In message <SG2PR03MB4053A9AE3E9612CBD66D6EBFF5230@SG2PR03MB4053.apcprd03.prod. outlook.com>, Suresh Ramasubramanian <ops.lists@gmail.com> wrote:
It is in their own members’ interest that they’re able to detect when some malefactor approaches them with clumsily forged paperwork, newly created shell companies pretending to be companies that were dissolved two decades ago etc and tries to hijack a netblock.
Although I'll always be in agreement with the general notion that RIRs have a responsibility to perform sound and adequate due diligence with respect to all transfers and allocations, I think that Suresh's comments here are a bit out of place with respect to this specific case. Here, it seems, based on the public reports, all of the i's were dotted, and all of the t's were crossed, and there was even a formal written endorsement of the transfer from some big shot associated with the original Russian registrant of the resources in question. There's no evidence on the table that there was any involvement in this instance of any shell companies or anything like that, so I, for one, have trouble finding fault with anything that NCC did in this case. RIRs -are- going to flim-flammed from time to time. Just ask ARIN about the Micfo case. Even banks get flim-flammed now and then. If someone is hell bent on running a con, and has sufficient time, resources, creativity, and, as seems to be true in this case, also has some insider participating in the whole scheme, then there's not a lot that can be done other than to request law enforcement to get involved, after the fact, which it appears has already taken place in this case. Regards, rfg