* Sander Steffann
For reference, when creating an RPKI ROA the address space holder can also create ROAs with ASN without the ASN holder's permission. I always read route(6) and ROA data as "the address space holder permits this ASN to announce its space" and realise that the ASN holder might not even be aware of being given this permission. And there is indeed no way to indicate "I don't want to be given this permission" in either DB or RPKI. My view may also be different from other's.
I understand that from a "keep the database clean" point of view it is annoying. Whether this is an actual (operational) problem has been argued both ways in the past, and I haven't seen any consensus. I'd love to see a discussion on that here.
One potential operational problems is relating to the construction of eBGP prefix filters. Say you and I peer, and you use an automated system to periodically generate and load prefix filters into your routers based on route6 objects in the RIPE database with origin:AS<tore>. Now some third party comes along and maliciously or accidentally creates half a million route6 objects for every /48 in their /29 allocation using origin:AS<tore>. Now what happens? Tore