September 2015 - ipv6-wg - mailman.ripe.net

New on RIPE Labs: IPv6 on the March
by Mirjam Kuehne 25 Sep '15

25 Sep '15

Dear colleagues, In this new RIPE Labs article Tony Smith from APNIC is looking at the increase in IPv6 deployment now ARIN has depleted their free pool of IPv4 addresses: https://labs.ripe.net/Members/mirjam/ipv6-on-the-march Kind regards, Mirjam Kuehne RIPE NCC

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Re: [ipv6-wg] [ipv6-wg-chair] ipv6 deployment startup
by Jen Linkova 22 Sep '15

22 Sep '15

Hi Nadim, On Sat, Sep 12, 2015 at 9:59 PM, Nadim Houeiss <nadim(a)win-dsl.com> wrote: > looking to start the deployment of ipv6 only network for a new part in my > network , i need to have info about wish solution will be the best to be > used for NAT64 techniques for new ipv6 only end users will be able to reach > ipv4 different services and web servers on the web. As far as I know most network vendors (Cisco, Juniper etc) support NAT64 on their equipment. However don't forget that you'd need DNS64 as well, so I'd suggest to check if the DNS solution you are using currently supports DNS64. >From my experience the main issue is not choosing a vendor for NAT64 but dealing with broken applications: - applications which assume than "no IPv4 address" means "no Internet connectivity" and not even trying to establish any connections if the device does not receive Ipv4 address; - applications which are using IPv4 literals; - applications which ask for "A" DNS RR only, so DNS64 does not help etc. > looking forward for your reply, BTW I'm removing ipv-wg-chairs@ (as it is just an alias which is used to reach RIPE IPv6 Working group chairs) and adding RIPE IPv6 mailing list. -- SY, Jen Linkova aka Furry

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[training] RIPE NCC Webinars - new dates
by Training Services 22 Sep '15

22 Sep '15

Dear colleagues, We are pleased to announce the launch of new dates for our Webinars. The RIPE NCC Webinars are live and take only one hour. You can interact with our trainers without leaving your desk. We focus on the topics and issues most important for LIRs. Register now at https://www.ripe.net/support/training/learn-online/webinars Participation is limited to 20 people, so don't hesitate if you want to take part! If you have questions, please email <training(a)ripe.net>. We look forward to seeing you online. Kind regards, RIPE NCC Training Services

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[training] IP Address Space Course this November in Bucharest
by Training Services 08 Sep '15

08 Sep '15

Dear colleagues, We are happy to announce that a RIPE NCC training course will take place on the Sunday before the RIPE 71 Meeting in Bucharest this November. This course will focus on how to obtain and manage IP address space. The course is free of charge and is open to anyone interested. The course will cover the most frequently asked questions that the RIPE NCC receives about IP address space. ----------------- Course details ---------------- IPv6 Address Space Basics: How to Obtain and Manage Your IP Addresses Sunday, 15 November 2015, 10-16:00 JW Marriott Bucharest Grand Hotel ---------------- Course goals ---------------- By the end of this course, you will be able to: - Manage your IPv4 and IPv6 addresses according to current RIPE Policies - Understand how to obtain IPv4 addresses through transfers - Protect your address space from hijacking ---------------------------------------- Who will benefit from this course? ----------------------------------------- Anyone interested in the policies and procedures around address space in the RIPE NCC service region will find this course useful. No prior knowledge of the topic is necessary. ------------------------- Course outline: ------------------------- - Becoming a RIPE NCC member (why and how) - Obtaining IP addresses (IPv4 and IPv6) - IP address space transfers, mergers and acquisitions - IPv6 basics - Address space hijacking - Resource Certification (RPKI) ---------------------------- Additional information ---------------------------- - Free of charge - Coffee and lunch will be provided - Delivered by the RIPE NCC’s Training Services and Registration Services departments ----------------------------------------- Registration for RIPE NCC members ----------------------------------------- If you are a RIPE NCC member and interested in attending this course, please visit our website on the following page to register: <https://lirportal.ripe.net/training/register/courseCode/LIR20150032> ------------------------------------ Registration for non-members ------------------------------------- If you are not (yet) a member, please fill out the following information and send this to <training(a)ripe.net>: - Email: - Course name: - Full name : - Vegetarian: yes/no Be quick - we only have 45 seats available on a first come, first served basis! If there is enough interest, we will continue to offer courses on different topics of interest alongside future RIPE Meetings. Kind regards, RIPE NCC Training Services

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Re: [ipv6-wg] [v6ops] Why operators filter IPv6 packets with extension headers?
by Eric Vyncke (evyncke) 08 Sep '15

08 Sep '15

Fernando et al., A couple of quick comments: - this reminds me of taylor-v6ops-fragdrop (which you cite at the end), did you approach any of this old I-D authors? - not sure whether the security implications should be re-stated again in this document, let's rather split the security & operational issues into two documents - in the introduction, 'widespread implementation limitations' is probably too strong (and I agree that my employer products could do better) - in the introduction, "intentionally dropped" ? I am afraid that some drop are not intentional - I would shorten a lot the section 3 (security implications) and simply put a lot of references to existing good documents of yours and others - I like section 4 (operational implications) but it does not match the title, it is more about why transit operators have to look at layer-4 - section 4 approaches the goal described in the abstract but actually only provide clues why operators intentionally (or non intentionally) drops packets with EH. For example, being unable to do ECMP is of course an operational impact but why would it be the cause of EH drop? - section 4.1 (iACL), beyond the permit/deny, some operators also rate limit some traffic such pings - section 4.1, perhaps worth mentioning that infrastructure ACL are more in the white list approach, i.e., what is not BGP/ICMP (in your example) to some prefixes is dropped, so, if someone uses EH to obscure the traffic, this EH traffic matching the destination prefix is dropped anyway by the ACL (so iACL works) but traffic destined to other destination is not impacted. Or did I got something wrong? - section 4.2 (route processor protection) is a little unclear - the processing of HbH would kill the Internet of course (at least with most routers), should HbH be separately called? - section 4.3 (DDoS mitigation), I am unsure about FlowSPec but can it also specify 'any traffic with EH' ? This would do the trick probably for dropping or diverting the DoS packets? - missing issue is lack of granular EH control by some routers, for example if an operator wants to block its subscribers RH-0 but can only drop RH (because RH type cannot be specified), then all RH are dropped including MIPv6 - section 5 (potential attack vector) appears to be focus on fragment drop by the public Internet. While it can probably work, the issues are twofold: 1) bad host implementations not doing enough tests before accepting a ICMP packet-too-big 2) public Internet dropping valid fragments in transit In both cases, we (the industry, vendors + operators) need to fix those two issues. May I STRONGLY suggest to remove all security issues (other docs are describing this) and focus only on the operational issues (esp in V6OPS) ? And skip any discussion on the rationale why packets with EH are dropped? Hope this helps to refine a potentially useful I-D. -éric On 1/09/15 03:17, "v6ops on behalf of Fernando Gont" <v6ops-bounces(a)ietf.org on behalf of fernando(a)gont.com.ar> wrote: >Folks, > >The topic of operators dropping IPv6 packets containing extension >headers has been raised quite a few times on this list and elsewhere. > >A month ago or so we published a document trying to summarize the >reasons for which operators filter IPv6 packets containing extension >headers. The document is available at: ><https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-gont-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-packet-drops-00.txt> > >We're currently working on a revision of this document, and would like >to hear feedback from the working group regarding our document. e.g., > >* Did we get anything wrong? >* Is there anything missing? > >Or, if you like the document and agree with its content, that's also >interesting feedback to have. > >Thanks! > >Best regards, >-- >Fernando Gont >e-mail: fernando(a)gont.com.ar || fgont(a)si6networks.com >PGP Fingerprint: 7809 84F5 322E 45C7 F1C9 3945 96EE A9EF D076 FFF1 > > > >_______________________________________________ >v6ops mailing list >v6ops(a)ietf.org >https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/v6ops

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Why operators filter IPv6 packets with extension headers?
by Fernando Gont 01 Sep '15

01 Sep '15

Folks, The topic of operators dropping IPv6 packets containing extension headers has been raised quite a few times on a number of mailing-lists and forums. A month ago or so we published a document trying to summarize the reasons for which operators filter IPv6 packets containing extension headers. The document is available at: <https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-gont-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-packet-drops-00.txt> We're currently working on a revision of this document, and would like to hear feedback from the ops community regarding our document. e.g., * Did we get anything wrong? * Is there anything missing? Or, if you like the document and agree with its content, that's also interesting feedback to have. P.S.: If possible, please CC <v6ops(a)ietf.org> and <draft-gont-v6ops-ipv6-ehs-packet-drops(a)tools.ietf.org> when sending feedback. Thanks! Best regards, -- Fernando Gont e-mail: fernando(a)gont.com.ar || fgont(a)si6networks.com PGP Fingerprint: 7809 84F5 322E 45C7 F1C9 3945 96EE A9EF D076 FFF1

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