- dns-wg - mailman.ripe.net

NTIA NoI: does anyone care?
by Jim Reid 10 Nov '08

10 Nov '08

So far there has been no discussion on the list about the NTIA proposals about getting the root signed. I would have hoped someone would have said something by now. Sigh. Please try to find some time to look at the NTIA's suggestions and if possible send your comments to the list. I think this WG has an obligation to make some sort of "official" response to the NTIA's consultation. After all, we played our part to get the ball rolling by producing the "sign the root" letter to ICANN at the Tallinn meeting. So now that there are some concrete proposals for consideration, I feel the WG should look at them and respond. I would also welcome suggestions from WG members about how to stimulate a discussion here about the NTIA proposals. Although time has been set aside in the RIPE57 agenda, that won't be enough. The majority of people on this list won't be in Dubai. And besides, it's really the list that should decide the WG's opinion and what action it should take. Over to you....

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NTIA response - v5
by Jim Reid 08 Nov '08

08 Nov '08

I have updated the draft response to reflect today's comments. Aside from tweaking the introductory paragraph -- I hope this now sets the right tone without upsetting Stephane -- the significant change was to move Rick's comments about trust to nomber 4 from number 12 on the list. This seemed to be a more suitable place for this point. Is version 5 of the draft now something that the WG as a whole can accept? PS: Please try to avoid suggestions on cosmetic changes to the text unless these would improve the clarity. The WG needs to reach consensus on a statement in a day or two. So we should try to focus on what we are trying to say rather than how we are actually saying it. Within reason of course.... # # $Id: ntia-draft,v 1.6 2008/11/05 22:36:42 jim Exp $ # The RIPE community (or DNS WG?) thanks the NTIA for its consultation on proposals to sign the root and is pleased to offer the following response to that consultation. We urge the adoption of a solution that leads to the prompt introduction of a signed root zone. Our community considers the introduction of a signed root zone to be an essential enabling step towards widespread deployment of Secure DNS, DNSSEC. It is to be expected that a community as diverse as RIPE cannot have a unified set of detailed answers to the NTIA questionnaire. However several members of the RIPE community will be individually responding to that questionnaire. We present the following statement as the consensus view of our community (or the DNS Working Group?) about the principles that should form the basis of the introduction of a signed DNS root. 1. Secure DNS, DNSSEC, is about data authenticity and integrity and not about control. 2. The introduction of DNSSEC to the root zone must be recognised as a global initiative. 3. Addition of DNSSEC to the root zone must be done in a way that does not compromise the security and stability of the Domain Name System. 4. When balancing the various concerns about signing the root zone, the chosen approach must provide an appropriate level of trust and confidence by offering a maximally secure technical solution. 5. Deployment of a signed root should be done in a timely but not hasty manner. 6. To assist with a timely deployment, any procedural changes introduced by DNSSEC should be aligned with the current process for coordinating changes to and the distribution of the root zone. However those procedural changes should provide sufficient flexibility to allow for the roles and processes as well as the entities holding those roles to be changed after suitable consultations have taken place. 7. Policies and processes for signing the root zone should make it easy for TLDs to supply keys and credentials so the delegations for those TLDs can be signed. 8. There is no technical justification to create a new organisation to oversee the process of signing of the root. 9. No data should be moved between organisations without appropriate authenticity and integrity checking. 10. The public part of the key signing key must be distributed as widely as possible. 11. The organisation that generates the root zone file must sign the file and therefore hold the private part of the zone signing key. 12. Changes to the entities and roles in the signing process must not necessarily require a change of keys.

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Input from the ICANN meeting in Cairo
by Patrik Fältström 08 Nov '08

08 Nov '08

In Cairo, I was thinking of what we have written so far, and find that the conclusions people draw from the text we have so far is not consistent with what I think was said at the RIPE meeting in Dubai. I will suggest text, but wanted to rise these two things asap: - I did NOT hear at the RIPE meeting in Dubai any specific preference for either of IANA or Verisign as the holder of any keys. That said, I did hear some voices that felt "IANA is the natural trust anchor today for the DNS namespace, and because of that they should also hold the KSK". I did not hear any similar voice for Verisign. - I have heard last week more voices that think one should look carefully at the whole chain of trust from the TLD via the root to the resolver. And point out the whole chain is important. This include at where/when the zone is signed. I hear some people saying it is good if the DS record passed from the TLD is signed as soon as possible (by the organisation that receive the DS, today IANA). To let the rubber hit the road: These _technical_ arguments argue for a zone signing by the organisation receiving the DS, and therefore the ZSK should be held by that organisation. This imply further a move of the zone creation from Verisign to IANA. So, I see the following alternatives being the dominant ones: 1. No change in the current structure. ZSK should be with Verisign as Verisign is zone creator. KSK stays also with Verisign so that KSK and ZSK are close to each other. Security of DS when moving DS from IANA to Verisign is unclear, and trust chain from IANA (that we trust for the root of the namespace) and the KSK that Verisign holds is unclear. 2. No change in the current structure. ZSK should be with Verisign as Verisign is zone creator. KSK held by IANA. Namespace root and KSK held by IANA, so trust chain is simple to see. Security of DS when moving DS from IANA to Verisign is unclear. 3. Zone signing is with IANA, so IANA send signed records to Verisign. This imply a change in the current structure as more than the record changed is sent to Verisign (also NSEC etc). ZSK should be with IANA. KSK held by IANA. Namespace root and KSK held by IANA, so trust chain is simple to see. Security of DS is clear as it is signed when received by IANA. Then on top of this, we could have alternatives like whether the "control over the keys" should be via some multiple-password systems like suggested by Verisign, or split-key, or whether the community can "simply" trust whoever is going to hold the keys (via open key ceremonies etc). I think my question is, should reply from RIPE list alternatives in a way similar to this (I do not claim the above is perfect), so that it is easier for "whoever make the decision" can count plusses and minuses from their point of view? Something I think should be possible already with the current list of bullets, if one just make some of the points more clear and down to earth and not so much hand waving. Patrik

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Input from the ICANN meeting in Cairo
by Patrik Fältström 08 Nov '08

08 Nov '08

In Cairo, I was thinking of what we have written so far, and find that the conclusions people draw from the text we have so far is not consistent with what I think was said at the RIPE meeting in Dubai. I will suggest text, but wanted to rise these two things asap: - I did NOT hear at the RIPE meeting in Dubai any specific preference for either of IANA or Verisign as the holder of any keys. That said, I did hear some voices that felt "IANA is the natural trust anchor today for the DNS namespace, and because of that they should also hold the KSK". I did not hear any similar voice for Verisign. - I have heard last week more voices that think one should look carefully at the whole chain of trust from the TLD via the root to the resolver. And point out the whole chain is important. This include at where/when the zone is signed. I hear some people saying it is good if the DS record passed from the TLD is signed as soon as possible (by the organisation that receive the DS, today IANA). To let the rubber hit the road: These _technical_ arguments argue for a zone signing by the organisation receiving the DS, and therefore the ZSK should be held by that organisation. This imply further a move of the zone creation from Verisign to IANA. So, I see the following alternatives being the dominant ones: 1. No change in the current structure. ZSK should be with Verisign as Verisign is zone creator. KSK stays also with Verisign so that KSK and ZSK are close to each other. Security of DS when moving DS from IANA to Verisign is unclear, and trust chain from IANA (that we trust for the root of the namespace) and the KSK that Verisign holds is unclear. 2. No change in the current structure. ZSK should be with Verisign as Verisign is zone creator. KSK held by IANA. Namespace root and KSK held by IANA, so trust chain is simple to see. Security of DS when moving DS from IANA to Verisign is unclear. 3. Zone signing is with IANA, so IANA send signed records to Verisign. This imply a change in the current structure as more than the record changed is sent to Verisign (also NSEC etc). ZSK should be with IANA. KSK held by IANA. Namespace root and KSK held by IANA, so trust chain is simple to see. Security of DS is clear as it is signed when received by IANA. Then on top of this, we could have alternatives like whether the "control over the keys" should be via some multiple-password systems like suggested by Verisign, or split-key, or whether the community can "simply" trust whoever is going to hold the keys (via open key ceremonies etc). I think my question is, should reply from RIPE list alternatives in a way similar to this (I do not claim the above is perfect), so that it is easier for "whoever make the decision" can count plusses and minuses from their point of view? Something I think should be possible already with the current list of bullets, if one just make some of the points more clear and down to earth and not so much hand waving. Patrik

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revised text for NTIA response - v4
by Jim Reid 06 Nov '08

06 Nov '08

I have updated the list of bullet points to reflect the recent comments and feedback. There are a few minor tweaks and some introductory motherhood and apple pie statements. Point 5 has the most substantive change. I think it now accommodates the concerns that some have expressed about the possibilty that the existing way of managing the root could become entrenched by the deployment of DNSSEC. Perhaps the two sentences here need to be split into discrete statements? We have to be careful here. If we don't go along with the current process for co-ordinating root zone changes, politicians will latch on to that as an excuse to open another line of attack over USG control of the Internet. If that happens, we won't get a signed root any time soon. So I hope the line we can all agree on is "Let's go with the current process for managing the root for now to get DNSSEC deployed. But don't introduce a signed root in a way that will prevent a different mechanism with perhaps different entities and roles being used at some point later on.". I hope we can all live with that. This is what I have tried to encapsulate in point 5. Point 12 is a tweaked version of Richard Lamb's remarks. I think this could/should be moved nearer to the top of the list. Anyway, now it's time for comments. It would be helpful if you contribute alternate text along with any clarifications or remarks. ie Please don't just say "Point X is unclear/confusing". Please say why it's confusing and suggest better wording. If we are to reach consensus by this weekend, the discussion needs to be focused and direct. # # $Id: ntia-draft,v 1.4 2008/11/03 10:25:25 jim Exp $ # RIPE welcomes the NTIA's consultation on the proposals to sign the root and is pleased to support that effort. We urge the NTIA to adopt a solution that leads to a prompt signed root zone. The solution must not compromise the stability and integrity of the root zone management process. It should be flexible enough to allow for the entities and roles involved in the process to be replaced or for the process itself to be replaced. The solution should minimise reasonable concerns, whether they are of a political, economic or business nature. It is to be expected that a community as diverse as RIPE cannot have a unified set of detailed answers to the NTIA questionnaire. However several members of the RIPE community will be individually responding to that questionnaire. We present the following statement as the consensus view of our community (or the DNS Working Group?) about the principles that should form the basis of the introduction of a signed DNS root. 1. Secure DNS, DNSSEC, is about data authenticity and integrity and not about control. 2. The introduction of DNSSEC to the root zone must be recognised as a global initiative. 3. Addition of DNSSEC to the root zone must be done in a way that the security and stability of the Domain Name System is not at risk. 4. Deployment of a signed root should be done in a timely but not hasty manner. 5. To assist with a timely deployment, any procedural changes introduced by DNSSEC should be aligned with the current process for coordinating changes to and the distribution of the root zone. However those procedural changes should provide sufficient flexibility to allow for the roles and processes as well as the entities holding those roles to be changed after suitable consultations have taken place. 6. Policies and processes for signing the root zone should make it easy for TLDs to supply keys and credentials so the delegations for those TLDs can be signed. 7. There is no technical justification to create a new organisation to oversee the process of signing of the root. 8. No data should be moved between organisations without appropriate authenticity and integrity checking. 9. The public part of the key signing key must be distributed as widely as possible. 10. The organisation that generates the root zone file must hold the private part of the zone signing key. 11. Changes to the entities and roles in the signing process must not necessarily require a change of keys. 12. When balancing the various concerns about signing the root zone, the chosen approach must provide an appropriate level of trust and confidence by offering a maximally secure technical solution.

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Re: [dns-wg] NTIA response - v5
by ololocc＠entratek.com 06 Nov '08

06 Nov '08

Please unsubscribe cc_ololo(a)yahoo.com ------Original Message------ From: Jim Reid Sender: dns-wg-admin(a)ripe.net To: bmanning(a)vacation.karoshi.com Cc: dns-wg(a)ripe.net Sent: Nov 6, 2008 7:25 AM Subject: Re: [dns-wg] NTIA response - v5 On Nov 5, 2008, at 23:01, bmanning(a)vacation.karoshi.com wrote: > much better - wrt the opening statement, I suspect this should > be couched as a response from teh RIPE DNS WG and not the Ripe > community as a whole, since I suspect they have not seen the text > or had a chance to comment on the same. Bill, the algorithm here is: if (no wg consensus by this weekend) give up send agreed WG text to ripe-announce if (ripe consensus by Nov 20th-ish) send letter(we == RIPE community) else send letter(we == DNS WG) Sent via BlackBerry from T-Mobile

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NTIA and RIPE
by Patrik Fältström 30 Oct '08

30 Oct '08

On request, now as text. The original is the PDF though, so I do not guarantee this version is exactly like the current version on PDF. I hope so though! Patrik -- that missed lunch...see some of you in the desert RIPE and NTIA 29th of October 2008 A - DNSSEC is about data authenticity and integrity and not about control. B - The addition of DNSSEC to the root zone must be recognised as a global initiative. C - Addition of DNSSEC must be done in a way that the deployment of DNS is not at risk. D - Deployment should be done in a timely but not hasty manner. E - Any procedural changes introduced by DNSSEC should be aligned with the process for coordinating changes to and the distribution of the root zone. F - Policies and processes for signing the root zone should make it easy for TLDs to participate. G - There is no technical justification to create a new organisation to oversee the process of signing of the root. H - No data should be moved between organisations without appropriate authenticity and integrity checking. I - The public part of the KSK must be distributed as widely as possible. J - The organisation that creates the zone file must hold the private part of the ZSK. K - Changes to the entities and roles in the signing process must not require a change of keys.

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Re: [dns-wg] NTIA and RIPE
by Richard Lamb 30 Oct '08

30 Oct '08

... On 2008Oct29, at 7:30 PM, Edward Lewis wrote: >Regardless of my personally agreeing with such a statement or not, here are my >reactions to some of the bullets. > >At 15:01 +0400 10/29/08, Patrik Fältström wrote: > > > B - The addition of DNSSEC to the root zone must be recognised as a > global initiative. > >I'm unclear on the intent of the B statement. See my comment on E. > > E - Any procedural changes introduced by DNSSEC should be aligned with the > process for coordinating changes to and the distribution of the root zone. > >In some interpretations of B & E, these two could be conflicting. I.e., B implies >that the current state of root zone management is too centered in the US, E evokes >a message encouraging the status quo. > >Mind you - I am not commenting on B or E, but my reading of the two leaves come >confusion in my mind. Perhaps I am misunderstanding B and/or >E as it is presented >here. I take B to mean we want the global Internet community to use and trust it. ..and yes control and operation that is less US centric. Thank you for "translating" E. It does evoke the current state of affairs which unfortunately do not best serve DNSSEC (even envisioned in [1]) and contradictory with B. I dont believe anyone is suggesting changing the current distribution mechnism for the root zone...only changing the creation of that zone to secure it and its new contents effectively. The how and who should be up to the community the root serves. IMHO E needs to be removed. It refers to a "process" that is by no means favored by the whole community nor frozen in stone. Why build it into DNSSEC? I have yet to understand the drivers behind E as there are any number of ways to achieve the same "balance" while simlifying and securing the process. Given the will, making such changes does not take a long time. In a previous life in government I have seen greater issues settled, contracts written, and even $$ doled out in less than a month. All depended on what level pressure is applied. Its your root. Design it and make sure it is what you want. ... > K - Changes to the entities and roles in the signing process must not > require a change of keys. > >I technically disagree with that, if there is a change in the entity performing the >zone signing, the private key material should not have to be transferred out in the >transition. The private key material of concern here is the ZSK, not the KSK. Agreed. >-- >-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=->=- >Edward Lewis +1-571-434->5468 >NeuStar > >Never confuse activity with progress. Activity pays more. Very much agree ;-) Not speaking for my employer on any of this lest I be looking for another career. -Rick [1] http://www.icann.org/en/tlds/agreements/verisign/root-server-management-tra… signed version elsewhere

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ANNOUNCEMENT: RIPE NCC Training Courses
by Training 30 Oct '08

30 Oct '08

[Apologies for duplicate e-mails] Dear Colleagues, The RIPE NCC invites you to register for one of our upcoming training courses: - The LIR Training Course This course teaches LIRs how to request Internet number resources and interact with the RIPE NCC. A course outline is available at: http://www.ripe.net/training/lir/outline.html - The Routing Registry Training Course This course teaches LIRs how to use the RIPE Database for routing. A course outline is available at: http://www.ripe.net/training/rr/outline.html - The DNS for LIRs Training Course This course teaches LIRs about the RIPE NCC's DNS-related services. A course outline is available at: http://www.ripe.net/training/dns/outline.html To see the location of upcoming courses and to register, please use the LIR Portal or complete the registration form on our website at: http://www.ripe.net/cgi-bin/trainingform.pl.cgi If you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact us at <training(a)ripe.net>. Kind regards, Rumy Kanis Training Services Manager RIPE NCC

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Planned maintenance for ns.ripe.net, 4 November 08
by Sjoerd Oostdijck 30 Oct '08

30 Oct '08

[Apologies for duplicate emails.] Dear Colleagues, This message concerns people who have ns.ripe.net listed as a secondary DNS server for their reverse DNS zones. In order to improve the quality of our service, we are adding additional servers to our infrastructure. The effect of this change will be that we will perform zone transfers from more then one IP address within the ranges 193.0.0.0/22 and 2001:610:240::/48 as documented at: http://www.ripe.net/rs/reverse/reverse_howto.html On 4 November 2008 at 11:00 UTC, ns.ripe.net will move to a load-balanced solution. No noticeable downtime is expected. If you would like to make sure that we can properly transfer the zone from your server after the change, we recommend that you follow the following steps: - Increase the serial number in your zone's Start of Authority (SOA) record. - Wait for a zone transfer to be initiated from the 193.0.0.0/22 or the IPv6 address range. - Now you can compare the zone serials on your master server and ns.ripe.net. To compare the serials you can use tools like "dig", "drill" or "host -C" to query the SOA record and compare the serials on both servers. If you have any further questions about this message, please contact us at dns-help(a)ripe.net Regards, Sjoerd Oostdijck DNS Services RIPE NCC

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