Dear anti-abuse working group, BGP prefix hijacking remains a problem for Internet routing, despite the (partial) use of RPKI or detection services. We would like to hear your opinions on BGP prefix hijacking (concerns, existing defenses, needs, etc.) that would help us research new defense mechanisms both for its detection and mitigation. Please help us by answering this short (< 10min, 21 questions) and anonymous survey. Survey URL: http://tinyurl.com/hijack-survey <http://tinyurl.com/hijack-survey> *** The survey *** This survey is part of a joint research effort by CAIDA (www.caida.org <http://www.caida.org/>) and the ICS-FORTH (www.ics.forth.gr <http://www.ics.forth.gr/>) research institute, to study (a) operator awareness of BGP prefix hijacking attacks/incidents, (b) presently used defenses against BGP prefix hijacking, (c) the willingness to adopt new defense mechanisms, and (d) reasons that may hinder the deployment of BGP prefix hijacking defenses. We expect the findings of this survey to increase the understanding of existing BGP hijacking defenses and the needs of network operators, as well as help us design and implement new defense mechanisms that we will present to the operator and scientific communities. A summary of the aggregate results will be published as a part of an article/conference paper. Thank you in advance, and we look forward to your responses! Alberto (CAIDA) and Pavlos (ICS-FORTH)