- db-wg - mailman.ripe.net

Temporary origins
by snash 24 Jun '15

24 Jun '15

Thanks for comments. My interest was to continue the discussion that Job hosted at RIPE70, and to get to some guidelines for those that need to exploit temporary redirection with BGP; whether customers or providers of services. Job, thanks for your observation that "the RIPE database supports this, you can create multiple route-objects covering the same prefix but with different "origin:" values.". Randy states agreement. However, this does conflict with some other Internet documents, like BCP-6. That can only be confusing and may inhibit global consensus. If IETF BCP documents are inaccurate then the RIPE community has some responsibility to point it out. The dual authorisation that RIPE requires on a ROUTE object seems an unnecessary hurdle, and gives rise to the cross-border concern that Job raised in the BoF. The consensus from RPKI seems to be that the inetnum maintainer has the authority to grant ROA. I do not know the history of why RIPE asks for AS maintainer also. Is there still some good reason? (If so, I am puzzled that it does not apply to RPKI, but that is a separate discussion). Removing the AS maintainer from the route object Creation authorisation seems to solve the cross-region problem. Are there reasons not to do this? Job mentioned that RaDB seems to have neither authorisation requirement, so creating a global view of the IRR is challenging without policy agreement leading to trust on these things. Summary: 1/ ask IETF to update BCP-6. Is this something RIPE NCC should do? 2/ discuss why AS maintainer authorisation is required for RIPE ROUTE object Creation. I subsequently read the article by Den Is May 2015, which comments that there is no written policy for IRR. Steve

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Personalised authorisation
by Sascha Luck [ml] 19 Jun '15

19 Jun '15

Hi Alex, > Our current proposal allows authorisation on person objects for > those who want it, through maintainer objects Does this mean that calling a maintained object will spit out a reference to a mntner: object which will spit out a ton of references to person: objects which are authorised to make changes on the original object? rgds, Sascha Luck

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[training] RIPE NCC Webinars - new dates
by Training Services 18 Jun '15

18 Jun '15

Dear colleagues, We are pleased to announce the dates for the RIPE NCC Webinars for the coming quarter. These interactive on-line learning sessions take about one hour, and give you the opportunity to learn and interact with our trainers without leaving your desk. In the next 3 months you can participate in the following Webinars: - Advanced RIPE Atlas Usage (NEW!) - Introduction to the RIPE Database - RIPE Database - Advanced Topics - IPv6 in the RIPE Database - IPv6 Addressing Plan - Webinar for New LIRs - Resource Certification (RPKI) Register now at https://www.ripe.net/support/training/learn-online/webinars Participation is limited to 20 people, so don't hesitate if you want to take part! If you have any questions, please email <training(a)ripe.net>. We look forward to seeing you online. Kind regards, RIPE NCC Training Services

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MD5s of the RIPE database, Deprecation of MD5 and safe authentication methods
by Sascha Luck [ml] 17 Jun '15

17 Jun '15

Sorry for breaking the thread already, wasn't subscribed to this before. IMO there is a lot of work to be done before deprecating passwords. Right now this seems more than a little half-baked: 1) There should most definitely be SSO support for syncupdates. Webupdates, I'm sure, is fine for some but to me it's the most awkward and time-consuming way to make any db change. As far as email is concerned, deprecate that for all I care. I have never used that method in 15 years. 2) There are many issues with using PGP. As someone who makes DB changes for up to 5 LIRs at a time and who does not have a desk with a PC from which all work is done, what am I supposed to do? (On a side note, SSO has made that job so very much easier. If it can be used to authenticate mntners, by all means, please make that possible!) -Use the same privkey for all mntners? Hardly. -put all the privkeys on a USB stick? What if that is lost or stolen? All mntners are now compromised and have to be changed. Hopefully there is a copy of each privkey in some secure location... So, I wouldn't deprecate passwords until there is another option that is as flexible as a simple password. rgds, Sascha Luck

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Re: [db-wg] Publishing Deleted Objects - Legal Analysis
by Athina Fragkouli 12 Jun '15

12 Jun '15

Dear Bengt and all, The purpose of the RIPE Database is defined in Article 3 of the RIPE Database Terms and Conditions: ------------------ Article 3 - Purpose of the RIPE Database The RIPE Database contains information for the following purposes: - Ensuring the uniqueness of Internet number resource usage through registration of information related to the resources and Registrants - Publishing routing policies by network operators (IRR) - Facilitating coordination between network operators (network problem resolution, outage notification etc.) - Provisioning of Reverse Domain Name System (DNS) and ENUM delegations - Providing information about the Registrant and Maintainer of Internet number resources when the resources are suspected of being used for unlawful activities, to parties who are authorised under the law to receive such information. - Scientific research into network operations and topology - Providing information to parties involved in disputes over Internet number resource registrations to parties who are authorised under the law to receive such information. ------------------- The RIPE Database Terms and Conditions can be found here: https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/db/support/documentation/terms Kind regards, Athina Fragkouli Legal Counsel RIPE NCC > From: Bengt Gördén <bengan(a)resilans.se> > Subject: Re: [db-wg] Publishing Deleted Objects - Legal Analysis > Date: 9 Jun 2015 17:12:02 GMT+2 > To: db-wg(a)ripe.net > > Den 2015-06-02 15:36, Athina Fragkouli skrev: >> Dear colleagues, > Hi Athina, > > Thank you for the legal clarification i this matter. > >> In response to the question raised on the Database WG mailing list, >> “…whether there would be legal restrictions or considerations with >> regards to publishing information about deleted objects or the deleted >> objects themselves”, please find below a preliminary analysis from a >> legal perspective. >> >> The RIPE Database contains a variety of types of data. A distinction >> should be made between database objects that contain personal data (i.e. >> person and role objects) and those that do not (i.e. inetnum, inet6num, >> autnum, etc.). >> >> For database objects containing personal data, the Personal Data >> Protection Act in the Netherlands applies. More specifically, according >> to the Act personal data may be collected for specific, explicitly >> defined and legitimate purposes. >> Once collected, this data must not be >> kept for any longer than is necessary to achieve the purpose for which >> it has been collected. >> >> In consultation with the RIPE community, the RIPE Data Protection Task >> Force identified the reason why personal data should be inserted into, >> and made publicly available through, the RIPE Database. The reason the >> Internet community initially requested that this data be made publicly >> available was for Internet operation purposes. Internet network >> operators should have each other’s contact details (which is considered >> to be personal data by the Act) in order to facilitate communication >> among the individuals responsible for networks in case of operational >> problems in the network (troubleshooting, abuse, etc.). >> >> Accordingly, the RIPE Database contains the contact details of >> individuals that are responsible for resolving operational problems in a >> network. However, if an individual no longer has this responsibility, >> this individual’s contact details must be deleted from the RIPE Database. >> >> If the RIPE community wishes to have access to contact details of >> individuals that were responsible for resolving operational problems in >> the past, then the RIPE community must have a specific, explicitly >> defined and legitimate purpose for it. If such a purpose is defined, the >> RIPE NCC will proceed with investigating the conditions under which this >> feature can be implemented in compliance with the Act. Implementation of >> this feature may include prior consent of these individuals. >> >> For more information about the implementation of this legislation in the >> RIPE Database and related services, please see the RIPE NCC Data >> Protection Report [1]. >> >> For database objects that do not contain personal data, there are no >> restrictions in terms of personal data protection. If the RIPE Community >> wishes the RIPE NCC to include the feature for publishing the history of >> deleted objects in the RIPE Database, the RIPE NCC will proceed with the >> implementation of this feature. As part of this process the RIPE NCC >> will need to investigate and possibly update its procedures and >> governance documents to ensure compliance with its legal obligations. >> Updating the relevant governance documents is subject to the RIPE NCC >> procedural document “Adoption Process for RIPE NCC Corporate Documents” >> [2]. > > If we can start out with inetnum, inet6num, aut-num, route, route6 and organisation it's good so far. > > I have a question about the word "purposes" of the text. Denis also mentions "purposes" in his e-mail. Are these "purposes" defined somewhere in a RIPE document or is it a legal definition that must be applied to what we believe is the "purpose" of an object? > > regards, > > -- > > Bengt Gördén > Resilans AB > >

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Publishing Deleted Objects - Legal Analysis
by Athina Fragkouli 09 Jun '15

09 Jun '15

Dear colleagues, In response to the question raised on the Database WG mailing list, “…whether there would be legal restrictions or considerations with regards to publishing information about deleted objects or the deleted objects themselves”, please find below a preliminary analysis from a legal perspective. The RIPE Database contains a variety of types of data. A distinction should be made between database objects that contain personal data (i.e. person and role objects) and those that do not (i.e. inetnum, inet6num, autnum, etc.). For database objects containing personal data, the Personal Data Protection Act in the Netherlands applies. More specifically, according to the Act personal data may be collected for specific, explicitly defined and legitimate purposes. Once collected, this data must not be kept for any longer than is necessary to achieve the purpose for which it has been collected. In consultation with the RIPE community, the RIPE Data Protection Task Force identified the reason why personal data should be inserted into, and made publicly available through, the RIPE Database. The reason the Internet community initially requested that this data be made publicly available was for Internet operation purposes. Internet network operators should have each other’s contact details (which is considered to be personal data by the Act) in order to facilitate communication among the individuals responsible for networks in case of operational problems in the network (troubleshooting, abuse, etc.). Accordingly, the RIPE Database contains the contact details of individuals that are responsible for resolving operational problems in a network. However, if an individual no longer has this responsibility, this individual’s contact details must be deleted from the RIPE Database. If the RIPE community wishes to have access to contact details of individuals that were responsible for resolving operational problems in the past, then the RIPE community must have a specific, explicitly defined and legitimate purpose for it. If such a purpose is defined, the RIPE NCC will proceed with investigating the conditions under which this feature can be implemented in compliance with the Act. Implementation of this feature may include prior consent of these individuals. For more information about the implementation of this legislation in the RIPE Database and related services, please see the RIPE NCC Data Protection Report [1]. For database objects that do not contain personal data, there are no restrictions in terms of personal data protection. If the RIPE Community wishes the RIPE NCC to include the feature for publishing the history of deleted objects in the RIPE Database, the RIPE NCC will proceed with the implementation of this feature. As part of this process the RIPE NCC will need to investigate and possibly update its procedures and governance documents to ensure compliance with its legal obligations. Updating the relevant governance documents is subject to the RIPE NCC procedural document “Adoption Process for RIPE NCC Corporate Documents” [2]. Kind regards, Athina Fragkouli Legal Counsel RIPE NCC [1] https://www.ripe.net/about-us/legal/ripe-ncc-data-protection-report [2] https://www.ripe.net/about-us/corporate-governance/adoption-process-for-rip…

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Personalised authorisation
by Tim Bruijnzeels 02 Jun '15

02 Jun '15

Dear working group, Yesterday during the WG session we presented a proposal for implementing personalised authorisation: https://ripe70.ripe.net/wp-content/uploads/presentations/165-ripe70-pers-au… <https://ripe70.ripe.net/wp-content/uploads/presentations/165-ripe70-pers-au…> https://ripe70.ripe.net/archives/video/123 <https://ripe70.ripe.net/archives/video/123> As recorded in the first cut of the minutes: > D. Personalised authentication (Tim Bruijnzeels, RIPE NCC) > (See presentation) > This will allow one click creation of person objects > Maintain credentials in one place. > Allow better auditing. > Done by extending person object to have multiple optional auth: attribute > This will ultimately allow existing auth: sso references to be cleaned up > Last auth: attribute should not be removed from a person object that is used in an authorisation context. Apart from questions about possible additions below, there seemed to be general approval for the above as an addition to the existing maintainer mechanism. We would very much like to implement this soon. We are already working on improving the way users can log in and use the web updates, and manage maintainers (and who is authorised for them), so having this would be extremely useful for that effort. Technically I don't think the above has to depend on further extensions below. Roles can be added at any time that we consensus on them, and showing audit logs is a separate effort - building on this. > Should this be extended to the role object as well? This would involve additional business rules but is technically possible. I understand and fully agree that there is a need to maintain a list of authorised persons centrally. But in effect a maintainer can be used for this purpose. Multiple objects can be maintained by the same maintainer, and the list of persons authorised can then be managed on this single maintainer: obj1 ---\ ---> mnt1 ---> pers1 obj2 ---/ \--> pers2 In other words, just like role objects can group persons in a 'contact' context, 'maintainers' could group persons in a 'authorisation' context, where also other things such as "upd-to:" etc can find a home. So, technically I don't think there is a need to have another role object here: obj1 ---\ ---> mnt1 ---> role1 ---> pers1 obj2 ---/ \--> pers2 Conceptually this can work of course, but it adds some complexity, and things to resolve: a) referencing roles from maintainers, and authorised persons from roles The proposal was to refer to authorised persons from maintainers like this: auth: person-<nichandle> Can we resolve this by allowing: = auth: role-<nichdl> on maintainers = auth: person-<nichdl> on roles But no other auth: flavours for now. Also note that this person is not necessarily an authorisation *contact* for others. If we follow current practice consistently we would filter this value for security purpose. b) business rules regarding auth->role Suggestion: - A role can only be added to a maintainer as "auth: role-<nichdl>" if it has at least one "auth: person-<nichdl>" - The last "auth: person" can not be removed from a role if it's referenced anywhere as "auth: role-" - As before: "auth: person-<nichl>" can only be added if the person has at least one "auth: <something>" - As before: the last "auth:" can not be removed from a person if it's referenced anywhere as "auth: person-" > It would be useful to record what credential (maintainer) was used to make a particular change to an object and this change > would facilitate this. RV was asked to raise this on the mailing list. Currently we do know internally which maintainer was used to submit a successful update, but not which credential. Technically this could be added of course. And in case of SSO or PGP people can get some idea of which user did the update. But showing which password hash was used for an update may not be best security practice. With authorisation delegated to persons (possibly through roles) we will be able to give a much more better output. We can refer to the name of the person, rather than a credential that should be private to that person. Also note that for any of this we will also need to be sure that the user viewing this information is authorised to see this. So what we had in mind here is to show this only on the web interface for logged in users authorised for at least one mnt-by of the object they are looking at.

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Database release 1.80 deployed to RC environment
by Alex Band 01 Jun '15

01 Jun '15

Dear colleagues, We are happy to announce the deployment of RIPE Database software release 1.80 to the Release Candidate (RC) environment. This release contains quite significant changes to long-standing RIPE Database functionality. This is why we urge you to thoroughly test your tools and scripts against the RC environment to make sure nothing in your workflow breaks: https://www.ripe.net/data-tools/db/release-notes/rc-release-candidate-envir… 1. This release continues to gradually phase out the "changed" attribute. We're now in phase 2, where the attribute is marked as optional. For details on this functionality change, please refer to the implementation plan: https://labs.ripe.net/Members/tim/deprecating-the-changed-attribute-in-the-… 2. Also according to plan, the "referral-by" attribute has now been completely removed. It is no longer mandatory when creating or updating maintainers. We will perform a data cleanup following the release, to remove this attribute from current maintainer objects. Documentation for this release is published here: https://www.ripe.net/data-tools/support/documentation/ripe-database-documen… Please contact us if you find any issues with this release, or in case you have any questions or comments. We plan to deploy this release to the production environment on Monday, 13 July. Kind regards, Alex Band Product Manager (standing in for Tim, who is enjoying being a proud father)

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abuse-c on legacy resources
by denis walker 29 May '15

29 May '15

Hi Piotr During the RIPE Meeting you suggested the idea of legacy resource holders adopting the practice of referencing an abuse contact using the one accepted method currently in use in the RIPE Database with "abuse-c:". In terms of responsible management of internet resources I don't think anyone could argue against all resources documented in the RIPE Database making reference to an abuse contact via an ORGANISATION object showing who is responsible for a resource. Many ideas raised at RIPE Meetings are quickly forgotten after the meeting. How can we move this idea forward so it does not become another of those 'good idea, but never implemented'? cheersDenisIndependent Netizen

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History lost ...
by Erik Bais 21 May '15

21 May '15

Hi, With the IP transfers going in full swing, it is quite common these days that the larger prefix size is broken up in to multiple smaller prefixes.. As the original prefix is split up, the IPRAs remove the original prefix from the database .. and with it .. the history Is there a way to preserve that data to be able to still lookup the data using list-versions or show-version # Regards, Erik Bais

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Prevent use of RIPE-NCC-RPSL-MNT in a mnt-by
by denis 18 May '15

18 May '15

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created, last-modified mandatory?
by Daniel Zepeda 15 May '15

15 May '15

It wasn't clear to me from the provided documentation here: https://labs.ripe.net/Members/tim/deprecating-the-changed-attribute-in-the-… if or when the 'created' and 'last-modified' attributes would be mandatory? Thanks! DZ

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Cancel
by Luciano Panza 15 May '15

15 May '15

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Minutes from RIPE 70
by Nigel Titley 14 May '15

14 May '15

Folks Here is the first cut at the minutes. Additions and corrections to me, please Nigel

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Re: [db-wg] re-evaluate route-object authorisation model
by George Michaelson 14 May '15

14 May '15

I am from out of region, and I do not maintain data in the RIPE DB with a view to configuring routing, or to have my prefix originated. I am associated with an agency (another RIR) which is not able to be fully represented inside RIPE DB for logistical reasons but instead operates as an autonomous, un-related space of IRR/WHOIS in the same format (RPSL). Users of that service have come to expect that they can lodge IRR data inside my service, in respect of their prefixes. This seems reasonable. And so we enter the problem of 'which DB, which resources, which region, which authorization, why, how' I too prefer, that for route: objects, we move to an acceptance that the ASN holder is not materially bound to announce simply because there is a route object, the ASN holder is not inherently attacked because they were not asked, and instead we should be accepting the INFORMATION that a route object asserts, first class from SIGNED DATA in a ROA. (sorry for shouting) I understand there is a hypothetical risk that FILTER OWNERS are spammed into a ddos wall of death from the creation of huge numbers of route: objects not referring to them. But, this is not significantly different in my mind, to the risk that I take a valid /32 in IPv6, which I have in eg RIPE and then use the public maintainer to add 2^32-1 sub instances of data which refer to any ASN outside of RIPE, thus killing the entire WHOIS anyway for anyone. Not a hypothetical attack. Its a real one. And, by virtue of the maintainer, it exists now. I believe that transitionally, moving to prevent the out-of-region AS thing in RIPE will impact around 350-400 people who currently assert route: objects depending on this. I believe that is a tractable problem. I believe the addition of a tool to emit route: objects from RIPE RPKI Validator, and possibly the dragon s/w makes this a moot point, because those prefix holders can create objects in RPKI which replace that function, trivially. If the RIPE S/W is modified to stop needing ASN to approve route objects, then users in my region using my WHOIS will be able to create route: objects, while we work on persuading them to create ROA instead. I know APNIC Helpdesk staff would like to be able to stop recommending use of un-secured IRR, and having to mediate the conversation between ASN and INetnum maintainer by hand. They wish to ask if this can be considered as an operational problem. -George On 14 May 2015 at 11:47, Randy Bush <randy(a)psg.com> wrote: >>> some folk at euro ixen require route objects in ripe's irr. some >>> folk who get address space from other rirs appear at those euro ixen >>> and wish to peer. >> >> ixps which build route server configurations using ixp manager can >> apply arbitrary IRR source tags (or combinations) on a per-customer >> basis. > > yes, and peval() and other tools take an IRR instance list. but i have > enough windmills without tilting at this one. you wanna peer with > brunhilde, you play by her rules. > > when i saddle up rosenantes, it is to get all this to be rpki-based > origin validation instead. > > randy >

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RIPE 70 DB-WG agenda V3
by Piotr Strzyzewski 14 May '15

14 May '15

Dear DB-WG Members This is the 3rd draft of an agenda for the DB-WG Meeting at RIPE70 at the Hotel Okura in Amsterdam, Netherlands. This version includes new proposal made by Denis Walker. The DB-WG Meeting is scheduled as usual for Thursday, May 14th, starting at 16:00 local time, after the coffee break. The length of our timeslot is 90 minutes. For the overall RIPE 70 meeting plan please refer to its most up-to-date version at https://ripe70.ripe.net/programme/meeting-plan/ Please feel free to comment agenda items or propose additional topics to be discussed both on the mailing list or direct to the WG Chairs at db-wg-chairs(a)ripe.net Looking forward to see you all in Amsterdam. All the best, Job, Nigel & Piotr ________________________________________________________________________ A. Administrative Matters [~5 min] . Welcome . select scribe (thanks to Nigel for volunteering again!) . finalise agenda . approval of minutes from previous WG meeting(s) . review of action list (Nigel Titley) B. Data Base Operational Update (Tim Bruijnzeels, RIPE NCC) [~10 min] C. New DB-Software functionality (Tim Bruijnzeels, RIPE NCC) [~20 min] (proposed, test, deployment) . referral-by deprecation - where are we now? - what are next steps (timeline) . from "changed:" to "last-modified:" / "created:" - where are we now? - what are next steps (timeline) . RIPE NCC to stop enforcing accurate organisation names in "descr:" attribute . restrict usage of RIPE-NCC-RPSL-MNT . new MNTNER - RIPE-NCC-LEGACY-MNT . other aspects D. Personalised authentication (Tim Bruijnzeels, RIPE NCC) [~10 min] E. New proposals (Piotr Strzyżewski) [~10 min] . UTF-8 in the DB . same INET(6)NUM objects with different status . cleanup some hacks with status values . make phone number optional in person objects . clean up historical "abuse-mailbox:" attributes F. Orphaned Objects (William Sylvester) [~5 min] G. Using RPKI for signing RPSL objects (Robert Kisteleki, RIPE NCC) [~5 min] H. "source: field for non RIPE address space" (Job Snijders) [~10 min] I. continue promotion of the the new Afrinic RR (Job Snijders) [~5 min] Y. Input from other Working Groups and/or Task Forces . Cross-registry Authentication for IRR Data BoF (Job Snijders) [~10 min] Z. AOB __________________________________________ -- gucio -> Piotr Strzyżewski E-mail: Piotr.Strzyzewski(a)polsl.pl

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re-evaluate route-object authorisation model
by Job Snijders 14 May '15

14 May '15

Dear working group, Yesterday during the birds of a feather session about "cross-registry authorisation" the idea to relax the authorisation requirements for route-object creation was brought up (again). I ask this group to further explore. Today, to create a route-object, BOTH the inetnum mntner, and the autnum mntner need to approve the creation of the route-object. One could argue that it is sufficient to require only authorisation from the inetnum owner to create a route-object. This would simplify the process, especially if the autnum is managed in a non-RIPE RIR. No longer would ARIN autnum owners be required to create a superfluous autnum object in the RIPE database. Questions: - should the authorisation model work differently for RIPE managed space versus non-RIPE managed space? Should we even continue to allow route-objects covering non-RIPE managed space? - should the authorisation model work differently when creating a route-object for RIPE managed space with a non-RIPE managed autnum? If yes, how so? - although in this idea the autnum owner is no longer required to approve /creation/ of a route-object, would it be a good idea to allow the autnum owner to /delete/ any route-object in which their autnum is referenced as origin? - Is RFC 2725 the only reason why the authorisation model was implemented as it was implemented, can someone remember practical reasons for doing it this way? During the BoF it was pointed out that any potential DoS vector already exists today. - ... ? Kind regards, Job

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Re: [db-wg] [routing-wg] RPKI Validator 2.19; export ROAs as RPSL route: objects
by Randy Bush 13 May '15

13 May '15

>> We've been getting a lot of requests to make processed RPKI data >> easily available in existing (RPSL based) workflows. This is why we >> added the ability to export all ROAs as route: objects in the latest >> release, version 2.19. Practically, this means that running an RPSL >> export will give you almost 450,000 highly reliable, cryptographically >> validated route: objects. > Interesting! I was considering writing a script to do this, but the NCC > beat me to it! :-) drl wrote the script and has made the data available for years > Wouldn't it make sense to align the "created:" date with something > more specific to the ROA rather then the export date? yes > Another consideration might be to create a "expiry-date:" derived from > the ROA's expiry date for easy debugging purposes. use a remark: randy

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Cross-RIR route object registration
by snash 13 May '15

13 May '15

In considering the verification of Route Object ownership for route acceptance policies, please consider organisations which implement temporary BGP announcements for traffic diversion for uses like DDoS Mitigation. The AS may be registered with an RIR which is not the same as the RIR of the Route Object. Plus there must continue to be a means to have more than one entity pre-authorised to announce any particular Route Object, or subnet thereof. Regards Steve ________________________ Steve Nash CEng MIET Consulting Engineer Arbor Networks office +44 118 967 4917 mobile +44 772 029 1359 www.arbornetworks.com ________________________ Please be advised that this email may contain confidential information. If you are not the intended recipient, please notify us by email by replying to the sender and delete this message. The sender disclaims that the content of this email constitutes an offer to enter into, or the acceptance of, any agreement; provided that the foregoing does not invalidate the binding effect of any digital or other electronic reproduction of a manual signature that is included in any attachment.

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Cross registry authentication BOF - rough notes
by Nigel Titley 13 May '15

13 May '15

Please find the rough notes that I took during this BOF attached Nigel

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Minutes of DB-WG for the RIPE 69 meeting
by Nigel Titley 11 May '15

11 May '15

Folks I'm a bit late in sending these minutes out, for which I apologise. Please rapidly get any comments back to me. Thanks Nigel

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[training] RIPE NCC Training Courses July-September 2015
by Training Services 11 May '15

11 May '15

Dear colleagues, Our training team travels the RIPE NCC service region to deliver training courses to our members without any additional cost. Over the next few months, we'll be in Frankfurt, London, Skopje, Stockholm, Minsk, Sarajevo, Vladivostok, Tel Aviv, Tallinn, Zurich, Paris, Amsterdam. Visit the following page to register and to check which training courses we are giving in your area: https://lirportal.ripe.net/training/courses The RIPE NCC delivers the following training courses: - LIR Training Course - Database Training Course - Basic IPv6 Training Course - 2 day Advanced Training Course - Routing Security Training Course For more information visit: https://www.ripe.net/support/training/courses With kind regards, Rumy Spratley-Kanis Training Services Manager

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Proposal to clean up historical "abuse-mailbox:" attributes
by denis 09 May '15

09 May '15

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[training] RIPE NCC Training Courses July-September 2015
by Training Services 08 May '15

08 May '15

Dear colleagues, Our training team travels the RIPE NCC service region to deliver training courses to our members without any additional cost. Over the next few months, we'll be in Frankfurt, London, Skopje, Stockholm, Minsk, Sarajevo, Vladivostok, Tel Aviv, Tallinn, Zurich, Paris, Amsterdam. Visit the following page to register and to check which training courses we are giving in your area: https://lirportal.ripe.net/training/courses The RIPE NCC delivers the following training courses: - LIR Training Course - Database Training Course - Basic IPv6 Training Course - 2 day Advanced Training Course - Routing Security Training Course For more information visit: http://www.ripe.net/lir-services/training/courses With kind regards, Rumy Spratley-Kanis Training Services Manager

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Re: [db-wg] db-wg Digest, Vol 44, Issue 7
by denis walker 08 May '15

08 May '15

Hi Piotr Just to be clear, you refer to free text attributes. This has a specific meaning in terms of database syntax checks. It applies to those attributes where no syntax checks are done, for example "address:", "descr:", "remarks:". Is your proposal only referring to these attributes? I trust you do not mean all attributes other than primary keys. Incidentally, although "person:", "role:" and "org-name:" are not primary keys, they are not free text either. Currently there are syntax checks done on these values. If you allow these in UTF8 then all these syntax checks will have to be dropped. cheersdenisindependent netizen Date: Fri, 17 Apr 2015 12:18:04 +0200 From: Piotr Strzyzewski <Piotr.Strzyzewski(a)polsl.pl> To: db-wg(a)ripe.net Subject: [db-wg] Proposal to allow UTF8 Message-ID: <20150417101804.GD7031(a)hydra.ck.polsl.pl> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Dear DB-WG Members Proposal: I propose to allow UTF8 in all free text attributes of all DB objects except in primary keys. Description: RIPE NCC service region covers Europe, the Middle East and parts of Central Asia. Moreover we have users from outside of this region. This means that WHOIS DB stores data for people and organizations from number of different countries using number of different alphabets. At this moment, all data in the RIPE WHOIS DB have to be stored using 7-bit plain US ASCII character set. [As a side note: It is technically possible to store some UTF8 content in some attributes, but the answer to whois query (both terminal and web based) returns "?" character in this case.] Lack of the full support for national character sets leads to some problems which includes, but is not limited to: 1. Mistakes in person/organization names due to national->english and english->national (based mostly on guess) conversion. 2. Mistakes in person/organization address due to national->english and english->national (based mostly on guess) conversion. 3. Conflict of converted words with other correct words (most visible in latin-based character sets). 4. Possible offensive word formation due to national->english conversion of names and/or addresses of person/organization. [As a side note to points no 1-3: This could lead to some problems when LEA tries to find out precisely who should be contacted in case of abuse.] On the other side, community members needs to know who is responsible for certain resource without the necessity of understanding all the others character sets. Moreover, some objects are filled with data that has to be provided in ASCII character set due to business rules (like ORGANISATION object details for LIRs). RIPE NCC has a policy to insist on latin based names for organisation objects that it verifies (allocated, and sponsored end-user space). Taking this into accout I propose to allow UTF8 in all free text attributes of all DB objects except in primary keys. Some possible issues to be addressed: 1. When this proposal will be supported by the DB-WG, then it has to be discussed at least with AA-WG and AP-WG. 2. UTF8 may cause problems for client code. Comment: The proper implementation plan and announcements schedule should be prepared. 3. UTF8 may result in contact addresses and names that are not readable by a large part of the community. Comment: Primary keys (mostly names) still have to be in ASCII character set. Moreover, LIRs data are also in ASCII character set due to business rules. 4. At this moment there are no major technical issues blocking UTF8 support in the RIPE DB back-end. However thorough checks have to be done. Looking for your comments. Piotr -- gucio -> Piotr Strzy?ewski E-mail: Piotr.Strzyzewski(a)polsl.pl

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