Dear lir-wg, On the topic if the ICANN reform http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/blueprint-20jun02.htm With reference to the RIR joint statement of June 20th http://www.ripe.net/ripencc/about/regional/rir-icann-statement-20020620.html and the response from the ICANN reform committee: http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/update-16sep02.htm and the discussion at the RIPE meeting I would like to ask the lir-wg members to study theese statements and actively participate in the ICANN reform process. Either by: 1) Discussion on this list, and with clear advice to your AC members on how you wish to advice us to act. or 2) submitting your oppinion directly to the ERC http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/blueprint-20jun02.htm Best Regards, Hans Petter Holen lir-wg chair
Here is the final proposal from the ICANN reform Committee. -hph ------------ Forwarded Message ------------ Date: 2. oktober 2002 19:15 -0700 From: Louis Touton <touton@icann.org> To: ASO Council <aso-council@aso.icann.org> Subject: [aso-council] ICANN Evolution and Reform Committee "Final" Report and Recommendations To the Address Council: In preparation for the ICANN Shanghai meeting on 28-31 October, the ICANN Evolution and Reform Committee has issued its "Final" Implementation Report and Recommendations. The document is posted at <http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/final-implementation-report-02 oct02.htm>. This report is accompanied by a set of proposed new bylaws that describe the (proposed) steady-state future structure and processes for ICANN. The report gives a summary of the major features of the proposed bylaws. This Report is expected to be the main topic of discussion at the ICANN meeting in Shanghai in late October. As explained in the report, the Evolution and Reform Committee recommends that arrangements for transition to the reformed ICANN (as determined at the Shanghai meeting) be considered immediately after the Shanghai meeting. With regard to the ASO, the Committee's report states: ASO. We recommend that the current ASO structure and operations, as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding between ICANN and various regional Internet address registries, remain unchanged. We believe that it would be appropriate for the Address Council to have a non-voting liaison designated by the Governmental Advisory Committee, but discussions on this topic are still ongoing with the RIRs. The RIRs have raised other concerns with, and proposed other changes regarding, the role of the ASO, which should be the topic of continuing discussions. The ASO provisions of the proposed New Bylaws are in Article VIII, which is posted at <http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/proposed-bylaws-02oct02.htm#VI II>. Although the ASO has been one of the better-operating ICANN bodies to date, the members of the Evolution and Reform Committee would very much like to hear and discuss views of members of the Address Council and the broader address community about any ideas for optimizing the ASO's operations. Best regards, Louis Touton Secretary * on-line archive: http://aso.icann.org/wilma-bin/wilma/aso-council * * To unsubscribe: send "unsubscribe" to aso-council-request@aso.icann.org * ---------- End Forwarded Message ---------- --On 24. september 2002 23:57 +0200 Hans Petter Holen <hpholen@tiscali.no> wrote:
Dear lir-wg,
On the topic if the ICANN reform http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/blueprint-20jun02.htm
With reference to the RIR joint statement of June 20th http://www.ripe.net/ripencc/about/regional/rir-icann-statement-20020620.h tml
and the response from the ICANN reform committee: http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/update-16sep02.htm
and the discussion at the RIPE meeting I would like to ask the lir-wg members to study theese statements and actively participate in the ICANN reform process.
Either by: 1) Discussion on this list, and with clear advice to your AC members on how you wish to advice us to act.
or
2) submitting your oppinion directly to the ERC http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/blueprint-20jun02.htm
Best Regards, Hans Petter Holen lir-wg chair
At 08:02 AM 10/3/2002, Hans Petter Holen wrote:
Here is the final proposal from the ICANN reform Committee.
-hph
After an initial reading this looks like - more of the same - too much form - very little substance Daniel
Reading trough the final implementation report and recomendations http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/final-implementation-report-02oc t02.htm I have the following comments:
B. The structure of ICANN (...) It is now clear that a purely private-sector body cannot effectively carry out the ICANN mission.
I would be curious to see the reasoning behind this. My personal opinion from the IP addressing area is that a purely private-sector body has indeed carried out its mission without government intervention. I am not shure government intervention would improve the processes. With that said, I still belive in transparency and bottom up processes with open participation, so individuals with the appropriate expertice from relevant government organisations should be welcomed in the process just as any other participants.
C. ICANN process
As a general comment I am fairly confused on wether the processes of the two domain supporting organisations are part of ICANN and ICANNs processes or wether they are separate entities with their own responsibility for their processes.
E. Participation by Critical Entities
I am curious to know what critical entities are refered to as not currently participating.
B. Board of directors I note that a Director may no longer be removed by the supporting organisation appointing that director.
C. Supporting organisations I note that with the new structure the ICANN board representatives from the NAMES side now are 2+2 board members while the addressing side appoints 2 members.
regarding funds: I support the approach taken by the RIRs to fund the ASO secretariat bottom up (directly by the RIRs) rather than top down (ie first paying money to ICANN to fund the secretariat). In my oppinion this approach should be taken by all SOs. Looking forward to hear other opinions on this. Best Regards, Hans Petter Holen
At 8:15 PM +0200 10/6/02, Hans Petter Holen wrote:
Reading trough the final implementation report and recomendations http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/final-implementation-report-02oc t02.htm I have the following comments:
B. The structure of ICANN (...) It is now clear that a purely private-sector body cannot effectively carry out the ICANN mission.
I would be curious to see the reasoning behind this. My personal opinion from the IP addressing area is that a purely private-sector body has indeed carried out its mission without government intervention.
Hans Petter, I think that this just states what should be obvious - that the structure of ICANN should include a role for governments, because it is unrealistic to expect that governments will agree to have no say in any of the areas of ICANN's mission (the ccTLDs are an example). That's not the same thing as "government intervention"; in my mind, at least, it means something like "public/private partnership." One of the objectives of the reform process is to negotiate the terms of such a partnership so as to keep ICANN as close to the private-sector ideal as possible. Stuart's original "Case for Reform" made the same point at greater length: "I have come to the conclusion that the original concept of a purely private sector body, based on consensus and consent, has been shown to be impractical. The fact that many of those critical to global coordination are still not willing to participate fully and effectively in the ICANN process is strong evidence of this fact. But I also am convinced that, for a resource as changeable and dynamic as the Internet, a traditional governmental approach as an alternative to ICANN remains a bad idea. The Internet needs effective, lightweight, and sensible global coordination in a few limited areas, allowing ample room for the innovation and change that makes this unique resource so useful and valuable."
I am not shure government intervention would improve the processes.
With that said, I still belive in transparency and bottom up processes with open participation, so individuals with the appropriate expertice from relevant government organisations should be welcomed in the process just as any other participants.
I agree.
C. ICANN process
As a general comment I am fairly confused on wether the processes of the two domain supporting organisations are part of ICANN and ICANNs processes or wether they are separate entities with their own responsibility for their processes.
The three SOs are part of ICANN; the new bylaws specify some of their processes, and leave some of them up to the Council of each SO (macro- vs. micro-management).
E. Participation by Critical Entities
I am curious to know what critical entities are refered to as not currently participating.
B. Board of directors I note that a Director may no longer be removed by the supporting organisation appointing that director.
I hadn't noticed that, but you're right - this is a difference between the old bylaws and the new bylaws. I don't know the reason for the change, but will find out.
C. Supporting organisations I note that with the new structure the ICANN board representatives from the NAMES side now are 2+2 board members while the addressing side appoints 2 members.
Yes; separating the ccTLDs from the other TLDs creates two "names" SOs, each of which elects 2 directors.
regarding funds: I support the approach taken by the RIRs to fund the ASO secretariat bottom up (directly by the RIRs) rather than top down (ie first paying money to ICANN to fund the secretariat).
The ERC's final report notes that the RIRs prefer this approach to funding the ASO secretariat, and I see no reason not to do it this way; certainly there is nothing in the report or the new bylaws that would prevent it. - Lyman
Reading trough another important document the proposed bylaws I have the following comments: http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/proposed-bylaws-02oct02.htm
Article I Mission & Core values I note that policy development trough Openness and Transparency are not part of the mission or core values.
Transparency is treated in a separate article III
Article II I note that the board may act by a majority vote, some times of all members, but in most cases of the members present. While this is normal and sufficient for most activities I am uncertain if this provides stability enough for ICANN. There should actually be a reference here to Article XIX which requires 2/3 for alterations or amendments to the bylaws.
Article XIX should in my view also require an open process for changes and amendments, this process should explicitly include some endorsment from thesupporting organisations. The rationale behind this is that in a normal corporation or organisation changing the bylaws is not within the powers of the board but rather a task for the general assembly. Thus should be with ICANN aswell. Artilce II Transparency some of the details on how to opreate a website hardly belongs in the bylaws but rather in some operating procedures. Section 5.2 Actions taken by the board shall be made public within 5 days. I am uncertain if this applies to the AC aswell ? Mayby they should ? Article IV Accountability and review and Article V Ombudsman I note that this is a fairly substantial set of roles and procedures to handle disputes etc: - and Ombudsman - reconcideration comittee of the board - Independendt review panel I whish a simpler structure could have been possible, but I guess the learnings have shown that this is necessary ? Article VI Composition of the Board. As I understand the current ICANN Bylaws there shall be no less than nine (9) and no more than nineteen (19) members of the board. Three (3) Directors selected by the Address Supporting Organization, Three (3) Directors selected by the Domain Name Supporting Organization Three (3) Directors selected by the Protocol Supporting Organization and Nine (9) at large directors. pluss the president. In the new board there will be Eight (8) voting members selected by the nomination comitee Two selected by the Address Supporting Organization Two selected by the Country-Coude Names Supporting Organisation Two selected by the Generic Names Supporting Organisation plus the president To view the shift of influence on ICANN desicions I made the following simple calculations: Old New ASO 3 16 % 2 13 % PSO 3 16 % 0 0 % Cc 0 % 2 13 % G 0 % 2 13 % Names 3 16 % Other 9 47 % 8 53 % President 1 5 % 1 7 % 19 15 My observation is that the IP addressing community direct influence is reduced from 16% of the votes on the board to 13 % While the manes community direct influence is increased from 16 to 23%. To balance the view the addressing comunity is given some influence on the selection of the other board members by a seat on the nomination comitee just as we had some influence on the election of the at large representatives in the old bylaws trough participation on equal terms with other members of the community in the election process. I think this change reflects the focus of ICANN and I can understand, even tough I do not necessarily fully agree, thosse who think this change is so bad that the addressing comunity should walk away from ICANN. As a matter of principle I personnaly do not think it is a good idea to have the CEO of a company or a corporation be a voting member of the board. The CEO should report to the board and be sresponsible for carrying out the desicions of the board and thus not be part of the desicion makers themselves. This is however not a change to the current structure, and may just as well be a cultural thing. Section 8. I am somewhat confused by this, couldnæt this be made much simpler ? Article VIII Address supporting organisation As this mainly refers to the existing MOU I have no comments other than - there is the addition of a GAC liason to the Address Council which I see no harm in. I would however raise the question on wether the AC could have a liason to the GAC in return ? - does the MOU need to be reviewed to fit better in the new Bylaws ? Article IX and X I note that while the ASO article consists of 5 parts of half a page or so, the Articles concerning the names span several pages. Most of this belong in the Bylaws or MOU of that particular supporting organisation. Bottom line from reading this is that while I personally could live with most of it I get - less feeling of a bottom-up organisation with open processes, and more the feeling of an organisation with a board making top down desicions. I know this is perhaps mainly emotional. As always I am curious to hear other opinions on this. Best Regards, Hans Petter Holen
At 9:07 PM +0200 10/6/02, Hans Petter Holen wrote:
Reading trough another important document the proposed bylaws I have the following comments: http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/proposed-bylaws-02oct02.htm
Article I Mission & Core values I note that policy development trough Openness and Transparency are not part of the mission or core values.
Hans Petter, Surely that's what this core value statement (from the list in section 2) says: "7. Employing open and transparent policy development mechanisms that (i) promote well-informed decisions based on expert advice, and (ii) ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy development process."
Transparency is treated in a separate article III
Article II I note that the board may act by a majority vote, some times of all members, but in most cases of the members present. While this is normal and sufficient for most activities I am uncertain if this provides stability enough for ICANN. There should actually be a reference here to Article XIX which requires 2/3 for alterations or amendments to the bylaws.
Good point - the wording is "In all other matters, except as otherwise provided in these Bylaws..."; Article XIX is an example of "except as otherwise provided," but it would be clearer to refer to it specifically in the text of Article II.
Article XIX should in my view also require an open process for changes and amendments, this process should explicitly include some endorsment from thesupporting organisations.
The rationale behind this is that in a normal corporation or organisation changing the bylaws is not within the powers of the board but rather a task for the general assembly. Thus should be with ICANN aswell.
This may reflect a difference between what is "normal" in different countries. In a normal corporation or organization in the U.S., changing the bylaws is definitely within the powers of the board. For a public company, the shareholders (the general assembly?) can force or prevent bylaw changes by removing or seating individual directors, but they have no specific power of review. However, as this issue hadn't occurred to me before you raised it, I'd be interested to hear other viewpoints on how the Board's power to amend the bylaws should be specified.
Artilce II Transparency some of the details on how to opreate a website hardly belongs in the bylaws but rather in some operating procedures.
True; we may have gone a bit too far in this Article, as ICANN has frequently been criticized on "transparency" grounds.
Section 5.2 Actions taken by the board shall be made public within 5 days. I am uncertain if this applies to the AC aswell ? Mayby they should ?
The new bylaws do not impose this requirement on the AC (nor does the existing MoU http://www.aso.icann.org/docs/aso-mou.html), but the AC could certainly choose to adopt such a requirement on its own account.
Article IV Accountability and review and Article V Ombudsman I note that this is a fairly substantial set of roles and procedures to handle disputes etc: - and Ombudsman - reconcideration comittee of the board - Independendt review panel
I whish a simpler structure could have been possible, but I guess the learnings have shown that this is necessary ?
Unfortunately, yes. Section 2(C) of the Final Report refers to our hope that the processes of the reformed ICANN will be sufficiently transparent and bottom-up that there will be fewer circumstances in which disagreements get to the point of requiring these dispute-resolution measures. While I think it is reasonable to *hope* for this, it would be naive to *expect* it.
Article VI Composition of the Board. As I understand the current ICANN Bylaws there shall be no less than nine (9) and no more than nineteen (19) members of the board.
Three (3) Directors selected by the Address Supporting Organization, Three (3) Directors selected by the Domain Name Supporting Organization Three (3) Directors selected by the Protocol Supporting Organization
and Nine (9) at large directors.
pluss the president.
In the new board there will be Eight (8) voting members selected by the nomination comitee Two selected by the Address Supporting Organization Two selected by the Country-Coude Names Supporting Organisation Two selected by the Generic Names Supporting Organisation plus the president
To view the shift of influence on ICANN desicions I made the following simple calculations:
Old New ASO 3 16 % 2 13 % PSO 3 16 % 0 0 % Cc 0 % 2 13 % G 0 % 2 13 % Names 3 16 % Other 9 47 % 8 53 % President 1 5 % 1 7 % 19 15
My observation is that the IP addressing community direct influence is reduced from 16% of the votes on the board to 13 % While the manes community direct influence is increased from 16 to 23%. To balance the view the addressing comunity is given some influence on the selection of the other board members by a seat on the nomination comitee just as we had some influence on the election of the at large representatives in the old bylaws trough participation on equal terms with other members of the community in the election process.
I think this change reflects the focus of ICANN and I can understand, even tough I do not necessarily fully agree, thosse who think this change is so bad that the addressing comunity should walk away from ICANN.
I'm a bit confused by this. It seems to me that the interests of the addressing community and those of the names community are parallel, not overlapping, and certainly not in conflict; so this is not a "battle" in which the side with more Board members "wins." The world of names is much more controversial, and full of differing opinions, than the world of addresses. It is harder to ensure that all of the different viewpoints in the names arena are represented than it is to do this for the addressing arena. It's not "names are more important to ICANN than addresses."
As a matter of principle I personnaly do not think it is a good idea to have the CEO of a company or a corporation be a voting member of the board. The CEO should report to the board and be sresponsible for carrying out the desicions of the board and thus not be part of the desicion makers themselves. This is however not a change to the current structure, and may just as well be a cultural thing.
I realize that this is done differently in different countries. In the U.S., every board I have been on has included the CEO as a voting member. However, it is not necessary (to put it mildly) for ICANN to always follow the U.S. model, so if anyone else feels that this is something that we should change, please let me know.
Section 8. I am somewhat confused by this, couldnæt this be made much simpler ?
I don't much like it either, but we tried many different ways to describe this in simpler terms, and every one of them turned out to be either inaccurate or even harder to understand. Sigh.
Article VIII Address supporting organisation As this mainly refers to the existing MOU I have no comments other than - there is the addition of a GAC liason to the Address Council which I see no harm in. I would however raise the question on wether the AC could have a liason to the GAC in return ?
This might be a good idea, but there's also the possibility that the GAC liaison could operate effectively in both directions - this is what we expect to be the case, for example, with the liaison from the TAC to the Board. It would be a good question for the AC to consider.
- does the MOU need to be reviewed to fit better in the new Bylaws ?
We (the ERC) didn't see anything in the existing MoU that is in conflict with the new Bylaws (or vice versa), but it would certainly be a good idea for the AC to review both documents together.
Article IX and X I note that while the ASO article consists of 5 parts of half a page or so, the Articles concerning the names span several pages. Most of this belong in the Bylaws or MOU of that particular supporting organisation.
You're right - Article VIII is short because there's another document (the MoU establishing the ASO) that contains the details; Article X is long because it's the only place, for now, to put the details for the GNSO. (Presumably, Article IX will be roughly the same length as Article X when the details of the ccNSO have been worked out, unless by then we have a separate MoU in which to put them.)
Bottom line from reading this is that while I personally could live with most of it I get - less feeling of a bottom-up organisation with open processes, and more the feeling of an organisation with a board making top down desicions.
I know that the ERC's intention is for the reform process to produce an ICANN that is much more clearly driven bottom-up, with open processes; but I also understand that many people read the documents, and don't get that impression. It may be that the number of words necessary to be very careful and specific about what the groups at the "top" - the board, the SOs, and the other structures of ICANN - can and cannot do, and the way in which they must do it in order to be genuinely open and transparent, is just so much greater than the number of words necessary to say that "policy development is a bottom-up process that gathers input from the broadest possible range of interested parties through procedures that are open and transparent to all participants..." We tried to balance in the Final Report some of the inevitably top-heavy language of the Bylaws, but I do not think that we have been completely successful. - Lyman
Lyman, some comments to a selection of your comments; --On 7. oktober 2002 15:56 -0400 Lyman Chapin <lyman@acm.org> wrote:
At 9:07 PM +0200 10/6/02, Hans Petter Holen wrote:
Reading trough another important document the proposed bylaws I have the following comments: http://www.icann.org/committees/evol-reform/proposed-bylaws-02oct02.htm
Article I Mission & Core values I note that policy development trough Openness and Transparency are not part of the mission or core values.
Hans Petter,
Surely that's what this core value statement (from the list in section 2) says:
"7. Employing open and transparent policy development mechanisms that (i) promote well-informed decisions based on expert advice, and (ii) ensure that those entities most affected can assist in the policy development process."
You are right, I can only appologise for not catching that. Maybe there is just to many core values to catch my eye. ((We recently did a management training camp in my company, and the trainer riped appart our mission and core values statement and we rebuild from scratch a handful of core values forming an easy to remember acronym. with one liners to follow. While this is much more form than content, it may be something to think trough: how to make a T-shirt with ICANNs mission and Core values.))
Article XIX should in my view also require an open process for changes and amendments, this process should explicitly include some endorsment from thesupporting organisations.
The rationale behind this is that in a normal corporation or organisation changing the bylaws is not within the powers of the board but rather a task for the general assembly. Thus should be with ICANN aswell.
This may reflect a difference between what is "normal" in different countries.
My point excactly, and perhaps some more influence of European non profit organisations would really be the way to look rather than US corporate law. What we are building is a coop like rather than a for profit multi-national.
In a normal corporation or organization in the U.S., changing the bylaws is definitely within the powers of the board.
In the University Symphony Orcestra, Canoe Club, Folk Dance society etc etc it would be unheard to have the board have powers like this. Emotionaly I would use as strong words as un-democratic and top-down on creations like this.
For a public company, the shareholders (the general assembly?) can force or prevent bylaw changes by removing or seating individual directors, but they have no specific power of review. However, as this issue hadn't occurred to me before you raised it, I'd be interested to hear other viewpoints on how the Board's power to amend the bylaws should be specified.
Not so in Norway: Lov om allmennaksjeselskaper (allmennaksjeloven). http://www.lovdata.no/all/nl-19970613-045.html 5-18. Vedtektsendring (1) Beslutning om å endre vedtektene treffes av generalforsamlingen, hvis ikke noe annet er fastsatt i lov. Beslutningen krever tilslutning fra minst to tredeler så vel av de avgitte stemmer som av den aksjekapital som er representert på generalforsamlingen. (Desicion to change the bylaws are made by the general assembly unless otherwise stated by law. Changes requres at least 2/3rds of the votes from the share holder capital represented at the meeting.) (2) Beslutning om vedtektsendring som forringer en hel aksjeklasses rett, må tiltres av eiere av to tredeler av den representerte kapital i denne klassen. Dessuten må minst halvdelen av stemmene fra de aksjeeiere som ikke eier aksjer i noen annen klasse, være avgitt for forslaget. (3) I vedtektene kan det fastsettes strengere flertallskrav enn det som følger av paragrafen her. So under Norwegian law ICANN as a public shareholder company would have to change this.
Artilce II Transparency some of the details on how to opreate a website hardly belongs in the bylaws but rather in some operating procedures.
True; we may have gone a bit too far in this Article, as ICANN has frequently been criticized on "transparency" grounds.
:-)
As a matter of principle I personnaly do not think it is a good idea to have the CEO of a company or a corporation be a voting member of the board. The CEO should report to the board and be sresponsible for carrying out the desicions of the board and thus not be part of the desicion makers themselves. This is however not a change to the current structure, and may just as well be a cultural thing.
I realize that this is done differently in different countries. In the U.S., every board I have been on has included the CEO as a voting member.
The storry I hear from my collegues who keep an eye on the US corporate life tells me that some of the most recent "incidents" in the US have made people think that maybe this is not such a good idea after all. Maybe the CEO should indeed report to somebody who can oversee and ask nasty questions from time to time.
However, it is not necessary (to put it mildly) for ICANN to always follow the U.S. model, so if anyone else feels that this is something that we should change, please let me know.
I am also eager to hear if it is just me who feels this way. -hph
Hans Petter, Lyman - Hans Petter Holen wrote:
--On 7. oktober 2002 15:56 -0400 Lyman Chapin <lyman@acm.org> wrote:
For a public company, the shareholders (the general assembly?) can force or prevent bylaw changes by removing or seating individual directors, but they have no specific power of review. However, as this issue hadn't occurred to me before you raised it, I'd be interested to hear other viewpoints on how the Board's power to amend the bylaws should be specified.
Not so in Norway: Lov om allmennaksjeselskaper (allmennaksjeloven). http://www.lovdata.no/all/nl-19970613-045.html
[...] (Desicion to change the bylaws are made by the general assembly unless otherwise stated by law. Changes requres at least 2/3rds of the votes from the share holder capital represented at the meeting.)
So under Norwegian law ICANN as a public shareholder company would have to change this.
that is _exactly_ how changes to the bylaws would have to happen in Germany as well; at least for co-operatives. Regards, Carsten (speaking personally, not on behalf of the RIPE NCC)
You are right, I can only appologise for not catching that. Maybe there is just to many core values to catch my eye. ((We recently did a management training camp in my company, and the trainer riped appart our mission and core values statement and we rebuild from scratch a handful of core values forming an easy to remember acronym. with one liners to follow. While this is much more form than content, it may be something to think trough: how to make a T-shirt with ICANNs mission and Core values.))
Hans Petter, Yes, but who would be brave enough to wear such a T-shirt? :-)
My point excactly, and perhaps some more influence of European non profit organisations would really be the way to look rather than US corporate law.
What we are building is a coop like rather than a for profit multi-national.
This is a good point; one could argue that too many of ICANN's structures and processes have been developed by analogy to U.S. corporate models, and that we should look to other examples.
In a normal corporation or organization in the U.S., changing the bylaws is definitely within the powers of the board.
In the University Symphony Orcestra, Canoe Club, Folk Dance society etc etc it would be unheard to have the board have powers like this.
Emotionaly I would use as strong words as un-democratic and top-down on creations like this.
Maybe the right way to do this is to say that the Board has the power to change the bylaws and articles of incorporation (as a legal matter of incorporation, which is currently in California), but that such a change must be treated as a policy matter like any other, requiring review and public comment from the community. In fact, that's what we're doing with the proposed bylaw changes now - the process of public discussion and comment has been going on since last February. What the Board votes on in Shanghai will be very different, as a result of this period of public review and debate, than if the Board (or the ERC) just sat down and decided, by themselves, what the new bylaws should be.
I realize that this is done differently in different countries. In the U.S., every board I have been on has included the CEO as a voting member.
The storry I hear from my collegues who keep an eye on the US corporate life tells me that some of the most recent "incidents" in the US have made people think that maybe this is not such a good idea after all. Maybe the CEO should indeed report to somebody who can oversee and ask nasty questions from time to time.
OK, that was too easy...sometimes its a real handicap to be "from the U.S." The ICANN CEO definitely reports to and is subordinate to the Board. It's not the same as complete separation, but because the CEO is a voting member of the Board *ex officio*, he or she wears two hats that are in practice distinguishable - the CEO hat, and the Board member hat. But I agree that we should consider other models for how the CEO and the Board should be related. - Lyman
----- Original Message ----- From: "Lyman Chapin" <lyman@acm.org>
Emotionaly I would use as strong words as un-democratic and top-down on creations like this.
Maybe the right way to do this is to say that the Board has the power to change the bylaws and articles of incorporation (as a legal matter of incorporation, which is currently in California), but that such a change must be treated as a policy matter like any other, requiring review and public comment from the community. In fact, that's what we're doing with the proposed bylaw changes now - the process of public discussion and comment has been going on since last February.
Reform and changing the bylaws, was a self-manufactured smoke-screen to distract people while the .ORG re-delegation was being done behind the scenes and while the U.S. Government Department of Commerce extension was being done behind the scenes. As predicted, the "Reform Process" captured the imagination of the new, clueless, U.S. DOC employees, and they rubber-stamped a renewal like robots. Now that the smoke has cleared, people are saying, "Oh, now what ? We better generate a lot of revenue, because that is what the U.S. Government wants." That was about the only substantive comment the U.S. DOC made, they said they wanted ICANN to be well-funded. The best way to do that is to start charging ALL customers the same for IP address space leasing. ARIN and ICANN are corporations subject to U.S. laws. RIPE and APNIC may be under ARIN as is the case with LACNIC. That can be transparent to ICANN, above ARIN. http://lacnic.net/en/transition.html http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv4-address-space U.S. companies must be consistent in their charging and charge rates based on market values to avoid concerns about dumping at below cost or cross-subsidies and bartering, where certain select vendors pay nothing or less because of insider relationships, as opposed to published, volume agreements that are available to all customers. Jim Fleming 2002:[IPv4]:000X:03DB:...IPv8 is closer than you think...IPv16 is even closer... http://www.ietf.com http://www.iana.org/assignments/ipv4-address-space http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/domainname/130dftmail/unir.txt http://ipv8.dyndns.tv http://ipv8.dyns.cx http://ipv8.no-ip.com http://ipv8.no-ip.biz http://ipv8.no-ip.info http://ipv8.myip.us http://ipv8.dyn.ee http://ipv8.community.net.au
participants (5)
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Carsten Schiefner -
Daniel Karrenberg -
Hans Petter Holen -
Jim Fleming -
Lyman Chapin