- db-wg - mailman.ripe.net

FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi! ---Max Tulyev--- In Russia ALL uncertified by goverment cryptographic system is illegal. So SSL (lirportal) is illegal. But PGP/MD5/CRYPT is NOT illegal, because it don't do encryption and not interfere with SORM (SORM - a mandatory part of any ISP in Russia, that do hidden analysis and mirroring some of traffic to FSB), but only do signatures. ---- I can say that you are wrong. There are many proves of that. ---Max Tulyev--- Also, unlike PGP, lirportal can't do safr multiply persons authorization (i.e. owner of PI space creates route object with his upstream's AS, signs it, sent to upstream, upstream signs it too and send to RIPE). ---- Are we going to discuss a new proposal already instead of existing? :) The way you have mentioned works just so ONLY because the method (e-mail) used for the problem resolution. You himself (I don't even mean the community) can suggest much more easy and preferrable method of multiply person authorisation by a web-site (lirportal). Vladislav Potapov Ru.iiat

2 1

RE: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi! > Vladislav! If you wish to be really constructive - do policy > proposal for shutting down MD5-PW - personally I will vote > for that too. Max, I'm not a reactionary as you may think. I'm not against changes to the better. But it should be adequate, effective and universal for the region it serves. I don't know why you start to think on behalf (and propose against) of the 3500 other members using the scheme. If we got to the stage of a new proposal then maybe we should drop e-mail as a way to change the objects in the DB? It will be more constructive than shutting down both "password" ways. At least this way solves the "crypting mail prohibited" problem together with crypting ALL conversation (not only password part) and many more (and much more productive that the halved currently proposed "step"). The mechanism for that is already here - lirportal. Vladislav Potapov Ru.iiat > -----Original Message----- > From: db-wg-admin(a)ripe.net [mailto:db-wg-admin@ripe.net] On > Behalf Of Max Tulyev > Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 9:13 PM > To: db-wg(a)ripe.net > Subject: Re: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW > authorisation in the RIPE Database > > > Hi! > > My official +1. We need to shut it out as mail-from was. > > Vladislav! If you wish to be really constructive - do policy > proposal for shutting down MD5-PW - personally I will vote > for that too. > > Sascha Lenz wrote: > > Hi, > > > > Potapov Vladislav wrote: > > > >> Hi, > >> -Hank > >> > >>> I think a number of people have pointed out why they wish to > >>> deprecate > >>> > >> crypt-pw. > >> No, I'm not convinced. And a number of people - only Gert Doering? > >> The point of view they propagate - it should increase security (in > >> reality - not). But, we all know: false sense of security is worse > >> than knowledge of a problem. > >> > > > > actually i don't care much about this issue, but since you > raise the > > question - i have show my support for Gert/the proposal in general > > here, that is, i'm IN FAVOR of the depreciation of CRYPT-PW. > > > > It's not needed, it's more than a litte more insecure than > MD5-PW, it > > doesn't change anything operational. > > > > ..and no i'm not going to comment any other side-arguments > here, gets > > too personal. > > > > I support the original proposal - full stop. > > > > > > > -- > WBR, > Max Tulyev (MT6561-RIPE, 2:463/253@FIDO) > >

2 1

FW: FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi! I don't understand WHAT IT'S PROVES? Or you decided to say something only to be shown? -----Original Message----- From: db-wg-admin(a)ripe.net [mailto:db-wg-admin@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Max Tulyev Sent: Thursday, October 05, 2006 2:16 PM To: db-wg(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database Hi! Come on, begin your education career from your FSB (ex-KGB if somebody don't know) colleagues: inetnum: 213.24.76.0 - 213.24.77.255 netname: RT-CLNT-FSB-RF descr: Federal Security Service of Russian Federation descr: 3/6 Lubyansky Proezd Moscow 103045 country: RU admin-c: DIP2-RIPE admin-c: ANH8-RIPE tech-c: ANH8-RIPE tech-c: DIP2-RIPE status: ASSIGNED PA mnt-by: AS8342-MNT source: RIPE # Filtered person: Dmitry Pravikov address: FSB RF address: 3/6 Lubyansky Proezd Moscow 103045 remarks: phone: +7 095 2248374 phone: +7 495 2248374 remarks: fax-no: +7 095 2244441 fax-no: +7 495 2244441 e-mail: pravikov(a)fsb.ru nic-hdl: DIP2-RIPE source: RIPE # Filtered remarks: modified for Russian phone area changes person: Alexander Holushco address: FSB RF address: 3/6 Lubyansky Proezd Moscow 103045 remarks: phone: +7 095 2244441 phone: +7 495 2244441 remarks: fax-no: +7 095 2244441 fax-no: +7 495 2244441 e-mail: root(a)fsb.ru nic-hdl: ANH8-RIPE source: RIPE # Filtered remarks: modified for Russian phone area changes % Information related to '213.24.0.0/16AS8342' route: 213.24.0.0/16 descr: RTCOMM-RU origin: AS8342 mnt-by: AS8342-MNT source: RIPE # Filtered As we can see - there is *NO* mntner at all at *-c: objects! ;-) Potapov Vladislav wrote: > Hi, > > >> From: Gert Doering [mailto:gert@space.net] >> Changing from CRYPT-PW to MD5-PW doesn't incur any >> operational changes, and doesn't require key management and >> crypto of any sort, but *will* improve security. >> > No "operational changes"? Let's look at the plan to get an image that > it's not so "problemless". I don't speak about RIPE resources which > should support this change. About security: there was several > opponents of your view already. I'm adding myself to them. > > >> From: Gert Doering [mailto:gert@space.net] >> Security issues in the IRR DB impact all of us (like "fake objects, >> use that to leverage a routing attack"). >> > Let's not say fairy tales about that. I have asked about REAL LIFE > problems with the scheme. Nobody has answered. As for security > issues... I think the better way to do this things is to educate > people, convince them to have better way of security. Up to now it is > only "small group words" and 3500 usages... > > I'm against the proposal. > > Vladislav Potapov > Ru.iiat > > -- WBR, Max Tulyev (MT6561-RIPE, 2:463/253@FIDO)

2 1

FW: FW: FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi, ---- From: db-wg-admin(a)ripe.net [mailto:db-wg-admin@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Max Tulyev If to be seriously, I'm showing until weak schemes will be exist, people (even so serious) *WILL* use it. Education will *NOT* helps to solve the problem (so, try ;) ). ---- Then it's better to start banning people who do not agree with you? It's much more simplier than discuss, educate... ---- From: db-wg-admin(a)ripe.net [mailto:db-wg-admin@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Max Tulyev I agree better is set off ANY password authorization. We can do it at least step-by-step, but leave it alone is the worst thing we can do. ---- I don't think that the matter even worst speaking about, because still nobody has answered that there has been any problem with existing schemes even for no-maintainer objects (it's one more way to ignore your attempts to strengten maintainer object). So "the worst thing we can do" is only words. The information in the DB is not accurate, representative or hard tied to operational issues, so the world will be there if it disappears completely (maybe slightly annoying for some players, not more). Potapov Vladislav Ru.iiat

2 1

FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi, -Hank >I think a number of people have pointed out why they wish to deprecate crypt-pw. No, I'm not convinced. And a number of people - only Gert Doering? The point of view they propagate - it should increase security (in reality - not). But, we all know: false sense of security is worse than knowledge of a problem. -Hank >To answer your latest points - data in the DB should be accurate and it does show who is allowed or not allowed to use a range of IPs, and if the data does 'disappear' as you say, it will have operational impact on a number of ISPs that build their access lists from the data in the RIPE-DB. "Should be" != "is" And to now this inaccuracy has NO operational impact on nobody. -Hank >It would appear that you might be enjoying the ability to abuse certain RIPE objects with weak security and by deprecating crypt-pw we will be impacting your playground. Hank, I think it is very cheap accusation at first hand; you are not eligible to accuse me of something - the second; it (abusing) hasn't happened before to speak about it - the third. Speaking your way I can think that RIPE doesn't know where to put money and want us to allow spend them on the projects not well-thinked and useles. Please be more constructive! Let's not allow to go to personal accusation. Vladislav Potapov Ru.iiat

5 4

Re: FW: FW: FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Hank Nussbacher 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

At 03:49 PM 05-10-06 +0400, Potapov Vladislav wrote: >I don't think that the matter even worst speaking about, because still >nobody has answered that there has been any problem with existing >schemes even for no-maintainer objects (it's one more way to ignore your >attempts to strengten maintainer object). So "the worst thing we can do" >is only words. The information in the DB is not accurate, representative >or hard tied to operational issues, so the world will be there if it >disappears completely (maybe slightly annoying for some players, not >more). I think a number of people have pointed out why they wish to deprecate crypt-pw. To answer your latest points - data in the DB should be accurate and it does show who is allowed or not allowed to use a range of IPs, and if the data does 'disappear' as you say, it will have operational impact on a number of ISPs that build their access lists from the data in the RIPE-DB. It would appear that you might be enjoying the ability to abuse certain RIPE objects with weak security and by deprecating crypt-pw we will be impacting your playground. -Hank >Potapov Vladislav >Ru.iiat

1 0

FW: FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi, On Thu, Oct 05, 2006 at 02:21:53PM +0400, Potapov Vladislav wrote: > The mail will still contain a "password: <something>" block, just the > way this password is hashed in the maintainer object is > different." > > Then it is NOT improve security much. It does. It takes away the attack angle of breaking CRYPT-PW hash. You are not read to the end again. "In security ALL parts are essential." You lock only one part of the "security" > Using your allegory: Let's put > huge lock on our cardboard door? In security ALL parts are essential. > BEFORE I can use "the day-to-day" operation I should change CRYPT-PW > to MD5-PW. And PERSONALLY I don't need the enhanced in some way but > weak in the other "security". As our members tell us that "crypto is hard!!!!" we can not enforce PGP (which would be a big step) - so security is increased in small steps. And you decided to go against "our members"? Maybe it is useful to tell them back? To educate? To convince BEFORE proposing? Maybe then all members (without changes) will put the most secure algorithms to their data? In other way your proposal will be ... authoritarian. And not from real life... Vladislav Potapov Ru.iiat

1 0

RE: [db-wg] Re: [enum-wg] Proposal for new org-type
by Antoin Verschuren 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Per Heldal wrote: > On Wed, 2006-10-04 at 09:47 +0200, Antoin Verschuren wrote: > [snip] >> I can see a reason for the term "REGISTRY" if RIPE intends to expand >> heir services to more than IP network services, and doesn't feel to >> create a long list of different marketing terms for different >> organisations. I work for a ccTLD registry that is not an LIR, and >> even though that is a clear Internet registry function like IANA, >> RIR or LIR, RIPE currently does not supply a service for that >> function that requires an entry in the DB. >> >> Conclusion: >> I can live with ENUM-REGISTRY, REGISTRY, OTHER or no org-type at all. >> I cannot live with the org-type NON-REGISTRY. >> >> My prefference would be the ENUM-REGISTRY org-type. > > > This proposal is taking things out of context. The word REGISTRY in > RIPE-terms means an IP-address registry. Nothing more, nothing less. > That your organisation is categorised as NON-REGISTRY by RIPE doesn't > mean that RIPE does not acknowledge your role as a registry in some > other context, just that you're not an ip-addr registry. Should the > database contain exceptions for all kinds of registries which happen > to deal with something else than ip-addresses? That's why we changed the proposal to change the NON-REGISTRY into OTHER. Antoin Verschuren Technical Advisor Policy & Business Development SIDN Utrechtseweg 310 PO Box 5022 6802 EA Arnhem The Netherlands T +31 26 3525510 F +31 26 3525505 M +31 6 23368970 E antoin.verschuren(a)sidn.nl W http://www.sidn.nl/

2 1

FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi, "> No "operational changes"? In the day-to-day operation ("sending in mails to change objects to the RIPE DB") going from CRYPT-PW to MD5-PW *will* *not* *change* *anything*. The mail will still contain a "password: <something>" block, just the way this password is hashed in the maintainer object is different." Then it is NOT improve security much. Using your allegory: Let's put huge lock on our cardboard door? In security ALL parts are essential. BEFORE I can use "the day-to-day" operation I should change CRYPT-PW to MD5-PW. And PERSONALLY I don't need the enhanced in some way but weak in the other "security". "> Let's look at the plan to get an image that it's not so "problemless". So where exactly *do* you see "problems"?" It's simple: the big amount of people and resources involved. "In your mail you speak about "crypto" - which is NOT involved here (except hashing the password) - this proposal is not forcing anybody to go to PGP, just to a different password storing scheme." It's not the only point I spoke about. Please reread once more. Please get a reality check on what is proposed, and what is proposed as replacement. It was my idea initially. I do not see much sense in the proposal, because you can use "better security" without ANY CHANGES AT ALL. *Good* security is fixing problems *before* they happen. Like "lock your front door when you leave your house, even if you have never been burglared yet". If you speak about your home for $1000000 - it's true. And if we speak about cabin for $10? How much sense is a lock for $1000 then? Vladislav Potapov Ru.iiat

2 1

FW: FW: [db-wg] Proposal to deprecate CRYPT-PW authorisation in the RIPE Database
by Potapov Vladislav 05 Oct '06

05 Oct '06

Hi, > From: Gert Doering [mailto:gert@space.net] > Changing from CRYPT-PW to MD5-PW doesn't incur any > operational changes, and doesn't require key management and > crypto of any sort, but *will* improve security. No "operational changes"? Let's look at the plan to get an image that it's not so "problemless". I don't speak about RIPE resources which should support this change. About security: there was several opponents of your view already. I'm adding myself to them. > From: Gert Doering [mailto:gert@space.net] > Security issues in the IRR DB impact all of us (like "fake objects, > use that to leverage a routing attack"). Let's not say fairy tales about that. I have asked about REAL LIFE problems with the scheme. Nobody has answered. As for security issues... I think the better way to do this things is to educate people, convince them to have better way of security. Up to now it is only "small group words" and 3500 usages... I'm against the proposal. Vladislav Potapov Ru.iiat

2 1