In message <93666.1576523466@segfault.tristatelogic.com>, Ronald F. Guilmette <rfg@tristatelogic.com> writes
Due to my general ignorance of these matters, I would very much like to be shown some real-world and current examples of each of the above three alleged problems, i.e.:
*) faked origin ASes
*) AS paths that are not technically valid
*) ROAs for ASNs that should not show up for public routing.
I hope that Ruediger is on this list, and that he will provide me with at least one or two examples of each of the above.
You might find it useful to read this IMC paper Taejoong Chung, Emile Aben, Tim Bruijnzeels, Balakrishnan Chandrasekaran, David Choffnes, Dave Levin, Bruce M. Maggs, Alan Mislove, Roland van Rijswijk-Deij, John Rula, and Nick Sullivan. 2019. RPKI is Coming of Age: A Longitudinal Study of RPKI Deployment and Invalid Route Origins. In Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference (IMC '19). ACM, New York, NY, USA, 406-419. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1145/3355369.3355596 There's a number of other academic researchers mining the RIPE data (and other repositories) looking for "interesting" announcements ... and then writing papers about what they have found. However if you are looking for spam related wickedness you may need to go rather further than just looking at public data Note also that "faked" and "should not show up" are generally judgement calls based on opinion (sometimes very well informed opinion) or on assertions by the beneficial users of address blocks as to the announcements that can be considered valid. -- richard Richard Clayton Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755