked in a long-running talk-shop, many members have concluded that voting will not change the fee structure anyway—hence the apathy. The article’s causal chain (“low-stakes motion -> low turnout”) misses this deeper disillusionment and therefore understates the real driver.

3. Generational claims based on join-year are shaky
The author equates join-year with age. Many 2020-era accounts are second LIRs opened to grab the last /22 of IPv4; they are not “younger people” and many have since been merged or closed. Using join-year as a proxy for demographic age badly skews the conclusion on “younger members disengaging”.

4. Country-level slices suffer small-n noise

Examples such as Spain (21 voters) or Portugal (26 new-decade members) are well below the threshold where percentage changes are meaningful. Confidence intervals are wide; conclusions on “sudden drops” are anecdotal.

Alternative explanations that should no longer be sidelined:

1. Process friction: Since 2023 voters must juggle two factor codes from Assembly Voting. Support tickets show many missed the second code e-mail; the article never mentions this operational hurdle.

2. Meeting overlap: RIPE 90 sessions extended into early evening; several countries had national holidays (e.g. Whit Monday) the same week, suppressing live participation.

3. Representation gap: All three confirmed 2025 Executive Board candidates reside in the USA, Czech Republic and Netherlands; none come from the Middle East, Caucasus or former CIS. Those sub-regions account for well over 3 000 RIPE NCC members, so many non-EU voters see no natural champion and skip the ballot.

4.IRV structural bias discourages out-of-region bids
RIPE NCC uses Instant-Runoff Voting for Board seats. IRV rewards broadly acceptable “middle-of-the-pack” names; research shows it “enabled more centrist candidates and more moderate outcomes” in real elections.

Because EU-based activists form the largest, mutually supportive bloc, their nominees accumulate the second- and third-preference transfers needed to survive successive IRV rounds. A candidate backed mainly by one non-EU country (e.g. Turkey or Kazakhstan) enters with a solid first-choice column but little cross-border fallback—making elimination almost certain. Members are starting to grasp that mathematics, and many no longer invest effort in “token” candidacies.

5.Ultra-short ballot window
• RIPE May-2025: polls opened Wednesday 14 May during the GM and closed Friday 16 May 09:00 (UTC+1) – barely 39 hours
• ARIN-2024: 24 Oct to 1 Nov (8 days).
• APNIC-2025: online voting opens ten business days before the AGM (13 Feb to 27 Feb)
When peers in other RIRs can vote at leisure over a full week (or two), RIPE’s one-and-a-half-day window - plus the two separate Assembly-Voting codes - forces busy operations teams to choose between production work and casting a ballot. Predictably, many skip the hassle.

While this analysis offers valuable participation metrics, it risks overlooking deeper structural issues that may determine RIPE NCC's future governance effectiveness. The charging scheme controversy of 2023-24 demonstrated significant member appetite for fundamental reform, yet the institutional response - creating a consultative task force with no pricing authority - has left many feeling that formal voting channels cannot deliver meaningful change. Meanwhile, representation gaps persist with major member regions lacking candidates on executive bodies. If these underlying tensions continue to be framed primarily as "low engagement" rather than addressed through substantive policy alternatives and broader geographical inclusion, the risk is not just continued low turnout, but a growing disconnect between member expectations and institutional responsiveness. The organization's long-term legitimacy depends on ensuring that analytical insights lead to actionable governance improvements, not just documentation of declining participation.

On Wed, 2025-05-28 at 13:13 +0200, Ilke Ilhan wrote:

Hi all,

Following the GM on 14 May, we analysed participation and reflected on turnout. In this new article on RIPE Labs, we share our thoughts on what we saw: https://labs.ripe.net/author/ilke-ilhan/gm-may-2025-a-deep-dive-into-low-turnout/

Let us know what else you'd like to see covered in these post-GM pieces.

Cheers,

Ilke

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