- db-wg - mailman.ripe.net

ISO Country Code Change
by Katie Petrusha 27 Oct '06

27 Oct '06

[Apologies for duplicate e-mails] Dear Colleagues, The ISO 3166 country codes list has been changed. The previous country code for Serbia and Montenegro (CS) has been replaced with two new country codes: RS - Serbia ME - Montenegro On Friday, 27 October 2006, the RIPE Database software and the LIR Portal will be altered to accept all three codes. The old CS country code will be deprecated at a later date. The full ISO 3166 country code list is available at: ftp://ftp.ripe.net/iso3166-countrycodes.txt http://www.iso.org/iso/en/prods-services/iso3166ma/02iso-3166-code-lists/li… If you have any questions e-mail us at: ripe-dbm(a)ripe.net Kind regards, -- Katie Petrusha Software Engineer RIPE NCC

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ASn32-compliant RIPE Database software available
by Katie Petrusha 25 Oct '06

25 Oct '06

[Apologies for duplicates] Dear Colleagues, The RIPE NCC has updated its database software to support the new ASN32 objects. As you may be aware, studies of Autonomous System Number (ASN) consumption rates show that the existing pool of unallocated 2-byte ASNs will run out somewhere between 2010 and 2014. >From 1 January 2007, it will be possible to request 32-bit ASNs (ASN32 objects). You can find the policy on these 4-byte ASNs at: http://www.ripe.net/ripe/docs/ripe-389.html Although the first of these will not appear in the RIPE Database until the start of next year, the revised code is available to download for testing purposes from: http://www.ripe.net/db/cvs-bugzilla.html (CVS branch name: asn32_changes_fixed) You can also find the list of modified files at the end of this mail. If you have any questions about this, please e-mail sw-bugs(a)ripe.net Regards, -- Katie Petrusha Software Engineer RIPE NCC List of changed files in RIPE whois software: ----------------------- src/defs/variants/RIPE/syntax.xml src/defs/variants/RIPE/classes.xml defs/variants/RIPE/attributes.xml all the lex/yacc parser files wk/which_keytypes.c wk/which_keytypes.h src/modules/ln/lu_whois.c src/modules/qi/query_instructions.c src/modules/qc/query_command.c conf/rip.config.sample.in src/modules/ca/ca_dictionary.h src/modules/ca/ca_macros.h src/modules/ca/dictGen.m4 src/modules/ud/ud_core.c src/SQL/create.tables.in src/SQL/create_asn32.patch.in dbupdate test-data files in tests/dbupdate/test-data src/modules/qc/query_command.h src/modules/ud/ud.h src/modules/ud/ud_command.c -------------------------

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Webquery and Webupdates services were unavailable
by Trudy Prins 24 Oct '06

24 Oct '06

[Apologies for duplicate mails] Dear Colleagues, Between 14:30 - 14:50 (UTC) on Tuesday, 24 October 2006 our Webquery and Webupdates services were unavailable. This problem was due to performance issues on one of our servers and has now been resolved. We apologise for any inconvenience. If you have any questions or concerns regarding this issue, please contact us at: <ripe-dbm(a)ripe.net> Regards, -- Trudy Prins User Support Coordinator

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Re: [enum-wg] Proposal for new org-type
by Niall O'Reilly 19 Oct '06

19 Oct '06

This message has two purposes. It is addressed to the ENUM WG with the purpose of determining consensus in this WG on the proposal from Antoin Verschuren. It is addressed to the DB and NCC-Services WGs as an inter-WG communication to alert these WG's to expect a consensus in the ENUM WG and a request from ENUM WG for related changes to the RIPE database. On 3 Oct 2006, at 10:35, Antoin Verschuren wrote: > In order for ENUM registries to be correctly distinguished in the RIPE > NCC database, I want to propose a new organization type to be used in > the organization object. > > Current organization types are: > IANA > RIR > NIR > LIR > NON-REGISTRY > > I would like this list to be extended with the term REGISTRY. > > I will note the issue tomorow in the ENUM WG, but need consensus to > take > place here, so please comment either here or tomorrow in the ENUM WG > session. On 4 Oct 2006, at 09:47, Antoin Verschuren wrote: > I can live with ENUM-REGISTRY, REGISTRY, OTHER or no org-type at all. > I cannot live with the org-type NON-REGISTRY. During his presentation in the ENUM WG, Antoin Verschuren made the following proposal. > In order for ENUM registries to not be misinterpreted in the RIPE > NCC database, I want to propose to change an organization type to be > used in the organization object. > Current organization types are: > > IANA > > RIR > > NIR > > LIR > > NON-REGISTRY > I would like this NON-REGISTRY to be changed to OTHER. I will declare consensus in the ENUM WG unless objections to Antoin's proposal are posted on the ENUM WG mailing list before 12:00 UTC on Thursday, 18 October 2006. Best regards, Niall O'Reilly Co-Chair, RIPE ENUM Working Group

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org: question
by Max Tulyev 18 Oct '06

18 Oct '06

Hi! As a LIR, I have org: object (with org-type: LIR). But I can't use it in my objects, because of there is mnt-ref: RIPE-NCC-HM-MNT. The question is why? -- WBR, Max Tulyev (MT6561-RIPE, 2:463/253@FIDO)

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Deprecation of CRYPT-PW authorisation from the RIPE Database
by Agoston Horvath 16 Oct '06

16 Oct '06

Dear colleagues, I would like to inform you that the project to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in mntner objects in the RIPE Database is scheduled to start this week. Regards, Agoston Horvath Software Engineering Department RIPE NCC -------- Original Message -------- Subject: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2006 15:48:12 +0200 From: Katie Petrusha <katie(a)ripe.net> To: db-wg(a)ripe.net Dear colleagues, Here follows the proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in mntner objects in the RIPE Database. Comments would be appreciated. Background and motivation ------------------------- In the RIPE Database there are several authorisation types currently supported: CRYPT-PW, MD5-PW, PGPKEY and X509. These authorisation types define what kind of authorisation tokens can be used in "mntner" objects. CRYPT-PW authorisation type is based on UNIX crypt() functionality and is vulnerable to both dictionary and brute force attacks given the fixed password length and lack of cryptographic strength given today's computing power. While maintaining and protecting objects in the RIPE Database is the responsibility of the respective maintainer, the RIPE DB WG agreed that it's the responsibility of the community to ensure that only appropriate tools and algortihms are used and maintained. Since CRYPT-PW does no longer fulfill this requirements with the reasons given above, the WG also agreed to phase out CRYPT-PW. PGPKEY and X.509 have been the recommended authentication schemes for some time (http://www.ripe.net/db/support/security/security.html) MD5-PW shares two weaknesses with CRYPT-PW: passwords are sent in clear together with update requests and MD5 is vulnerable to dictionary attacks,as well. Still, MD5-PW will not be phased out together with CRYPT-PW, since at least the dictionary attack can be prevented by chosing passwords or pass phrases of appropriate length and entropy. MD5 offers a short path of migration away from CRYPT-PW without major change in processes. LIRs should, however, seriously consider a migration towards a public key based authentication scheme (PGPKEY or X.509). The MD5-PW method will be addressed separately. We propose to deprecate the CRYPT-PW authorisation step-by-step. Affected objects ---------------- There are currently ~3500 mntner objects in the RIPE Database that have only CRYPT-PW authorisation. There are about 300 mntner objects that have mixed authorisation of CRYPT-PW and some other authorisation types. Plan ---- 1. Gather mntner objects: group A: only CRYPT-PW authorisation group B: CRYPT-PW and (PGP or X509 or MD5) authorisation 1a. E-mail the contacts of those mntner objects (notify, admin-c, tech-c, mnt-nfy) to notify them about the coming change. 1b. notify the DB-WG mailing list 1 month later: 2. Modify the RIPE Database software: 1) reject any change to mntner object that adds new CRYPT-PW. 2) show a warning if CRYPT-PW was used during authorisation. 3) show a warning if object being updated still contains (existing) CRYPT-PW. 2a. E-mail the contacts of the mntner objects (notify, admin-c, tech-c, mnt-nfy) notifying them about the change and the next steps. 2b. notify the DB-WG mailing list 1 month later: 3. Modify the RIPE Database software: 1) disable CRYPT-PW in the syntax 2) disable CRYPT-PW in authorisation 3a. Modify mntner objects. group A: auth: is changed to MD5-PW, new password generated. group B: auth: CRYPT-PW is changed into "remarks" line "remarks: "your object was modified due to CRYPT-PW deprecation" is added 3b. Notify the contacts of the mntner objects: group A: explanation about the changes done, and URL with details on how to 'recover' the locked mntner object (similar to NONE deprecation process) group B: explanation about the changes done 3c. notify the DB-WG mailing list 4. Finished.

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First draft of RIPE53 minutes
by Nigel Titley 06 Oct '06

06 Oct '06

Folks, Please find first rough draft of minutes of this morning's meeting. Comments welcome. Nigel <<Minutes.txt>>

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FW: FW: FW: FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 06 Oct '06

06 Oct '06

Hi, ---Gert Doering--- The information in the RIPE DB, especially the route: and aut-num: objects, are very closely tied to operational issues. A number of large networks (specific example: Cable & Wireless, AS1273, our upstream provider) are using this data to build their BGP filters. This is very much "hard tied to operational issues". ------------------ Gert, you know very well that the RIPE DB is not the only DB in the world. It is inaccurate at the moment in many cases. There are several networks which are not in any DB. "The large networks" may use SOME DB records, yes, but they use other ways to build their configuration too. They HAVE TO live in the real world. It's their "operational issues". Then they can live with it further. I think that sort of global changes for so many users of the DB (not "lookers" but a sort of "data administrators") should be done with their opinions and their "operational issues" taking into account but not the only "big fish players. Vladislav Potapov Ru.iiat P.S. To Max Tulyev:"I will be so thankful if you will point me to the law ;)" I won't do that for many reasons. In the Internet there are many answers to your questions.

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FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi! ---Max Tulyev--- In Russia ALL uncertified by goverment cryptographic system is illegal. So SSL (lirportal) is illegal. But PGP/MD5/CRYPT is NOT illegal, because it don't do encryption and not interfere with SORM (SORM - a mandatory part of any ISP in Russia, that do hidden analysis and mirroring some of traffic to FSB), but only do signatures. ---- I can say that you are wrong. There are many proves of that. ---Max Tulyev--- Also, unlike PGP, lirportal can't do safr multiply persons authorization (i.e. owner of PI space creates route object with his upstream's AS, signs it, sent to upstream, upstream signs it too and send to RIPE). ---- Are we going to discuss a new proposal already instead of existing? :) The way you have mentioned works just so ONLY because the method (e-mail) used for the problem resolution. You himself (I don't even mean the community) can suggest much more easy and preferrable method of multiply person authorisation by a web-site (lirportal). Vladislav Potapov Ru.iiat

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RE: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi! > Vladislav! If you wish to be really constructive - do policy > proposal for shutting down MD5-PW - personally I will vote > for that too. Max, I'm not a reactionary as you may think. I'm not against changes to the better. But it should be adequate, effective and universal for the region it serves. I don't know why you start to think on behalf (and propose against) of the 3500 other members using the scheme. If we got to the stage of a new proposal then maybe we should drop e-mail as a way to change the objects in the DB? It will be more constructive than shutting down both "password" ways. At least this way solves the "crypting mail prohibited" problem together with crypting ALL conversation (not only password part) and many more (and much more productive that the halved currently proposed "step"). The mechanism for that is already here - lirportal. Vladislav Potapov Ru.iiat > -----Original Message----- > From: db-wg-admin(a)ripe.net [mailto:db-wg-admin@ripe.net] On > Behalf Of Max Tulyev > Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 9:13 PM > To: db-wg(a)ripe.net > Subject: Re: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW > authorisation in the RIPE Database > > > Hi! > > My official +1. We need to shut it out as mail-from was. > > Vladislav! If you wish to be really constructive - do policy > proposal for shutting down MD5-PW - personally I will vote > for that too. > > Sascha Lenz wrote: > > Hi, > > > > Potapov Vladislav wrote: > > > >> Hi, > >> -Hank > >> > >>> I think a number of people have pointed out why they wish to > >>> deprecate > >>> > >> crypt-pw. > >> No, I'm not convinced. And a number of people - only Gert Doering? > >> The point of view they propagate - it should increase security (in > >> reality - not). But, we all know: false sense of security is worse > >> than knowledge of a problem. > >> > > > > actually i don't care much about this issue, but since you > raise the > > question - i have show my support for Gert/the proposal in general > > here, that is, i'm IN FAVOR of the depreciation of CRYPT-PW. > > > > It's not needed, it's more than a litte more insecure than > MD5-PW, it > > doesn't change anything operational. > > > > ..and no i'm not going to comment any other side-arguments > here, gets > > too personal. > > > > I support the original proposal - full stop. > > > > > > > -- > WBR, > Max Tulyev (MT6561-RIPE, 2:463/253@FIDO) > >

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FW: FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi! I don't understand WHAT IT'S PROVES? Or you decided to say something only to be shown? -----Original Message----- From: db-wg-admin(a)ripe.net [mailto:db-wg-admin@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Max Tulyev Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 2:16 PM To: db-wg(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database Hi! Come on, begin your education career from your FSB (ex-KGB if somebody don't know) colleagues: inetnum: 213.24.76.0 - 213.24.77.255 netname: RT-CLNT-FSB-RF descr: Federal Security Service of Russian Federation descr: 3/6 Lubyansky Proezd Moscow 103045 country: RU admin-c: DIP2-RIPE admin-c: ANH8-RIPE tech-c: ANH8-RIPE tech-c: DIP2-RIPE status: ASSIGNED PA mnt-by: AS8342-MNT source: RIPE # Filtered person: Dmitry Pravikov address: FSB RF address: 3/6 Lubyansky Proezd Moscow 103045 remarks: phone: +7 095 2248374 phone: +7 495 2248374 remarks: fax-no: +7 095 2244441 fax-no: +7 495 2244441 e-mail: pravikov(a)fsb.ru nic-hdl: DIP2-RIPE source: RIPE # Filtered remarks: modified for Russian phone area changes person: Alexander Holushco address: FSB RF address: 3/6 Lubyansky Proezd Moscow 103045 remarks: phone: +7 095 2244441 phone: +7 495 2244441 remarks: fax-no: +7 095 2244441 fax-no: +7 495 2244441 e-mail: root(a)fsb.ru nic-hdl: ANH8-RIPE source: RIPE # Filtered remarks: modified for Russian phone area changes % Information related to '213.24.0.0/16AS8342' route: 213.24.0.0/16 descr: RTCOMM-RU origin: AS8342 mnt-by: AS8342-MNT source: RIPE # Filtered As we can see - there is *NO* mntner at all at *-c: objects! ;-) Potapov Vladislav wrote: > Hi, > > >> From: Gert Doering [mailto:gert@space.net] >> Changing from CRYPT-PW to MD5-PW doesn't incur any >> operational changes, and doesn't require key management and >> crypto of any sort, but *will* improve security. >> > No "operational changes"? Let's look at the plan to get an image that > it's not so "problemless". I don't speak about RIPE resources which > should support this change. About security: there was several > opponents of your view already. I'm adding myself to them. > > >> From: Gert Doering [mailto:gert@space.net] >> Security issues in the IRR DB impact all of us (like "fake objects, >> use that to leverage a routing attack"). >> > Let's not say fairy tales about that. I have asked about REAL LIFE > problems with the scheme. Nobody has answered. As for security > issues... I think the better way to do this things is to educate > people, convince them to have better way of security. Up to now it is > only "small group words" and 3500 usages... > > I'm against the proposal. > > Vladislav Potapov > Ru.iiat > > -- WBR, Max Tulyev (MT6561-RIPE, 2:463/253@FIDO)

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FW: FW: FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi, ---- From: db-wg-admin(a)ripe.net [mailto:db-wg-admin@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Max Tulyev If to be seriously, I'm showing until weak schemes will be exist, people (even so serious) *WILL* use it. Education will *NOT* helps to solve the problem (so, try ;) ). ---- Then it's better to start banning people who do not agree with you? It's much more simplier than discuss, educate... ---- From: db-wg-admin(a)ripe.net [mailto:db-wg-admin@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Max Tulyev I agree better is set off ANY password authorization. We can do it at least step-by-step, but leave it alone is the worst thing we can do. ---- I don't think that the matter even worst speaking about, because still nobody has answered that there has been any problem with existing schemes even for no-maintainer objects (it's one more way to ignore your attempts to strengten maintainer object). So "the worst thing we can do" is only words. The information in the DB is not accurate, representative or hard tied to operational issues, so the world will be there if it disappears completely (maybe slightly annoying for some players, not more). Potapov Vladislav Ru.iiat

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FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi, -Hank >I think a number of people have pointed out why they wish to deprecate crypt-pw. No, I'm not convinced. And a number of people - only Gert Doering? The point of view they propagate - it should increase security (in reality - not). But, we all know: false sense of security is worse than knowledge of a problem. -Hank >To answer your latest points - data in the DB should be accurate and it does show who is allowed or not allowed to use a range of IPs, and if the data does 'disappear' as you say, it will have operational impact on a number of ISPs that build their access lists from the data in the RIPE-DB. "Should be" != "is" And to now this inaccuracy has NO operational impact on nobody. -Hank >It would appear that you might be enjoying the ability to abuse certain RIPE objects with weak security and by deprecating crypt-pw we will be impacting your playground. Hank, I think it is very cheap accusation at first hand; you are not eligible to accuse me of something - the second; it (abusing) hasn't happened before to speak about it - the third. Speaking your way I can think that RIPE doesn't know where to put money and want us to allow spend them on the projects not well-thinked and useles. Please be more constructive! Let's not allow to go to personal accusation. Vladislav Potapov Ru.iiat

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Re: FW: FW: FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Hank Nussbacher 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

At 03:49 PM 05-10-06 +0400, Potapov Vladislav wrote: >I don't think that the matter even worst speaking about, because still >nobody has answered that there has been any problem with existing >schemes even for no-maintainer objects (it's one more way to ignore your >attempts to strengten maintainer object). So "the worst thing we can do" >is only words. The information in the DB is not accurate, representative >or hard tied to operational issues, so the world will be there if it >disappears completely (maybe slightly annoying for some players, not >more). I think a number of people have pointed out why they wish to deprecate crypt-pw. To answer your latest points - data in the DB should be accurate and it does show who is allowed or not allowed to use a range of IPs, and if the data does 'disappear' as you say, it will have operational impact on a number of ISPs that build their access lists from the data in the RIPE-DB. It would appear that you might be enjoying the ability to abuse certain RIPE objects with weak security and by deprecating crypt-pw we will be impacting your playground. -Hank >Potapov Vladislav >Ru.iiat

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FW: FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi, On Thu, Oct 05, 2006 at 02:21:53PM +0400, Potapov Vladislav wrote: > The mail will still contain a "password: <something>" block, just the > way this password is hashed in the maintainer object is > different." > > Then it is NOT improve security much. It does. It takes away the attack angle of breaking CRYPT-PW hash. You are not read to the end again. "In security ALL parts are essential." You lock only one part of the "security" > Using your allegory: Let's put > huge lock on our cardboard door? In security ALL parts are essential. > BEFORE I can use "the day-to-day" operation I should change CRYPT-PW > to MD5-PW. And PERSONALLY I don't need the enhanced in some way but > weak in the other "security". As our members tell us that "crypto is hard!!!!" we can not enforce PGP (which would be a big step) - so security is increased in small steps. And you decided to go against "our members"? Maybe it is useful to tell them back? To educate? To convince BEFORE proposing? Maybe then all members (without changes) will put the most secure algorithms to their data? In other way your proposal will be ... authoritarian. And not from real life... Vladislav Potapov Ru.iiat

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RE: [db-wg] Re: [enum-wg] Proposal for new org-type
by Antoin Verschuren 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Per Heldal wrote: > On Wed, 2006-10-04 at 09:47 +0200, Antoin Verschuren wrote: > [snip] >> I can see a reason for the term "REGISTRY" if RIPE intends to expand >> heir services to more than IP network services, and doesn't feel to >> create a long list of different marketing terms for different >> organisations. I work for a ccTLD registry that is not an LIR, and >> even though that is a clear Internet registry function like IANA, >> RIR or LIR, RIPE currently does not supply a service for that >> function that requires an entry in the DB. >> >> Conclusion: >> I can live with ENUM-REGISTRY, REGISTRY, OTHER or no org-type at all. >> I cannot live with the org-type NON-REGISTRY. >> >> My prefference would be the ENUM-REGISTRY org-type. > > > This proposal is taking things out of context. The word REGISTRY in > RIPE-terms means an IP-address registry. Nothing more, nothing less. > That your organisation is categorised as NON-REGISTRY by RIPE doesn't > mean that RIPE does not acknowledge your role as a registry in some > other context, just that you're not an ip-addr registry. Should the > database contain exceptions for all kinds of registries which happen > to deal with something else than ip-addresses? That's why we changed the proposal to change the NON-REGISTRY into OTHER. Antoin Verschuren Technical Advisor Policy & Business Development SIDN Utrechtseweg 310 PO Box 5022 6802 EA Arnhem The Netherlands T +31 26 3525510 F +31 26 3525505 M +31 6 23368970 E antoin.verschuren(a)sidn.nl W http://www.sidn.nl/

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FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi, "> No "operational changes"? In the day-to-day operation ("sending in mails to change objects to the RIPE DB") going from CRYPT-PW to MD5-PW *will* *not* *change* *anything*. The mail will still contain a "password: <something>" block, just the way this password is hashed in the maintainer object is different." Then it is NOT improve security much. Using your allegory: Let's put huge lock on our cardboard door? In security ALL parts are essential. BEFORE I can use "the day-to-day" operation I should change CRYPT-PW to MD5-PW. And PERSONALLY I don't need the enhanced in some way but weak in the other "security". "> Let's look at the plan to get an image that it's not so "problemless". So where exactly *do* you see "problems"?" It's simple: the big amount of people and resources involved. "In your mail you speak about "crypto" - which is NOT involved here (except hashing the password) - this proposal is not forcing anybody to go to PGP, just to a different password storing scheme." It's not the only point I spoke about. Please reread once more. Please get a reality check on what is proposed, and what is proposed as replacement. It was my idea initially. I do not see much sense in the proposal, because you can use "better security" without ANY CHANGES AT ALL. *Good* security is fixing problems *before* they happen. Like "lock your front door when you leave your house, even if you have never been burglared yet". If you speak about your home for $1000000 - it's true. And if we speak about cabin for $10? How much sense is a lock for $1000 then? Vladislav Potapov Ru.iiat

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FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi, > From: Gert Doering [mailto:gert@space.net] > Changing from CRYPT-PW to MD5-PW doesn't incur any > operational changes, and doesn't require key management and > crypto of any sort, but *will* improve security. No "operational changes"? Let's look at the plan to get an image that it's not so "problemless". I don't speak about RIPE resources which should support this change. About security: there was several opponents of your view already. I'm adding myself to them. > From: Gert Doering [mailto:gert@space.net] > Security issues in the IRR DB impact all of us (like "fake objects, > use that to leverage a routing attack"). Let's not say fairy tales about that. I have asked about REAL LIFE problems with the scheme. Nobody has answered. As for security issues... I think the better way to do this things is to educate people, convince them to have better way of security. Up to now it is only "small group words" and 3500 usages... I'm against the proposal. Vladislav Potapov Ru.iiat

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RE: [db-wg] Re: [enum-wg] Proposal for new org-type
by Antoin Verschuren 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

leo vegoda wrote: > Do people find org-type values like IANA, RIR, LIR and so on useful? > If not, maybe we just need two values: REGISTRY for IANA, RIRs, LIRs, > TLDs and Tier 1 ENUM operators and NON-REGISTRY for everyone else. > However, if people really find the hierarchical distinctions in the > current org-type values useful, maybe we need some additional > granularity for the different kinds of domain registries? > > If the extra granularity is useful, perhaps we need to allow > organisations to have multiple org-type values? That's probably > preferable to having multiple objects for a single organisation. It depends on what is is supposed to be used for in the DB. If is is needed to distinguish types of organisations when making queries, the types makes sense. But if it's only there to give a label and it is never used, it doesn't. I wouldn't mind changing the "NON-REGISTRY" into "OTHER", like I now have to apply for a RIPE meeting. But on the other hand, if RIPE wants to use it as a differentiation of their customers, and this would be expressed in the RIPE DB, I think ENUM-REGISTRY would be appropriate, and I would also find it logical I can register at a RIPE meeting as "ENUM-REGISTRY". It's then just a customer type. I can see a reason for the term "REGISTRY" if RIPE intends to expand heir services to more than IP network services, and doesn't feel to create a long list of different marketing terms for different organisations. I work for a ccTLD registry that is not an LIR, and even though that is a clear Internet registry function like IANA, RIR or LIR, RIPE currently does not supply a service for that function that requires an entry in the DB. Conclusion: I can live with ENUM-REGISTRY, REGISTRY, OTHER or no org-type at all. I cannot live with the org-type NON-REGISTRY. My prefference would be the ENUM-REGISTRY org-type. Antoin Verschuren Technical Advisor Policy & Business Development SIDN Utrechtseweg 310 PO Box 5022 6802 EA Arnhem The Netherlands T +31 26 3525510 F +31 26 3525505 M +31 6 23368970 E antoin.verschuren(a)sidn.nl W http://www.sidn.nl/

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Re: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Gert Doering 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi, (I'm adding db-wg(a)ripe.net back into the CC: list) On Thu, Oct 05, 2006 at 01:50:09PM +0400, Potapov Vladislav wrote: > > From: Gert Doering [mailto:gert@space.net] > > Changing from CRYPT-PW to MD5-PW doesn't incur any > > operational changes, and doesn't require key management and > > crypto of any sort, but *will* improve security. > No "operational changes"? In the day-to-day operation ("sending in mails to change objects to the RIPE DB") going from CRYPT-PW to MD5-PW *will* *not* *change* *anything*. The mail will still contain a "password: <something>" block, just the way this password is hashed in the maintainer object is different. > Let's look at the plan to get an image that it's not so "problemless". So where exactly *do* you see "problems"? In your mail you speak about "crypto" - which is NOT involved here (except hashing the password) - this proposal is not forcing anybody to go to PGP, just to a different password storing scheme. > I don't speak about RIPE resources which > should support this change. > About security: there was several opponents of your view already. I'm > adding myself to them. Please get a reality check on what is proposed, and what is proposed as replacement. > > From: Gert Doering [mailto:gert@space.net] > > Security issues in the IRR DB impact all of us (like "fake objects, > > use that to leverage a routing attack"). > Let's not say fairy tales about that. I have asked about REAL LIFE > problems with the scheme. Nobody has answered. *Good* security is fixing problems *before* they happen. Like "lock your front door when you leave your house, even if you have never been burglared yet". Gert Doering -- NetMaster -- Total number of prefixes smaller than registry allocations: 98999 SpaceNet AG Mail: netmaster(a)Space.Net Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14 Tel : +49-89-32356-0 D- 80807 Muenchen Fax : +49-89-32356-234

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Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Katie Petrusha 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Dear colleagues, Here follows the proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in mntner objects in the RIPE Database. Comments would be appreciated. Background and motivation ------------------------- In the RIPE Database there are several authorisation types currently supported: CRYPT-PW, MD5-PW, PGPKEY and X509. These authorisation types define what kind of authorisation tokens can be used in "mntner" objects. CRYPT-PW authorisation type is based on UNIX crypt() functionality and is vulnerable to both dictionary and brute force attacks given the fixed password length and lack of cryptographic strength given today's computing power. While maintaining and protecting objects in the RIPE Database is the responsibility of the respective maintainer, the RIPE DB WG agreed that it's the responsibility of the community to ensure that only appropriate tools and algortihms are used and maintained. Since CRYPT-PW does no longer fulfill this requirements with the reasons given above, the WG also agreed to phase out CRYPT-PW. PGPKEY and X.509 have been the recommended authentication schemes for some time (http://www.ripe.net/db/support/security/security.html) MD5-PW shares two weaknesses with CRYPT-PW: passwords are sent in clear together with update requests and MD5 is vulnerable to dictionary attacks,as well. Still, MD5-PW will not be phased out together with CRYPT-PW, since at least the dictionary attack can be prevented by chosing passwords or pass phrases of appropriate length and entropy. MD5 offers a short path of migration away from CRYPT-PW without major change in processes. LIRs should, however, seriously consider a migration towards a public key based authentication scheme (PGPKEY or X.509). The MD5-PW method will be addressed separately. We propose to deprecate the CRYPT-PW authorisation step-by-step. Affected objects ---------------- There are currently ~3500 mntner objects in the RIPE Database that have only CRYPT-PW authorisation. There are about 300 mntner objects that have mixed authorisation of CRYPT-PW and some other authorisation types. Plan ---- 1. Gather mntner objects: group A: only CRYPT-PW authorisation group B: CRYPT-PW and (PGP or X509 or MD5) authorisation 1a. E-mail the contacts of those mntner objects (notify, admin-c, tech-c, mnt-nfy) to notify them about the coming change. 1b. notify the DB-WG mailing list 1 month later: 2. Modify the RIPE Database software: 1) reject any change to mntner object that adds new CRYPT-PW. 2) show a warning if CRYPT-PW was used during authorisation. 3) show a warning if object being updated still contains (existing) CRYPT-PW. 2a. E-mail the contacts of the mntner objects (notify, admin-c, tech-c, mnt-nfy) notifying them about the change and the next steps. 2b. notify the DB-WG mailing list 1 month later: 3. Modify the RIPE Database software: 1) disable CRYPT-PW in the syntax 2) disable CRYPT-PW in authorisation 3a. Modify mntner objects. group A: auth: is changed to MD5-PW, new password generated. group B: auth: CRYPT-PW is changed into "remarks" line "remarks: "your object was modified due to CRYPT-PW deprecation" is added 3b. Notify the contacts of the mntner objects: group A: explanation about the changes done, and URL with details on how to 'recover' the locked mntner object (similar to NONE deprecation process) group B: explanation about the changes done 3c. notify the DB-WG mailing list 4. Finished. -- Katie Petrusha RIPE NCC

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FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi, Personally I don't agree with the proposal. It's wrong from several points of view. First of all, "There are currently ~3500 mntner objects in the RIPE Database that have only CRYPT-PW authorisation. There are about 300 mntner objects that have mixed authorisation of CRYPT-PW and some other authorisation types." I think the number of the objects in the DB with only CRYPT-PW authorisation shows that the method is useful and handy. Speaking about weakness... I remember the previous global deprecation of no-authorisation-at-all. The main argument was a case which involved several hundreds objects changing by an MISTAKE. I think then the deprecation was the right thing. Are there cases which involves cracking objects with CRYPT-PW authorisation? Maybe we should compare the gravity of the consequencies of leaving the authorisation scheme with complexity of mainteinance mostly informational resource? Then: "While maintaining and protecting objects in the RIPE Database is the responsibility of the respective maintainer, the RIPE DB WG agreed that it's the responsibility of the community to ensure that only appropriate tools and algortihms are used and maintained." means for me: all users of the DB are right, but the WG is more important. Am I right? Maybe we should leave the resolution of the problem to the maintainers? There are several methods of authorisation: if someone want to severe the protection of his/her objects he/she can do it right now without any modifications! I should say about one more point. For several types of organisations in Russia (for example) there are some restrictions about using encryption and keys of some sort (for example in the e-mail messages). I think the news will bring additional concerns and problems for the organisation (I think not only in Russia). Conclusion: the proposal is rather early, unreasoned and unnessesary. Kind regards, Vladislav Potapov Ru.iiat It seems that Dear colleagues, Here follows the proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in mntner objects in the RIPE Database. Comments would be appreciated. Background and motivation ------------------------- In the RIPE Database there are several authorisation types currently supported: CRYPT-PW, MD5-PW, PGPKEY and X509. These authorisation types define what kind of authorisation tokens can be used in "mntner" objects. CRYPT-PW authorisation type is based on UNIX crypt() functionality and is vulnerable to both dictionary and brute force attacks given the fixed password length and lack of cryptographic strength given today's computing power. While maintaining and protecting objects in the RIPE Database is the responsibility of the respective maintainer, the RIPE DB WG agreed that it's the responsibility of the community to ensure that only appropriate tools and algortihms are used and maintained. Since CRYPT-PW does no longer fulfill this requirements with the reasons given above, the WG also agreed to phase out CRYPT-PW. PGPKEY and X.509 have been the recommended authentication schemes for some time (http://www.ripe.net/db/support/security/security.html) MD5-PW shares two weaknesses with CRYPT-PW: passwords are sent in clear together with update requests and MD5 is vulnerable to dictionary attacks,as well. Still, MD5-PW will not be phased out together with CRYPT-PW, since at least the dictionary attack can be prevented by chosing passwords or pass phrases of appropriate length and entropy. MD5 offers a short path of migration away from CRYPT-PW without major change in processes. LIRs should, however, seriously consider a migration towards a public key based authentication scheme (PGPKEY or X.509). The MD5-PW method will be addressed separately. We propose to deprecate the CRYPT-PW authorisation step-by-step. Affected objects ---------------- There are currently ~3500 mntner objects in the RIPE Database that have only CRYPT-PW authorisation. There are about 300 mntner objects that have mixed authorisation of CRYPT-PW and some other authorisation types. Plan ---- 1. Gather mntner objects: group A: only CRYPT-PW authorisation group B: CRYPT-PW and (PGP or X509 or MD5) authorisation 1a. E-mail the contacts of those mntner objects (notify, admin-c, tech-c, mnt-nfy) to notify them about the coming change. 1b. notify the DB-WG mailing list 1 month later: 2. Modify the RIPE Database software: 1) reject any change to mntner object that adds new CRYPT-PW. 2) show a warning if CRYPT-PW was used during authorisation. 3) show a warning if object being updated still contains (existing) CRYPT-PW. 2a. E-mail the contacts of the mntner objects (notify, admin-c, tech-c, mnt-nfy) notifying them about the change and the next steps. 2b. notify the DB-WG mailing list 1 month later: 3. Modify the RIPE Database software: 1) disable CRYPT-PW in the syntax 2) disable CRYPT-PW in authorisation 3a. Modify mntner objects. group A: auth: is changed to MD5-PW, new password generated. group B: auth: CRYPT-PW is changed into "remarks" line "remarks: "your object was modified due to CRYPT-PW deprecation" is added 3b. Notify the contacts of the mntner objects: group A: explanation about the changes done, and URL with details on how to 'recover' the locked mntner object (similar to NONE deprecation process) group B: explanation about the changes done 3c. notify the DB-WG mailing list 4. Finished. -- Katie Petrusha RIPE NCC

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RE: [enum-wg] Proposal for new org-type
by Antoin Verschuren 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Marco d'Itri wrote: > On Oct 03, leo vegoda <leo(a)ripe.net> wrote: > >> Do people find org-type values like IANA, RIR, LIR and so on useful? >> No. What would be the point? As Leo pointed out: Looking back into the mail archives for 2003 and 2004 I think the original purpose was to let people know how close to the End User the registration on a block of IP addresses was. If my memory is correct, the org-type was introduced after it was felt that status attribute values like "ALLOCATED-BY-IANA" or "ALLOCATED-BY-RIR" would overburden the status attribute syntax unnecessarily. One of the possible functionality could be that you'd not like to contact certain organisations holding numberblocks when abuse comes from them since you will know these numbers are distributed in a specific fashon, and you'll probably be not reaching an end user. Don't know if such routines are used. Antoin Verschuren Technical Advisor Policy & Business Development SIDN Utrechtseweg 310 PO Box 5022 6802 EA Arnhem The Netherlands T +31 26 3525510 F +31 26 3525505 M +31 6 23368970 E antoin.verschuren(a)sidn.nl W http://www.sidn.nl/

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RE: [enum-wg] Proposal for new org-type
by Antoin Verschuren 04 Oct '06

04 Oct '06

Niall O'Reilly wrote: > This message has two purposes. > > It is addressed to the ENUM WG with the purpose of determining > consensus in this WG on the proposal from Antoin Verschuren. To let there be no misunderstanding, the final proposal with most consensus so far is: >> In order for ENUM registries to not be misinterpreted in the RIPE >> NCC database, I want to propose to change an organization type to be >> used in the organization object. >> Current organization types are: >> >> IANA >> RIR >> NIR >> LIR >> NON-REGISTRY >> >> I would like this NON-REGISTRY to be changed to OTHER. > > I will declare consensus in the ENUM WG unless objections to Antoin's > proposal are posted on the ENUM WG mailing list before 12:00 UTC on > Thursday, 18 October 2006. Regards, Antoin Verschuren Technical Advisor Policy & Business Development SIDN Utrechtseweg 310 PO Box 5022 6802 EA Arnhem The Netherlands T +31 26 3525510 F +31 26 3525505 M +31 6 23368970 E antoin.verschuren(a)sidn.nl W http://www.sidn.nl/

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Re: [enum-wg] Proposal for new org-type
by leo vegoda 04 Oct '06

04 Oct '06

Hi, I cc'd the Database WG list for input on object syntax. On 3 Oct 2006, at 4:52GMT+02:00, Ondřej Surý wrote: [...] > My point was that not only ENUM registries exists in current internet. > We are .cz domain registry and while I don't have problem with > whatever > label we have in RIPE database (we do have LIR atm), we don't exactly > fall into LIR category (in it's original meaning - ie. ISP). Hence I > could easily imagine that our org-type: would be changed to > REGISTRY to > match reality a bit more. One legal entity might run an LIR, a ccTLD registry and an ENUM registry. Whether you want to identify them as a REGISTRY, a DOMAIN- REGISTRY or something else is dependent on what you want to use the org-type to tell people. Looking back into the mail archives for 2003 and 2004 I think the original purpose was to let people know how close to the End User the registration on a block of IP addresses was. If my memory is correct, the org-type was introduced after it was felt that status attribute values like "ALLOCATED-BY-IANA" or "ALLOCATED-BY-RIR" would overburden the status attribute syntax unnecessarily. Do people find org-type values like IANA, RIR, LIR and so on useful? If not, maybe we just need two values: REGISTRY for IANA, RIRs, LIRs, TLDs and Tier 1 ENUM operators and NON-REGISTRY for everyone else. However, if people really find the hierarchical distinctions in the current org-type values useful, maybe we need some additional granularity for the different kinds of domain registries? If the extra granularity is useful, perhaps we need to allow organisations to have multiple org-type values? That's probably preferable to having multiple objects for a single organisation. Thoughts? -- leo vegoda Registration Services Manager RIPE NCC

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