- anti-abuse-wg - mailman.ripe.net

Fwd: [ripe-list] Network security and Brussels
by Brian Nisbet 14 Sep '17

14 Sep '17

As I know not everyone is on or reads the ripe-list, I felt it useful to forward this to the WG. Thanks, Brian -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: [ripe-list] Network security and Brussels Date: Thu, 14 Sep 2017 11:19:53 +0200 From: Gordon Lennox <gordon.lennox.13(a)gmail.com> To: ripe-list(a)ripe.net The Commission has just published a little bunch of things on security. As a very simple guide: a “Communication” is about what could happen, a “Report” is about what has happened and the “Regulation” is about changing ENISA. A lot of reading! Too much? But of interest to various WGs, including of course the Cooperation WG and the new IoT community? So: A COMMUNICATION from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Making the most of NIS – towards the effective implementation of Directive (EU) 2016/1148 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-476-F1-EN-M… https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-476-F1-EN-A… A REPORT from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council assessing the extent to which member states have taken the necessary measures to comply with Directive 2013/40/EU on attacks against information systems and replacing Council Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-474-F1-EN-M… A REPORT from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the evaluation of the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-478-F1-EN-M… A Proposal for a REGULATION of the European Parliament and of the Council on ENISA, the "EU Cybersecurity Agency", and repealing Regulation (EU) 526/2013, and on Information and Communication Technology cybersecurity certification (''Cybersecurity Act'') https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/1/2017/EN/COM-2017-477-F1-EN-M… Gordon

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(no subject)
by Christian Carstensen 13 Sep '17

13 Sep '17

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RIPE75 Anti-Abuse Working Group Agenda
by Brian Nisbet 12 Sep '17

12 Sep '17

Morning, Due to the notification requirements of RIPE75 this is the final agenda for the Anti-Abuse WG meeting on Wednesday 25th October. While there may be some adjustments to timings etc nothing much else will change. I look forward to seeing you all in Dubai! A. Administrative Matters * Welcome * Scribe, Jabber, Stenography * Microphone Etiquette * Approve Minutes from RIPE 74 * Finalise agenda B. Update * B1. Recent List Discussion - 10' * B2. C. Policies - * C1. 2017-02 (Regular abuse-c Validation) - Gregory Mounier - 20' D. Interactions - * D1. Working Groups - DB & Implementation of "abuse-c" * D2. E. Presentation - * E1. Netflow Based Botnet Detection, Alireza Vaziri - 25' * E1. Pre-Transfer Clean-Up of Abused Prefixes, Eric Bais - 25' X. A.O.B. Z. Agenda for RIPE 76 Thanks, Brian -- Brian Nisbet Network Operations Manager HEAnet CLG, Ireland's National Education and Research Network 1st Floor, 5 George's Dock, IFSC, Dublin D01 X8N7, Ireland +35316609040 brian.nisbet(a)heanet.ie www.heanet.ie Registered in Ireland, No. 275301. CRA No. 20036270

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2017-02 New Policy Proposal (Regular abuse-c Validation)
by phishing＠storey.xxx 12 Sep '17

12 Sep '17

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] [db-wg] RIPE Policy Proposal 2017-02 Validates Database Attributes
by Horváth Ágoston János 11 Sep '17

11 Sep '17

Hi all, Agreed that a yearly email ping-pong is not really a good verification of abuse contact address. It's trivial to let RIPE NCC mails through and throw away the rest. But, one might ask, what's the point of a database if the data is not reliable? What's the point of all that contact info if we can't trust it? Why would we want to store (and serve) data that is not correct? Data validation is standard industry practice, pretty much everywhere. You can't even buy a bar of chocolate without validating your email address. One might ask, why would RIPE NCC not follow even the most basic industry practices while validating data of this importance? Cheers, Agoston On Thu, Sep 7, 2017 at 6:54 PM, Sascha Luck [ml] via db-wg <db-wg(a)ripe.net> wrote: > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: "Sascha Luck [ml]" <dbwg(a)c4inet.net> > To: db-wg(a)ripe.net > Cc: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net > Bcc: > Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2017 17:54:04 +0100 > Subject: Re: [db-wg] RIPE Policy Proposal 2017-02 Validates Database Attributes > All, > > I will discuss this here as I do not accept the Anti-Abuse WG as > a forum for this proposal. For one thing, this proposal affects > every ripedb user - in fact, as this entails changes to how the > NCC provides services, the services-wg would be an even better > venue. For another, given the "population" and culture of > "debate" on the AAWG, any "consensus" reached there would be so > worthless as to be farcical. (If anyone wants amplification on > this, https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/anti-abuse-wg/ > provides ample evidence. > > To the meat of the proposal: > > Firstly, this proposal conflicts somewhat with NWI-7 in this very > WG. (Another reason why it should have gone here in the first > place) With the upcoming possibility of delegating abuse-c: to > (customers') resource objects, who bears any consequences of > these customers not replying to this proposed email? >> >> Rationale >> a. Arguments supporting the proposal > > >> Accurate and validated information in the RIPE Database is >> essential to establish a trusted and transparent environment in >> which all network operators can operate safely. > > > abuse-c: is a contact object, just as admin-c: or tech-c: and > (correct me if I'm wrong) audited at the same time as the rest of > the contact information. What makes it so unique that this > verification is not enough? > >> Accurate and >> validated information helps Internet troubleshooting at all >> levels, but it also helps to attribute malicious online >> activities that undermine this trusted environment. > > > See above. > >> The lack of reliable accurate and validated information in the >> database negatively impacts legitimate uses of the RIPE Database, >> including: > > > An *email adress* that doesn't reply once a year does NOT equate > to a "lack of reliable accurate and validated information". I > find this statement somewhat insulting to the NCC team who do > make the effort to keep the ripedb data accurate and do audit > resource holders. > There is an issue with the reliability of out-of-region and > legacy resource data but as the NCC has no "enforcement" powers > over these resource holders, in these cases this proposal > snatches at thin air. >> >> Assuring the security and reliability of the network by >> identifying points of contact for IP addresses for network >> operators, ISPs, and certified computer incident response teams; > > > "org:", "admin-c:", "tech-c:", "mnt-by:" and, yes, "abuse-c:" exist. > >> Ensuring that IP address holders are accountable, so individuals, >> consumers and the public are empowered to resolve abusive >> practices that impact safety and security; >> Assisting businesses, consumer groups, healthcare organisations >> and other organisations that are combating fraud (some of which >> have mandates to electronically save records) to comply with >> relevant legal and public safety safeguards; > > > The contact object that does (or *should*) stand for the person(s) who > can speak for a LIR, legally, is "admin-c:". "abuse-c:" is some role > account in a NOC or even a ticket system unlikely to have any > decision-making power. An attempt to make these roles (perhaps > even personally) responsible for the behaviour of a LIR and its > customers is counter-productive. I for one would flatly refuse to > do any abuse report handling under these circumstances. > >> Complying with national, civil and criminal due process laws in >> support of investigations and providing justice for victims. > > > Would the proposers please amplify exactly which law or due > process is violated by the NCC not sending an email once a year > to an abuse-c:? Myself, and I'm sure the NCC legal team, would be > interested to know. > > On a technical note, email is neither a secure nor a reliable > transport for such verification. In the day of blocklists and > large email providers imposing arbitrary restrictions on email > senders it is not guaranteed that a verification email reaches > the intended address or that a reply reaches the sender. The NCC > ARC procedure, however employs both email and personal contact > via telephone to verify the accuracy of the ripedb information. > > In toto, this proposal would impose unneccessary work on LIRs and > the NCC, using unsuitable means to rectify a non-existing issue, and I therefore oppose it. > >

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2017-02 New Policy Proposal (Regular abuse-c Validation)
by Nick Hilliard 11 Sep '17

11 Sep '17

> The goal of this proposal is to give the RIPE NCC a mandate to > regularly validate "abuse-c:" information and to follow up in cases > where contact information is found to be invalid. which states: > b. Arguments opposing the proposal [...] > If organisations are not cooperative, the RIPE NCC ultimately has the > possibility to close their RIPE NCC membership and deregister their > Internet number resources. The most serious problem with this proposal is that it's saying: "make sure your abuse-c mailbox is working and if it isn't, this proposal is explicitly threatening that the RIPE NCC can take your numbering resources away". This is a highly aggressive approach and I don't think this is a viable or appropriate way of handling stewardship of IP numbering resources, and particularly not from a monopoly organisation. Useful abuse management is far more than tickbox compliance with having your abuse-c mailbox connected up to an autoresponder. A working abuse-c mailbox is great, but mandating this requirement in this way is going to turn the abuse-c mechanism into a window-dressing exercise which can be satisfied by an autoresponder. On this basis I don't support this proposal. Why didn't the authors just talk to the RIPE NCC and ask them to include abuse-c validation in the Assisted Registry Check? This seems like a far less heavy-handed option than creating a policy proposal. It also involves better quality community outreach, and without the threat of aggression implicit in proposal 2017-02. Nick

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] [db-wg] RIPE Policy Proposal 2017-02 Validates Database Attributes
by Sascha Luck [ml] 10 Sep '17

10 Sep '17

All, I will discuss this here as I do not accept the Anti-Abuse WG as a forum for this proposal. For one thing, this proposal affects every ripedb user - in fact, as this entails changes to how the NCC provides services, the services-wg would be an even better venue. For another, given the "population" and culture of "debate" on the AAWG, any "consensus" reached there would be so worthless as to be farcical. (If anyone wants amplification on this, https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/anti-abuse-wg/ provides ample evidence. To the meat of the proposal: Firstly, this proposal conflicts somewhat with NWI-7 in this very WG. (Another reason why it should have gone here in the first place) With the upcoming possibility of delegating abuse-c: to (customers') resource objects, who bears any consequences of these customers not replying to this proposed email? >Rationale >a. Arguments supporting the proposal >Accurate and validated information in the RIPE Database is >essential to establish a trusted and transparent environment in >which all network operators can operate safely. abuse-c: is a contact object, just as admin-c: or tech-c: and (correct me if I'm wrong) audited at the same time as the rest of the contact information. What makes it so unique that this verification is not enough? >Accurate and >validated information helps Internet troubleshooting at all >levels, >but it also helps to attribute malicious online >activities that undermine this trusted environment. See above. >The lack of reliable accurate and validated information in the >database negatively impacts legitimate uses of the RIPE Database, >including: An *email adress* that doesn't reply once a year does NOT equate to a "lack of reliable accurate and validated information". I find this statement somewhat insulting to the NCC team who do make the effort to keep the ripedb data accurate and do audit resource holders. There is an issue with the reliability of out-of-region and legacy resource data but as the NCC has no "enforcement" powers over these resource holders, in these cases this proposal snatches at thin air. >Assuring the security and reliability of the network by >identifying points of contact for IP addresses for network >operators, ISPs, and certified computer incident response teams; "org:", "admin-c:", "tech-c:", "mnt-by:" and, yes, "abuse-c:" exist. >Ensuring that IP address holders are accountable, so individuals, >consumers and the public are empowered to resolve abusive >practices that impact safety and security; >Assisting businesses, consumer groups, healthcare organisations >and other organisations that are combating fraud (some of which >have mandates to electronically save records) to comply with >relevant legal and public safety safeguards; The contact object that does (or *should*) stand for the person(s) who can speak for a LIR, legally, is "admin-c:". "abuse-c:" is some role account in a NOC or even a ticket system unlikely to have any decision-making power. An attempt to make these roles (perhaps even personally) responsible for the behaviour of a LIR and its customers is counter-productive. I for one would flatly refuse to do any abuse report handling under these circumstances. >Complying with national, civil and criminal due process laws in >support of investigations and providing justice for victims. Would the proposers please amplify exactly which law or due process is violated by the NCC not sending an email once a year to an abuse-c:? Myself, and I'm sure the NCC legal team, would be interested to know. On a technical note, email is neither a secure nor a reliable transport for such verification. In the day of blocklists and large email providers imposing arbitrary restrictions on email senders it is not guaranteed that a verification email reaches the intended address or that a reply reaches the sender. The NCC ARC procedure, however employs both email and personal contact via telephone to verify the accuracy of the ripedb information. In toto, this proposal would impose unneccessary work on LIRs and the NCC, using unsuitable means to rectify a non-existing issue, and I therefore oppose it.

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] [db-wg] RIPE Policy Proposal 2017-02 Validates Database Attributes
by phishing＠storey.xxx 09 Sep '17

09 Sep '17

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oppose 2017-02 "Regular abuse-c Validation"
by Peter Hessler 08 Sep '17

08 Sep '17

STRONG OPPOSITION! As an operator who has to read abuse-c emails, this is a waste of my time. I have real things to do, instead of bothering with this kind of crap. Responding to RIPE ping mails does not mean an abuse-c will respond to emails from non-RIPE entities, nor that a mailbox will keep working in-between pings. This is simply busy work, and has no value. Additionally, the threat that RIPE will deregister for failure to respond is insulting, vulgar, and obscene. -- Katz' Law: Man and nations will act rationally when all other possibilities have been exhausted.

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2017-02 New Policy Proposal (Regular abuse-c Validation)
by phishing＠storey.xxx 08 Sep '17

08 Sep '17

1 0