December 2011 - db-wg - mailman.ripe.net

<auto-dbm@ripe.net> is slow this afternoon.
by RIPE Database Administration 16 May '18

16 May '18

Dear Colleagues, Because of a very high level of use this afternoon, the response time of <auto-dbm(a)ripe.net> is longer than normal. I have made contact with those who are responsible and I expect the situation to improve as the machine works through the queue. Please be patient. Obviously we at the RIPE NCC Database Group are continuously working to make the performance of the database as good as possible. However, we cannot make improvements in zero time. We thank you for your co-operation up to now and we ask for your continued co-operation so that everyone receives the best possible service. If you have anymore questions, please contact <ripe-dbm(a)ripe.net>. Regards, Ambrose Magee ____________________________ RIPE Database Administration.

2 2

Re: [db-wg] MD5 and Password Security in the RIPE DB, Fwd: Wonder if you can help - re: PDP
by David Kessens 14 Dec '11

14 Dec '11

Emilio, Wilfried, Nigel, Emilio wrote: > My apologies for sending the previous email to the full working group. > It was intended for the Database Working Group Chairs. But now that you accidentaly mailed us, I would like to take the opportunity to mention that I believe that we don't need the PDP process invoked for these kind of changes. I hope that we as a community have not petrified that far that we cannot request the RIPE NCC to make a change to the RIPE database and be done with it. To say it in a different way, the issue at hand is much closer (but not quite the same) to a bug fix/operational issue than a public policy change. David Kessens PS And regarding the topic of shadow passwords in the RIPE database, you might be interested in the following presentation by me from 1995, page 11: ftp://ftp.ripe.net/ripe/presentations/ripe-m22-david-DB-REPORT.ps.gz --- On Mon, Dec 12, 2011 at 10:55:23AM +0100, Emilio Madaio wrote: > Hi Nigel and Wilfried, > > as promised last week to Nigel, I'd like to make a short recap and > have your attention on the following. > > I have been contacted by David Freedman in regards of a couple of > policy proposals he sent you for review and possible submission to the > PDP. Below you can find, for more details, my summaries of the proposals > and what analysis we did in the NCC. > > As you will see, both cases can be tackled by the NCC with ideas that > can be discussed by the DB WG and, if approved, easily implemented. > Among the possible decisions you can take, there are also: > > -starting discussion in the mailing list now; or > -present and discuss at RIPE 64. > > Obviously we can consider, as David asked, to start the PDP if you deem > it necessary. > > In any case, David did not have a chance to hear from you, so I kindly > ask you to let him know, either your decision or that you acknowledged > his intentions. > > And please do not hesitate to let me know how I can help. > > > I included the email he sent so far and the aforementioned proposal texts. > > > Best Regards > Emilio Madaio > Policy Development Officer > RIPE NCC > > > -----oooooooo-------- > SUMMARIES: > > 1) The first proposal's scope regards the display of the MD5 password > hashes in the "auth:" attribute. Since then the DB department published > an article recommending the technical solutions of, in short: > > -filtering out "auth:" attributes from all query results on MNTNER objects > -adjusting Webupdates to require maintainer password authorisation over > HTTPS before presenting the object to the user for updating. > > This solution can be easy and quick to implement. They only need some > discussion in the DB WG. > > 2) The second proposal's scope regards the restriction to secure > channels for all the possible mntner authentications. In this instance > as well, the NCC can provide some quick technical alternatives for the > DB WG to discuss. > > > > > > > > > > > -------- Original Message -------- > [..] > > > Date: Tue, 15 Nov 2011 09:44:31 +0000 > From: David Freedman <david.freedman(a)eu.clara.net> > To: db-wg-chairs(a)ripe.net > Subject: My proposals > > Hi there, > > On 08/11 I sent you two policy proposals for review, concerning the > publication and use of MD5 authentication > attributes in the database. > > Since then, Denis Walker has published an article on RIPE labs describing a > potential solution to one of these issues > > https://labs.ripe.net/Members/denis/securing-md5-hashes-in-the-ripe-database > > Could you please tell me what happens next in the scope of both my proposals > and security community support for Denis' idea? > > Regards, > > David Freedman > > > Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2011 16:10:35 +0000 > From: David Freedman <david.freedman(a)eu.clara.net> > To: db-wg-chairs(a)ripe.net > Subject: Re: Policy Proposal "Removal of auth: MD5-PW from WHOIS > information" > > s/scheme/schemes, apologies > > On 08/11/2011 16:03, "David Freedman" <david.freedman(a)eu.clara.net> wrote: > > >Please see below: > > > >--------------------------- > > > >Number: > >(assigned by the RIPE NCC) > > > >Policy Proposal Name: Removal of auth: MD5-PW from WHOIS information > > > >Author: > > a. David Freedman > > > >b. david.freedman(a)uk.clara.net > > > >c. Claranet > > > >Proposal Version: > >(assigned by the RIPE NCC) > > > >Submission Date: 8/11/2011 > > > >Suggested RIPE WG for discussion and publication: Database Working Group > > > >Proposal Type: > >a. new > > > >Policy Term: > >b. Indefinite > > > >Summary of proposal: > >Policy text: > >b. New policy text > > > >This is a proposal to remove the display the "auth:" attribute for auth > >type "MD5-PW" in WHOIS information, in order to increase the security of a > >number of user's mntner objects. > > > >Rationale: > >a. Arguments supporting the proposal > > > >Numerous sources have demonstrated the vulnerability of the MD5-PW to > >compromise when presented with modern compute power, a number of alternate > >"auth" scheme exist which provide far more > >security to the mntner. By allowing these attributes to be exposed in > >WHOIS information, malicious entities could direct their efforts to > >computing a plaintext input of the hash and thus > >compromise mntner objects (and hence protected resources) of their choice. > > > >b. Arguments opposing the proposal > > > >The database group state: "Since any change in the current process means > >significantly changing the behaviour of the RIPE Database* and will break > >existing use cases of the system, it is not something the RIPE NCC can > >make a decision on.", this could involve significant work for the Database > >Group. > > > >*- As an example, current Update process requires the full object > >-including the hashes for maintainer objects- to be used in the update > >message. > > > >--------------------------- > > > > > Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2011 16:10:14 +0000 > From: David Freedman <david.freedman(a)eu.clara.net> > To: db-wg-chairs(a)ripe.net > Subject: New proposal : Prevention of use of MD5-PW over insecure channels > > See below > > ----------- > > Number: > (assigned by the RIPE NCC) > > Policy Proposal Name: Prevention of use of MD5-PW over insecure channels > > Author: > a. David Freedman > > b. david.freedman(a)uk.clara.net > > c. Claranet > > Proposal Version: > (assigned by the RIPE NCC) > > Submission Date: 8/11/2011 > > Suggested RIPE WG for discussion and publication: Database Working Group > > Proposal Type: > a. new > > Policy Term: > b. Indefinite > > Summary of proposal: > Policy text: > b. New policy text > > This is a proposal to ensure that all mntner authentication which makes > use of MD5-PW for an object transaction, do so over a secure channel, in > order to increase the security of such transactions. > > Rationale: > a. Arguments supporting the proposal > > Numerous sources have demonstrated the vulnerability of the MD5-PW to > compromise when presented with modern compute power, a number of alternate > "auth" schemes exist which provide far more > security to the mntner. By allowing the plaintext password to be passed > over insecure channels, information could be intercepted and the plaintext > password obtained, potentially compromising > mntner objects (and hence protected resources). > > b. Arguments opposing the proposal > > A number of object maintainers may currently make use of such insecure > channels (for example, unencrypted SMTP), these functions may be related > to legacy systems which are costly to update. > > > ----------- > > > Date: Tue, 8 Nov 2011 16:03:30 +0000 > From: David Freedman <david.freedman(a)eu.clara.net> > To: db-wg-chairs(a)ripe.net > Subject: Policy Proposal "Removal of auth: MD5-PW from WHOIS information" > > Please see below: > > --------------------------- > > Number: > (assigned by the RIPE NCC) > > Policy Proposal Name: Removal of auth: MD5-PW from WHOIS information > > Author: > a. David Freedman > > b. david.freedman(a)uk.clara.net > > c. Claranet > > Proposal Version: > (assigned by the RIPE NCC) > > Submission Date: 8/11/2011 > > Suggested RIPE WG for discussion and publication: Database Working Group > > Proposal Type: > a. new > > Policy Term: > b. Indefinite > > Summary of proposal: > Policy text: > b. New policy text > > This is a proposal to remove the display the "auth:" attribute for auth > type "MD5-PW" in WHOIS information, in order to increase the security of a > number of user's mntner objects. > > Rationale: > a. Arguments supporting the proposal > > Numerous sources have demonstrated the vulnerability of the MD5-PW to > compromise when presented with modern compute power, a number of alternate > "auth" scheme exist which provide far more > security to the mntner. By allowing these attributes to be exposed in > WHOIS information, malicious entities could direct their efforts to > computing a plaintext input of the hash and thus > compromise mntner objects (and hence protected resources) of their choice. > > b. Arguments opposing the proposal > > The database group state: "Since any change in the current process means > significantly changing the behaviour of the RIPE Database* and will break > existing use cases of the system, it is not something the RIPE NCC can > make a decision on.", this could involve significant work for the Database > Group. > > *- As an example, current Update process requires the full object > -including the hashes for maintainer objects- to be used in the update > message. > > --------------------------- > > David Kessens ---

6 7

Re: [db-wg] MD5 and Password Security in the RIPE DB, Fwd: Wonder if you can help - re: PDP
by Emilio Madaio 12 Dec '11

12 Dec '11

Dear Colleagues, My apologies for sending the previous email to the full working group. It was intended for the Database Working Group Chairs. Best Regards Emilio Madaio Policy Development Officer On 12/12/11 10:55 AM, Emilio Madaio wrote: >

1 0