Hi Sergio

As I read through this thread similar ideas came to my mind. The question I would ask is "Is it too late to take a completely different approach to abuse contacts and reporting via the RIPE Database?"

Suppose we had a standard form available via the ripe.net website for providing details of abuse. If you are able to find the "abuse-c:" details in the database now then you must know the IP address involved. The RIPE NCC could send the report to the abuse contact taken from the database via the specified IP address. This does not have to be an email interface either. We could look at other options. The RIPE NCC would then at least know if the report was successfully delivered. Using a standard form would make it much easier for the resource holder to interpret the information.

Someone said:
"Making such a scheme compulsory would be unacceptable to people who wish to interact with network owners without disclosing that in public ..."
I have no understanding of the technology involved here, but when I send you a message on WhatsApp it is encrypted end to end. WhatsApp have no idea (they say) of the content of the message. Would it be possible to submit a form on ripe.net in a way that the content of that form is encrypted and sent to the resource holder so the RIPE NCC have no idea of the content of the form? That would satisfy this concern.

Regardless of the outcome of the RIPE Database Requirements Task Force, something like this could still be implemented as it is external to the RIPE Database.

Food for thought...

cheers

denis

co-chair DB-WG


On Wednesday, 15 January 2020, 10:22:28 CET, Sérgio Rocha <sergio.rocha@makeitsimple.pt> wrote:


Hi,

Maybe we can change the approach.
If RIPE website had a platform to post abuse report, that send the email for
the abuse contact, it will be possible to evaluate the responsiveness of the
abuse contact.

This way anyone that report an abuse could assess not only the response but
also the effectiveness of the actions taken by the network owner. After some
time with this evaluations we would easy to realize who manages the reports
and even who does not respond at all.

Sérgio

-----Original Message-----
From: anti-abuse-wg [mailto:anti-abuse-wg-bounces@ripe.net] On Behalf Of
Gert Doering
Sent: 15 de janeiro de 2020 08:06
To: Carlos Friaças <cfriacas@fccn.pt>
Cc: Gert Doering <gert@space.net>; anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg@ripe.net>
Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] working in new version of 2019-04 (Validation
of "abuse-mailbox")

Hi,

On Wed, Jan 15, 2020 at 07:23:38AM +0000, Carlos Friaças via anti-abuse-wg
wrote:
> I obviously don't speak for the incident handling community, but i
> think this (making it optional) would be a serious step back. The
> current situation is already very bad when in some cases we know from
> the start that we are sending (automated) messages/notices to blackholes.

So why is it preferrable to send mails which are not acted on, as opposed to
"not send mail because you know beforehand that the other network is not
interested"?

I can see that it is frustrating - but I still cannot support a policy
change which will not help dealing with irresponsible networks in any way,
but at the same time increases costs and workload for those that do the
right thing alrady.


> To an extreme, there should always be a known contact responsible for
> any network infrastructure. If this is not the case, what's the
> purpose of a registry then?

"a known contact" and "an *abuse-handling* contact" is not the same thing.

Gert Doering
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