- db-wg - mailman.ripe.net

Antwort: Deletion of German domains
by Jörg Bauer/Denic 27 Jun '00

27 Jun '00

On 27.06.00 11:33 RIPE Database Administration <ripe-dbm(a)ripe.net> wrote: > > > Dear Colleagues, > > According to the agreement between RIPE NCC and DENIC we plan > to delete German (.de) domain objects from RIPE whois database > on June 28th. From then on, information about German domains will > be available from DENIC's whois server, whois.nic.de. nearly correct ;-) The server name is whois.denic.de -- ----------------------------------+------------------------------------------- Joerg Bauer | eMail : Joerg.Bauer(a)denic.de DENIC eG | Fon : +49 69 272 35 180 Wiesenhuettenplatz 26 | Fax : +49 69 27235 235 D-60329 Frankfurt | ----------------------------------+-------------------------------------------

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Deletion of German domains
by RIPE Database Administration 27 Jun '00

27 Jun '00

Dear Colleagues, According to the agreement between RIPE NCC and DENIC we plan to delete German (.de) domain objects from RIPE whois database on June 28th. From then on, information about German domains will be available from DENIC's whois server, whois.nic.de. Please note that you may experience some delays in processing your updates on June 28-29. We are sorry about any inconvenience this may cause. If you have any more questions, please don't hesitate to contact <ripe-dbm(a)ripe.net>. We are sorry about any inconvenience this may cause. Regards, Engin Gunduz ____________________________ RIPE Database Administration.

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Flaw in PGP 5.0 key auto-generation
by RIPE Database Administration 16 Jun '00

16 Jun '00

Dear Colleagues, We are forwarding a warning about a flaw in PGP 5.0 key auto-generation. Please note that the problem appears _only_ when one auto-generates the key (using /dev/random device). If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact <ripe-dbm(a)ripe.net>. Regards, Engin Gunduz ____________________________ RIPE Database Administration. >CERT Advisory CA-2000-09 Flaw in PGP 5.0 Key Generation > > Original release date: May 30, 2000 > Last Revised: -- > Source: CERT/CC > > A complete revision history is at the end of this file. > >Systems Affected > > * UNIX systems having a /dev/random device running any version of > PGP 5.0, including U.S. Commercial, U.S. Freeware, and > International versions > * Keys created non-interactively on such a system > * Documents encrypted with such a key > * Signatures generated with such a key > >Overview > > Under certain circumstances, PGP v5.0 generates keys that are not > sufficiently random, which may allow an attacker to predict keys and, > hence, recover information encrypted with that key. > >I. Description > > In order to generate cryptographically secure keys, PGP (and other > products) need to use random numbers as part of the input to the key > generation process. Generating truly random numbers is a difficult > problem. PGP has traditionally solved that problem by prompting the > user to type some random characters or to move the mouse in a random > manner, measuring the time between keystrokes and using this as a > source of random data. Additionally, PGP uses a file (usually called > randseed.bin) as a source of randomness. However, PGP also provides > the ability to generate keys non-interactively (useful, for example, > if you need to generate a large number of keys simultaneously or > provide a script to generate a key). When generating keys > non-interactively, PGP needs a source of random numbers; on some > systems PGP v5.0 uses the /dev/random device to provide the required > random numbers. > > PGP v5.0, including U.S. Commercial, U.S. Freeware, and International > versions, contains a flaw in reading the information provided by > /dev/random. This is not a flaw in /dev/random but instead is the > result of a flaw in how PGP processes the information returned from > /dev/random. Thus, when a key is generated non-interactively using a > command such as > > pgpk -g <DSS or RSA> <key-length> <user-id> <timeout> <pass-phrase> > > it does not contain sufficient randomness to prevent an attacker from > guessing the key. If such a command were issued on a system with no > available randseed.bin file, then the resulting key may be > predictable. > > This problem was discovered and analyzed by Germano Caronni > <gec(a)acm.org>, and verified by Thomas Roessler <roessler(a)guug.de> and > Marcel Waldvogel <mwa(a)arl.wustl.edu>. A copy of their analysis can be > found at > > http://www.securityfocus.com/templates/ > archive.pike?list=1&msg=20000523141323.A28431(a)olymp.org > >II. Impact > > Keys produced non-interactively with PGP v5.0 on a system with > a /dev/random device may be predictable, especially those > produced in an environment without a pre-existing randseed.bin > file. > > Documents encrypted with a vulnerable key may recoverable by an > attacker. Additionally, an attacker may be able to forge a > digital signature corresponding to a vulnerable key. > > Signatures produced using a vulnerable key, including > signatures in certificates, may be untrustworthy. > >III. Solution > > If your PGP key was generated non-interactively using any > version of PGP v5.0 on a system with a /dev/random device, you > may wish to revoke it. > > Documents encrypted with a predictable key may need to be > re-encrypted with a non-vulnerable key, if your particular > circumstances warrant it; that is, if the information still > needs to be encrypted. > > You may need to resign documents signed with a vulnerable key > if your circumstances warrant it. > >Appendix A Vendor Information > >Network Associates > > Network Associates Security Advisory > Date: May 30, 2000 > Author: PGP Engineering > Background: > > A security issue has been discovered in the following PGP > products: > > PGP 5.0 for Linux, US Commercial and Freeware editions > > PGP 5.0 for Linux, Source code book (basis for PGP 5.0i for Linux) > > The following PGP products are NOT affected by this issue: > > + PGP 1.x products > + PGP 2.x products > + PGP 4.x products > + All other PGP 5.x products > + PGP 6.x products > + PGP 7.x products > > Synopsis: > > During a recent review of our published PGP 5.0 for Linux > source code, researchers discovered that under specific, rare > circumstances PGP 5.0 for Linux will generate weak, predictable > public/private keypairs. These keys can only be created under > the following circumstances: > > + Keys are generated using PGP's command line option for > unattended batch key generation, with no user interaction for > entropy (random data) collection > + No keys were generated interactively on this system > previously (e.g., a PGP random seed file is not present on > this system prior to unattended batch key generation) > + PGP is able to access the UNIX /dev/random service to gather > entropy during unattended batch key generation > > PGP 5.0 for Linux does not process the data read from > /dev/random appropriately, and therefore does not gather enough > entropy required to generate strong public/private keypairs. > This issue affects both RSA and Diffie-Hellman public/private > keypairs, regardless of keysize. Network Associates has > verified that this issue does not exist in any other version of > PGP. > > Solution: > > Users who generated keys in the manner described above are > strongly urged to do the following: > > + Revoke and no longer use keys suspected to have this problem > + Generate new public/private keypairs with entropy collected > from users' typing and/or mouse movements > + Re-encrypt any data with the newly generated keypairs that is > currently encrypted with keys suspected to have this problem > + Re-sign any data with the newly generated keypairs, if > required > > Users are also urged to upgrade to the latest releases of PGP, > as PGP 5.0 products have not been officially supported by > Network Associates since early 1999, or distributed by Network > Associates since June 1998. > > Additional Information: > > US commercial and freeware versions of PGP 5.0 for Linux were > released in September 1997 by PGP, Inc., a company founded by > Phil Zimmermann. Source code for the PGP 5.0 product family was > published in September 1997. PGP, Inc. was acquired by Network > Associates in December 1997. > > Acknowledgements: > > PGP appreciates the efforts of Germano Caronni, Thomas Roessler > and Marcel Waldvogel in identifying this issue and bringing it > to our attention. > > A pgp signed version of this statement is also available at > > http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-09/pgp.asc > __________________________________________________________ > > The CERT Coordination Center thanks Germano Caronni, Thomas > Roessler, and Marcel Waldvogel for initially discovering and > reporting this vulnerability, and for their help in developing > this advisory. Additionally we thank Brett Thomas for his > insights. > __________________________________________________________ > > Shawn Hernan was the primary author of this document. > _______________________________________________________________ > > This document is available from: > http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-09.html > _______________________________________________________________ > >CERT/CC Contact Information > > Email: cert(a)cert.org > Phone: +1 412-268-7090 (24-hour hotline) > Fax: +1 412-268-6989 > Postal address: > CERT Coordination Center > Software Engineering Institute > Carnegie Mellon University > Pittsburgh PA 15213-3890 > U.S.A. > > CERT personnel answer the hotline 08:00-20:00 EST(GMT-5) / > EDT(GMT-4) Monday through Friday; they are on call for > emergencies during other hours, on U.S. holidays, and on > weekends. > >Using encryption > > We strongly urge you to encrypt sensitive information sent by > email. Our public PGP key is available from > > http://www.cert.org/CERT_PGP.key > > If you prefer to use DES, please call the CERT hotline for more > information. > >Getting security information > > CERT publications and other security information are available > from our web site > > http://www.cert.org/ > > To be added to our mailing list for advisories and bulletins, > send email to cert-advisory-request(a)cert.org and include > SUBSCRIBE your-email-address in the subject of your message. > > * "CERT" and "CERT Coordination Center" are registered in the > U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. > _______________________________________________________________ > > NO WARRANTY > Any material furnished by Carnegie Mellon University and the > Software Engineering Institute is furnished on an "as is" > basis. Carnegie Mellon University makes no warranties of any > kind, either expressed or implied as to any matter including, > but not limited to, warranty of fitness for a particular > purpose or merchantability, exclusivity or results obtained > from use of the material. Carnegie Mellon University does not > make any warranty of any kind with respect to freedom from > patent, trademark, or copyright infringement. > __________________________________________________________ > > Conditions for use, disclaimers, and sponsorship information > > Copyright 2000 Carnegie Mellon University. > > Revision History > >May 30, 2000: initial release

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First steps in moving *.de domain objects
by Andrei Robachevsky 08 Jun '00

08 Jun '00

Dear Colleagues, As part of the process of moving *.de domains from the RIPE Database today, 8 July, we started updating unmaintained person objects referenced from German domain objects. Currently there are about 100,000 such objects in the RIPE database and all of them will be protected by DENIC-P maintainer. The Database performance should not be affected. This step is essential because the setup of DENIC database is planned to be done in two phases: first moving domain objects and then moving/copying person ones. The time needed between the two phases is 1-2 months as estimated by DENIC. In such circumstances after the first phase is completed person objects referenced only from *.de domains may be occasionally deleted if not protected by maintainer. Best regards, Andrei Robachevsky Database Group Manager RIPE NCC

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Top 100 Maintainers List 20000605
by RIPE Database Administration 05 Jun '00

05 Jun '00

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Top 100 Maintainers List 20000524
by RIPE Database Administration 24 May '00

24 May '00

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Delay in processing updates
by RIPE Database Administration 24 May '00

24 May '00

Dear Colleagues, We have currenly a larger update queue than usual. We expect that updates in the queue will be processed in 4-5 hours. If you have not yet received an acknowledgement to your updates, there is no need to send them again. All updates received by auto-dbm(a)ripe.net have been queued. We are sorry about the inconvenience. If you have any questions, please contact <ripe-dbm(a)ripe.net>. Regards, Engin Gunduz ____________________________ RIPE Database Administration.

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RIPE Database working normally again.
by RIPE Database Administration 18 May '00

18 May '00

Dear Colleagues, Thank you for your patience. The RIPE Database is working normally again. Updates are being processed and queries are being answered by the primary server. If you have any questions, please contact <ripe-dbm(a)ripe.net>. Daniele Arena ------------- RIPE NCC

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raw minutes for RIPE35 DB-WG
by Wilfried Woeber, UniVie/ACOnet 18 May '00

18 May '00

Dear DB-WG, attached pleae find a copy of the raw notes as taken by the Scribe. Many thanks to Engin for compiling the notes and sending them shortly after the meeting. The fact that they are still in raw format is exclusively my fault. As I've received offers for help this situation should improve... A more comprehensive version could be posted to the web-site. Please refer to the draft agenda and to tomorrow's wg meeting for more details. Thank you. Wilfried. ______________________________________________________________________ Date: Thu, 2 Mar 2000 11:11:38 +0100 (CET) From: Engin Gunduz <engin(a)ripe.net> To: woeber(a)cc.univie.ac.at Subject: Draft minutes of RIPE35 DB WG Hi Wilfried, I'm attaching the draft minutes for RIPE35 DB WG. I couldn't pick up the names of a couple of participants, unfortunately. Also, since they are not on the web site, the URLs of presentations are not complete yet. Regards, -engin Engin Gunduz RIPE NCC DB Group -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- RIPE 35 Database Working Group Thursday, Feb 24th Agenda: Slot#1 ,9:00 A. Administrative Stuff (Wilfried Woeber, Chair) B. RIPE DB, operational update (NCC: AMRM, 20 mins) C. A short review on the maintainer mechanism - are there any security concerns? D. A "smarter" whois client E. (tentatively) Is there an interest to register CERT/IRT-related info? Slot#1, 11:00 F. Status of reimplementation project (NCC, JLSD 20mins) G. Transition to RIPE DB v3.0 and transition TF (JLSD & WW, 15 mins) H. Do we need/want a DB review/re-structuring TF - future topics of interest - I/O with other WGs - Logistics Y. Input from other WGs Z. AOB ------------------- Chair: Wilfried Woeber Scribe: Engin Gunduz Participants: 65 A. Administrative Stuff The proposed agenda agreed with an addition of item "D". Scribe appointed, Engin Gunduz. B. RIPE DB, operational update (NCC: AMRM) (presentation is available at http://www.ripe.net/ripe/meetings/archive/ripe-35/presentations/...... ) AMRM provided an update on: - Performance - Software status - Reimplementation - Other RIPE DB services - ripe-dbm mailbox - Operational issues C. A short review on the maintainer mechanism WW: 1. There was a useful presentation by Olaf (Kolkman) about PGP. DB is an example for PGP being used with weaker authorisation methods. Has anybody used PGP? (4 people raised their hands). 2. CENTR activity. We've been talking about removing domain objects from whois db. Do you have any timing for this? AMRM: This is a political question, please ask this to Joao. D. A "smarter" whois client WW: Technical framework: NCC has offered mechanism to referral mechanism. This is working nicely. The central whois server has to act as a proxy. But, whois client needs to know whois.ripe.net. Now, we can have a client who tries to find a TXT field from DNS, so that it would know which whois server to query. We may ask NCC to implement this. What do you think? Should NCC spend resources for this? We will chase this issue. Peter Koch: There was some intelligence in one of the old RIPE whois clients which enabled it to query whois-<tld>.ripe.net. AMRM: We don't know about this. E. Is there an interest to register CERT/IRT-related info? WW: Background: It's becoming more frequent that people are abusing network resources. Now, how would you find out whom to contact in such cases? Proposal: We can have a mechanism to point the user to a proper point. Would anybody be volunteer for a blueprint? AMRM: In roles, we have "trouble" attribute. This is for such cases. But I think you mean a more sophisticated thing. Former chair of FIRST: You must be in FIRST organisation. (Break) Slot #2: (11:00) F. Status of reimplementation project (NCC, JLSD) (presentation is available at http://www.ripe.net/ripe/meetings/archive/ripe-35/presentations/...... ) Questions: Jake Khoun: There are three-five groups trying to implement RPSL. Isn't it possible to create a subgroup to coordinate activities? JLSD: We tried to bind people together. WW: This is a good input. We can found (a top level, not local) an open forum. RIPE NCC employees can follow ARIN & APNIC mailing lists. WW: More than 50% of the objects in the RIPE whois DB are not exactly related to RIPE, being an IP registry. JLSD: It will be hard to find a solution to this. Domains are growing extremely fast. We are trying to find a solution. We have talked to DENIC & Norwegian domain registry, they are going to move their objects. They expect to get their domain objects in approximately 3 weeks, and person objects in 2-3 months. We are happy to help them. So, I just ask for coordination here. If you want to delete your domain objects, please let us know. We have referral mechanism, we can use it. Jake Khoun: I had a proposal: The behaviour of whois server could be to search all sources, instead of only RIPE source, and, to stop at the first match. David Kessens: I think the main reason for current default behaviour was to save computer resources. But I don't think that this is the case anymore. We must be able to change the default behaviour. But I don't like the idea of stopping at the first match. G. Transition to RIPE DB v3.0 and transition TF (JLSD & WW) WW: Who is in general think that they will be hit by new interfaces? (Three persons raised their hands, Jake Khoun, Nigel Titley, and one more person). WW: So, could we count on you to form a Transition Task Force? JLSD: We can use db-beta list for this. WW: We will get back to you about this before May. JLSD: Agreed. WW: Another point: There was a bug report on security of RIPE DB software. JLSD: The mntner "feature" was already there. Finally the community say that it is a bug. But at this point of time, there is no point in fixing this in the old DB. A participant: Is it difficult to fix this? JLSD: The question is, should we divert the resourses to it or not. Jake Khoun: The actual fix would be to put proper mntners to objects. WW: There was a report on some unauhorised changes to objects. So, nobody must have unprotected objects in the DB. Now, should we tell the users that they must use at least CRYPT-PW, but not MAIL-FROM? Dmitry Morozovsky: RIPN does not put unprotected objects in their DB. Can RIPE do that with the reimplementation? WW: We must have the social engineering first, I think, e.g., putting a text in ACK messages which says that the MAIL-FROM authorisation is not good enough. AMRM: Some users just don't read ACK or notification messages. Jake Khoun: There should be enough emphasis on using CRYPT-PW & PGP instead of MAIL-FROM. Action Point: on NCC to draft a proposal. H. Do we need/want a DB review/re-structuring TF WW: I'm looking for someone to help me documenting our achievements. I don't have time to do proper documentation. Please any volunteer find me in breaks. WW: What should be the future of the DB WG? I'd like to get some input on what should we have as a charter? What are we supposed to do. Please think about your personal priorities, and provide input. Apologies for no minutes. Y. Input from other WGs No input. Z. AOB There wasn't any other business. Chair thanks to participants and closes RIPE35 DB WG meeting. -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-

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draft agenda for DB-WG meeting, RIPE 36, Budapeat
by Wilfried Woeber, UniVie/ACOnet 17 May '00

17 May '00

Proposed Agenda for the Database Working Group Meeting RIPE-36, May 2000, Budapest, HU 1. Draft Thursday, May 18, 2000 at 10:30 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ A. Administrative stuff (Wilfried Woeber, chair) . scribe . list of participants . agenda bashing . raw scribe notes distributed . help offered by - Nigel Titley, - Ulf Kieber chair asks for approval Actions: . to install the RE-Impl.-TF . "move weak authentication to historical" (ed. comm.) B. RIPE DB, operational update (RIPE NCC) C. DB Software Re-Implementation (RIPE NCC) D. Report on Certification Authority activities (APNIC) E. Activity Plan for next year! . . Y. Input from other WGs - Routing: native multicast routing (Jan Novak)? Z. AOB: Common XML Registration Template (Joel Rowbottom) mail-to: proposal with token and confirmation (Michael C. Battilana) A brief update on CERT/IRT-related issues (WW144/Jaques Schuurman) a more clever whois and using DNS for "remote control" (WW144) ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ WW, 17-MAY-2000 20:34:22

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