The first, and main one, is that this isn't current operational practice across a lot of IXPs. It might happen one day that it'll be adopted widely across IXPs, but as far as I'm aware, we're not at that point yet. When We are not at that point because our plan was to first publish a document with a timeline of future actions. If we have totally misunderstood the process of publishing a RIPE BCOP
On Jun 06, "Nick Hilliard (INEX)" <nick@inex.ie> wrote: then we can just move on with the plan and come back in a couple of years to publish the document (if anybody will still care to do the work when ~everybody in Europe will already have adopted it).
In the case of routing security, there are still difficulties for organisations who have ASNs, as-sets and route lists which span different RIRs, and for whom third party IRRDBs provide a reasonable and responsible mechanism for expressing their intended routing policies. Cutting these I do not believe that this is a real issue: while it may be slightly more convenient for some networks to just dump all route objects in RADB instead of using the appropriate IRR which is authoritative for each prefix, I think that at this point it is a fact that filters are generated as the union of the results from multiple IRRs. So I do not believe that allowing this is worth the troubles which come from using non-authoritative IRRs.
organisations off is not going to help routing security overall - they'll simply bypass route servers and then the industry will be back to unfiltered bgp sessions again. The proposal does not specify any actions for non-RS BGP filters, so I am not sure that I understand your point.
-- ciao, Marco