Hi guys

Perhaps after the RIPE NCC implements the agreed actions on foreign ROUTE objects, it would be a good idea to do a (one time?) cleanup/review of all foreign ROUTE objects in the RIPE IRR. Find the contact details in the appropriate RIR Database for all non RIPE address space covered by these ROUTE objects. Send them a notification with a link to click if they approve of the ROUTE object. If no response is received within a defined time period, delete the ROUTE object.

cheers

denis

co-chair DB WG

---

From: Job Snijders via db-wg <db-wg@ripe.net>
To: Brian Rak <brak@choopa.com>
Cc: db-wg@ripe.net
Sent: Thursday, 9 November 2017, 17:53

Subject: Re: [db-wg] Getting fraudulent entries removed

Dear Brian,

It appears that RIPE NCC is lacking a clear and expedient procedure to
remedy unauthorised route object creation. I'd be happy to volunteer to
work with the RIPE NCC to develop a procedure that aligns with industry
standards on how to verify abuse reports like these and resolve them in
a timely manner. (Of course this doesn't help you right now.)

The topic of ARIN space in the RIPE database has been discussed
extensively. A long thread on this topic started here
https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/db-wg/2017-October/005622.html,
sadly, some people even indicated they don't see an issue with how things are
right now https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/db-wg/2017-October/005627.html
Fortunately this was a minority view, and the RIPE NCC is now tasked to
more clearly mark non-authoritative route objects as can be read here:
https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/routing-wg/2017-October/003456.html

One thing I recommend you do is to set the "OriginAS" through the ARIN
webinterface, this will show the world what the origin AS ought to be:
https://www.arin.net/resources/originas.html. You could reference this
field in your communication with RIPE NCC to demonstrate that the RIPE
IRR version of the route object does not align with your intentions.

Another thing you can do is file complaints with the upstreams of
AS205869 (some of them visible here https://bgp.he.net/AS205869) Telia
seems to be their main provider.

Kind regards,

Job

On Thu, Nov 09, 2017 at 11:22:33AM -0500, Brian Rak via db-wg wrote:
> Hi,
>
> We've run into an issue where an unknown malicious party appears to have
> hijacked some of our IP space.  They created entries in the RIPE database
> that they are using to actually get this space announced.  What's even worse
> is their carrier is trying to say these announcements are legitimate because
> they have IRR entries (which is a whole other issue)
>
> What is the process like for actually getting this fraudulent entry
> removed?  I've been in contact with RIPE NCC Support, and they have been
> super unhelpful (ref case #14523)
>
> The fraudulent entry is:
>
> https://apps.db.ripe.net/search/lookup.html?source=ripe&key=198.13.32.0/19AS39967&type=route
>
> route:           198.13.32.0/19
> descr:           2nd route
> origin:          AS39967
> mnt-by:          ADMASTER-MNT
> created:         2017-10-13T00:20:08Z
> last-modified:   2017-10-13T00:20:08Z
> source:          RIPE
>
> I should also note that this ASN suspiciously appears to be announcing other
> people's space as well, but I can only confirm that this particular entry
> does not belong.  I would suspect that their other IRR entries are fake as
> well.
>
> You can verify my request by reaching out to any of the POCs associated with
> this network: https://whois.arin.net/rest/net/NET-198-13-32-0-1
>
> Thanks,
> Brian Rak
>
>