I agree, but to avoid throwing the baby out with the bathwater, I would
suggest to you that it would be best if you could suggest to the proposal's
author and sponsor some different language with respect to the procedure
for judging such matters... some different process that would address
your reasonable concerns about process... rather than just saying that
the whole proposal is unacceptable.
In short, it appears that yur objection here is about implementation
details, and that you do not object to the over-arching concept, assuming
of course that the process of adjudicating such matters may be made
substantially more reliable and fool-proof.
Perhaps. I've spoken with at least one of the authors and am still not entirely convinced the wording can be done such that it reasonably addresses the issues I've presented. I'll reserve judgement until version 2.0 is released for discussion.
see last line
So you do agree that there is a -possibility- that a threat exists and that
it might, in theory, and under some appropriate circumstances, be diminished
or eliminated by the termination of the RIPE contract with certain well
proven and accurately identified "rogue" members, yes?
If a NCC member is actively and willfully, after having been notified and given ample opportunity to resolve the issue, engaged in widespread hijacking such that RIR/NIR members have complained about their ability to use their own resources, yes.
That case has nothing at all to do with the theft OF IP ADDRESSES, and thus,
it is rather entirely irrelevant to this discussion.
The case does deal with the slippery slope argument in that it demonstrates at least one instance of modern law where removing content from an online service (at all) resulted in an opening for legal liability. While not an issue specific to policy discussion, I do believe it is worth consideration when determining potential breadth of the policy. Action should be well backed with evidence.
see last line
My apologies for not quoting the relevant section properly.
I disagree, and apparently, so does Cloudflare. And they should know.
Cloudflare's blog post on the subject has comments on the matter. One of their staff members is known for stating "Is this the day the Internet dies?", a reference to the fact that they acknowledge they (at the time) were about to take content offline for what were non-required reasons.
That isn't to say that I think this is an inherently bad option. I just think it needs to be balanced such that it is clearly justified when action is taken.
see last line
The question is whether or not this proposal is a demonstrably bad way to -try- to begin
to address the problem, at least in part. I remind you that right now there
is essentially -zero- disincentive to the act of deliberate hijacking.
Getting depeered by transits, losing IX memberships, and having gear seized by authorities all seem like potential disincentives. Having a bunch of NCC-allocated IP space doesn't matter when you are unable to use it.
Again, I am in agreement with you, but I do believe that this is a matter
of fine-tuning the procedural aspects of the propsal, rather than simply
opposing or abandoning it wholesale.
Agreed so far as being open to revisions. see last line
Given the number of references I've made to rev 2.0, I'll likely hold additional comments until it is released, as they are quite possibly irrelevant.
Jacob Slater