- db-wg - mailman.ripe.net

Deprecating auth=NONE
by Hank Nussbacher 15 Apr '03

15 Apr '03

Back in March 2002 we started to deprecate auth=MAIL-FROM. In August we finished it: http://www.ripe.net/ripencc/pub-services/db/mailfrom.html We did not do the same for auth=NONE and the RIPE announcement stated: "Though NONE "auth" scheme is even weaker it is not supposed to be consciously used for object protection, but rather as notification facility. Therefore NONE "auth" scheme is outside the scope of this proposal." It has come lately to the attention in the Internet security realm that spammers as well as crackers are hijacking IP address space. One easy way to "steal" IP address space is via those that have auth=NONE on their objects. Go to: http://www.ripe.net/db/whois-free.html select ALL and type in the search bar "auth: none". The results of those that can have their IPs easily hijacked is, how shall I say this, enormous. Luckily the RIPE search form is limited to 100 hits. Just as an example and not to pick on C&W but: aut-num: AS13186 as-name: UNSPECIFIED descr: C&W SA Autonomous System descr: Alcalde Barnils 64-68 descr: Parque Empresarial Sant Joan descr: 08190 Sant Cugat del Valles descr: BARCELONA import: from AS3352 action pref=100; accept ANY import: from AS12541 action pref=100; accept ANY import: from AS3561 action pref=100; accept ANY import: from AS16091 action pref=100; accept AS16091 export: to AS3352 announce AS13186 AS16091 export: to AS12541 announce AS13186 AS16091 export: to AS3561 announce AS13186 AS16091 export: to AS16091 announce ANY default: to AS12541 action pref=100; networks ANY admin-c: RV4415-RIPE tech-c: XL5-RIPE remarks: AS3352 -> anvazque@obscured-domain remarks: AS12541 ->graham.cole@obscured-domain mnt-by: AS13186-MNT mntner: AS13186-MNT descr: Cable and Wireless SA admin-c: RV4415-RIPE tech-c: XL5-RIPE upd-to: d12@obscured-domain auth: NONE mnt-by: AS13186-MNT referral-by: RIPE-DBM-MNT route: 212.66.160.0/19 descr: Intercom Servicios Telematicos Avanzados, S.A. origin: AS13186 notify: xlario@obscured-domain mnt-by: AS13186-MNT I could right now remove the route entry for 212.66.160.0/19 or change it to some other origin and thereby hijack the entry. All those that use auto-build tools based on the info in RIPE would allow me to announce the /19 and not C&W in Spain. Just an example. There are thousands. RIPE NCC won't deprecate auth=NONE without us telling them to do it. Why would we not want this? -Hank

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Problems with RipeWhois.pm
by Arnd Vehling 28 Mar '03

28 Mar '03

Hi All, i am experiencing the following problem with the RipeWhois perl modul supplied with asused-3.65 / $Id: RipeWhois.pm,v 1.4 2001/04/18 17:01:20 timur Exp $ The "RipeWhois" function only works as long as i have the environment variables WHOIS_HOST set. If i unset the var the function stops working. I verified that with the supplied test client "cwhois". All command-line parameters and in-script defaults are ignored. OS is Solaris, perl version is: v5.6.1 Any Ideas? best regards, Arnd -- NetHead Network Design and Security Arnd Vehling av(a)nethead.De Gummersbacherstr. 27 Phone: +49 221 8809210 50679 Köln Fax : +49 221 8809212

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Ref: Abuse contact
by Wilfried Woeber, UniVie/ACOnet 27 Mar '03

27 Mar '03

>To: s.willing(a)mops.net >CC: anti-spam-wg(a)ripe.net >From: RIPE Database Manager <ripe-dbm(a)ripe.net> >Date: Tue, 25 Mar 2003 10:07:29 +0100 >Subject: [anti-spam-wg(a)ripe.net] Re: NCC#2003034446 Abuse contact > >Dear Sebastian, > >Any changes to database schemas are decided upon in >RIPE Database Working Group, Yes, in principle, but as a matter of fact we prefer requests for object creations or modifications to come in from the "user base" (including a rough blueprint :-), i.e. the appropriate RIPE WG(s). >which is an open working >group. It has a mailing list. You can subscribe to it >and present your proposal there, for the review of other >members of the WG. Its web page is: > >http://www.ripe.net/ripe/wg/db/index.html In this particular case I'd expect (at least) Anti-SPAM to discuss any deployment scenarios, before we go ahead and modifify objects. As a personal note - I tend to think the IRT object might be a better place to put such stuff. Because the IP-address management role(s), being more administartive, often do not have close links to abuse or incident roles within an ISP. >If you have any more questions, please don't hesitate >to contact <ripe-dbm(a)ripe.net>. > >Regards, > >Engin Gunduz >____________________________ >RIPE Database Administration. Cheers, Wilfried (RIPE DB-WG Chair) _________________________________:_____________________________________ Wilfried Woeber : e-mail: Woeber(a)CC.UniVie.ac.at UniVie Computer Center - ACOnet : Tel: +43 1 4277 - 140 33 Universitaetsstrasse 7 : Fax: +43 1 4277 - 9 140 A-1010 Vienna, Austria, Europe : RIPE-DB: WW144, PGP keyID 0xF0ACB369 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~:~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ On Tue, 25 Mar 2003 09:53:28 +0100 (CET), S Willing wrote: * Hello! * * Some RIPE entries already include abuse information, but not in a uniform type. * * Arin has some extra abuse contact attributes: * OrgAbuseHandle: ABUSE23-ARIN * OrgAbuseName: Abuse * OrgAbusePhone: +1-800-436-8489 * OrgAbuseEmail: abuse(a)genuity.com * * I'ld like to suggest a new RIPE-DB attribute: "abuse-mail". * * It should be required for every new allocation and optional for assignments. * Somewhere in the future, the whois server should automatically return the * most-specific "abuse-mail"-entry which exists. * For example: 10.1.0.0/16 allocation has an "abuse-mail"-entry, but * 10.1.2.0/25 has none. In this case, the entry from the allocation * is returned. * 10.1.3.128/26 has an own "abuse-mail"-entry which is returned if * someone queries this object. * * MfG / Regards, * S.Willing * * ************************************************************************ * M / W / S Sebastian Willing * http://www.mops.net Technical director * Telefon: 01803/684310578 e-Mail: s.willing(a)mops.net * Telefax: 01805/445169111 SW88-RIPE * ************************************************************************ * --------------------------------------------------------------------------------

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Mirroring of LEVEL3 database
by Koepp, Karsten 12 Mar '03

12 Mar '03

Hello around, does anyone besides me consider the Level (3) IRR database useful to be mirrored? I can find the Level(3) data on whois.ra.net but I would like to continue using whois.ripe.net. I understand the db admins position but I consider this source valuable. I have no statistics on the number of objects - I just happen to meet source LEVEL3 now and then. Karsten > Dear Karsten.Koepp, > > Regarding you question about the RIPE NCC mirroring the LEVEL > 3 database, > we currently have no plans on doing that as we were not requested by > LEVEL 3 to carry a mirror of their data. > > Our requirements for mirroring are: > 1. The source is a public IRR > 2. It should have considerable size > 3. It should be useful for the users in the RIPE region > > We don't seek out databases to mirror, although if a number > of our users > think that it can be useful we can ask permission for that. > > Best Regards, > Tiago Antao > ---------------------------- > RIPE Database Administration >

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Proposed change 2003.1: notification for more-specific
by Shane Kerr 10 Mar '03

10 Mar '03

Colleagues, This is one of a number of proposed changes to the way the RIPE Database works. These are changes that are intended to make the database work more consistently, as well as provide an increased level of security and control to users. Please have a look, and discuss it here. [2003.1] Notification on more-specific object creation authorisation -------------------------------------------------------------------- Change: When the creation of an object requires authorisation by a less-specific object, normal mntner notification will apply; "upd-to:" is notified of failure, and "mnt-nfy:" is notified of success. Where there are multiple maintainers, only one is needed to successfully authorise the creation, but all the maintainers in the list will be notified. For example: inetnum: 192.168.101.0 - 192.168.101.255 . . . mnt-by: EXAMPLE-MNT mnt-lower: ANOTHER-MNT mnt-lower: YET-ANOTHER-MNT If the successful creation of the more specific inetnum: inetnum: 192.168.201.0 - 192.168.201.255 . . . mnt-by: SOME-MNT Is authorised by YET-ANOTHER-MNT in the less specific inetnum, notifications will be sent to the "mnt-nfy:" listed in both ANOTHER-MNT and YET-ANOTHER-MNT. Motivation: This is useful for two cases. The first is so that the maintainer of an object will be notified when unauthorised attempts to create objects occur and will receive confirmation when objects are successfully created. The second is for cases where there are multiple maintainers in a position to authorise a creation (as in the example above). The maintainers that did not specificially authorise the creation are still notified (this is how notification for updates works today). -- Shane Kerr RIPE NCC

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Proposed change 2003.3: "reclaim:"-like functionality
by Shane Kerr 10 Mar '03

10 Mar '03

Colleagues, This is one of a number of proposed changes to the way the RIPE Database works. These are changes that are intended to make the database work more consistently, as well as provide an increased level of security and control to users. Please have a look, and discuss it here. [2003.3] Implementation of "reclaim:"-like functionality -------------------------------------------------------- Proposal: Any maintainer that would have been able to authorise the creation of an object can authorise the deletion of the same object. If creation of an object requires authorisation from multiple maintainers (e.g. route objects that require authorisation from an aut-num and an inetnum), then any of those maintainers may authorise the deletion. Motivation: The maintainer of an object is responsible for insuring that the data in the object is accurate. For hierarchical objects the maintainer can delegate responsibility for a subset. However, under the current implementation, there is no way for the maintainer to delete objects created and delegated to maintainers who should not or will not have access to the resources represented by these objects any more. For example, if the holder of portable address space changes ISP, then the address space will be advertised from a different AS. This means that the old route object is invalid and should be deleted. However, if the old ISP maintains the object, then the holder of the space has no way to delete the old object. This old route object will prevent the creation of a new route object that represents the new arrangement. The "reclaim:" attribute defined in RPSS allows for very similar functionality, but it may not be added to space that already has objects. This means that any existing more-specific objects cannot be deleted by the maintainers of the less-specific objects. For the case of old objects - the ones most likely to need such deletion - this means that the "reclaim:" attribute does not help. The "reclaim:" attribute also has a different syntax, depending on the specific object type that it is present in. This complicates parsing of objects. -- Shane Kerr RIPE NCC

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Another Proposal: Sort of generated Authorized-by Attribute + some PGP stuff
by Ulrich Kiermayr 04 Mar '03

04 Mar '03

Hi List, Since Shane has posted some proposals for the RIPE-DB, I have another one: For Updates which have been authorized by someone using strong encryption it would be nice to reflect the key that has been used in the object. this is similar to the changed: attribute but should be generated by the robot and not filled in by the user. Why? At the moment there is no way to tell that data within the Database is authentic in a way that it was really put in by the person who is in the object (pls. correct me if I am wrong), and the mnt-* just prevents you from stealing an object and not from giving it away to pretend something. Usually this is not bad, but related to some irt-stuff it can give the people the opportunity to pretend to be someone else. If the authorizing key was reflected in the object, one can check if who sent the update.... Something else related to PGP (and discussed with wilfried a while ago): it would be really nice to be able to link key-certs and persons/roles together other than by using remarks.... (as we do it now). lG uk -- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Ulrich Kiermayr Zentraler Informatikdienst der Universitaet Wien Network Security Universitaetsstrasse 7, 1010 Wien, Austria ------------------------------------------------------------------------ eMail: ulrich.kiermayr(a)univie.ac.at Tel: (+43 1) 4277 / 14104 Hotline: security.zid(a)univie.ac.at Fax: (+43 1) 4277 / 9140 ------------------------------------------------------------------------ GPG Key fingerprint = BF0D 5749 4DC1 ED74 AB67 7180 105F 491D A8D7 64D8

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Proposed change 2003.4: "mnt-lower:" on set objects
by Shane Kerr 04 Mar '03

04 Mar '03

Colleagues, This is one of a number of proposed changes to the way the RIPE Database works. These are changes that are intended to make the database work more consistently, as well as provide an increased level of security and control to users. Please have a look, and discuss it here. [2003.4] Addition of "mnt-lower:" to set objects ------------------------------------------------ Change: The "mnt-lower:" attribute will be optional for all set object types, which are as-set, filter-set, peering-set, route-set, and rtr-set. The "mnt-lower:" must authorise creation when hierarchical names are used. If it is not present, "mnt-by:" must authorise the creation. Motivation: The set objects in RPSL allow hierarchical names. The rules for authorising creation of such an object is documented in RPSS, and specifies that when an AS is used in the name, "mnt-lower:" on the aut-num object may authorise the creation, otherwise "mnt-by:" of the aut-num is used. In this case: as-set: AS1:AS-foo If AS1 had a "mnt-lower:" attribute, the maintainer listed there would have to authenticate the creation, otherwise the "mnt-by:" of AS1 would be used. This allows the administrator of an aut-num to delegate authority to create sets to maintainers without having to allow them to modify the aut-num itself. This functionality is not present within the set classes themselves. For example: as-set: AS1:AS-Foo:AS-Bar If AS1:AS-Foo object is allowed to have the "mnt-lower:" attribute, a maintainer that can create AS1:AS-Foo:AS-Bar but not modify AS1:AS-Foo can be used. -- Shane Kerr RIPE NCC

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Proposed change 2003.2: removal of cross notifications
by Shane Kerr 04 Mar '03

04 Mar '03

Colleagues, This is one of a number of proposed changes to the way the RIPE Database works. These are changes that are intended to make the database work more consistently, as well as provide an increased level of security and control to users. Please have a look, and discuss it here. [2003.2] Removal of cross notifications in the routing registry --------------------------------------------------------------- Proposal: Deprecate cross notifications. This means removing "cross-mnt:" and "cross-nfy:" attributes from aut-num or route objects with them (150 and 555 of each, respectively). Motivation: Currently cross notifications provide a redundant facility now fully implemented by RPSL authorisation. Also, current implementation sends notifications to every possible overlapping route (-L + -M), which is not very consistent with RPSL hierarchical authorisation scheme. -- Shane Kerr RIPE NCC

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Proposed change 2003.0: default to protected inetnum/inet6num/domain
by Shane Kerr 04 Mar '03

04 Mar '03

Colleagues, This is one of a number of proposed changes to the way the RIPE Database works. These are changes that are intended to make the database work more consistently, as well as provide an increased level of security and control to users. Please have a look, and discuss it here. [2003.0] Default to protected for inetnum, inet6num, and domain objects ----------------------------------------------------------------------- Change: All hierarchical object types will now default to requiring authorisation for more-specific object creation. Motivation: In RPSS, objects use "mnt-lower:" to specify a maintainer which has the ability to authorise the creation more-specific objects. If a "mnt-lower:" attribute is not present, then the "mnt-by:" of the less-specific object is used. For example: route: 192.168.100.0/24 origin: AS1 mnt-by: EXAMPLE-MNT mnt-lower: ANOTHER-MNT . . . Authorisation for creation of a more-specific route must be given by ANOTHER-MNT. inetnum: 192.168.200.0/24 origin: AS1 mnt-by: EXAMPLE-MNT . . . Authorisation for creation of a more-specific route must be given by EXAMPLE-MNT (in the absence of an exact match or less specific route object). For object types not defined in RPSS, the current behaviour is as defined in RIPE-181. This includes inetnum, inet6num, and domain objects. In RIPE-181 if no "mnt-lower:" attribute is present, then requests to create more-specific objects require no authorisation from the less-specific inetnum. The proposal is to bring this into line with the new default. For example: inetnum: 192.168.101.0 - 192.168.101.255 mnt-by: EXAMPLE-MNT mnt-lower: ANOTHER-MNT . . . Authorisation for creation of a more-specific inetnum must be given by ANOTHER-MNT. inetnum: 192.168.201.0 - 192.168.201.255 mnt-by: EXAMPLE-MNT . . . Authorisation for creation of a more-specific inetnum does NOT currently require authorisation by EXAMPLE-MNT. The proposed change would require authorisation by EXAMPLE-MNT. -- Shane Kerr RIPE NCC

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