It also seems like there are some things to learn here about how complex a network (or collection of networks) can be subject to this sort of shut-down. Iljitsch over at Ars Technica, for instance, is making the claiming that the more complex technical environment (not *legal*) in some other countries could make this harder. <http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/01/how-egypt-or-how-your-government-could-shut-down-the-internet.ars> I haven't thought about exactly what they would be, but it seems like there are some measurements that could be done to back up this claim, i.e., to evaluate the "shut-down-ability" of a national infrastructure, or conversely, its robustness. Things like diversity of connectivity across providers and physical interconnection points come to mind. --Richard On Jan 31, 2011, at 7:19 AM, Daniel Karrenberg wrote:
About what we are doing:
There is much mis-information and conjecture going on. Therefore it is important to get measurable facts out there in real time. We are being careful with analysis and conscious about not causing further breakage. But there is value in documenting the facts.
About ISOC:
It is ISOC's role to make policy statements supporting "The Internet is for Everyone!" and as an ISOC trustee I fully support that.
About what the RIRs could do:
I am not sure if it would be appropriate for the RIPE NCC to make policy statements on this issue. What would be the legitimacy of such statements? What would they do to the neutrality of the RIPE NCC?
RIPE making a statement is an entirely different matter. That process is best started by enlisting support among the RIPE community, on the RIPE list and by talking to the chair.
Daniel