- db-wg - mailman.ripe.net

RIPE Whois Server version 3.1.0
by RIPE Database Administration 26 Feb '02

26 Feb '02

Dear Colleagues, [Apologies for multiple messages]. The RIPE NCC is pleased to announce the release of Version 3.1.0 of the RIPE Whois server. This software is compliant with both RPSL (RFC-2622) and RPS-Security (RFC-2725). This release adds several user-visible improvements: - New status type for inetnum objects: LIR-PARTITIONED. - New object type, irt, and associated new attributes: "irt:", "mnt-irt:", "irt-nfy:", "signature:", and "encryption:". The RPSL parsing has been totally rewritten. The new mechanism makes adding new classes and attributes much easier. Additionally, many, many bugs have been fixed. Detailed release notes can be found at the following URL: ftp://ftp.ripe.net/ripe/dbase/software/RELEASE-NOTES-3.1.0 You can download this release by anonymous FTP from the following URL: ftp://ftp.ripe.net/ripe/dbase/software/ripe-dbase-3.1.0.tar.gz If you do not intend to use the cross-reference files or prefer to build them yourself via "make docs", you can download the source without these files by anonymous FTP from the following URL: ftp://ftp.ripe.net/ripe/dbase/software/ripe-dbase-3.1.0-nocxref.tar.gz A diff for the 3.1.0 "nocxref" version is also available, if you already have 3.0.2 and would prefer to patch that version instead, at the following URL: ftp://ftp.ripe.net/ripe/dbase/software/patch-ripe-dbase-3.0.2-nocxref-3.1.0… If you have any more questions, please don't hesitate to contact <ripe-dbm(a)ripe.net>. -- Shane Kerr RIPE NCC

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New Document available: RIPE-238
by RIPE NCC Document Announcement Service 13 Feb '02

13 Feb '02

[Apologies for duplicate mails] New/Revised RIPE Document Announcement -------------------------------------- A revised/new document is available from the RIPE document store. Ref: ripe-238 Title: RIPE Database Reference Manual Author: Joao Luis Silva Damas, Andrei Robachevsky Date: 6 February 2002 Format: PS=277479 TXT=124400 Obsoletes: ripe-223 Obsoleted by: Updates: Updated by: Short content description ------------------------- This document is an updated version of the "RIPE Database reference manual" (ripe-223). It describes the functionality of version 3.0 of the RIPE Database that uses the Routing Policy Specification Language to represent all Database objects. It also implements the Routing Policy System Security (RPSS) to provide authorisation mechanisms to enable a higher level of security for Internet Routing Registries (IRR). Accessing the RIPE document store --------------------------------- The RIPE document store is available via anonymous FTP to ftp.ripe.net, in the directory ripe/docs. The URLs for the new documents on the FTP-server are: ftp://ftp.ripe.net/ripe/docs/ripe-238.ps PostScript version ftp://ftp.ripe.net/ripe/docs/ripe-238.txt plain text version You can also access the RIPE documents in HTML format via WWW. The RIPE Database reference manual is available from the WWW at the following URL: http://www.ripe.net/ripe/docs/databaseref-manual.html

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Re: Missing mnt-routes in ALLOCATED PA objects
by RIPE Database Administration 12 Feb '02

12 Feb '02

Dear Karsten, Please see Sabrina Waschke's message regarding the issue: http://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail-archives/db-wg/20010701-20020101/msg00099.html If you have any more questions, please don't hesitate to contact <ripe-dbm(a)ripe.net>. Regards, Engin Gunduz ____________________________ RIPE Database Administration. Karsten Koepp wrote: >Hi all, > >already twice customers of us were not able to update route >records, because RIPE had not included mnt-routes (and mnt-lower) >lines into the inetnum object when allocating a block. >The blocks where we experienced the problem were allocated >in 1996: inetnum: 193.203.96.0 - 193.203.127.255 >and 1999: inetnum: 212.95.64.0 - 212.95.95.255 > >This is not an easy to understand problem for small ISPs dealing >with route objects only now and then. To solve this problem it is >necessary that LIRs send the inetnum object to be updated to >hostmaster(a)ripe.net and RIPE update the object with RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT. >Only then the ISP can update their route records. > >Question: >- Is there a reason for not existing mnt-lower and mnt-routes lines? >- If not, can RIPE update all affected inetnums in an automatic manner? > >This would really help a lot, because manual updates create a lot of >consultancy need from upstream providers (us in this case) and, I guess, >a considerable workload on the RIPE hostmaster team. > >Regards Karsten > >------------------------------------------------------------- >Karsten Koepp >IP Network Planning

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Missing mnt-routes in ALLOCATED PA objects
by Koepp, Karsten 11 Feb '02

11 Feb '02

Hi all, already twice customers of us were not able to update route records, because RIPE had not included mnt-routes (and mnt-lower) lines into the inetnum object when allocating a block. The blocks where we experienced the problem were allocated in 1996: inetnum: 193.203.96.0 - 193.203.127.255 and 1999: inetnum: 212.95.64.0 - 212.95.95.255 This is not an easy to understand problem for small ISPs dealing with route objects only now and then. To solve this problem it is necessary that LIRs send the inetnum object to be updated to hostmaster(a)ripe.net and RIPE update the object with RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT. Only then the ISP can update their route records. Question: - Is there a reason for not existing mnt-lower and mnt-routes lines? - If not, can RIPE update all affected inetnums in an automatic manner? This would really help a lot, because manual updates create a lot of consultancy need from upstream providers (us in this case) and, I guess, a considerable workload on the RIPE hostmaster team. Regards Karsten ------------------------------------------------------------- Karsten Koepp IP Network Planning Lambdanet Communications GmbH (AS13237) Guenther-Wagner-Allee 13 D-30177 Hannover (Germany) Phone +49 (0)511 / 84 88 - 12 55 Fax +49 (0)511 / 84 88 - 12 59 Mobile +49 (0)178 / 3 62 - 12 55 mailto:Karsten.Koepp@lambdanet.net News & Facts on our Website: www.lambdanet.net -------------------------------------------------------------

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RIPE DB down for updates?
by Daniel Roesen 10 Feb '02

10 Feb '02

Hi, http://www.ripe.net/ripencc/pub-services/db/mrtg/whois.html it looks like the update processing is halted since yesterday evening... Best regards, Daniel

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New RIPE Database features
by Andrei Robachevsky 07 Feb '02

07 Feb '02

Dear colleagues, [ Apologies for multiple messages ] The new features of the RIPE Database requested by the community are now available in "beta version" on our TEST whois server (http://www.ripe.net/ripencc/pub-services/db/testdb.html). The new features are: - the "irt" object (please see my previous announcement at http://www/ripe/mail-archives/db-wg/current/msg00012.html) - the new "status:" value of the inetnum object "LIR-PARTITIONED PA/PI" (please see the original proposal at http://www/ripe/mail-archives/db-wg/20010701-20020101/msg00090.html). You may try these features by - sending your updates to test-dbm(a)ripe.net; - querying the test-whois.ripe.net, port 43. The new version of the software is under heavy testing now and will be put into production shortly after the RIPE meeting. Your comments are appreciated. You may contact the development team directly at dbrip(a)ripe.net. Best regards, Andrei Robachevsky DB Group Manager RIPE NCC

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RE: Database development plans
by Lu, Ping 31 Jan '02

31 Jan '02

> -----Original Message----- > From: David Kessens [mailto:david@IPRG.nokia.com] > Sent: Wednesday, January 30, 2002 11:22 PM > To: Lu, Ping > Cc: 'Larry J. Blunk'; db-wg(a)ripe.net > Subject: Re: Database development plans > > > > Ping, > > On Wed, Jan 30, 2002 at 07:20:47PM -0500, Lu, Ping wrote: > > > > If the mail can be intercepted then a cookie confirmation > > won't make a difference. > > You can forge a mail header without being able to intercept the mail. > > > If the mail can be intercepted then a clear-text password scheme > > won't make a difference. > > You can guess the password without being able to intercept the mail. > > David K. > --- > And CRYPT-PW now is no better than the MAIL-FROM. Both are easy to get thru. But my point is "If the email is not secure then the new proposals (cookie, MD5 or even shadow password) won't achieve their goals". However let's focus on "If the email is secure ..." case now. Ping Lu Cable & Wireless USA Network Tools and Analysis Group W: +1-703-292-2359 E: plu(a)cw.net

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RE: Database development plans
by Lu, Ping 31 Jan '02

31 Jan '02

> > I still feel that MAIL-FROM with cookie confirmation is > considerably > better than "no authentication". I don't see how a cookie is really > any easier to intercept than a password or secret string sent in the > clear. It also doesn't suffer from potential dictionary cracking > attacks. While it is clear that user's will find it more complicated > than the current MAIL-FROM, I could still envisage some > preferring it over passwords/PGP-KEYs. > > I checked out majordomo's cookie confirmation code and found that > the cookie generation uses a hash of a secret string, the user's > email address, and the requested command. Thus the server does not > need to keep any cookie state. One could include a timestamp in the > cookie hash generation and confirmation message to help guard against > replay's. > > Finally, I would imagine that those who are using automatic scripts > would migrate to passwords or (preferably) PGP. > > If the mail can be intercepted then a cookie confirmation won't make a difference. If the mail can be intercepted then a clear-text password scheme won't make a difference. Only if the mail is secure then a cookie or password makes sense. Also a cookie confirmation increases the chance to start a mail storm. >> In my ISI/RPSL/6bone version of the perl server (=not the >> official RIPE version of the perl software) the crypt-pw is indeed not shown upon >> query or in the downloadable database files. This is not a bad idea to shadow the crypted string (then MD5 is not really necessary ). But I think the RIPE-DB server needs some structure changes to support this. >> >> This is clearly a community decision. I would suggest that if MD5 is > > implemented as an additional method, strings bigger than 8 > characters > > are a necessity (and it is really easy to do so with MD5). > The extra > > length makes it really difficult to have dictionary attacks if > > properly used (I mean you can use a file with the complete works of > > shakespeare when generating the MD5 hash) > > If RIPE-DB are going to support different auth functions, why not using PAM to support any kind of PAM modules then ? Ping Lu Cable & Wireless USA Network Tools and Analysis Group W: +1-703-292-2359 E: plu(a)cw.net

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Database development plans
by Andrei Robachevsky 30 Jan '02

30 Jan '02

Dear colleagues, Please find below a list of the projects that we included in our development plan. We would appreciate if you could indicate importance and usefullness of specific projects so we can adjust their priorities. Several more detailed proposals will follow. Here I just included brief description of the projects not to enter premature implementation discussion. Regards, Andrei Robachevsky DB Group Manager RIPE NCC 1. Authorisation checks across multiple databases Migration to v3/RPSL made creating objects in the routing registry a much more complex process due to the introduction of the Routing Policy System Security (RFC 2725). The real problem was with so called "foreign" route objects that either announce non-RIPE address space or are originated from non-RIPE ASN. As there were no corresponding objects in the RIPE database such transactions failed. A workaround is in place now that requires duplication of objects in the RIPE RR and as a result - low security level. The proposed solution is to get this information from sources that contain authoritative information about network objects that are supposed to authorise the transaction. For example, when creating a route from APNIC's address space, but originated from a RIPE ASN, authorisation information will be requested from both RIPE and APNIC sources. 2. Real-time (interactive) updates Currently only e-mail updates are supported by the RIPE Database which complicates automation of the update process at the clients side. The facility that will allow connection oriented interactive, or real-time updates, will simplify development of the client tools and make synchronising of LIR's address management database an easier task. Once implemented this project will present a facility for other tools, such as web-based update interface, or a standalone syntax checker. 3. Automatic cleanup of unreferenced person objects You may find the initial proposals: http://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail-archives/db-wg/20010701-20020101/msg00079.html http://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail-archives/db-wg/20010701-20020101/msg00092.html The problem statement and the solution remains almost the same, with some modifications: - cleanup process is based on internal DB data, rather than object attributes or meta-attributes - "holders" of the objects to be deleted are notified n days before using standard DB notification mechanisms. 4. Further development of the database software - Improving error reporting - Improving server performance - Software portability and configuration 5. Improve database security These ideas were discussed at the RIPE-41, the detailed proposals will follow - Deprecate MAIL-FROM as a weak auth scheme that doesn't serve todays's security requirements. This will be done in several phases starting form not allowing updating mntner objects containing this scheme, and ending with not allowing updates to be authorised with MAIL-FROM. - Implement authentication scheme using MD5 as a more secure mechanism compared to crypt. Passphrases can be used instead of 8 character passwords and MD5 fingerprint will be presented in the auth value. - Implement inverse queries on auth, encryption, signature for PGP keys only (key-cert's).

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Re: Database development plans
by Wilfried Woeber, UniVie/ACOnet 30 Jan '02

30 Jan '02

> In regards to the MD5 fingerprint, would this be a straight MD5 hash, or >something like the FreeBSD MD5-based password hash (which I believe supports >passwords longer than 8 chars)? I would certainly expect support for more than 8 characters, like in newer versions of Linux. >Also, would the hash continue to be openly published? I guess so. Hiding something in the response (by default) has the potential of confusing people while trying to update and/or delete objects. We've been through that already ;-) >It would seem you would still have to deal with potential dictionary attacks. Correct. >I understand the Perl-based RIPE server would use a "*" in place of >the actual crypt-pw and I've been considering adding support for this in IRRd. >Also, I would suggest reading the following paper regarding the strength >of traditional Unix crypt, FreeBSD's MD5-based crypt, and OpenBSD's Blowfish- >based bcrypt -- http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/provos.html Thanks for the pointer! > Regards, > Larry Blunk > Merit Regards, Wilfried.

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