In message <51C469A3.5020404@heanet.ie>, Brian Nisbet <brian.nisbet@heanet.ie> wrote:
The WG can of course make the NCC aware of a bad operator
With what effect, exactly? To what end? Do you see what I mean? If such information transmission (to NCC) occurs, and if no allocations ever change as a result, then what was the point?
I do see what you mean, but I was answering the questions you asked. Without a policy change, likely agreed to by the NCC membership (which opens up a whole different can of stakeholder interaction worms) there would be no automatic action. However such a notification may trigger an audit and the NCC's only processes, which may in turn lead to action under the procedures as currently documented.
In case anyone missed it, it was exactly the above snippet from the discussion that Brian and I have been having here on the list that prompted my set of three proposals. I am forced to agree that it appears, even to me, that it is rather unlikely that the RIPE membership would vote _anybody_ the authority to simply kick a given person or company out of RIPE altogether, EVEN IF all available evidence points to said party being the absolute scum of the earth (and guilty of hacking, cracking, spamming, running botnets and generally being a menace to all of mankind). I wish this were not true, but at present it appears that it is. So consider _that_ idea tabled (please). But just as Brian said, there is the established NCC audit process. Presumably, within that process any party undergoing an audit receives a full and fair review, and an opportunity to be heard... or what we here in the states call "due process". It does not seem unreasonable to begin such a process in cases where there exists probable cause to believe that some party has broken the already established rules relating to allocations and their justifications. Regards, rfg