- anti-abuse-wg - mailman.ripe.net

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach
by Suresh Ramasubramanian 23 Mar '19

23 Mar '19

There's also the interesting comparison of how some TLD registries - many of them - act on canceling spam and phish domains while others go to every extreme not to do so. --srs ________________________________ From: anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net> on behalf of ac <ac(a)main.me> Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2019 11:16 AM To: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach On Fri, 22 Mar 2019 17:13:20 +0000 Nick Hilliard <nick(a)foobar.org> wrote: > Regarding over-reach, the RIPE NCC was instituted as a numbering > registry and as a supporting organisation for the RIPE Community, > whose terms of reference are described in the RIPE-1 document. The > terms of reference make it clear that the purpose of the RIPE > Community and the RIPE NCC is internet co-ordination and - pointedly > - not enforcement. Proposal 2019-03 goes well outside the scope of > what the RIPE Community and the RIPE NCC were constituted to do, and > I do not believe that the Anti Abuse working group has the authority > to override this. > the wg is not overriding anything. 2019-03 is about removing resources, in much the same way as same resources would have been removed for payment. (RIPE NCC accounts person would "judge" that there was no payment and resources would be affected) Just because there is a decision it does not mean that such a decision is "law enforcement" or judicial. 2019-03 is administrative and not legal/law/judicial > The second point relates to the long term consequences of the > proposal. If the RIPE Community were to pass this policy, then it > would direct the RIPE NCC to act as both a judiciary and policing > agency for internet abuse. Judgement and enforcement of behaviour > are the competence of national governments, courts and law No. You are saying the same thing, though eloquently, in a different way and trying to link it to some future potential hijacking by gov of RIR. It is not much of a decision that RIPE NCC has to make either as: 1. There was hijacking OR 2. There was no hijacking Whether it was accidental, ongoing for long period of time and all the other technical and scientific facts, this may require some sort of interpretation of facts. But, not whether it actually happened or not. > > But, this is not how to handle the problem of BGP hijacking. Even if > it had the slightest possibility of making any difference at a > technical level (which it won't), the proposal would set the RIPE > Community and the RIPE NCC down a road which I believe would be > extremely unwise to take from a legal and political point of view, > and which would be difficult, if not impossible to manoeuver out of. > ianal, NCC legal will surely evaluate the legal aspects, but practically every new shell company that has to deal with compliance and other issues is just another layer in the onion.

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)
by Carlos Friaças 23 Mar '19

23 Mar '19

Hi Erik, All, Thanks for your input. Your message was quite long, so i'll try to answer several aspects of it below, after quoting what you wrote. ======= > 1. "The official reaction to Dutch parliament was, that it was too hard > to prosecute or even find the actual people behind the hijack and they > decided not to go after them." This means they decided this time, it doesn't mean they wouldn't decide differently in a subsequent timeframe. The hijackers could easily repeat their wrongdoings? Yes, they could, with the same set of resources (same ASN and same other legitimate prefixes to support the 'operation'). It's important also to state that a different victim might feel differently and it could value extra tools in fighting this. Remember, a non-dutch victim will have some extra difficulty engaging with dutch courts because those victims will lack in knowledge about dutch law. This is also a case which involved #politics. A private company (as a victim), would probably in the first place defend their own interests and their shareholders, regardless of its country's politics. ======= > 2. "Even IF they would have proceeded .. under Dutch law, BGP Hijacking > isn't a criminal offence and as a result, not directly illegal or > criminal.. Performing a (D)DOS or breaking into a computer system is.. > but BGP hijacking as such isn't. Especially if the IP space wasn't in > use.. so nothing broke or stopped working .." So, acting at RIR level could be seen as actually filling in for a gap in Dutch law? If this is the case, good, as this gap affects people well beyond dutch (and EU) borders. Again, i think we are dismissing the relevance of the other type of victims involved... those who *receive* the hijacked routes announcements and can be easily tricked by "oh, this is the dutch parliament's space, so this should be fine" and then their packets go towards the hijacker's network/systems. That's a clear path to enable "impersonation", "fraud", and so on... ======= > 3. "So even if they would get the Bulgarian spammer/hijackers in front > of a Dutch judge .. the change was that ... they would walk, because there > was no harm done .. No law was broken, no system invaded and nothing > stopped working..." I think 2019-03's goal is not to bring more people from around the world in front of Dutch judges. :-) With this self-regulatory framework in place hijackers (and everyone) will have in writing that their actions are not tolerated by the community, and if it comes to that, their 'business model' will be somewhat affected if they need to gather/find new numbers to resume their line of 'business'. ======= > 4. "So in this case, the Italian Police (ROS) used (forced??) an Italian > ISP to hijack some IP space to regain control of their lost RAT C&C > server.. (endpoint for RAT infected machines.) This wasn't an accident > .. but was it criminal by the ISP to assist their local police ? And > what would have been the impact if they didn't... ?" While this might be indifferent for the average Internet User in Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Chile, Canada, Seychelles or Belize, and any of them might argue this line of action should have a consequence, the best way 2019-03 tries to accomodate this type of corner cases is the ratification phase. Those who will have to ratify a 2nd instance report can be provided with enough evidence (an Italian court order?) so that ratification doesn't occur. Even if this isn't the case (and no evidence is provided) or the report even disputed, the ISP can only get a warning (and the concrete consequence is out of 2019-03's scope). ======= > 5. "These are your/our tax dollars at work ... They either don't care > or are the bad actor themselves." It depends on the viewpoint and the available set of evidence. In this case it can also be argued that it was a good actor. :-) Additionally, nothing guarantees that a report/complaint is going to be issued against _every_ hijack. Also, admissible evidence (from historical routing data) will have an expiration timeframe in version 2.0. ======= > 6. "So the customers that hold an SSA or End-User Agreement (PI Holders > for IP space and AS number) look to be the 'target' of the policy, > however that leaves out the legacy resource holders.." That is unaccurate. The 'target' is everyone who intentionally performs an hijack. About the legacy resource holders, if they violate RIPE policies, i don't see why their access to NCC's Services can't be denied (permanently or temporarily?) -- that's my interpretation, but we can also have a line about that in version 2.0. If RPKI is not available for legacy resources, that might have some impact. ======= > 7. "And with the current transfer policies in place, yes it is possible > to obtain a legacy AS number and a legacy IPv4 prefix ...for yourself .. > and those can't be 'retrieved' with this policy .. And even with the > policy, it isn't the RIPE NCC that COULD de-register them as they are > not allocated by the RIPE NCC in the first place ..." Exactly. Here we agree. The only possible consequence/effect (imho) is denying access to services, based on non-compliance with RIPE policies. Anyway, 2019-03 doesn't have the "recovering" of resources back to the NCC as a goal. ======= > 8. "So Legacy holders (resources with a legacy status) are for obvious > reasons, excluded for penalties and out of reach. Also according to the > policy that specifies services to Legacy holders, as this policy doesn't > state that it wants to include and impact legacy holders." I don't agree. If you check i was one of the co-authors of 2012-07 :-) In my initial drafts for 2019-03, there was a line about legacy holders. It seems now clear it needs to be recovered for version 2.0 :-) ======= > 9. "The biggest issue what I see in this policy, is that the RIPE NCC ( > either themselves or the Exec Board. ) is desired / aimed to pull the > trigger on a membership or contractual relationship." And they could (the Exec Board) decide not to do it, due to the ratification section. But *today*, it's a tool they don't have. If you are uncomfortable with the Exec Board, would the RIPE Chair/Vice-Chair be an acceptable alternative? Or should a different set of people be selected to have control over the ratification knob? ======= > 10. "These kind of actions or decisions should be kept out of the RIPE > NCC office and the actual case and decision should be made by a court > and court order." I fully agree the NCC staff should be completely kept out of this process. I'm not entirely sure about the Exec Board, but would easily agree on an independent set of people. As you already stated, Dutch law has a loophole (ok, you might not see it as a loophole) where a BGP hijack is not illegal, so saying "come back with a court order" is something that obviously won't happen and hijacks can happily proceed without any major disturbance. ======= > 11. "If someone likes to make the case that someone is in violation, > there should be a neutral judge that should review the case and the > accuser can go to the RIPE NCC with the result .. And the RIPE NCC will > just execute based on the outcome." That's what we tried to design with 2019-03, where the "neutral judge" is a set of experts -- i.e. more than one. ======= > 12. "I can understand the sentiment or intent of the policy, but I'm > against any form of policy where the RIPE NCC or the Exec Board will be > involved in the actual decision like this as it will impact their > neutral status and the fact they are opening themselves for liability > claims." As i've written above, i'm open to suggestions about how to take the Exec Board out of the picture, so that could be incorporated in version 2.0 (please see #9 above). ======= Best Regards, Carlos

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2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)
by António Manuel Araújo Da Silva Rio Costa 22 Mar '19

22 Mar '19

Hi, I express my support to the 2019-03 proposal Best Regards; António Rio Costa UTAD ICT email: acosta(a)utad.pt sip: acosta(a)voip.utad.pt ext: 4668 Tlf: +351 259350668 ___________________________________________ I do not fear computers. I fear the lack of them. "Isaac Asimov" __________________________________________________________ ---Nota de Confidencialidade--- Os dados constantes da presente mensagem são destinados apenas à(s) pessoa(s) ou entidade(s) acima referida(s), podendo conter informação CONFIDENCIAL, cuja divulgação está expressamente vedada nos termos da lei. Se não é o destinatário da mensagem, ou se ela lhe foi enviada por engano, por favor informe de imediato enviando um email para acosta(a)utad.pt e apague a mesma. --- Confidentiality Note --- The data contained in this message is intended only for the person (s) or entity (s) referred to above, and may contain CONFIDENTIAL information whose disclosure is expressly prohibited under the law. If you are not the recipient of the message, or if it was sent to you in error, please inform immediately by sending an email to acosta(a)utad.pt and delete it.

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)
by Gert Doering 22 Mar '19

22 Mar '19

Hi, On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 07:38:34AM +0000, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote: > Ah that way. Then - > > Do we have rough consensus? If not at what point is it reached? Now this is left to the AA WG chairs to decide :-) As per the RIPE PDP, we're in "discussion phase", which is run to the end date Marco announced (too lazy to look it up). Then, the proposers decide together with the relevant WG chairs if they think it makes sense to go ahead (it does not have to have consensus, but should have some amount of support, and no counter arguments that are compelling enough to outright kill the proposal). If yes, the RIPE NCC does the Impact Analysis, and the proposal moves to review phase. At the end of the review phase, the WG chairs determine rough consensus. Here's a nice video about the phases https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies plus the link to the formal document https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-710 Gert Doering -- NetMaster -- have you enabled IPv6 on something today...? SpaceNet AG Vorstand: Sebastian v. Bomhard, Michael Emmer Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14 Aufsichtsratsvors.: A. Grundner-Culemann D-80807 Muenchen HRB: 136055 (AG Muenchen) Tel: +49 (0)89/32356-444 USt-IdNr.: DE813185279

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2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)
by CSIRT.UMINHO Jose Ramada 21 Mar '19

21 Mar '19

Hello all. I support the 2019-03 proposal. Cumprimentos, Jose Ramada ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------- CSIRT.UMINHO - Universidade do Minho Serviços de Comunicações - Campus de Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga - Portugal Tel.: + <callto:351%20253%2060%2010%2020> 351 253 60 10 20, Fax: <callto:+351%20253%2060%2010%2029> +351 253 60 10 29 <https://csirt.uminho.pt/> https://csirt.uminho.pt | <mailto:report@csirt.uminho.pt> report(a)csirt.uminho.pt | <mailto:info@csirt.uminho.pt> info(a)csirt.uminho.pt ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------- This email is confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not disclose or use the information contained in it. If you have received this mail in error, please tell us immediately by return email and delete the document --- Este e-mail foi verificado em termos de vírus pelo software antivírus Avast. https://www.avast.com/antivirus

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP
by CSIRT.UMINHO Amandio Antunes 21 Mar '19

21 Mar '19

Hi all! I support the 2019-03 proposal. Cumprimentos, Amândio Antunes ----------------------------------------------------------------- CSIRT.UMINHO Universidade do Minho Serviços de Comunicações Campus de Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga - Portugal Tel.: + 351 253 60 40 20, Fax: +351 253 60 40 21 email: amandio(a)csirt.uminho.pt | http://www.csirt.uminho.pt ----------------------------------------------------------------- This email is confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not disclose or use the information contained in it. If you have received this mail in error, please tell us immediately by return email and delete the document. -- Este email é confidêncial. Se não é o destinatário do mesmo, não deve nem revelar, nem usar o seu conteúdo. Se recebeu esta mensagem por engano, por favor informe-nos Imediatamente, devolvendo e apagando este email.

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2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)
by Filipe Manuel Rebelo 21 Mar '19

21 Mar '19

Hi, I would like to express my support to the 2019-03 proposal. Regards. ________________________________ AVISO - Esta mensagem e quaisquer documentos anexos seus podem conter informa??o confidencial sujeita a sigilo profissional para uso exclusivo do(s) seu(s) destinat?rio(s). Cabe ao destinat?rio assegurar a verifica??o da exist?ncia de v?rus ou erros, uma vez que a informa??o contida pode ser intercetada ou corrompida. Se n?o for o destinat?rio, n?o dever? usar, distribuir ou copiar este e-mail, devendo proceder ? sua elimina??o e informar o emissor. ? estritamente proibido o uso, a distribui??o, c?pia ou qualquer forma de dissemina??o n?o autorizada do conte?do desta mensagem. DISCLAIMER - This message, as well as any attachments to it, may contain confidential information for exclusive use of the intended recipients. The recipients are responsible for the verification of the existence of viruses or errors, since the information transmitted could have been intercepted or in any way corrupted. If you?re not the intended recipient, you cannot use, distribute or copy this message, and you should destroy it and inform the originator of it. It?s strictly prohibited the use, distribution copy or any other form of unauthorized dissemination of this message?s content.

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@EXT: 2019-03 New Policy Proposal
by Marcolla, Sara Veronica 20 Mar '19

20 Mar '19

Hi all, +1 for the proposal as is. Thank you both Carlos and Jordi for bringing this topic up for discussion. Kind regards, Sara Marcolla Europol - O3 European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3) www.europol.europa.eu ******************* DISCLAIMER : This message is sent in confidence and is only intended for the named recipient. If you receive this message by mistake, you may not use, copy, distribute or forward this message, or any part of its contents or rely upon the information contained in it. Please notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the relevant e-mails from any computer. This message does not constitute a commitment by Europol unless otherwise indicated. *******************

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal
by Karl-Josef Ziegler 20 Mar '19

20 Mar '19

Hello! I'm also supporting this new policy proposal. Best regards, - Karl-Josef Ziegler

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] [routing-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation) to be discussed on Anti-Abuse Working Group Mailing List
by Andrey Korolyov 19 Mar '19

19 Mar '19

> > You can find the full proposal at: > https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-03 Hey WG, out of curiosity, why neighboring ASNs are not carrying any responsibility for not filtering out a malicious advertisement from a directly-peered neighbor in the proposal? AFAIU most leaks happen because large parties are letting their ACL loose, not because some state-backed player decides to take a pick on someone's else traffic (though both variants exists). The peer who allows any prefix announcement originating from its direct neighbor is no less responsible for the hijack as the origin AS itself. Could you please suggest a possibility to include that kind of relations (determined by third parties, as currently stated for hijacker's AS in the draft) and measures against a transit/upstream in same manner as they are currently defined for a hijacker? Thanks.

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