March 2019 - anti-abuse-wg - mailman.ripe.net

2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)
by Marco Schmidt 18 Apr '19

18 Apr '19

Dear colleagues, A new RIPE Policy proposal, 2019-03, "BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation", is now available for discussion. The goal of this proposal is to define that BGP hijacking is not accepted as normal practice within the RIPE NCC service region. You can find the full proposal at: https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-03 As per the RIPE Policy Development Process (PDP), the purpose of this four-week Discussion Phase is to discuss the proposal and provide feedback to the proposer. At the end of the Discussion Phase, the proposers, with the agreement of the Anti-Abuse WG co-chairs, decide how to proceed with the proposal. We encourage you to review this proposal and send your comments to <anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net> before 17 April 2019. Kind regards, Marco Schmidt Policy Officer RIPE NCC Sent via RIPE Forum -- https://www.ripe.net/participate/mail/forum

34 189

Proposal 2019-03 BGP Hijacking
by Vitor Leitao 01 Apr '19

01 Apr '19

I would like to manifest my support to the proposal 2019-03. Rgds, Vitor Leitao

8 8

Dogs
by Ronald F. Guilmette 01 Apr '19

01 Apr '19

I feel compelled to offer my apologies to the list membership for my posting here about a week ago in which I made retorical use of the word "dogpiles" as in "cleaning up our own dogpiles". It was certainly not my intent to offend anyone with my usual and rather cavalier use of language. Nontheless, following that post, a number of dog owners on the list wrote to me privately to express thier disgust and outrage at what appeared to them to have been personalised and selective attacks on either them or their pets or both. As it was pointed out to me, in no uncertain terms, dogs are far from the only type of pets that routinely manufacture piles of what are generally considered to be non-recyclable waste by-products. Cats, lizards, parakeets, and even ring-tailed lemurs also routinely gift to thier environments copious quantities of effluent. Given these facts, some members here righfully objected to my singling out of dogs for either special note or special derision. I do apologize to all concerned, and I promise that in future I will make every reasonable attempt to be species-neutral in my use of language, whenever possible, especially now that I am aware of the issue, and of the specific offense that some on the list can and do take to my manner of speech. To paraphrase, I will amend my speech lest I mar my fortunes. Regards, rfg P.S. It certainly does seem evident to me that the best way that I could avoid getting into trouble like this in the future would be for me to never say anything. I do believe, based on some evidence, that at least a few of the members here would be quite alright with that solution.

1 0

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach
by Lu Heng 31 Mar '19

31 Mar '19

On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 19:11 ac <ac(a)main.me> wrote: > On Sat, 23 Mar 2019 18:57:43 +0800 > Lu Heng <h.lu(a)anytimechinese.com> wrote: > > It’a very much because of internet has become part of unitiy to my > > point of view. > > > > Any policy that says “if you do bad thing we taking your IP number > > back” is very much like “if you do bad thing we cut your > > water/electricity off”. > > > the point is: you can do what you like with "your ip", if it is "your > ip" but part of what makes it "your ip" is an advertisement that is > an assignment by an administrative power and the same > administrative power comes with responsibility and a whole bunch > of unavoidable and undetachable other things.... > > so, we can keep going around in chicken and egg circles, but I think my > mind is made up now... thank you for that :) > > I am +1 for adoption of 2019-03 as it stands... > Sure, so does my mind, I am -1 for the adoption. Yes you do have responsibility to things you processe(in this case the rights to use the IP), but doesn’t give you rights to policing other people when your procession get damaged, I still firmly believe that rights belong to the police and judges. And for the record, it’s in my short term interest to have that policy as we do suffer from time to time hijackings, and I made presentation in this working group how more half million of our IP get hijacked for half a year. But for the long term stability of the registry, or the internet as a whole, in which in all my interest to protect, I really like to see community avoid policy like that. > Andre > > > > -- -- Kind regards. Lu

3 3

2019-03 and over-reach
by Nick Hilliard 31 Mar '19

31 Mar '19

The aim of the 2019-03 proposal, as far as I understand it, is to grant the RIPE NCC the authority to make formal judgements about alleged abuse of network resources with the implicit intention that unless the party involved ends the alleged abuse, the RIPE NCC would enforce the judgement by LIR shutdown if the alleged infringer were a member, or refusal to provide service if the alleged infringer were not. There are several aspects of this proposal that are pretty disturbing, but the two that jump out are 1. over-reach by the RIPE Community, 2. encroachment into the arena of supranational law enforcement. I'm not going to go into the technical content of the proposal, despite the fact that I don't believe it would have any impact whatever on dealing with the problem of hijacking. Limited companies can be registered for tiny amounts of money, and it's naive to believe that any actor who is dishonest enough to engage in persistent bgp hijacking would think twice about switching from one company to another in a heartbeat, in order to avoid the consequences of a policy like 2019-03. Regarding over-reach, the RIPE NCC was instituted as a numbering registry and as a supporting organisation for the RIPE Community, whose terms of reference are described in the RIPE-1 document. The terms of reference make it clear that the purpose of the RIPE Community and the RIPE NCC is internet co-ordination and - pointedly - not enforcement. Proposal 2019-03 goes well outside the scope of what the RIPE Community and the RIPE NCC were constituted to do, and I do not believe that the Anti Abuse working group has the authority to override this. The second point relates to the long term consequences of the proposal. If the RIPE Community were to pass this policy, then it would direct the RIPE NCC to act as both a judiciary and policing agency for internet abuse. Judgement and enforcement of behaviour are the competence of national governments, courts and law enforcement agencies, not of private companies. If the RIPE NCC starts encroaching in this territory, it should expect national governments and law enforcement agencies to start taking an active interest in taking control. This scenario would not be beneficial to the RIPE Community. There are other pile of other considerations here, not least whether the RIPE NCC would have any legal jurisdiction to deregister resources where it had determined "abuse", and what the legal liability of the company would be if it were determined that they didn't have jurisdiction to act. I don't question the motives of the authors of this proposal - neither of them has anything but the best of intentions in mind. Regarding BGP hijacking in general, I've been involved in attempting to deal with many hijackings over the years and am as frustrated as anyone. Like many other people in this community, I have also spent a lot of time and effort trying to deal with the problem from a practical point of view, both in terms of tooling and deployment standards for IXPs and service providers. But, this is not how to handle the problem of BGP hijacking. Even if it had the slightest possibility of making any difference at a technical level (which it won't), the proposal would set the RIPE Community and the RIPE NCC down a road which I believe would be extremely unwise to take from a legal and political point of view, and which would be difficult, if not impossible to manoeuver out of. Nick

10 29

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)
by Töma Gavrichenkov 30 Mar '19

30 Mar '19

> Isn't the whole point of route registries generally and RIPE's in particular > supposed to be to make it easy for pretty much any arbitrary outsider to > look at a given block and a given route to that block and conclude that > the two -do- in fact properly go together, or conversely, that they do not? That could be obviously only done after BGPSec and RPKI are fully deployed, in which case we won't be needing the proposal in question. See the "hypothetical example" in https://www.ripe.net/ripe/mail/archives/anti-abuse-wg/2019-March/004601.html | Töma Gavrichenkov | gpg: 2deb 97b1 0a3c 151d b67f 1ee5 00e7 94bc 4d08 9191 | mailto: ximaera(a)gmail.com | fb: ximaera | telegram: xima_era | skype: xima_era | tel. no: +7 916 515 49 58

8 15

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Welcome to the "anti-abuse-wg" mailing list
by Pedro Veiga 30 Mar '19

30 Mar '19

I support 2019-03 Regards, PV Às 11:13 de 30/03/2019, anti-abuse-wg-request(a)ripe.net escreveu: > Welcome to the anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net mailing list! > > To post to this list, send your email to: > > anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net > > General information about the mailing list is at: > > https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/anti-abuse-wg > > If you ever want to unsubscribe or change your options (eg, switch to > or from digest mode, change your password, etc.), visit your > subscription page at: > > https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/options/anti-abuse-wg/pedroveiga%40outlook.c… > > > You can also make such adjustments via email by sending a message to: > > anti-abuse-wg-request(a)ripe.net > > with the word `help' in the subject or body (don't include the > quotes), and you will get back a message with instructions. > > You must know your password to change your options (including changing > the password, itself) or to unsubscribe. It is: > > s58ttw@Peter > > Normally, Mailman will remind you of your ripe.net mailing list > passwords once every month, although you can disable this if you > prefer. This reminder will also include instructions on how to > unsubscribe or change your account options. There is also a button on > your options page that will email your current password to you. > > The RIPE community's strength comes from its breadth of experience, > diversity of views and an open, respectful exchange of ideas. These > are values that we want all of our community members to uphold. Please > take a moment to read the code of conduct > <https://www.ripe.net/participate/mail/ripe-mailing-list-ripe-forum-code-of-…> > that applies to all RIPE mailing lists and the RIPE Forum. > . >

1 0

BGP Hijacking proposal
by Carlos Nunes da Costa 30 Mar '19

30 Mar '19

I support the 2019-03 proposal. Best regards, Carlos Costa [costa(a)ua.pt] aSIC - área Segurança, Informática e Comunicações sTIC - serviços de Tecnologias de Informação e Comunicação [http://www.ua.pt/stic] Universidade de Aveiro / Campus Universitário Santiago / 3810-193 Aveiro Suporte Técnico: https://bud.ua.pt / Telf: +351 234 370099 / Ext: 22299 Geral/Administrativo: stic(a)ua.pt<mailto:stic@ua.pt> / Telf: +351 234 372469 / FAX: +351 234 370214 / Ext: 22250 Aviso de Confidencialidade/ Confidentiality Notice Esta mensagem, e os ficheiros eventualmente anexos, é confidencial e reservada apenas ao conhecimento da(s) pessoa(s) nela indicada(s) como destinatária(s). Se não é o seu destinatário, ou se lhe foi enviada por erro, não faça qualquer uso do respectivo conteúdo e proceda à sua destruição, notificando o remetente. / This message, and the existing attached files, is confidential and intended exclusively for the individual(s) named as addressees. If you are not the intended recipient, or if it was sent to you by error, you are kindly requested not to make any use of its contents and to proceed to the destruction of the message, thereby notifying the sender.

1 0

I support the 2019-03 proposal
by Ricardo T. Martins 29 Mar '19

29 Mar '19

0 *H÷ 010 `He0 *H÷ $QContent-Type: multipart/related; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_011F_01D4E643.7521BE50" This is a multipart message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_011F_01D4E643.7521BE50 Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="----=_NextPart_001_0120_01D4E643.7521BE50" ------=_NextPart_001_0120_01D4E643.7521BE50 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Dear Members, I support the 2019-03 proposal. Kind regards, _ Ricardo T. Martins / [ricardo(a)ua.pt] Gabinete de Cibersegurança / [gcs(a)ua.pt] Universidade de Aveiro Reitoria Campus Universitário de Santiago - Edifício 3, 3810-193 Aveiro T: +351 234 370 200 <http://www.ua.pt/> http://www.ua.pt <https://www.facebook.com/ricardo.rtm> <https://www.linkedin.com/in/ricardo-martins-07172113/> <https://twitter.com/> <https://plus.google.com/> <https://www.youtube.com/> <https://www.instagram.com/ricardomartinstm/> Aviso de Confidencialidade/ Confidentiality Notice Esta mensagem, e os ficheiros eventualmente anexos, é confidencial e reservada apenas ao conhecimento da(s) pessoa(s) nela indicada(s) como destinatária(s). Se não é o seu destinatário, ou se lhe foi enviada por erro, não faça qualquer uso do respetivo conteúdo e proceda à sua destruição, notificando o remetente. This message, and the existing attached files, is confidential and intended exclusively for the individual(s) named as addressees. If you are not the intended recipient, or if it was sent to you by error, you are kindly requested not to make any use of its contents and to proceed to the destruction of the message, thereby notifying the sender. ------=_NextPart_001_0120_01D4E643.7521BE50 Content-Type: text/html; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable <html xmlns:v=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" = xmlns:o=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" = xmlns:w=3D"urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" = xmlns:m=3D"http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" = xmlns=3D"http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40"><head><meta = http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; = charset=3Diso-8859-1"><meta name=3DGenerator content=3D"Microsoft Word = 15 (filtered medium)"><style></style></head><body lang=3DPT = link=3D"#0563C1" vlink=3D"#954F72"><div class=3DWordSection1>Dear Members,<o:p></o:p><o:p> </o:p>I support = the 2019-03 proposal.<o:p></o:p><o:p> </o:p>Kind = regards,<o:p></o:p>_<o:p></o:p><o:p> </o:p><table class=3DMsoTableGrid = border=3D1 cellspacing=3D0 cellpadding=3D0 width=3D"100%" = style=3D'width:100.0%;border-collapse:collapse;border:none'><tr><td = width=3D"20%" valign=3Dtop = style=3D'width:20.72%;border:none;border-top:solid #A6A6A6 = 1.5pt;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt'><o:p> </o:p></= p></td><td width=3D"79%" valign=3Dtop = style=3D'width:79.28%;border:none;border-top:solid #A6A6A6 = 1.5pt;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt'><= o:p> </o:p></td></tr><tr><td width=3D"20%" = valign=3Dtop style=3D'width:20.72%;border:none;border-right:solid = #A6A6A6 1.5pt;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt'><img width=3D192 height=3D101 = style=3D'width:2.0in;height:1.052in' id=3D"Picture_x0020_1" = src=3D"cid:image001.png@01D4E641.FCFB0900"><o:p></o:p></td><td= width=3D"79%" valign=3Dtop = style=3D'width:79.28%;border:none;padding:0cm 5.4pt 0cm 5.4pt'>R= icardo T. Martins=A0 / [= r= icardo(a)ua.pt]= <o:p></o:p>G= abinete de Ciberseguran=E7a / [gcs(a)ua.pt]<o:p></o:p>Universidade de Aveiro<o:p></o:p>Reitoria<o:p></o:p>Ca= mpus Universit=E1rio de Santiago - Edif=EDcio 3, 3810-193 = Aveiro<o:p></o:p>T: +351 234 370 = 200<o:p></o:p><a = href=3D"http://www.ua.pt/">http://www.ua.pt</a> <o:p></o:p><a = href=3D"https://www.facebook.com/ricardo.rtm" target=3D"_blank"><img = border=3D0 width=3D23 height=3D23 style=3D'width:.2395in;height:.2395in' = id=3D"Picture_x0020_30" src=3D"cid:image002.png@01D4E641.FCFB0900" = alt=3D"Facebook icon"></a>  <a = href=3D"https://www.linkedin.com/in/ricardo-martins-07172113/" = target=3D"_blank"><img = border=3D0 width=3D23 height=3D23 style=3D'width:.2395in;height:.2395in' = id=3D"Picture_x0020_31" src=3D"cid:image003.png@01D4E641.FCFB0900" = alt=3D"LinkedIn icon"></a>  <a = href=3D"https://twitter.com/" target=3D"_blank"><img = border=3D0 width=3D23 height=3D23 style=3D'width:.2395in;height:.2395in' = id=3D"Picture_x0020_32" src=3D"cid:image004.png@01D4E641.FCFB0900" = alt=3D"Twitter icon"></a>  <a = href=3D"https://plus.google.com/" target=3D"_blank"><img = border=3D0 width=3D23 height=3D23 style=3D'width:.2395in;height:.2395in' = id=3D"Picture_x0020_33" src=3D"cid:image005.png@01D4E641.FCFB0900" = alt=3D"Google Plus icon"></a>  <a = href=3D"https://www.youtube.com/" target=3D"_blank"><img = border=3D0 width=3D23 height=3D23 style=3D'width:.2395in;height:.2395in' = id=3D"Picture_x0020_34" src=3D"cid:image006.png@01D4E641.FCFB0900" = alt=3D"Youtbue icon"></a>  <a = href=3D"https://www.instagram.com/ricardomartinstm/" = target=3D"_blank"><img = border=3D0 width=3D23 height=3D23 style=3D'widt Mh:.2395in;height:.2395in' = id=3D"Picture_x0020_35" src=3D"cid:image007.png@01D4E641.FCFB0900" = alt=3D"Instagram icon"></a><o:p></o:p></td></tr></table><= p class=3DMsoNormal><o:p> </o:p>Aviso de Confidencialidade/ Confidentiality = Notice Esta mensagem, e os ficheiros eventualmente = anexos, =E9 confidencial e reservada apenas ao = conhecimento da(s) pessoa(s) nela indicada(s) como destinat=E1ria(s). Se = n=E3o =E9 o seu destinat=E1rio, ou se  lhe foi enviada por erro, = n=E3o fa=E7a qualquer uso do respetivo conte=FAdo e proceda =E0 sua = destrui=E7=E3o, notificando o remetente. This message, and the existing attached files, = is confidential and intended exclusively for the individual(s) named as = addressees. If you are not the intended recipient, or if it was sent to = you by error, you are kindly requested not to make any use of its = contents and to proceed to the destruction of the message, thereby = notifying the sender.<o:p></o:p><o:p> </o:p></div></body></html> ------=_NextPart_001_0120_01D4E643.7521BE50-- ------=_NextPart_000_011F_01D4E643.7521BE50 Content-Type: image/png; name="image001.png" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-ID: <image001.png(a)01D4E641.FCFB0900> iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAMAAAABlCAYAAAAbDexaAAAAAXNSR0IArs4c6QAAAAlwSFlzAAAO xAAADsQBlSsOGwAAABl0RVh0U29mdHdhcmUATWljcm9zb2Z0IE9mZmljZX/tNXEAAEhMSURBVHhe 7Z13kF3Vned//d7rHNTdklpq5YAkhGQQYIIxGQYYbIMNjuU83vGWZ7we19iuqanamdrarZqt+WOr PLvrqp2yPeNxLDxjjAk2YLCNTTDGBCOSAAWUY7danfN+P79zz+vbT+91QNGoL7Reuvecc+/5/vLv /E5uVIfNHDNP4Ax9Arkz9L5nbnvmCfgTmCGAGSCc0U9ghgDO6OmfufkZApjBwBn9BGYI4Iye/pmb nyGAGQyc0U9ghgDO6OmfufmTRACEGsoKnnax707WhJzKvk/WPc70M5UncPwJIAmrjdqoIF+mf3kd 0VgyKSLQSWX6cxyKMPwavuOVa44ml6nczLhzYiPpxpL3YYga06hGmO8/dXUhrU7WeTqUON1rJ2t7 5vcT+gSOOwGAhYi5EYEMPIyOZoQ1voUQRBJlGcvo44iTB6Qx7L9nRjg7qy9iC9NEU8C0U0+80rE5 kiBUfYwyBO9TY/J++CK5KBl7fOLexhTj5MVOm+boT+hEzzRe/AkcVwIgqyL+F3n+kDgsvD8DZ3dg 6j9HacAdGOSMYc7RuSP6KxsZsWF+45dpoCj27UTnBEeH/ikhPL6HSvg/UALEGQgASXX0MRX8c08l KSV1rzMgPP2ewHElgMBZBXRN+ohY7ejgQB5a4vFH3X2EHb/xftjVnxHLlVcE4LqalGLnkzw/1BkA PjIUT4zyKM3KAXyEP+oXFDhkZTlGXsRSmRIBBkmXvjrcLeNPCGxK7Rw7QGJql6t2M8ekT+C4EsCI OLdlMpbVs99994+t4/GHraqqUlpGzkazgCHR8zlNahCQB/rAMTM6YG09WWv94Ids0SWX67NkAucD oClOJhKgv3fAXnhqs/V3D1pWlzIWQIF0iWl/oc9Ry6rtgYF+m7OsydacuyqxV8Y/M0Y5+VEMbIG8 Hf9SwVzqHQMm08DmfTGA8/2vf/1r6+rqshUrVtjatWv93p0xlLim8N6met7kz+SP44zjSgDhlsus p22HHfr3f7Hq5561XGWV9G4AHhgkGEDVHxEBjJSJ54sYcmjkIoDeular/y9/FcjCAQOAgjE9tWPU BvuHbftrB6zzQJ9aDYpY1slMtoVTQDCyXeVRswM2aP3i/qvONRsaDOoRxwh9+9VTO+IoI85HAL3a ryjP6jVKv6nex/g+p5qwC9CfeOIJ27lzp82aNcvOPfdcu+WWW6y6unrSm4h9zBDApI8qdYImeSQj 8T+qSXZoMdlmnb973Or27db3GevYvicxOGHFQaNxz5C/EWAzw9bY3GTZpgZb+qmPW8PiZWKYiaEs 6pga5wyqDgAYHh6xg53dtn37Qdu7e7cMaxGXS5sx8Plk67yyioytOPssG9k7aM+81mX9kgYY5n5m PD3q8JM+F7UnoA87YYuQpIfVqLUL1iywbJbPIsB0u5O05/YUkksSNc3BkbITqTd1dXXW1KTnmc3a s88+a/39/fbRj37UPxcD92SS5a1OEMcoAdykdU49BLqlcwwe2GuHfnKX1XR3WUdbh2X6h2wom3Ou n4Kg82E3fKWv11TXWEfrYlt6y/usTOfKP+OADvr/VLhmUDfoAeIZEEg6Bwbt4OFufTWmQkUtn0kF SBlpZw09AzbSNWg7O4ZsYFB3kTdVwptwzcRHlCijI8NiCAy7zGZV6j4q+h107u/K5KbQ0lg/EXjt 7e323HPP2UsvvWQXX3yxXXTRRd7mZMCEcOD8L7zwgv3qV7+ya6+9tiThQFBbtmyxhx56yObOnev9 tLa2+vlvdVvi2AgAbAE9GbxMLyDveu63NvLM0zbS2WWjAlcmUy5QZywXubkDIoASwFTXV1mfbN7y a66z6uaF4yY2KCFTPSIRqPVsuRh8mXX3DbkqkxH3C0fSopsjAqUk176OLus9cNgqduy1PhGNE1Fy rscxJsd/YOxqE5ULoha529nLWq28trzAH+vNT3pEzg8ov/e971lHR4dVVlbanXfe6aBev379hERQ aAi/9tprdsUVV1hFhR50wQHA9+zZYz/4wQ+ss7PTCeF3v/ud3XrrrU4IMwQw4XTh6R/TlDMjA3bw vvtsdlnWDrWLAEZzNiwr1FVgrEECT9HUhFqk9zfMabAjLQus5cob5IkRdATMqPNP7+GnVRyAps/y oZZJAqBGBfmg17zXU5/4XcSRrai2bHmV1CXUBAEY+oRIGPYYXY0Hc15FiqAOLlskUE52SyaDzZF3 RyUkNTn+I2fHkL3rrrusp6fHGhoa/PqBgQH70Y9+ZI2NjbZo0aKiRFDItcvLy627u9uOHDlic+bM yc9m7Kevr8/7QdJgN8R+7r33XpcCS5cunVTaTErRp/EJxyQB4KcZXJ6uf2ds/+OP2fBLf7BMd68N 9MsLUyEC0M1nE7012IJ4gjJSmYasWvrqaLUe+uVXW/N5bxfXxlszVbOz2FMNEgO4Z9QZr8QYUEkc r3BpZ+/4nRK7gffDmN24prA5Aki5H6eVtBAq9V7nhWYDMxiRaQ1riHCPNsXYNxMjAnA+88wzduDA AXnRqgLx6Ds4ODo9gEWvR9eP6pDft+5zaAg1LlHK9IruPzg46MQT24nnogbS1rZt2xz8sS2IBgJ8 6qmnbOHChZYTY3qrHsd4ZwK/uz7FuQf6bOcPvm8t4jRtBw95ICqqMCEdAm4a+PCovD/D4vT1zXOs p6HJ5l3/rqDsDA/aaE4q01T0hMIZ8UlPEIozJ7pcE+D7SzBXgjRwqRBGiPEajPhgqAS1LvyV1FhS dOpEg16OqwsJJunmYErbL5F4JlGBosG7b98+GfTykqVcmJEItm7dag8++KDddtttBljjsWPHDufk 6e8gACTArl27bMGCBXmVhnl79NFHndAwnNPGNf2gctEeBDVDACXIH9jI7JN+b9b23DNW9dqL4v59 1qkHXl4p15sm3d3/4qaRNzP/gwJ6eZ1+byy3ng3nWOO5F8oZOWzlshViAHfaHKcIsCLgj24rUEJC ls61UyQQxhooorQVEkVK/s6C3uRyRwQQhpM0kgxgKrItcm9nLE6IYz7/qBKiEgHcmpoa19OREkiL //iP/3BOD3i994QAaePuu+/271auXOltvvLKK05EtFHMzcq1SI6pumCnPV+nyQXHJgHIscFNJ0Af fPg+q+/vts72I1aZlbEl3ccnPLBbeQFxfSb+HV03d3aTteUqbOHtH7KMuFhO35H+UD4lr8+be3pR BQOWnnaUHB49BuwTAb5ol4mqAT1h5PMfDXl+h+45GD8hGjEJ54/NR44/kaeHczCGH3/8cXvxxRet trbW2traHLAQQ1oF4lwkAr9BBNgBSJaDBw/694V2VvpzmoCmZ4+9ufk5FVcdGwFg1Er9adv4lI08 9piNSP3pkv5fBccfpy+DLIxC3JSaJHH/rAJkmXM22OwNlwXd3LX1KaKk6JMauzYkeEYXrbPRwOHx CLkKBgUkDDo5LzD09KCnMh2O/LyeRPDaeb43lo49TP++JnNBRiJAvYleImyEQokRP8ff9u/f76BP S4liLtW3KuALZ/WYCAAPT2Z4wNofutuq9+y2zn3y+7svvNxB5iqx4w7YEQ0myW3U6urrrb22xuZ/ 8KM2Wl4Z9G08J8dEAGM2gGv2+n9kyHMuXBcP9kfw0jiHRHpBBBrv6JCQq78RBcc4pgVXbImkbRwC eH5GRAluPyT0RHtTNAGmQnVhjImkhIundf5SHD1KBYBfCPjJwD7Z71Me9Gl44tQIIMGWB7Pyum+Z 11Tp3bXNBh7/jTUIUAPy++PEcQM473oMfhH87sMCRk4++lxVtZWvO8/qLrg44c4QS7Q4pwW/1CMd Y+uB2ysNQSoWVOi4FiHg+Ql6uNydikCTKFSRq7KqygqrrSpXvCC4Lac+gtAa98o1WdQevc+U5eR9 4XW6EuXEISStWk0F0G913T8+6SkRwBj3AshM+JBwJRDJw7Dvgfuscs8+6+voFccj8EWTAYDBOxL0 bTnknOtWN9VYZ02F1V9/s+Xq5XpTygBRy6ln3ZQAiSf6B847PDTohnlDTbX79ENqxViKgxMn3hq5 91oaZ1lLc52dtXC2UiF6Shu9RbrNZxWpfdeoiDnoXmL0d7C3Vzc+O3iVXCqNqUsnDuqlW54K8E/F uE5ln1MiAGYwpJXh9yftQfn7TPShnXbw3rtsoQysfTLCMIjDVIeJjoTjnwX0ETHk6pZGO6wkrdlX XhFchdOxEEs+KRoJLs2cPEktMgq7647YoLh61hfbJMDL6yKAVMSsc1vrc9Y622zZvIz19ylrdVwf aeWlGAXElIRoPoTgmmNdORGVmRp/JM40fAjuETiV8z3Td8ETmBIBMGUuzvX/APOrya0QSWy5526b 3XbAehWqH5AnqErJNWUAK+XvCzaAiEZrA+rmz7E+qT+111xr1bPnyx2K9UvrxwqK4HOH0HJC3Pzm euud1WndkjRZ0AcIUy7JAGskQNYWi/svbqm1lXOVujYa3Ifjj9JqTDC041oAboOOkjAyfbhqFFiH 2zckyR3zvZ4cDJ8p0mJKBOAQcNUnGHxZcc6hg3ut94EHbc7gqO1q77QqooVuzCYnOzgC0TgHlPFV I+N376xWW3/VTc4LIapji/xGMJCN6jFn4Qs1jIzJQUkr5fYwIPzyqEA+nCQlDjtFBjCSaVTBHo5M pNzI+EvSZdqkTewAbx8Zmby6WzQBfD66PZVIwMkB+Ewv4QlMiQDCqSEzkAtILXvj4Qesbs8O6z3c ZRkRQZZUZNJ+80cAiQdUFNRpmD3HeuWjrr/uRquatzjxjR8r509P4xi4SEPwFWlOZCH/J/SUGCZE an1sQU1z+yT5uehrGu/jTkj6999jD+l7SrtCZyB3Oj6BowkgIGKcTepTinEprgbHHjh80Lp/8XOb o0SqXYpAliv5LULf0wAAlpYZjsobQn6+Xqy2udb2tMyzc29/v6sjqEXHW8zSZjzy/n4Z6zEOnZgm wTXK95IAnsIQ1ZJ0EC6N48noNNq2qfNCWsVkF56OkDizxnQ0AZSaM5/PoNYcePQBy77wjHUr7wRf u1d5QOAn1RfcFE48LRBNzaxa6xWJNCjnJzd/sdyh8NwTAA7n6ERgE50/Uu5RcxoS5eIQSmv5xwKG 43N/6dRmIriTHekFNPHc6AKN6RXpNmJMIB14O96MabIxn8rfi6tABXM3ltamPJ4+pTs8+JDVKXf+ kHT/XGq1FYGg6O4LjhcRh3qomVVvBxvqbPk1NwQdnJAp6cIn7AiGdaDHEp6XhDiQVr6C6zQ+AGQE b7H0BVfAktwd0qdJh4iEwG/kB0E8pEwUC5TxHecUriM4jR/JcRvalGwAN2Klx5NZeFicf3Djc2YE vbTgBBy7qZe4+rB4A7ZQPLTgpUHelboGa373bdaw6mz3yfvhga/jwyWTBvMPJY1nV3DcqE10dMAE mar7mKvzprJPj9sUTNxQ5N6kJ7/rXe/y/PwQNxl/cB65/Zs2bfIcoZhGDbDJG2JBDGsImMPCg/bI DbpPazk4/4yWABGfzsvdZnT0eIBnqKvD9nz3e9bQ32VHDrfLxRhWVeV16+AD8eeLSjQgHbtZwa7e OXOt6bp36eFXKCqLXz5cc3yPZJwJN0wMEfdMuhBIjsjlhrX80dWgdJZaSmJEuza0OnZErSq/UswJ PtxM/jvGcJTh/ObvFkDCwcnkXLJkyYQNrVq1yurlbfvZz36WT5F4z3ve4wvkJwL27Nmz7f777z8q TeLNj/qP48qjJECYcDgki0TCQmo4fFZAOfLCszb0/ONa7thn/Z09Sl9W8pUmx6u8JYAOxt+IeRqO 8n3KJI6H122wxjXrA/d3AztxWZ7oZ5RwfidkDF8RH2VQCJbNm99irQvmaxlkj7tOHcAs3IEgwv/5 4yhaTX4PqiEGR8gEdeaBnZSmmuNE6HDpYjp8+hFGfR5u36so9BtvvGEXXHCBnXfeeSHomHISFGZ6 kvdP+2dKCkR8bkcRQEgJDi5PmOcQqcL6hqXqexX1bRkatb0KfCVOznz+fuCM8FSS3hRVVbrE3Nb5 drh5ls2+8UbLKi+HdiCksFqqhG7+pokizeYhsiTyin9effpKKXmkmhUkW75qudXO0mq0rCTUorl2 1rpl3itrlyH7rv4eOyJdum+o33qGtXaNFWPenqK7infUK92jrrrWGvSXc8CHcK+nfniKePCEHSfs B+JMgXeyR8QClptvvjl/WiScYhmmZ5K6U+y5FZEATCScmoSxwKxzqtTQ9sLvrfwZLXjv7bZR5f1k y7UKLMZ59Mpkj0gUZHXdgEBTU19hdTVV1rH+Aq33vd49RGPaRliAcjwBEkYQ0iHcv0+ORdLBiNQd iHnF2atsTouAnxNxrm605ecsttlzm51YdvV12gtbXrdth/fbru426+jvtV6tcR5yN2myhFKNo0NX ihvPrqi1uRUipoYWW79spS1rmuv3F/OAQobHseW3xgmbaG1AelJLgbmYzTAZEZ0pv0/gBUrWS0lf Hx0ZtD33/Nga2g9Yx742B3kIFAQuPibxgxdoSF/MFSD2S3osuvW9OgenZ+JpGYtKHednPCYB0um+ /VqbXFtTaWvWn2VVDZWWrRmx8955ri04a4HUtGHbcuSgPfLKc7ZRxbz29il/CDVJ624HBvusr3/A BpRYR1CNVOmsAJ2tKFcufbVtV8W7CjGGJw9ssbk7NtoqEcJlUvPWzl1i1SzrRJ1wA/z4kvlxfmhn fHNHq0BuySG/Jfbh2hL3nVp1VP7o45btGVLeT+D+YflKiLb6FLvqr0JX+quprZD+X2Fd6y+yVRdc 5tmjYX0spbPCwvPArQu9GQVqkX8c/10AVDH1KcnwRBfXKYh9DMfZKrq1Zv1qFeA6YvNWN9kFV53n xuGu7iN2zx8es99vf826a7PWO9Rj7Qf224H9B61PNY1YnxDVGJdcqDfYOtw1OT76K1eyXbNWWPXO bbG24W576tEttqJpgb3/givt7Mb5ITou4uFJzRDC6UlrxY1ggRgAUL4Q3bbjqV9bbdtB6+zoDKkF Cc/3heXuVkTvj7mOIoD6WmuvqrBFN71HHLdW51P2NvxOLtGwpEDRrBjA7bpDMC7zkkVjCOoTV0X7 ocCdl7htvA+MUtkqjfUN9rb166y/slulD1fYuovW2ohKFf5qy8t2l4z5PcMd1q+coX1b99me/btE MPIMYfvwVDyvPy3n3LObaFXEMkTsSvDbrYXje7TgvKmp2RZq0Xl/56h99eEf2g1r3243rTrf6ipr 3Ehm2L5ackYinFaUUNwIZhGJkETK8+Abr9qhe++zlr4e61HJQWAXfejBAwKxkHOfFIWqzlpVY611 nnOuzbniaqlDApJrP0gTANQvzljlEqTowSp6JxYS2oY0DqoeJPsHGO9LXIcxmhgA/VJXquurbV3r euuyTjv3ktW2+vwVMmgH7I4nf2G/3PqSslLL7A2Bft/OHTbcp4Xk1ZUCvtKhk6zXJHMuT255jQ/C dAINRJKr1Jh0723Kij2kv9nz5rmr8t9fedw27d5hn7n0RmtV5QtWwp3I0N9phao/osGUCIRhBEvE iyO2Payo747t1tl1RGkPQzICQ4k/J4T8UkBcbCwsH7VaVSw4Ul9nDTffaOXNLa5nUzs0I3basevn 1v3GHVaueoi+cKRAPY7Yo5wtRnPfcJUt2PB5K6tZq85QoyANX8eovwlieKLemvoaeaK67Nx3rrY1 56+0Dhm0/+/Re+25A2+IJPps+4ubJdEUy1BKdIXSpkPyXHBlBiYdl7sks5kaa34hjDODoCplKYUo qdOmKmtdbe226qxV9nJ2v/2vR39in77wWjtn3hJXKYNQLW0bpBe0F7oup4KrwmhubGMyQ7gwQDYd r9NUxnW6nlNUBRqG3en/4Y7DbvzOE/j2H+70KmojAnKG8g0AxEs+w6C9/JSnHFfX1llP6xJbeOHl TiisyHJuLsAOH3nZKrf+u9VlZFiSI+/+8wA2PzxGkKhJ8s33jzTY6PrbpDas8fQJCCmgszQvRS3D 1do30GVLz1loZ5273I7IoP36oz+zp2XodkpXf/GlF7R3wZAKTZHCzZJJXJdhCK54RSIoINCjCDb1 ezTBK2QfsfbhpZdfsiVLV1q/Yg3/8rsH7POX32rLGufm/fGT2QSFuTkAktKF+PcnOmKqRBrQgB83 MJUhSh2HDh1yu6lUEd3TFcDHOq6QxJ8AMNqc4BqOvf3++2zWoX02qMoD0lwU+MIjBMcLFmGZOG2I FwhwmqDa2Y3Wo+BXxeXXWt2C5W4b+IJ4dGABrLxcpJXrt76d8q4cEEmUj3lugk6hZjVZw3DwxSru qpVaqpkSUi3Qn+nWCSUZcxEHCxy2R96bloVz7MKrz+NG7Ae/+6U9fXiLHe7usJcF/jKtl8yWS73T vXhZKa9iEbhz/ki6cE6YGO2B3iWDUOVc+4sDYKUcfCBcxFJL1KKtm1+TY2DYKpSC8H9/c5f99TUf sIX1jWPXxUc/NgX+POkT0EZJwStV4KjfGRfAx/PieDH4SXlYt26dF8IlGhyvp2QKaQ7U/SzF2QE/ 8YNIOLRXKu/oWEF3Ol0vpTewOzceExR6YlWbqjzf/xObr6S3AwfbtdqLU6nqkDdNXY/3GCipzwoi Ncqnvn/RElv53tuTZhNWmgAFFWNY6MkOZKy8P1RQczyj2iQEQPLyyKC4vc5h3XFmhNKAkJhAlQd8 EeQ7NjVurUwrqxq09ZeeJ7Wk3H668ff2+LaX7XCF8mRefVmTLOkR65V6WnRQYaIICB7/SJiUJqfv sFlH8Fp5EXivhp1XkgI1hChyIGMPBlZKLdq6dYsIXTGT5rn2o2d/Y//58vcofdwfth9hvdjRByUJ 02VOGCf5PelocFqKAF7KJv7iF7/wnKD3ve99DmAkxg9/+EPPEaKmaCnJk5YYnENby5Yte0tXheOp C1UxW17Tyzw7OLTK66FfWPUbm6y7Q77xXun+gIWpxduTzBiVFdjYrldcrk5ekF5Kcl91udUo5XkE 6ZBERCMu8Ab5mikBgHL57N4S4DL2j4MP6QJXdvUJD1L6cEOg6OFErLEsW7PYWhbPtU1tu+1Hrz5p XSpCt2njpqCDSydzV2ZyDxC04xF3ZeACrga5g1ffDUp1COodwwqL3oecKFgERBWISLyhCG+8oeAp E1etzNiWN7YoBlFnT+/bZve//JTduu7iUAQ4CZQVRo0B4Nvf/nav0kwdn5jYNtneAIAYSUEpdVQe imBRRpESh3w/2RElRqwuRyl2CGsim2WyNk/333Ohbj/VFEJgC3CMdrZb+yMPWFNvlx3WgpdKqSFD /nPw3cRsS88DQpsXkmcp539fbaOtuukW9yB5VJglj75AJomIJt4gfygp7WfsfdRxgh4eY2fxIZbA ff4ZA5CGhlpbt36NiHHQ7nzuEevNDduO17fakMq1Z+ShgnOzsN9rFgXoO/VFJ+4IyXr6Kqt9yipV vKu2rsaqqKAG15fd0NtP6cdO1UKVTg0xy62ai0STJEW5hqhW/ZFJMo5oxdzrL22yyg0b7KevPGUb Fq6wJY3S77xosFP5UWIA7v/hD3/Y/u3f/s0OHz48rTgCgKV0YuT2SAKkwmRHNJghuNtvv91rib7V j8QIDiJ8UHPBFweU8lAjX7kp4U15DUIDSW+JyE+4nMd85aLs17rb2qZquRUrrFr5/pWLzvKMz6BP B8d55HBBf0+YpOfQBK9LVAEcjr5OOM9IHZxTPojUigtmpOb8YtPvbOPhXdbe02X7tWkHQSsmOAd1 QltqNq960AW1sTTurGoEzZs731rnzQ91hdRmzmv8iHgo3gtxq4jWAWXD7tq7y7o7j0hSqQHtNoO7 N63WI2XcvhYRDCiFZNeeXVa3aKX96vXn7RPyDHFrpRYHQczz58+3L3zhC77BBZx8MsM5/Zymy7Wj bcAGGVdffbVvlFHoUZryPPwRnegEEPVvQDEo12D7fXdbzZFOufN6NP8V7st3tu8THLhngKWK3Oq3 hllNtntOi637wEe1K0qlTlNFYYzloPCMA7FPDEBHpwYcKUngb/VlFBRpggmWcGl6CL0wsIx1Sn99 YttmFSk3275lcyiVjorjDePJgsi4n9A5qtGQANcyv1WeG6UyaA1nQ1mNrZ6/0JbUtViDFvSj/nQp jrD/yCHbtG+n2eyszZ3XYnt2bretOzZbmfYXyyoFIuhQQbK4fSTqH8YBII6+X1s2LZrbak/ued0u bVtra2a3OuWFoN94SyCCHW78p3/6pycdUtMloJM+wOPUoTZuIZAVFIAKTcPhlzZa72OPWmVHn/L/ qbBA8gJsL0nzDVMcIsDKEcrVVtmguF/9Ze+0ShlN/OiRAtSjGNlNmLhL+nzAijsIsQDcoQ5EB3FI r46Sg++jZAhSKKot8ZfwJJw2ElHzysE9tr2vzdqPtFuvapXmKtgmj+S4ELn2jE0Riq9xBqDyeCxe tNSWrVhpWS3yuW7xOrti5Xpb0DhH6t94TzGJ3Ac62uzp3ZvtnhefsHJ5eEj62/Tq67J7VF0ieV5j jIL7Sfb1kgq1840dll2as2e2bbLVIoBgVxw9m9Ph9scJC+OaOdX9n4h7KtZmmF33cISJ2nf/PdYq f/Gh9oO+iUWZFNwc2ElSHQjUesgIPVoqQ83cOutsbrbWa29CcU6iscmKXwdyKRUmMTVd+wpxhGQo YS1LarT+3puJbaWJIH1b4uSKAr+w/VVrV0pzvzxYqDSDIlSh3FUR59GudifLDBXDWCTP1bJly62h N2Mfu/hGu2jhagXrxlDJOgF/ProWbWdeQ7PdrOju2tZl9o3f3K+An57FuoxtfPEVbQYi9c/3OcOQ 1jLDwC5k9OuZ6Pke6GyzeZlWe+WQaqkqul6v3WkmOs4UIJ4swBf2k3OftrtCM9b3nKo8P/WIxLmy IXtVV0eFa3270ES59e1NvQUZdgJUpThfhfzagxdeak3nX+xcNuYEBewfDf4xHRkVKFbOCd4U5/pu WyBBgpoU9TPIZXxrhW2H/KXBPtkkkkGLyxusurXa5qkSRfuhA3ZYvvBuRbPZCRKjvAJ3KLEL5Qst 0J66tf1Z+0/XvdsuaFrs33sSG6Xfne6SvqNqQ2lIPbgVs+baF6+/1f7hzq/Yod5XrKHikHUcULqI pADepVAf1bmH9+mkoLbbd2yxjbWzbOeGlXZOyyWnau5n+tUTyMUNLMqU9rv12z+wBqU7D1VJv10y zxfBOOALK5ppJgFqrnLUjuTqrPm6W6Q/VQssSX3whEiKPeFIADHJ07mqnxiS7NxJmRglwd5OZEEU Ccl3IQ+Va1MmtEBbLc/NbZdeZZd3bbAXdm+355X68LpV2aG62dar2qVdMloPKevziKLcGL0rpPbk ekfslrMvtfMFfrdNGElS4jBoc2PExjv69Ixw3W9LdYN99OIb7L/94IfWXNmjdQSDikKHO0/ihf4+ uHfFQPSI2m2H9c8etue3XR4IIInFHG9EFqZSTJYOcbz79/vGpks2+0gv1C/sCzU0BgDTQcCpjCkd 3Esv/pnK/XokGNi17XrDdu7eYnMWL7VstdKZxcVwFyIBPEcneEkTLhyuIW9+eNl5tvLSy7wCc4gJ u6PRQcy8Rgg7iBKsBls2cFVPFo6ZpOjDibE9duPRgAgR6GhehneFh+wVEQHBtIV1TbZwTbNdedY6 e33/btt4YKc9u/N121d12FpmzbGOLmUEaUOPOqVurKudb9eevSFvXTgeHcHFHn8cfbDKeeAXrXqf vefCX9uPn//fNruhyl5/RWUiVWVxbA0EqhP2Tki76Okos6aWYdv42pN2+wWyUbIkBx7/gyDYP//z P/sWSKwLxqt0sg/iEQTn2G+MRf3nn39+0SGww/3GjRt9+eZVV1017WGCL/ZJYFdNdtChr6nEPqTh 69HLNdiwcIld/c3vqOMQ7QyEMV4XT48q/kZ9zRFFPDkzaP5hq4vxR5heiIqBunuQOIGz10TFgiAS Thj22iW+AKcNqgM1P0MrEA5XJto1XqWEQye9+PCHnGpHPIL9ttaldvb8JXbz2gttc9se+7XWNr9c ttO6tGC/TNz/Qm2WzSKWIFQ0+oT7u+ArZqByonME1tBiFpfb5etvsftf+JYIasCyuFoVyeYexwRY GC8SoPeIotVqe8eBV0UQ/bI3ZAcUUEDaC/NmPDKR+xNIK8wDKuXeLNVPsfOnMr54HTlMjCPmMRXr h3QN1jAvXiwVdIIjze3z856S0LSBC5d75ig1dp9pXZdzPdztgKxC5+xtHiA2NiOJcZoQREiCydNI MKBVMTcsog8Acqd6/n1yPa6OISlVo0pt0NiybAAncGJgI2mCf0f/YkTSxogqOw+JMyp+U1aB/5Vs 06RtMjdZv+ubziS7OboEGuPcTiI0o3+gBdy1jdoK9cJ5y2393MW2s/uw/XbzS7ZVbsw1Io443DwO 04+gcELcdRXUmjKvCzNiZy0+3xqqWq29b4tKwSiVoCfsncagghmcdKFxDEpcDg6KY/WoqPCI6vhY Y76HOGEEruIGdXHbI5LZSFEgOst31ADifOr98J4N8gigRR8+uUFf/vKXPSWCayitwsG+YBE89EOb bJzBtXwPYPlDhSCaHNMkiBBzLu1xPvuS0X8EHAl1jJHfqTIRc4tuuukmu+aaazxXKd4f9xZ3q2E7 Vu6HftKgpi3uiVfGAkePzyKex+/skgPX5zf6TqtanMc9QmAcpIPEfdE8LsQc8U/Htv3W/uiLmgzU ELIug/4fAZF45yGb/GQF1UXelWQP4DDRYzkycdJBC8lnvfs2W/kWEco+KUqdAq7XEgUhkbfrk6hR WcU2cEhLExt6rLfzaRus7g8baOghKLArY7bLmt6xxpq0yMWT8xKhlU4pSCsqPmA3Zshlwt2bsZX1 c2zlhiutfwNEF6ohTNnjkpcKcA52vJRRXVZn8+cst12dr0kKKEDY0x8IduwhhGeJoS4GMKiBsF1U 7+gRa8iMRVxjkttvfvMbe/755+3CCy908HCgIjzyyCN2zjnn2PXXX28//vGPnavymcgv3A+QXHLJ JXbllVe6e/eOO+5wFYjPXAsYblSRAvJ8UN8ohcJG2jfccIOrH7//vXKnVFdo+/btDqi3ve1trpKg PnHeAw884N9BGPfcI4+hwPv+97/f22FXevYjZstVNvOmH5LynnjiCd/t/k/+5E9sg6LhgJHz2d8M gnrnO9/pIAa4UW9nV8tf/vKX9uqrr/r5tElZGMYSN/pDrWKny507dzoREsCDiNIbDMY6SS+//LLP 7+rVq/3Zcf9OAInf0noPKefn2a1WoZInHKOoK4HNuS47fnl3UIACI9QJ5NiglrjxGn31UUnxxjw6 Wyb1o2e/xH/nsLw1qEGhnQC8yLEhAoH0sNqq6reabgWZRDxem8IJRbbHcL/1L1Wk8rwVwYBMRFKh n4j78CGF2wgjQwVzJOLG1XagnnP05paqeHqEEyZMQBKmrtkH7xmbWn+QN4ISluGCE0JEoLFwOnl2 yc/jXtgmFcAx2fGAK2/evNnBB1CYeLgurxTMWrNmjb3++uv285//3BflkFDHxDfLTQ0YIRYARYEs AMBnwAlo4KAAn32DeX/dddd5sSwIkddPfepTLmUgDMAKIXmBAEmChx56yImLLFSAD9gBLzvQf/7z n3dOD9gBOtf95Cc/sWeffdbHuHbtWr9P7hcJxH3RPpmv7GQJWCNhAnikzle+8hW/nk3DATEEz3XU Qoo7WzLP5ECRSsL7yy67zAnjt7/9re1WQPKTn/ykPzPPBWL6/SFUamOJV7ZZJ6JNGYzOshKDMK7q CpORSAFUDE97CB6cceqDY0zfJG1QQnGoe7sNwhkFfqXSJNeNSRnACpBQnVWkQWOQX7/rNUVStX5A SxcJNGWltzetW+2rt3C2KAYXVKfCjLKIGg08GOWhbYjVjWkq1/FlMr5CHbwYKIt9x7Nj8Q7g7tXk Ij2DXRACh2mdNf/oGEu+YldKRKQ6gIhQGdJ79PIe8R1TogEf84aUwMhFRfn617/uRIK6w8RzTswi JcEOsAEAwAAxcA21gwDj97//fQchHP2ss85ywEN0pFFDZPTNH7lJSCU4Lhz829/+tveBNKAwF4QH 4UJg3D/j5Xfapj0kRUtLi2/2zTVweIxXuD73g+Q6++yzvS0Il+sANgTBeFGfIOwoPW699VZ/TrSJ VOI9fZJCwrlIHsbKWJBIbCcLQXLPuWySFOPR4GRJVrXSkWFUGKJRRfF9vxK8MNvOWKO/PnFzRWKJ U+qGGJOt1E/fqki6TUZ2AEEpN4ATvd3hA/j1XW5EqcPo+BoXqdPo11kFsrIsj1Qt/zLV6nHsYEcA mBihzlPfeJhCGO6NSVS34EnCnghRaNpwoHIPNJx3+ZZo0Al7TDn0TTDwiWb7BQytK9Y99iiCHu4p 3Jc/j8hMkIbsHVCuP/Yoy8pd5KJh/LijEVto9KUzQuN7DMcIdqQDwAYwaZUOIKxQvANgAOa9e/c6 oAAL0gAuHa9BPQGEXgpTYEfPJheJ5DjOgXOiUqFaxTUIEBVcGwmCmoGaRDW6dJo146VfgEsbSCYO Xhkb0gWAI4GQFnBwxkLb0d6AGPD28EfbZKzyHQeSABWNfmiHscMAUCXJkOVAAvE7qhFEkYrzB3en ZkXACDYAYc/gyw4qSlqfDdwsmblxExhZaiI6nPW6FmQjpE0miUTsMpOR6hCNX2fO+jQkTo8NUKHz cmXaTtW5dKgjxLhGScwTQXkCGoe7Z4u4ahI8hThG4tv3Vtg7QMa4347yng6/pPezlc+0Rl8wHoxw J4uk8fHA9E9O1eGmaR/pdqBzl1bN7RRwtPl3lwxVGfieZRuZhquJ0A4bjAB85fdnq5V3NKtIB+Er AJwGcbHKcKV868XsGQALZwcQEAkqCgY0agiAgtgAFZyUvvhDXUIFgVvGjFJABfA5OB/7ASKkTYCK LQKX51qS+Yp5a4qNz70yIkjG8q1vfcslGcRJ30gKVKuJqtdFO452IGBeeT7YD9wn30EsECjGMGPP ET11HunziT5M8hZrdgnd+zSIW8KvAzGUPPy3SAlwUnQcvgNUgJ121DbAY1E5/kAmOOV3imeHCtJB a88IlKF6MxeSx+NFRsapXC6d9N0YGYwNVIqXc/dhJzateILr66934Pfiat9WNYh7rbXlVj2k/6l+ 2CIJ9xlEwEq0WLilgD07+KHqoErx9slXHrCOUQXYBrJ2RCpedYXagJJTfIPnR5SEHSmzWh03v0aF bk2eNxnSrIP2J5gET6IEQB+OBypC5HYTzMS44FMEGu1x7Tve8Q5XH5588klXR+DqgCF6TwDY5Zdf nq9BClfG+IYo4MSRMOM4UbWwOSCKW265xVUOgHvvvfe6SoNRHNU4xoKxSl/btm1zFYnrkAgQY5Ri 9IOUQgX6zGc+45IGgmJ9BPeAhECV4YCYIRCAzn3B+XkPgXIubeMkQKJw8PnBBx/0+3HvWHyQaYeF 8/tEPQkkgByfQCXIz0aU8yFhIqgKAcjgHJUpsZMTjaSAosALa469wD/pxcHnH/1KgZuGscTxOtWD svzwQn+BW/JlWEeck+9Hloc2wttkW/Z+2/Yd+LFcMbuVEtFn7Z13ShLcLCBc49IlABLj3G8iaScl ZVjjILuEMWbFHPZ2braf/P47KrEi47531BbNlztOHD5IH1pIgoK0p6KptU2yX+QKWrniQk2C9u1N kW70AuHNgUMxqRh7AAsQeInHhEhQR/ic3jcgiv/IKTknGoYMB/0c8KDWcB1GazSCUVswelFlLr30 UgcLBi4gJYBFv1EHT/vX4fioGNgMXIeag/qBvUBfsTw7rxAbUgj16zvf+Y7bH6gj/HHv3E90hzJG CIG+AG0kGD5j8KPHY8QDePoh4MZ9I6m4N0CPU4BrYSQAnvMhsE9/+tN+nTygCXIQ0Q4m3IJaBUQA yn9iBqM6kyA9rfKUep8HDi0mvvqEjrzdYuFWvofwIBaHTeD0cRxhfy/ATkPj1eYxeIbxOufDTYtr TSf3Dbykolc/tB0777LB0U16QGV2cP+AlSsA1jxvl23Z9X/s3PpFCkqtTdagJQVvI6dP1VwnOo5X Kqu06RHrsQce/5+2b++T1qjEO/KmKudFV08cO/cb7oia1PVNSjMcrbBz11ySSNoxG4UJZGLQZ+GS gAnXJBN88cUXO+eORjAAA9xpQxmwci7f8QzgnpwX3Yt8Zt3wH/7wB/8e9cZnWefedtttDiDAzBpi vsOfjxGJpGAsUe+PkgXVAiOUA1csAGMMcGmu4z1j4TquwRh+97vf7SDFu4QrFw4O8UFIgBv7AMIE vN/85je9DYgmFvAFzBj0qFtPP/2098l13AsGO2PiPlDtSCXHuwVxcHDPLPbBceDroJ1NeSAscGxP FR5jp47IgEuEd/JTZNwJww9PMGGWzqYDpw/elwDieErekHCcxosi+w52CGnKRHLL3PWUtJUk1gTj EhUp4c2049IqjNuhqYfhdTl1X8ODWhK47y7be+gO6+n9g4A/YEcO5uxgm7inrshJVaufVWXdo79U SvM/2JpVf6cJWx24LEZ8VEmS9kMP3JHWCJQdtG1vfE3Fcu+3j1/bbG9s7rXhJiViKL4hB2ui3oX7 ZPnoiKRLuVTLxUsGrbJqmZ3Xeu6YgEl4S5QAGIZwKYzPaMACBCY+LpH8yEc+4r+h43IwVlyREA+c FhXgL/7iL5xg4jmxcC5qDu8BatrQBhxUl8YohhMDRgDFOQDqL//yLx2QtBmvW758uX3uc59zbg04 6RebgOs4cGXGMUWAcz7qFePneu4b3R+Acj0eoqgmQYRIrhhoY8wQNISEZOJ77hdCgij4LZ7D80DK MDaOearbFAOFLgGikYZR6MseE3XC1aBk8vkWXSm/eCXSSKLdjIE/mUUX+UGCRDc92cUKOzvFscCG S+NO6jGxzbEtyYNBgrqUFZcmVkYqcXCeh8XpvvVpkAXhe9dVEme/3rJLpI3utd1777Wde76lDNAX FXjqUlao9PN2RWkHWLwiLd/Hl9FE9NvKZXLvddxhz76wy9as+FtrqH+HmlVVN4dx4iFC6uia7GiP 8qBes1e2ftUOHv6htTZW6gH322yidMQ7pApBlbFYrjMAqURs4F1bU2YLG4dtbvOF1lS1IE9W8cml jUOADujSR1ymCJCYyPwTT6QeqlPMgeGcwmWNcD1AFsHpM554yGJbgIS/wrbRq6PxWxg4hCjSMQuu jedAfGki5TfGgKszffBdPCBObID0ASGkD9qHMPiL/cVnkiZqiIO/wvvhc9gZWvPjajfAFGvtg3fn jWBOS7L1E0bty1hLvI+6ScBokB6+4JycIQxhfUOqDFzbCYS+U3cFhw+pEWzGPaq1vRjOoejWkC7M 6bsh5U/kBHJ3AOX/sAvCwpOBoW57/sW/kS9cer68Sp2HzdoOAnykitx7rvgFMUY6ButYtm7rEWdW OD7zW9UN+py2dbrYFrVeZ7WVa8XRW3SmdPXRdrWxxfbs/bnWS/xKHH27bjFrW9/oVl+yG9zzI9sA AtT/GPyhJ8RaqKrRUF8pYtRumQ3X68dmnZa4hMdJ3fBACl2g6c/8HtWl9PeF5xS2Ucz7Ugiq+DlK o7QhPQ6B6XlLMcvC6wuvSRNP4Xh9TgoIMp5feC/xGcVxpj8Xa6PY2EnOcQrg3yGMlIXzrX4R1A+8 XA4E5pu8DZ0kTLfI+0gATh9uUyTblUpkDijg0b/3D6ozNGxDffqepYlRPUqMWe9HEiBXK1khrjJn 6VnaY1icQEAmk3JU0uDIQJ/NwrPjowwVGug3xjHKlV1ZU1VjA939tlfA37NPaxfkPs3kgm88jj9I v7ApBukJmzf3WHNLubXM3S7vxVbbeOgeLQhqlqGskupa/zw00inwtokgOq2cJZId5bZ7j3J2ULlY XyACDPn/Po2uV4YQmYhfxm9dTVacqExV6y5TH1e5quaL4kscpVyFpQBaDDyFTU9GAIW/pz9PdG2a SIq9n849Ft5HbK/U2NIG+XT7yUuAjPJ3exZLl1zQKH+9QOXuRoCfcEoPKOUfvQMuHFGPj++D3h4m PuF/upaU34F9z2h5ojhlmwAj7x6V5vJeoYRg8CqqBpdlZsvmUCnzwbcttb7KZdJ+lA+EJiHUD2ih uzVSL8gHqF6C+hNoB9Wr0pYv/pg92/6o6v9vsSMqWNvfr0UsYA18JvaDb2TBNq5c6z9mtFZgyI60 yXdcn9NiGRFOhQI3vhgezxIV1gT87pzqpA5Zf69kpVQbX+YJ2BOx5gzMH08gAj4Q3JvTogVGeg4L 5n5MEmyZ2gvFeMdF0UvNoL7Hy4LLkbEQ2kdNmQzQEzR3Qn5C1yYtAvUF3Tsa7Ceks4jAAokxnb6c AJi4puXzrfYTNwS9X/+HKsYBxoVHXqyPQbxon2MmAhBVgGjrRss8W2eZXVqVtZ9I45iXJMohZEKf dP3qpSrl0SJ/77UX2HDthb5HAZONwGrSeMtVzNYX3kfJ5NYzPnnfJtuqa66wha2fsZ17/84Wzquw rdtVUtADZgTRAD2ATuJobrQHGLLjC6rW/kPqr31A3F+MAI+Y62oiSIGWlAwIJqccJZaF+gPzQkMJ k/CHlqRb6BWP0/wW6c8q2FVTdYVyed4dslQ5zZ0QY6xlosnDjfjwww/7KbgBo55eyAHTKkOaQArV jULVJq1KOPm6tEw8aqmBFaow6T4gAIJYpGbglUkTQGFbxcZZauzTAfV0ztV8J/XutfFDtSqpRc6d CHNXhPJCOrEXAnMf4/zOef28yPnDENKfUVX62nVhnWrvV4h7Vo04uHxdACoWbXoMQIYJm1FUClhS g7KKd+Tq4fZ4Heg2SKYoj8ZJpUSlYpNuMjQXLPiwHTx0v9r5rc2ZW66EK5X7UziADT78FsgTIl6X qCzYQCSBUOeoIpF8jm+pL14/SePz6CGqjquOoWp1yIoNlsyY5NO9KUbAQqG6uowqTpDMt9rOWf23 uk10fxES4a8S2E8DIer6GIYYgvyWBhZzGGMBMTLMOcXAG8EaI72MOdYDTRNSvD6CqZg9ElMx0oQD 1ycDFU9OHGO63XSENj1uZ27JOuxidsF0QD2dc10CRDXUH5iL7eDxSWuneUkQ36REQ5ou0p2njVva 9HwbcVcvTAVY8mVJ4MCJNawXQEMuEH7KsGA+SCl/l3D9CNp0f0FdC9JmZJS8+fnilH8vz84XbP68 F2UcZ61d7s9Q5DesQyaNwXOeuJYAF/8laQvhQYS7CM+CcxAE0YROpGWifzGm5Jb0jYx45fzX1mp1 mpwU/f0Ntnb1l7RS7CJXu2g3U6asUbcbjlaCAAQZkvj9cRfiR8d1CVjTRW5xO5IZSVAouhTJj0nX 9fGRJ5wc/zuRXYJqBKvw6qCu4F6lT9QX4gikLeM5IRhGzIAxEFgiJYH3ZGaSq8O5gJ5oK54g2mTM uDb5jnRlosVIA84nneGaa65xlyXxBtrmGsZLO/j703GN6YD5zZzLsl8/8hw1rU+l1Pu0WjvWEaj2 i1NHIUtLzknOQNqHvvDIhNdgyIZRAMRQOsUVkjz0gvrD72OBscIbDjAK/2XK2JRP3LdW627X/o0q NvyVLWntkHSptgPtSuVllxt2wcFIh9jdV89wkicRhhKgmb5HgETh2kR/yadD+bljfqlhFc+qUbrM 8uXstFNvSxd90ebN+aB6E89RqokUqER/D/IsHhGoREHJsiQ4hKoDcL/xjW84IaQL2H73u9/1YFBM dCPVGFB99rOfzUuLyPUhHDIhUaPIh8FXT7oCkV/6+dCHPuRBJfzxgB8i4P2ddypSrvHgyyeblGWW EBtuT4iBFAWCaPj7SWkgq5T8IPqAGFCLuA7AQyS0S3yDIBguW1y1EDEBq/e+970eQDtZRyiMFXtL gT+v1yU/HoXz/DWTDzW6TN3eSE536CeNRv3bq64nNkiAcQiM+WlR2Yc4SnRZ5voM+jqBMrIu4cgj Wqf7Hlu3elDJWv/d5i/ZZWUqkXhQxq57qVylQteFtbuOpT8Z576fcWLDxrF6v7SdqDuoP1HtS8IQ +D5Jj26aVW6tC+VdUon3xfM/Y4sWf1bgx5vUK2IjVhCWkY6Xs+HGIILHHnvMQ/bo+gATTsu6WVJ8 US/gknBXUiUI9rArJCoE1wEsgEwUNKoVzCfSgkAR6QpxUQwA/trXvubSBvWEBSdkdMKt4doAmuvI /iTT9Ktf/apLDQJmxCi4juK7EBWRanz5+PyjTx+CJebAvXzwgx90sBO4IjLLewJeLLYh6su4uUfi A5MtjZwcdVM7Y4JdJsY3kPecOBidUfpx1PtIUWCJyXSOn1BZwi6jtuOrvBxAQXceexfIZJwuGBsK xkbRI6RwiKM7kRATCPQ0MqIdHWd/yDJnl9nzm/6HOOpW7WMmF+YOuVb7JS10TZkXPIoSLVZ1i27M dHdBy/eRo6q5ysR9hoRB9kObPy8nkZ6Ta7XWViz+sibz02p6jk4S51cKhG8zFb1r+fsONxX1YgDD /ZMiQOIWB8CFS/I9UoB8GoJlqCmkIfBKghsAheMS0Y0BKK4nOvrnf/7nnpsDZ6ctCCjaAJyDOsRn Mjs5h1eIjfQJVBXAi0SCqwN+TyfQ7xAJUgSwu12ZqgTBuCAsVB8OPFlIFO4HycVB6gN5R9w3Yzrt CMC1k4iDKb7P00LC9kOCXYA5ejQqUCCScELccyxkDgksjuDQaUiLIGejFP/Xz1S2TpbmR8OGYl9E DIaVAt3c9BG7dMPb7OXX/qs2yHjQVp9VZtrVyA4cyVq/1kBk5UUqEzFQC8+7coDTeRgDkiUsZAlW u98HVbCpQ6EwQJ0M9nnz2Q1HabejF9ias//ammffpHvV2mYS7JLq0qkmkyca5WL4GBPcAGJhdDRm T0ZCAXxwdfJqImEA1nSqQhg7e5oN2k9/+lNXS5AiADnmDUVmg+oDKFGNaDNmgpLaHNMjICAILC48 h7AAMN+n1/3Gfmmb6zkgDJLaYrpCPIf74V5jMl/yYE74y5QlwDGNJK9EyysioLgzknCwbECKw6IS ONSQGvobFrcfkTgPceRELiTaybTHEXV1qRwY1FVV62zDOV9VPc9vKT/oLpUnec0alJrQflgBNgXo BhQtHhYhREGDl8Y1o8Q2II17mPiBUp2pVFGrihh1NaNW16gUaO02aeL0jbPebSuXf9KqKs6XdJAH i91tHPWliHdMpAEWQA2QABhcNh5wdwzKuG8AxADo4KQYyBE8MSEspgyHrss8UYxsT3LsWfWFIQon /sd//Mf8qjFykCAgCAC1hv44n+9jliX9fvzjH8+nXCAZSJTD8EUKFHO9pr1UcVF+zM/hfO6Dvrj3 qZQzmTYOSlxwcggg6vpwSgF/QFy5V+AvTxbHpHVqOCu5Qjg+fXvVjLiFv08M0gkEQLF7jKXZsQ9C xTlx7swK5f78vc2f+z7bu09L8fbdYY2zdysrVEvvFIVTVUWlTQ+rFPqIJIOkChSA2qGBUCm6UgZ0 raK6FdUKlFWS36nzhputqfEmWzDvA1I7ZMQpj2jIq8upooGTsdy4Uxw73BHQwX3xmqB7k5TG6qi0 AUwiGL/jkYELo+6QOQrI0f8BePqA88YKERAHoETn5ojZo7ynb37HDkDFom9AigsW1QQDFluEtQVI HwgF1ehLX/rSuBVgpSK0EAqSBqMYWwCdH0OepZGoUBjJJ+s4OQSQ6BDDXn1B+fCShtULKbwVdOig UjhKfPmke2YUMe6VWqLCi/4swiqt6R8uP2JVL6SJ6+sD4uoVsgMusBXLVksVuN0Odz6ilObHlNP/ itVUHhB4Q559qHYnkAcB5YEyljKO6npt5CROvcJmN15izY3vEmg2iEiafJAjJPL5WulYJynaOKVT HyKn5hWXIyoHHhaMQ7g+oIy1/lFnAAoGMAYva2r5DV0c7wyu0MJAFsDD3Qiw/+mf/slBHxePIAmi SkNyGRyfbExesUNoC2LAIGehOYvL8dwgdRgLmZlwbnR4uHl01fIM43oA7guiQMXifAiaPxbQI10w mD/wgQ/ks09PRpT7pBBADA5ZxWLrbrxcWafdgSRcrYkrvBIbFOCpuCxMt3+oTqrQLC9o6w9jihw0 TSZBh+ffMVdrTv73oHUT9qqVq/Qy/V2qiDEgeFV5QBuV5fmaUh52KSp8WESjMvEelCjX+oFZVlW9 TGrO2fL0rBcoVmlsBKdQf7hToswikiQxL6RpMHYyRDEspkbEgBNPC65EVljB3SGKuG4WfzzgxW2I /xzXJ0AD/JGDFgaUAOgXv/hF9xTBbZEQXEubrNyKmZ4AkRx/zoHoMMJjW3HPAlZicR2Sh/5iVBpd n5RppBYEiTuUtI1o1EZQ8x2cHyJCenA/jCWdpTq1J3VsZ50UAgDppBDMWn6jNS292jM72XAiGrgx 4QJsxAIsHpIStxjWnsKxOrNbBBMZwUWfhZvZ4ZfEbTlGDBis4bewNqFZXPFSifpL9IcVgPThlZUD vHr9DP1BkrzicvWGQx++QD/YLWSdhiMaLxNz/mJDR90BXGmVALdo4YGKwl88SqkefA/I8denD4JP HDE6DGGl2ywkJCQBMQH+0n1y7xAZi038ztVfbLvY/SFdKL+SPkqNvdj1x+O7k0IAcMFQNrFeHF0L MOCTAc0RIlEDCotbEmYPJnGVBndmoiNN865DD5HtHs1+xwKA6Dgh9588HUY8Ks9R0H0CiKMHy9cl QEzi6iGbMwH+uOYLVbbpSbCp5On4neFSDVQ47ijGKNJtpq+L79PFZGObvBYrMhtTJbg2/kXQF44l BvdKTV1hmsU0p/iYTj8pBAD3TAe1WLDClIVpCyrQGFBjYpAmFzepoz/5ddrcfzrPJqgnvsgd37z3 FaLEY7gO6RiuUOXr+kyfs09nVBGcE+XHlJKKpYAXz09fV4pgJiKkqRJZMWKOxJImnuk8l+N17kki gFBw1lMOHFgxhz+BVoqB4bWJGkUSHgjc94SCf+xx+oREcoQgfBCRm0dCfHMG+ZudtFJcvpDjFj6j QiN4Kv2nCa2QgEpJhbTakg6Axevja3p8hb9NZWwn4pyTQgABu5GrRrSnOKer0IHVhnQ0R158dyLu u3SbUZ1ICPXkdj7WWxpsRGTRu6ORylkYxlHH5hUvCn9pkOE54ho8MbguOaJOPpl0iBmorEEgfoAh HCPStEObRGwxdtNl11GXYlEq7IG0e5XKD9g1eIE4L/Zxqp4x/Z4UAggs/Wj9e9yNp36e5MwT+7xO aefjbw2AEI0lekvuDmAGXFRsiFFZYgAEtYgH4FGJfn6CZgANNymuRtoBdLhMOT8urC/1MDkXNyj1 ffAK4SbFS0NKA8E5xgQR4e7ETYqHyp0WIgyuY1zUCcKLhDfp7rvvzld5xudP7hLtnurjJBHAVG6z mKF6KtB4Kvo8+vngz6fYK+7NdI1QgmOA/2Mf+5iDjRgBKcwkq+EyRQJAOGSFwu1JkyaqSzFYiIds UABI5Hgi45TfqEdEu6Q5EKUlG5UEOfz2cRMKxkIyHLEDAE0iHflDjCWmNUOcECb7HiOliCOQu/Rm NsKYCpKmc85pRADTGfZb/1zAQ6SX4BXRXcBOoApw8V30l8OVSWrDtUmkFvATCcaNiZ8dAiIoBmBJ SoMjRz19IrsKwEN45PTHahCkQCAJADFcn+8BPv0SE6Cfa665xmMRpDmk7QFcnkgd2uD9ycz5nwgt MwRwmtISYIGDEyQi6AQBxArIpCjHA3UjRnCjbUCUlqxPjlj4inRj0hfI2UEFmuyAwKgpFA8i0jFP B0kS84xixWpsBQgC8DNWpE60YyBSClyRMxT1/qgynSznRqn7nSGAyZBwin8HTHHpIUMhKIau/6// +q+eHoàGBHAtXASaIhZRmuGzayITzkr8PYFGBiMROpAJFYMLtsQPg6ESdo55f6EJNe49iWcb46Mj5 waYg2sv90D+p3EioyWIEJ/rxzxDAiX7Cb7L9UsAgiewTn/iEe2DgwkgKDE4AiUGKx+bP/uzPvFfA hucFLw2pCPwBQgxSCICjmKszBr/g2HBuuDo2BF4djGs8ObFSNGCPWywVu1UkAzYA/aEicaBGkZJN VHtGArxJgLzVL0sHj9IFcQE+Lk2qLnCwnDFWQ8M1ynXpCmp4fSASyihyoJqk1xhwPvo+nhqIA3BH FyVSBkMVfR9iAsxxUw64OoYuOUSoZKg58YhSgs9xTQOEEwkOgokLZ071PM5IgFM9AxP0HzkxoIvp CICUlVNwcX4HuLgUI7ijT57f8LzgBsUjhOuUAyM6nh+JDKKiTZLYMJY5UHng8rzGGALcHjWIlWa4 QdmMIq4DQL2K0sQrZ0jV4jNjZ6kkHi1sB9pEbaOd0+GYIYDTYRZKjAGAAkhy+1E/ACDcHXUEHRqi AOAxtx+DF26d1v3xBrF4JZ5PAlu6pijnoooQ5EIywOlpFxsCqQFo05ydMXE+48KwxlOFJEiXYyEj NL0bI7o+40dCxQS49GKdUzkFMwRwKp/+JH3DQTF0I1ePbkXAxWKUeEQjmagsRzwvqhyAL+r8xboE zJHzx2tRUYoFqhgT5yCJ+CscA5/jXmKxf85PF9xNG8yn+vHPEMCpnoEJ+i9MIoPLFgNPqWQzmk7/ VszgLMwATSfKpQ3k9PtibRZmjBbL/zkdH/UMAZyOs1IwpkKXY+GQJ/KkTMfLUiyZLvaVJozC79Lj mcp50xnTiZ6eGQI40U94pv3T+gnMEMBpPT0zgzvRT+D/A5rZKdeL9E7YAAAAAElFTkSuQmCC ------=_NextPart_000_011F_01D4E643.7521BE50 Content-Type: image/png; name="image002.png" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-ID: <image002.png(a)01D4E641.FCFB0900> iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABcAAAAXCAYAAADgKtSgAAAAGXRFWHRTb2Z0d2FyZQBBZG9iZSBJ bWFnZVJlYWR5ccllPAAAA3ZpVFh0WE1MOmNvbS5hZG9iZS54bXAAAAAAADw/eHBhY2tldCBiZWdp bj0i77u/IiBpZD0iVzVNME1wQ2VoaUh6cmVTek5UY3prYzlkIj8+IDx4OnhtcG1ldGEgeG1sbnM6 eD0iYWRvYmU6bnM6bWV0YS8iIHg6eG1wdGs9IkFkb2JlIFhNUCBDb3JlIDUuNi1jMTQyIDc5LjE2 MDkyNCwgMjAxNy8wNy8xMy0wMTowNjozOSAgICAgICAgIj4gPHJkZjpSREYgeG1sbnM6cmRmPSJo dHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8xOTk5LzAyLzIyLXJkZi1zeW50YXgtbnMjIj4gPHJkZjpEZXNjcmlw dGlvbiByZGY6YWJvdXQ9IiIgeG1sbnM6eG1wTU09Imh0dHA6Ly9ucy5hZG9iZS5jb20veGFwLzEu MC9tbS8iIHhtbG5zOnN0UmVmPSJodHRwOi8vbnMuYWRvYmUuY29tL3hhcC8xLjAvc1R5cGUvUmVz b3VyY2VSZWYjIiB4bWxuczp4bXA9Imh0dHA6Ly9ucy5hZG9iZS5jb20veGFwLzEuMC8iIHhtcE1N Ok9yaWdpbmFsRG9jdW1lbnRJRD0ieG1wLmRpZDpjMWFlOTJkMC1hMDYxLWEwNGItYWJhYy0zMjIw MDI5ZjlkNjgiIHhtcE1NOkRvY3VtZW50SUQ9InhtcC5kaWQ6OEM1RjIyNjM2RTEwMTFFOEE5Q0ZF OTNCNjA3RjdCM0EiIHhtcE1NOkluc3RhbmNlSUQ9InhtcC5paWQ6OEM1RjIyNjI2RTEwMTFFOEE5 Q0ZFOTNCNjA3RjdCM0EiIHhtcDpDcmVhdG9yVG9vbD0iQWRvYmUgUGhvdG9zaG9wIENDIDIwMTgg KFdpbmRvd3MpIj4gPHhtcE1NOkRlcml2ZWRGcm9tIHN0UmVmOmluc3RhbmNlSUQ9InhtcC5paWQ6 MTEyMzY2MTItNjk2My1lMTRkLWIzMjAtYjFmMDAxZTc0M2QwIiBzdFJlZjpkb2N1bWVudElEPSJ4 bXAuZGlkOmMxYWU5MmQwLWEwNjEtYTA0Yi1hYmFjLTMyMjAwMjlmOWQ2OCIvPiA8L3JkZjpEZXNj cmlwdGlvbj4gPC9yZGY6UkRGPiA8L3g6eG1wbWV0YT4gPD94cGFja2V0IGVuZD0iciI/PpK1T5YA AAEjSURBVHjaYmS2a2JkYGAoBeJiIBZjoBy8AuJeIO5mgRrcyUA9IAYzjwnqYlqAYiYqBQVWH7AQ q5KZiZEhwcuAwd1MmUGIj5Ph09efDEHVq/DqIdrwWWW+DPGe+iQ5nSjDZcX44Aa/+/Sd4diVxwz/ /v2njuGKUoJwdvOCQwyT154iyuVMxChiRGJ/+vaTOsHCwcbCUBZtzaAgwQ8X87dRZ5CXEACz2xYd Zvjz9x9uRwFzKM7AE+DhYHiztRS3y+ybKQ8WbACUFAkGJz6Xw4C9gTzD3olxYHZyxyaGhdsvUi9C yQWjhtPfcKKy/4cvPxkOXXgIZr94+4Vow4lKipQEyysamf2KCVqZ0gL0MjPJOx4DMr4BMajA5qZS 7d8Eqv0BAgwAfQJHIbUa3lIAAAAASUVORK5CYII= ------=_NextPart_000_011F_01D4E643.7521BE50 Content-Type: image/png; name="image003.png" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-ID: <image003.png(a)01D4E641.FCFB0900> öiVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABcAAAAXCAYAAADgKtSgAAAAGXRFWHRTb2Z0d2FyZQBBZG9iZSBJ bWFnZVJlYWR5ccllPAAAA3ZpVFh0WE1MOmNvbS5hZG9iZS54bXAAAAAAADw/eHBhY2tldCBiZWdp bj0i77u/IiBpZD0iVzVNME1wQ2VoaUh6cmVTek5UY3prYzlkIj8+IDx4OnhtcG1ldGEgeG1sbnM6 eD0iYWRvYmU6bnM6bWV0YS8iIHg6eG1wdGs9IkFkb2JlIFhNUCBDb3JlIDUuNi1jMTQyIDc5LjE2 MDkyNCwgMjAxNy8wNy8xMy0wMTowNjozOSAgICAgICAgIj4gPHJkZjpSREYgeG1sbnM6cmRmPSJo dHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8xOTk5LzAyLzIyLXJkZi1zeW50YXgtbnMjIj4gPHJkZjpEZXNjcmlw dGlvbiByZGY6YWJvdXQ9IiIgeG1sbnM6eG1wTU09Imh0dHA6Ly9ucy5hZG9iZS5jb20veGFwLzEu MC9tbS8iIHhtbG5zOnN0UmVmPSJodHRwOi8vbnMuYWRvYmUuY29tL3hhcC8xLjAvc1R5cGUvUmVz b3VyY2VSZWYjIiB4bWxuczp4bXA9Imh0dHA6Ly9ucy5hZG9iZS5jb20veGFwLzEuMC8iIHhtcE1N Ok9yaWdpbmFsRG9jdW1lbnRJRD0ieG1wLmRpZDpjMWFlOTJkMC1hMDYxLWEwNGItYWJhYy0zMjIw MDI5ZjlkNjgiIHhtcE1NOkRvY3VtZW50SUQ9InhtcC5kaWQ6OUI0RUUyRUI2RTEwMTFFODlCMTVB NTRGNjA3NDUwQkQiIHhtcE1NOkluc3RhbmNlSUQ9InhtcC5paWQ6OUI0RUUyRUE2RTEwMTFFODlC MTVBNTRGNjA3NDUwQkQiIHhtcDpDcmVhdG9yVG9vbD0iQWRvYmUgUGhvdG9zaG9wIENDIDIwMTgg KFdpbmRvd3MpIj4gPHhtcE1NOkRlcml2ZWRGcm9tIHN0UmVmOmluc3RhbmNlSUQ9InhtcC5paWQ6 MTEyMzY2MTItNjk2My1lMTRkLWIzMjAtYjFmMDAxZTc0M2QwIiBzdFJlZjpkb2N1bWVudElEPSJ4 bXAuZGlkOmMxYWU5MmQwLWEwNjEtYTA0Yi1hYmFjLTMyMjAwMjlmOWQ2OCIvPiA8L3JkZjpEZXNj cmlwdGlvbj4gPC9yZGY6UkRGPiA8L3g6eG1wbWV0YT4gPD94cGFja2V0IGVuZD0iciI/PgwcGFYA AAFrSURBVHjaYmQo38TIwMBQCsTFQCzGQDl4BcS9QNzNAjW4k4F6QAxmHhPUxbQAxUxUCgqsPmDC JROiK8mQYirHwMnKTLbpLNgEQ3WlGFZFG4PZhlL8DNkbL5NlOFaXMzMxUiVcsLp85aWnDP///2cQ 4mJjWHL+CXUNl+bjYJAEYhDQFudlOPHoPUOBjRKY//rrT4aD994yZFooMAgDLb/w7CPDgrOPGX78 +Uec4SrC3Az9PtpgduOeW2DDYfxnn34wsDIzMYhys8HVBwMj323uCaBviQhzfEAK6KOvv/4Ag+4Z w6+/ENe6qIgyWMkJEReh+MAXoMFGkw4xRCw7y9C2/zZc3ERGgHLDH334zvD++28w+8qLz3BxQU5W yg3//RcRsH/RA5lSwynORNQCWJPin3//GT7+gITrjz9/wTSM//nnH5QgQleHDBiBlcX/IRksNDf8 FY3MfsUErUxpAXpBqaUbVudRu/YHCDAAkZd1Bs+RlSsAAAAASUVORK5CYII= ------=_NextPart_000_011F_01D4E643.7521BE50 Content-Type: image/png; name="image004.png" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-ID: <image004.png(a)01D4E641.FCFB0900> iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABcAAAAXCAYAAADgKtSgAAAAGXRFWHRTb2Z0d2FyZQBBZG9iZSBJ bWFnZVJlYWR5ccllPAAAA3ZpVFh0WE1MOmNvbS5hZG9iZS54bXAAAAAAADw/eHBhY2tldCBiZWdp bj0i77u/IiBpZD0iVzVNME1wQ2VoaUh6cmVTek5UY3prYzlkIj8+IDx4OnhtcG1ldGEgeG1sbnM6 eD0iYWRvYmU6bnM6bWV0YS8iIHg6eG1wdGs9IkFkb2JlIFhNUCBDb3JlIDUuNi1jMTQyIDc5LjE2 MDkyNCwgMjAxNy8wNy8xMy0wMTowNjozOSAgICAgICAgIj4gPHJkZjpSREYgeG1sbnM6cmRmPSJo dHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8xOTk5LzAyLzIyLXJkZi1zeW50YXgtbnMjIj4gPHJkZjpEZXNjcmlw dGlvbiByZGY6YWJvdXQ9IiIgeG1sbnM6eG1wTU09Imh0dHA6Ly9ucy5hZG9iZS5jb20veGFwLzEu MC9tbS8iIHhtbG5zOnN0UmVmPSJodHRwOi8vbnMuYWRvYmUuY29tL3hhcC8xLjAvc1R5cGUvUmVz b3VyY2VSZWYjIiB4bWxuczp4bXA9Imh0dHA6Ly9ucy5hZG9iZS5jb20veGFwLzEuMC8iIHhtcE1N Ok9yaWdpbmFsRG9jdW1lbnRJRD0ieG1wLmRpZDpjMWFlOTJkMC1hMDYxLWEwNGItYWJhYy0zMjIw MDI5ZjlkNjgiIHhtcE1NOkRvY3VtZW50SUQ9InhtcC5kaWQ6QTk5NTQ4QjM2RTEwMTFFOEFDMzRG Q0I3NzgwQ0IzNjEiIHhtcE1NOkluc3RhbmNlSUQ9InhtcC5paWQ6QTk5NTQ4QjI2RTEwMTFFOEFD MzRGQ0I3NzgwQ0IzNjEiIHhtcDpDcmVhdG9yVG9vbD0iQWRvYmUgUGhvdG9zaG9wIENDIDIwMTgg KFdpbmRvd3MpIj4gPHhtcE1NOkRlcml2ZWRGcm9tIHN0UmVmOmluc3RhbmNlSUQ9InhtcC5paWQ6 MTEyMzY2MTItNjk2My1lMTRkLWIzMjAtYjFmMDAxZTc0M2QwIiBzdFJlZjpkb2N1bWVudElEPSJ4 bXAuZGlkOmMxYWU5MmQwLWEwNjEtYTA0Yi1hYmFjLTMyMjAwMjlmOWQ2OCIvPiA8L3JkZjpEZXNj cmlwdGlvbj4gPC9yZGY6UkRGPiA8L3g6eG1wbWV0YT4gPD94cGFja2V0IGVuZD0iciI/Ppj9fIUA AAG/SURBVHjazFVLSwJRFP7udUrTMmthQkJBREEPbFVtzZUQbaI/Ei0KWkVEiOuiVUH0B4JoE1aQ u2ohJURB73wUvS117kx3BiNCJ8dyoAMH5s6595tzvvnOPYQsPxIAY9xHuTvxd0twD3IPCDngWZTP nJ94hGceL1PGeRVQg4DVCigMNEPBhUIvHZUE1QLBZUrKizXbKBb6LPA2CLh5kzEVSSORlsD41tUr sXjmPpeADZ8VLdXfwyYu2jWvVY1T/txoJZjvtWCpvwrttRREDy3KwdYaij2/DeMdZrUSxdrsFO32 /CMpBqxfi5D10LLGy1MocVsppj1mTHaZsZMUcf4qF+R25TSLyIOkj/NBt4B39rW2mIABl6D5485e JP1qCcVFOC1EtyrCt0w/eIyrYGgzheNnqSiwsmf3jpWm80RaRpOteBvMHKQhl9pE0UcJ/lAK4STT BN6IiVg8yf6uQxXFRJ8KU7OVYBjeftPMWlMtI00VmOisRLfDlBe74B8MHGYwd5QBk3+mTLlyC25R tOKpM6GnnsJeQfCQkVUt798zSLI+FWmC//tbkeZmnhGmTqKgQeBBRS2B3KLs0/9DgAEAIK2RyF4J 5VgAAAAASUVORK5CYII= ------=_NextPart_000_011F_01D4E643.7521BE50 Content-Type: image/png; name=" image005.png" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-ID: <image005.png(a)01D4E641.FCFB0900> iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABcAAAAXCAYAAADgKtSgAAAAGXRFWHRTb2Z0d2FyZQBBZG9iZSBJ bWFnZVJlYWR5ccllPAAAA3ZpVFh0WE1MOmNvbS5hZG9iZS54bXAAAAAAADw/eHBhY2tldCBiZWdp bj0i77u/IiBpZD0iVzVNME1wQ2VoaUh6cmVTek5UY3prYzlkIj8+IDx4OnhtcG1ldGEgeG1sbnM6 eD0iYWRvYmU6bnM6bWV0YS8iIHg6eG1wdGs9IkFkb2JlIFhNUCBDb3JlIDUuNi1jMTQyIDc5LjE2 MDkyNCwgMjAxNy8wNy8xMy0wMTowNjozOSAgICAgICAgIj4gPHJkZjpSREYgeG1sbnM6cmRmPSJo dHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8xOTk5LzAyLzIyLXJkZi1zeW50YXgtbnMjIj4gPHJkZjpEZXNjcmlw dGlvbiByZGY6YWJvdXQ9IiIgeG1sbnM6eG1wTU09Imh0dHA6Ly9ucy5hZG9iZS5jb20veGFwLzEu MC9tbS8iIHhtbG5zOnN0UmVmPSJodHRwOi8vbnMuYWRvYmUuY29tL3hhcC8xLjAvc1R5cGUvUmVz b3VyY2VSZWYjIiB4bWxuczp4bXA9Imh0dHA6Ly9ucy5hZG9iZS5jb20veGFwLzEuMC8iIHhtcE1N Ok9yaWdpbmFsRG9jdW1lbnRJRD0ieG1wLmRpZDpjMWFlOTJkMC1hMDYxLWEwNGItYWJhYy0zMjIw MDI5ZjlkNjgiIHhtcE1NOkRvY3VtZW50SUQ9InhtcC5kaWQ6QzI4NTU3MUI2RTEwMTFFODlDMUY4 NjZGMDZCM0YxN0YiIHhtcE1NOkluc3RhbmNlSUQ9InhtcC5paWQ6QzI4NTU3MUE2RTEwMTFFODlD MUY4NjZGMDZCM0YxN0YiIHhtcDpDcmVhdG9yVG9vbD0iQWRvYmUgUGhvdG9zaG9wIENDIDIwMTgg KFdpbmRvd3MpIj4gPHhtcE1NOkRlcml2ZWRGcm9tIHN0UmVmOmluc3RhbmNlSUQ9InhtcC5paWQ6 MTEyMzY2MTItNjk2My1lMTRkLWIzMjAtYjFmMDAxZTc0M2QwIiBzdFJlZjpkb2N1bWVudElEPSJ4 bXAuZGlkOmMxYWU5MmQwLWEwNjEtYTA0Yi1hYmFjLTMyMjAwMjlmOWQ2OCIvPiA8L3JkZjpEZXNj cmlwdGlvbj4gPC9yZGY6UkRGPiA8L3g6eG1wbWV0YT4gPD94cGFja2V0IGVuZD0iciI/Pj3WIzQA AAJRSURBVHjatFVLaBNRFD0zmelMfiX0E6WKBEELEkQFEYsgFZUgoqKguJKoKN21liKidinWkIpr KSJIFVG7ENxVNy7aLhTqwmJoJVEsaTBt2ibpZD7PN880rdSkkzS5w+UyM3fOvHvuefdx8aPbOAA9 1Lupe7Fxm6Eeph4S8sB9qJ55l/E4uvJ4lVa8pgK+RsCsAsFKFieIsG3xATQumzGbgJFMlPyuJDhX J8EZ7AHndIP3NEI6eAxGKons22fIvhlYd1Elwd3dIZDFFBb6b7J7V0cvHGevQI9FYCzMrQvOF33R uAnykdPQf34vPMu8esyidChgifTi4K56Fm2+nSs8J6Zh/I6D5JSNgWuxSei/opDbT8Hmbfmb3LSZ 8Z8ZelLIc1zogOBrLZNzYiB19zLcnffgefgaubEPqNvbhlTvVWjfxgtp4q590CY+/18QdBMRKyU2 DY6A0CsZbAdRlmA/cRGua7fByXYQNQfoOhJn/NZoWfk9B1tzC/TpKIue8EvW7Oy75wxMGX2P1J3g GuCStHCSHc5LNyDs8EP9MkbBXtAexCAHzsPzYBCz1wMgmgpt6iuMxfnyOK+/9Yg1cK7zHAMxbWl4 iDY6wugQdx9A7tNHpJ/2l6cWTnZAajsOdXy0ALxa60TJgmTSlUnR1LE5O6TDJ8E3/DvXxNY90KMR qKsUU5TaYmoR/fvh7rrPNK6MDLMNZM4Xs5L0QB+bMRWDF5SydTtsDc2sGm1qglFi1UqPXEKg/5hk Xonx+TOvFsZOonCNwMMmLaH8TdVP/z8CDABmE9qUe3PKlAAAAABJRU5ErkJggg== ------=_NextPart_000_011F_01D4E643.7521BE50 Content-Type: image/png; name="image006.png" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-ID: <image006.png(a)01D4E641.FCFB0900> riVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABcAAAAXCAMAAADX9CSSAAAAGXRFWHRTb2Z0d2FyZQBBZG9iZSBJ bWFnZVJlYWR5ccllPAAAA3ZpVFh0WE1MOmNvbS5hZG9iZS54bXAAAAAAADw/eHBhY2tldCBiZWdp bj0i77u/IiBpZD0iVzVNME1wQ2VoaUh6cmVTek5UY3prYzlkIj8+IDx4OnhtcG1ldGEgeG1sbnM6 eD0iYWRvYmU6bnM6bWV0YS8iIHg6eG1wdGs9IkFkb2JlIFhNUCBDb3JlIDUuNi1jMTQyIDc5LjE2 MDkyNCwgMjAxNy8wNy8xMy0wMTowNjozOSAgICAgICAgIj4gPHJkZjpSREYgeG1sbnM6cmRmPSJo dHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8xOTk5LzAyLzIyLXJkZi1zeW50YXgtbnMjIj4gPHJkZjpEZXNjcmlw dGlvbiByZGY6YWJvdXQ9IiIgeG1sbnM6eG1wTU09Imh0dHA6Ly9ucy5hZG9iZS5jb20veGFwLzEu MC9tbS8iIHhtbG5zOnN0UmVmPSJodHRwOi8vbnMuYWRvYmUuY29tL3hhcC8xLjAvc1R5cGUvUmVz b3VyY2VSZWYjIiB4bWxuczp4bXA9Imh0dHA6Ly9ucy5hZG9iZS5jb20veGFwLzEuMC8iIHhtcE1N Ok9yaWdpbmFsRG9jdW1lbnRJRD0ieG1wLmRpZDpjMWFlOTJkMC1hMDYxLWEwNGItYWJhYy0zMjIw MDI5ZjlkNjgiIHhtcE1NOkRvY3VtZW50SUQ9InhtcC5kaWQ6QjQ4QUZCNjQ2RTEwMTFFOEEzNzVF NTgxMEE4QzI2QjUiIHhtcE1NOkluc3RhbmNlSUQ9InhtcC5paWQ6QjQ4QUZCNjM2RTEwMTFFOEEz NzVFNTgxMEE4QzI2QjUiIHhtcDpDcmVhdG9yVG9vbD0iQWRvYmUgUGhvdG9zaG9wIENDIDIwMTgg KFdpbmRvd3MpIj4gPHhtcE1NOkRlcml2ZWRGcm9tIHN0UmVmOmluc3RhbmNlSUQ9InhtcC5paWQ6 MTEyMzY2MTItNjk2My1lMTRkLWIzMjAtYjFmMDAxZTc0M2QwIiBzdFJlZjpkb2N1bWVudElEPSJ4 bXAuZGlkOmMxYWU5MmQwLWEwNjEtYTA0Yi1hYmFjLTMyMjAwMjlmOWQ2OCIvPiA8L3JkZjpEZXNj cmlwdGlvbj4gPC9yZGY6UkRGPiA8L3g6eG1wbWV0YT4gPD94cGFja2V0IGVuZD0iciI/Po8wG3kA AAD8UExURb0nLb0oLr4pL78uNL8sMsM6P8E0OcE1O8EzOcI4PsAvNcAyOMI5PsI3PcU/RcM8QsQ9 QstWWslQVcpTWMtUWchMUcVCR8ZCR8xYXcZDSMVARcdHTMZESc1cYM5dYs1cYdd7f9JtcdJrb9Js cdNuctV0eNBiZ9Z4fNFnbNBmadRxdtRyddh/g9d9gd2RlNqHit2Qk9uJjdqGid6Tlt+Ym+CbnuCZ m+GeoOq6u+i0t+avseOjpeOipOeytOu8vvTa2+7Jyu/KzOzBw/PX2O/Ky/LT1PPW1/HS0/Xd3vXf 4P/+/vrw8Pfl5fvy8/bh4vjp6vrv7/z19fns7f///9q9DSYAAAC/SURBVCjPY/AyZWVAB6ymXgym DNiAKQMrVnHsokhAkFGIDZu4vbA3OzZxPQsHWUsRBUFzNHHRYH1HAycrRR90Db6izkouVkoY4j5i rsouVipYxK39zGzcUMU5xMT4mJjEObm4+VHEVf0DDBkY5KwwnGlkLCSno+ZgwqxgzIwqrm7srOHi rulhoYwpbmWr5eujiy5ur2Flp+UiL4Qqru0ZqOEXJOTpJ4EszsPDIinALSXNwCtDIOBxxReu+MWR HgCcEBrF3WWLawAAAABJRU5ErkJggg== ------=_NextPart_000_011F_01D4E643.7521BE50 Content-Type: image/png; name="image007.png" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 Content-ID: <image007.png(a)01D4E641.FCFB0900> ûiVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABcAAAAXCAYAAADgKtSgAAAAGXRFWHRTb2Z0d2FyZQBBZG9iZSBJ bWFnZVJlYWR5ccllPAAAA3ZpVFh0WE1MOmNvbS5hZG9iZS54bXAAAAAAADw/eHBhY2tldCBiZWdp bj0i77u/IiBpZD0iVzVNME1wQ2VoaUh6cmVTek5UY3prYzlkIj8+IDx4OnhtcG1ldGEgeG1sbnM6 eD0iYWRvYmU6bnM6bWV0YS8iIHg6eG1wdGs9IkFkb2JlIFhNUCBDb3JlIDUuNi1jMTQyIDc5LjE2 MDkyNCwgMjAxNy8wNy8xMy0wMTowNjozOSAgICAgICAgIj4gPHJkZjpSREYgeG1sbnM6cmRmPSJo dHRwOi8vd3d3LnczLm9yZy8xOTk5LzAyLzIyLXJkZi1zeW50YXgtbnMjIj4gPHJkZjpEZXNjcmlw dGlvbiByZGY6YWJvdXQ9IiIgeG1sbnM6eG1wTU09Imh0dHA6Ly9ucy5hZG9iZS5jb20veGFwLzEu MC9tbS8iIHhtbG5zOnN0UmVmPSJodHRwOi8vbnMuYWRvYmUuY29tL3hhcC8xLjAvc1R5cGUvUmVz b3VyY2VSZWYjIiB4bWxuczp4bXA9Imh0dHA6Ly9ucy5hZG9iZS5jb20veGFwLzEuMC8iIHhtcE1N Ok9yaWdpbmFsRG9jdW1lbnRJRD0ieG1wLmRpZDpjMWFlOTJkMC1hMDYxLWEwNGItYWJhYy0zMjIw MDI5ZjlkNjgiIHhtcE1NOkRvY3VtZW50SUQ9InhtcC5kaWQ6RjcyQjNEQTI4RjMxMTFFODgyRjhC M0M0MjM1MzZCRTkiIHhtcE1NOkluc3RhbmNlSUQ9InhtcC5paWQ6RjcyQjNEQTE4RjMxMTFFODgy RjhCM0M0MjM1MzZCRTkiIHhtcDpDcmVhdG9yVG9vbD0iQWRvYmUgUGhvdG9zaG9wIENDIDIwMTgg KFdpbmRvd3MpIj4gPHhtcE1NOkRlcml2ZWRGcm9tIHN0UmVmOmluc3RhbmNlSUQ9InhtcC5paWQ6 NDYxZjM1NDQtYjVkNi03NDQwLTlmMmItMmUyNzYyNjdkNGNlIiBzdFJlZjpkb2N1bWVudElEPSJ4 bXAuZGlkOmMxYWU5MmQwLWEwNjEtYTA0Yi1hYmFjLTMyMjAwMjlmOWQ2OCIvPiA8L3JkZjpEZXNj cmlwdGlvbj4gPC9yZGY6UkRGPiA8L3g6eG1wbWV0YT4gPD94cGFja2V0IGVuZD0iciI/Po9CdYsA AAKLSURBVHjatFVJb1JRFP7eALRBoV2IWsAhuqrAogZrGnBId8QuNOo/0K0mpK5cmRijLW1SV8Yf YEw0LjRdVWprsRVnbBujxUSmWGIRKDL0MXjfZUhfmFqFk5y89+697zvf/e459zBjpgkGwDBxO3EN /t/CxB3ER/gS8G20zjRlPLbEuB1mZ1skRc0d8I1mORkH5S4lFDsVVXP5XB7RH1HkhFzd//l6oJar AzBdMIBX1I+fzWTx8YEHrrvzyGfzWwO3XBmA4Wwvpm/NIPAuCCEpECApw86uDujMOpywWyiZF3dm q3DYKtZyDqaLRrwcd2HxyTKivhj+/Eois56RuPG8AQet+zFDQA3neul/TZmrelRECg5+d6Aydnjw EPovmaHWq7EeimPhnhuJ1QQYjkHwQwiyThnUOjUi3yONmZc1TkZSFeAhhw2ry2E4b04j5PmJM6M2 JMIJzI7OIR3L0HVypbw5c5aXxuu/bCbyLGHqhpN+f5n8ikK+QMaP4duUl74XSXHNNWd5RvItbjf4 PiQZ8y340UUkEi23ka2bTVXg2bQ0K6K+KLR9PZKxfcf1iAXjpQTgt5fnNCpXjOu+/xZDYzb67n8T gPaoFiaSKc/sk9KiqpHnNZgL9KlQFQ9oxenFUwK0+4gGg9dPY69xDwUW9abrdhTXZRIbzZmL2xWL Rk8KRMxxGuC5l3otEwtJLDBRvqbg4vY8jxdp5TEsA99rP1K/05I1DDnzDlKh2j4tTl2z4tNDDznY 3NY0nxt/hUKugJPD1oZ3i5AS8PnRElwT8zXnGdKJCnUPleR894HuyuFuNjEFY4H49m/FzRKtraz9 84XOlnpeOyzMlpppO8whyjJS7nmt7v5/BRgAbWb2vyyFhBYAAAAASUVORK5CYII= ------=_NextPart_000_011F_01D4E643.7521BE50-- 0·0 çàåØFþå`üð090 *H÷ 0e10 UUS10U DigiCert Inc10Uwww.digicert.com1$0"UDigiCert Assured ID Root CA0 061110000000Z 311110000000Z0e10 UUS10U DigiCert Inc10Uwww.digicert.com1$0"UDigiCert Assured ID Root CA0"0 *H÷ 0 ÎäC\±ó·`ùq¥®Ü&ªôÎõ 9(X`øÚ©2a<µ±(Ü z¬çyS\1*ö26vÌÞÝ<š¢ïjû!òRaß ×â±ÙþdÒ[_ùX5ŒGÍ¡6ùkÔ°8>ÁÃ3ÙØ/þ(³§ÖÃnDÀa5þYvm×ñ¢K +ÿrÚ`Ð5ÆxU ¡Ïåm ÈI|13l"éÐ2Z¢ºí9:r¡æú€ÙÕ1u®}"®?Fö(yÈ±ÚäWÄ~°ŽŠV³œ²íª§ð·Åš?Ðÿ¡ë_wO£c0a0Uÿ0Uÿ0ÿ0UEë¢¯ôË1-Q§§!ómÈ0U#0Eë¢¯ôË1-Q§§!ómÈ0 *H÷ ¢Œßâíðãrszd¿÷rfØ2äBub®ëòÕÙÞV³ÌÎ(¹ `\LXäÓ=IEX5išGêVÆy«Øgß <æž&, œ=³(÷_ÿ"âéeïàßÁgI³]ë² *ë&íxŸ}?+ó·&5m_¶I[«=%ÁÌ¶ÂñoÆúdhë-ëB·úÝbñŸPg·lœóñk67|©[mzñF`×'ŸKÎŸÃg*hßç3f¿ nócú%ml¥·a±Ò£&¡qâÃùÃQ·+Î.æP²§ú E/¢ðò00è Kî·á7/ÔrB@œ*0 *H÷ 0e10 UUS10U DigiCert Inc10Uwww.digicert.com1$0"UDigiCert Assured ID Root CA0 141118120000Z 241118120000Z0i10 UNL10U Noord-Holland10U Amsterdam10 U TERENA10UTERENA Personal CA 30"0 *H÷ 0 Æ¥»Uô¥4rre_Õê hØOSb{ÎÚÔ2¯ËŠëÛàë4Á~S šù}fWh^-.+!šU/Sg xÍÒi`lž(ÎM±&EúÐ¡Î«·)VqlñV$]§0àn1snÚ WLdxµÇÛÆÞŸÓ/1 Ö9µà1@N£ÌIâlþðdúºŒ%O!ºÉf9Ôž{:TÏÕcºOñßè}á\Šµ{ãþ\4UëS<ñÐ×Ø)öY!Ã/S;QA\\pàóJ&Üå·ÏIÿdLA+£Š0¢0Uÿ0ÿ0Uÿ0y+m0k0$+0http://ocsp.digicert.com0C+07http://cacerts.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDRootCA.crt0Uz0x0: 8 64http://crl3.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDRootCA.crl0: 8 64http://crl4.digicert.com/DigiCertAssuredIDRootCA.crl0=U 60402U 0*0(+https://www.digicert.com/CPS0Uð!éIws®;èRpíBîÊ0U#0Eë¢¯ôË1-Q§§!ómÈ0 *H÷ :Â+þcÞ»aŽ¹Gšü|±& "QÈ=ùõÅX°^£²A1ÌNø}ìýwñÛÒDZ¶ °àüb;Ôb ñ <MwëD4{»N)ü'ê>j/HãúÚÃÿ3ÒìÔLŽKa¶ï²/ÈG§¿|áùïÑ»# »qÓT°2SëR(j |A< Ýeìu)ž~Û·+Úìµ¯bŠ8ÛÃÑšdºŸziI Í37:Š¹¯-4lsv:ÂžuèíÚýÛžÆeUWÔÔŒéTÔîÂ9Ÿ]Æm±¯À}(i±à0D0, ÁŽ÷eAWc£Ë+|Ä0 *H÷ 0i10 UNL10U Noord-Holland10U Amsterdam10 U TERENA10UTERENA Personal CA 30 181116000000Z 211116120000Z010 UPT10 UAveiro10U Universidade de Aveiro1$0"UGabinete de CiberseguranÃ§a10URicardo T. Martins0"0 *H÷ 0 ó3àø³-÷Y#siyÌt:L ðóæGÜ¢Íÿó<©ð7³÷t«õê\D\É.b8ºNÊµì7á2BÞ^ºüø²×\òë£þ2Ñ9·žºÈÍÍõ§ûÎ0©ôeP¶ÙÐ÷,~ì-ËNS¢vû±·îTà6ÕB Ì©oo[!'%ù}rlvä°Þ¶ìì@ßŒªT>çHm!räJ7/øCÊV§ÖF²Áh»ÝHŒsÇjõ~¶/MŒbÞ:j$¶ÑëŠÕVwq1¬|ÚWjÙ@¿oW7Dò>]=²ãSI£Ì0È0U#0ð!éIws®;èRpíBîÊ0U3ª?Èæà±&\lc%×ûväÏ0Uÿ00U0 ricardo(a)ua.pt0Uÿ 0U%0++0CU <0:08 `Hýl0*0(+https://www.digicert.com/CPS0uUn0l04 2 0.http://crl3.digicert.com/TERENAPersonalCA3.crl04 2 0.http://crl4.digicert.com/TERENAPersonalCA3.crl0s+g0e0$+… *H÷ =m WØ& éÞC@âÝK"eÊÿVyµÀÅÝ·TQt\g4ÑÇ;T4{kÌÌºNŸ<4¶Ì€;Áèµ}4].9Äe³ªGlÀÍÉ_mgŒL=x©,FS)ÁÆ=èÓ©.I&6tÕOËrFù,ý;%zAP5iðåBº¥®±fC!Ë-Šraª°ë kÆV]šÀÛëSÎ |·§$ÑL ¹éŠ>áQp1yyåxå@böx4YÑH®L¹nª47$CŽÛñ»Ò`}cÇxêãör<TÜâÚsš1Ë0Ç0}0i10 UNL10U Noord-Holland10U Amsterdam10 U TERENA10UTERENA Personal CA 3ÁŽ÷eAWc£Ë+|Ä0 `He 0 *H÷ 1 *H÷ 0 *H÷ 1 190329152410Z0O *H÷ 1B@w ãsm|nW³Ü+W§ÌÛ?¬Udè9mºùKÆi&žæ»fÞvLR¬ŽZè»ÂÌMâF¿;0 *H÷ 100 `He*0 `He0 *H÷ 0 `He0*H÷ 0 *H÷ @0 `He0 `He0 `He0+0 *H÷ µ>ç=Yûþfe²^"{kéEj)~IÆUö5ÛYqìÁÞÍ%we³AÙuÒ)ùmï;è O~@É(ÌTJ!òõnG{¶¶Û;·Î±÷aÙñAGÅ,AtêäØÝO"AæúhNÛÍBÐgãêgÒ¿7pu,4çÂûÞ ôÒcedšËUxí.ŽD@a7¹³ÆÑª»T!zt,žo$JE,6Rìltÿ;Ì¥Uavx[S^9ñ 5t²¬œñ«»F=I|ÏLÚëEÜüÑÂ4ñ [kuª"YÎÁÄªžC

1 0

(no subject)
by Ana Margarida Conceição Pipa 29 Mar '19

29 Mar '19

I support the 2019-03 proposal. Ana Pipa Cibersegurança Cybersecurity Rua Passeio do Báltico nº4 ∙ 1990-036 Lisboa ∙ Portugal T (+351) 211 024 033 ∙ Tlm (+351) 911 737 636 ana.pipa(a)iptelecom.pt<mailto:ana.pipa@iptelecom.pt> [cid:image001.jpg@01D28EAD.3689E9A0] www.iptelecom.pt<http://www.iptelecom.pt/> AVISO DE CONFIDENCIALIDADE Esta mensagem e quaisquer ficheiros anexos à mesma são confidenciais e para uso exclusivo do destinatário e os mesmos são propriedade da Infraestruturas de Portugal, SA. Cabe ao destinatário assegurar a verificação de vírus e outras medidas que assegurem que esta mensagem não afeta os seus sistemas. Se não for o destinatário, não deverá usar, distribuir ou copiar este correio eletrónico, devendo proceder à sua eliminação e informar o emissor. É estritamente proibido o uso, a distribuição, a cópia ou qualquer forma de disseminação não autorizada deste correio eletrónico e seus anexos. Se recebeu este correio eletrónico por engano, por favor reenvie-o juntamente com os anexos para o emissor e apague-o do seu sistema. A Infraestruturas de Portugal, SA. agradece a sua cooperação. DISCLAIMER The information contained in this e-mail and any accompanying documents is confidential, may be privileged, and is intended solely for the person and/or entity to whom it is addressed (i.e. those identified in the "To" and "cc" box). It is the property of Infraestruturas de Portugal, SA. Unauthorized disclosure, or copying of this communication, or any part thereof, is strictly prohibited and may be unlawful. If you have received this e-mail in error, please return the e-mail and attachments to the sender and delete the e-mail and attachments and any copy from your system. Infraestruturas de Portugal, SA. thanks you for your cooperation. Sede Social | Head Office Praça da Portagem · 2809-013 Almada · Portugal NIPC | Tax ID 503 933 813 Dê o seu contributo para a sustentabilidade. Imprima o estritamente necessário e a preto e branco.

2 1

2019-03 New Policy Proposal
by joao.silva＠anacom.pt 29 Mar '19

29 Mar '19

Hi all, I support the 2019-03 proposal. K.R. [cid:image001.gif@01D4E634.4FD739E0] João Feijó Silva Senior Consultant [https://www.anacom.pt/images/logotipos/Anacom_30anosEN.png] Lisboa (Headquarter) Av. José Malhoa, 12 1099 - 017 Lisboa - Portugal Tel: (+351) 217212211 www.anacom.pt [cid:image002.jpg@01D4E634.4FD739E0]<https://www.anacom.pt/> Pense no ambiente. Imprima o conteúdo desta mensagem apenas se for absolutamente necessário. Este email e ficheiros em anexo são confidenciais e destinados somente ao conhecimento e utilização da(s) pessoa(s) ou entidade(s) a quem foram endereçados. Se recebeu este email ou anexos por erro, ou a eles teve acesso não sendo o destinatário, por favor elimine-os contactando o remetente. Please consider the environment before printing this mail note. This email and files transmitted with it are confidential and intended for the sole use of the individual or organization to whom they are addressed. If you have received this email in error, please notify the sender immediately and delete it without using, copying, storing, forwarding or disclosing its contents to any other party. Autoridade Nacional de Comunicações https://www.anacom.pt/

1 0

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach
by José Legatheaux Martins 29 Mar '19

29 Mar '19

On Mon, 25 Mar 2019 at 10:45, ac <ac(a)main.me> wrote: > On Mon, 25 Mar 2019 09:29:47 +0000 > > I frequently read someone saying "RIPE is not the Internet > Police" (even I have said that a few times myself) but the hard > truth is that any RIR has a duty to exercise administrative authority. > Finding the balance where this duty is an over-reach, as per the subject > line of this hijacked thread, is an important discussion that I believe > this wg should have sometime as this relates directly to abuse also... > > I fully support the 2019-03 proposal. Even if the final decision is in the sense that "RIPE is not the Internet Police", nothing should prevent RIPE of being a reliable source of verified information on fully confirmed proofs about entities incurring in BGP hijacking practices. Also, nothing prevents RIPE of recommending the consultation of certified and justified reputation information whenever people engage in business relationships with new "unknown entities". In my opinion, RIPE could be the support organisation of that repository. Just my two cents ... All the best, José L.M. --------------------------------------------------------- Jose Legatheaux Martins President of ISOC Portugal https://legatheaux.eu

1 0

2019-03 New Policy Proposal
by João Farinha 29 Mar '19

29 Mar '19

I support the 2019-03 proposal.

1 0

2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)
by Daniel Marques 29 Mar '19

29 Mar '19

Hi all, I support the 2019-03 proposal. Kind Regards, * * banner*DANIEL MARQUES* *Founding Brother * Email:*dan.m@xcudo.pt <mailto:dan.m@xcudo.pt>* Tel.:*+351 927 484 445* Web.:*https://xcudo.pt <https://xcudo.pt>*

1 0

I support 2019-03 BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation
by André Melancia 28 Mar '19

28 Mar '19

I support 2019-03 BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation! André Melancia Developer / DBA / Microsoft Certified Trainer (MCT) <https://www.youracclaim.com/user/andypt> Lunar Cat, Unip.Lda. Owner / Principal Consultant → +351-919443776<tel:+351-919443776> → Mail<mailto:Andy@Andy.COM.PT>; Site<http://andy.pt/>; Facebook<https://facebook.com/ANDY.COM.PT>; Twitter<https://twitter.com/AndyPT>; LinkedIn<https://linkedin.com/in/AndreMelancia>; Skype<skype:AndyCOMPT> Join our Portuguese technical communities (our natives also speak English!): → Data Community Portugal: FB Page<https://facebook.com/DataCommunityPT>; FB Group<https://facebook.com/groups/DataCommunityPT> → IT Pro Portugal: FB Page<https://facebook.com/ITProPortugal>; FB Group<https://facebook.com/groups/ITProPortugal>; Twitter<https://twitter.com/ITProPT>; Site<http://itproportugal.pt/> → PowerShell Portugal: FB Page<https://facebook.com/PowerShellPortugal>; FB Group<https://facebook.com/groups/PowerShellPortugal>; Twitter<https://twitter.com/PowerShellPT> → Community Evenings: Eventbrite<https://communityevenings.eventbrite.com/> → Windows Development Portugal: FB Group<https://facebook.com/groups/WindowsDevPT> → Revista Programar: Revista Programar<https://revista-programar.info/>

1 0

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach
by Sascha Luck [ml] 25 Mar '19

25 Mar '19

On Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 12:44:47PM +0200, ac wrote: >I frequently read someone saying "RIPE is not the Internet >Police" (even I have said that a few times myself) but the hard >truth is that any RIR has a duty to exercise administrative authority. Only as far as it pertains to the registration of allocated/assigned resources. All membership of the RIPE NCC since its foundation was entered into with the understanding that the NCC is a *registry* not an *enforcer* and does not regulate the operation or behaviour of member networks. 2019-03 attempts to change this by plugging into an ill-defined concept of "policy". This is perhaps a fundamental issue, as there has been "mission creep" from "address-policy" (the better term is "resource policy") into all sorts of other aspects of network operations. Unfortunately, RIPE and the NCC were founded in much more cooperative days and so it was omitted to clearly define the "limits of authority", perhaps because it was not seen as necessary back then. I therefore argue that it is maybe time to have a discussion on what exactly RIPE and the NCC should be and what, if any, limits on their administrative power there should be. I hope, though, that everyone can at least agree that *this* is *not* the forum for that discussion. rgds, SL >Finding the balance where this duty is an over-reach, as per the subject >line of this hijacked thread, is an important discussion that I believe >this wg should have sometime as this relates directly to abuse also... > >and, similarly, arguing that because Afrinic etc does not do this or >does not do that, is hardly any great argument either, many interesting >things, angles and points in these 2019-03 discussions and threads :) > >Andre > > >

4 4

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach
by Brian Nisbet 25 Mar '19

25 Mar '19

Colleagues, I want to comment on something below... > -----Original Message----- > From: anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net> On Behalf Of ac > Sent: Saturday 23 March 2019 08:54 > > So, anyway, as 2019-03 deals with hijacking, this entire over reach argument > is factually not relevant at all > > and, more so: 2019-03 not proceeding would be counter to the ethical > administration of resources, a dereliction of responsibility and a breach of > trust implied in any such administration (as well as administrative authority) A core part of the policy process in the RIPE Community is that nothing is set in stone. A policy which is rejected one day may be accepted another, or something which is put in place may be changed or altered when new information comes to light. This is all part of the PDP. *If* 2019-03 does not reach consensus it in no way implies the RIPE Community does not care about BGP hijacking (community pushes like MANRS and general work on RPKI says otherwise), all it says is that this proposal was not deemed to be the right way to go about it. Thanks, Brian Co-Chair, RIPE AAWG Brian Nisbet Service Operations Manager HEAnet CLG, Ireland's National Education and Research Network 1st Floor, 5 George's Dock, IFSC, Dublin D01 X8N7, Ireland +35316609040 brian.nisbet(a)heanet.ie www.heanet.ie Registered in Ireland, No. 275301. CRA No. 20036270

2 1

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)
by Töma Gavrichenkov 25 Mar '19

25 Mar '19

Hi all, > A new RIPE Policy proposal, 2019-03, "BGP Hijacking is > a RIPE Policy Violation", is now available for discussion. Sorry if the issues I'm raising were already addressed somewhere around the thread. As of now, I believe it's the size of an average fiction book, and I don't quite have enough time to read that. I also apologize now in advance for abstaining from the discussion at some point in future, because in quite the same fashion I won't be able to read unnecessarily (and sometimes I believe deliberately) long responses. Whoever is planning to win a consensus through exhaustion is going to win that anyway. With that in mind, 1. As of now, the draft looks like a nice example of "document designed by a committee". It's too strict where there's no real need to be strict, and at the same time too weak where you don't expect it to be weak. E.g. 4 weeks to report + 4 weeks to investigate + 2 weeks for an appeal give us solid 10 weeks for an attack to stay there, which is, to put it gently, a substantial amount of time. 2. OTOH the ultimate result (membership cancellation) may be seen as a very heavy punishment. In fact in theory this policy could make things worse. Most of the ISPs are very slow in applying security updates to their equipment, including border routers. (Also, vendors themselves are not quite keeping up as well) Now, say, I'm an ISP who really wants to push my competitor out of business. With this policy here's a sequence of steps that will win you the market: - hire a script kiddie who will break into that company's Mikrotik; - announce roughly half of IPv4 address space through that breach just for it to be surely on the news; - relax and enjoy watching your competition disappearing in no later than 2,5 months. While I would, in my perfect dream, personally support the idea of cancelling an LIR membership for not updating one's devices at least on a weekly basis, I don't really think this is what the authors of the draft were going to propose, and I know quite a few people, Randy Bush for starters, whom the authors, to put it mildly, won't probably be able to convince. The example by Warren also deserves attention, and I personally don't really anticipate that "won't be too hard to figure out", because frankly we're in fact yet to see the hijacking attempts where an attacker would be deliberately trying hard to hide their identity. 3. If I were to design that process, I'd put it in a different way, e.g.: - 2 business days to find experts. Really, four weeks for that?! Yes, we know that NCC isn't the most dynamic organization out there, but with a pre-populated pool of experts at the current rate of hijacking incidents reported to public that shouldn't really be an issue. - 3 business days to investigate and prepare a preliminary report. Another 5 business days to continue investigation if necessary, with another report at the end. Maybe a third iteration if necessary. Immediate membership suspension at the end if the experts decide it's necessary to do so now. - A grace period of 8 weeks for the suspected hijacker to collect further evidence and provide additional arguments to justify their position. - An appeal phase of another 8 weeks with ultimate decision and, where necessary, membership termination in the end. All the numbers above are rough estimations, they are only there to showcase the idea: - the reaction to *mitigate* should be immediate; - the reaction to *penalize* should allow for a large enterprise — or a large ISP! — to keep up. -- Töma

7 16

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach
by Gert Doering 23 Mar '19

23 Mar '19

Hi, On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 12:27:32PM +0200, ac wrote: > On Sat, 23 Mar 2019 18:04:22 +0800 > Lu Heng <h.lu(a)anytimechinese.com> wrote: > > > > It???s very much like electricity company tell you if you do something > > bad we will cut you off and stop supply electricity.and yes, they > > will cut you if you stop paying them, but that doesn???t mean they can > > they also cut if you cheat by stealing electricity. But they will not cut you off if you use the electricity in ways that your neighbours do not like. And this is where things start getting complicated. A and B have a contract. B does something C does not like (but which is legal). Why should that affect A? Gert Doering -- NetMaster -- have you enabled IPv6 on something today...? SpaceNet AG Vorstand: Sebastian v. Bomhard, Michael Emmer Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14 Aufsichtsratsvors.: A. Grundner-Culemann D-80807 Muenchen HRB: 136055 (AG Muenchen) Tel: +49 (0)89/32356-444 USt-IdNr.: DE813185279

4 6

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] anti-abuse-wg Digest, Vol 88, Issue 72
by Durga Prasad Malyala 23 Mar '19

23 Mar '19

Sorry off topic. How Come I subscribed to digest yet getting multiple mails per day? Cheers/DP On Sat, Mar 23, 2019, 22:53 <anti-abuse-wg-request(a)ripe.net> wrote: > Send anti-abuse-wg mailing list submissions to > anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net > > To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit > https://lists.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/anti-abuse-wg > or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to > anti-abuse-wg-request(a)ripe.net > > You can reach the person managing the list at > anti-abuse-wg-owner(a)ripe.net > > When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific > than "Re: Contents of anti-abuse-wg digest..." > > > Today's Topics: > > 1. Re: 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE > Policy Violation) (Carlos Fria?as) > 2. Re: 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE > Policy Violation) (Sascha Luck [ml]) > 3. Re: 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE > Policy Violation) (Lu Heng) > 4. Re: 2019-03 and over-reach (Nick Hilliard) > 5. Re: 2019-03 and over-reach (Hank Nussbacher) > 6. Re: 2019-03 and over-reach (Hank Nussbacher) > > > ---------------------------------------------------------------------- > > Message: 1 > Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 13:39:04 +0000 (WET) > From: Carlos Fria?as <cfriacas(a)fccn.pt> > To: T?ma Gavrichenkov <ximaera(a)gmail.com> > Cc: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net > Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP > Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation) > Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1903231315330.9599(a)gauntlet.corp.fccn.pt> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-15"; Format="flowed" > > > On Sat, 23 Mar 2019, T?ma Gavrichenkov wrote: > > > Hi all, > > Hi, > (will try to keep it short) > > > (...) > > 1. As of now, the draft looks like a nice example of "document > > designed by a committee". > > > > It's too strict where there's no real need to be strict, and at the > > same time too weak where you don't expect it to be weak. E.g. 4 weeks > > to report + 4 weeks to investigate + 2 weeks for an appeal give us > > solid 10 weeks for an attack to stay there, which is, to put it > > gently, a substantial amount of time. > > Just two co-authors. The set will grow for proposals in other RIRs. And > we'll gladly accept help, as Jordi is doing the most of heavy lifting. > > If your issue is timescales they can be adapted in subsequent versions. > What we tried to design here was "due process" with enough "checks & > balances" embedded. > > > (...) > > 2. OTOH the ultimate result (membership cancellation) may be seen as a > > very heavy punishment. > > > > In fact in theory this policy could make things worse. > > The scenarios you and others mentioned should be run through the process > and what you call "the ultimate result" should only happen if there is > absolutely no doubt about the intent and about the 'who'. If company A > takes control of company B's router (or hires someone to do it) is already > doing something which in most jurisdictions could fall onto "crime". If > company A could be identified, then they could/should be the 'who', and > not company B. > > I won't expect this proposal will stop *all* intentional hijackers. > Firstly it will depend on a complaint/report, then it must be crystal > clear (with all the checks & balances in place) that is was intentional, > and the hijack was made by person/org X. So if you see bogus routes from > <big company name here>'s ASN coming from somewhere in the world where > they have no business, that's because someone else is (ab)using their > ASN... > > (I would also like to hear Randy's take on 2019-03, even now before > version 2) > > > (...) > > 3. If I were to design that process, I'd put it in a different way, e.g.: > > It's not explicitely written down, but yes, the idea was to have a > (pre-existing) worldwide pool of experts. The timescales were mostly > designed expecting it would be possible to build that pool on a voluntary > basis. So 4 weeks was for a set of experts to agree on the report, > possibly on their own free time... :-) > > > Best Regards, > Carlos > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 2 > Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 13:54:06 +0000 > From: "Sascha Luck [ml]" <aawg(a)c4inet.net> > To: JORDI PALET MARTINEZ <jordi.palet(a)consulintel.es> > Cc: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net > Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP > Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation) > Message-ID: <20190323135406.GO99066(a)cilantro.c4inet.net> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii; format=flowed > > > All, > > can I ask every participant in this discussion to PLEASE, PLEASE > quote properly. It's becoming absolutely impossible to ascertain > who wrote what and who made a statement and who answered it. > > > To brass tacks: > > On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 01:44:21PM +0100, JORDI PALET MARTINEZ via > anti-abuse-wg wrote: > > Immediate membership suspension at the end if the experts decide it's > > necessary to do so now. > > This is not possible under the SSA/ripe-697. Section 1.2.1.1 of > ripe-697 states clearly the grounds for termination of > membership. "BGP hijacking" is not one of them. While it is > presumably possible to add additional reasons, it will be, > TTBOMK, only by membership vote. > > I did at the start decide to give this proposal the benefit of > the doubt but I am now convinced that its intent is the > subversion of the RIPE NCC in order to force it to abuse its > dominant market position to remove from (internet) existence, > members who exhibit behaviour that, while arguably legal, > elements of this community don't like. > > Moreover, the proposal aims at doing this while largely > excluding the RIPE NCC itself from the decision-making process, > instead using some panel of "experts" to decide who should live > and who should die. Whence the authority of these "experts" > comes is not explained. The NCC Board is then, or so I surmise, > tasked with giving this decision an air of legitimacy by > ratifying it. Why the (unpaid) Board would even accept such a > questionable honour, I don't know, especially in light of the > potential liabilities. > > Further, the danger exists that this community is not done yet. > Once a mechanism to terminate unwelcome behaviour is established, > it is relatively easy to plug in any other behaviour that this > community, or elements thereof, would like to see removed from the > internet. > > In conclusio, this proposal has the potential to irredeemably > damage the relationship the NCC has with its members and I would > even argue that it has the potential to threaten the very > existence of the NCC if the powers that be decide that it is > abusing its power as a monopoly provider. > > For the avoidance of doubt, I remain in opposition, > > SL > > > > ------------------------------ > > Message: 3 > Date: Sat, 23 Mar 2019 22:26:46 +0800 > From: Lu Heng <h.lu(a)anytimechinese.com> > To: "Sascha Luck [ml]" <aawg(a)c4inet.net> > Cc: JORDI PALET MARTINEZ <jordi.palet(a)consulintel.es>, > anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net > Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP > Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation) > Message-ID: > <CAAvCx3jaLVGJxH-KBfwsTt-gWk7v77ceDAmm= > DM0yvsO__ioMA(a)mail.gmail.com> > Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" > > On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 21:54 Sascha Luck [ml] <aawg(a)c4inet.net> wrote: > > > > > All, > > > > can I ask every participant in this discussion to PLEASE, PLEASE > > quote properly. It's becoming absolutely impossible to ascertain > > who wrote what and who made a statement and who answered it. > > > > > > To brass tacks: > > > > On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 01:44:21PM +0100, JORDI PALET MARTINEZ via > > anti-abuse-wg wrote: > > > Immediate membership suspension at the end if the experts decide > it's > > > necessary to do so now. > > > > This is not possible under the SSA/ripe-697. Section 1.2.1.1 of > > ripe-697 states clearly the grounds for termination of > > membership. "BGP hijacking" is not one of them. While it is > > presumably possible to add additional reasons, it will be, > > TTBOMK, only by membership vote. > > > > I did at the start decide to give this proposal the benefit of > > the doubt but I am now convinced that its intent is the > > subversion of the RIPE NCC in order to force it to abuse its > > dominant market position to remove from (internet) existence, > > members who exhibit behaviour that, while arguably legal, > > elements of this community don't like. > > > > Moreover, the proposal aims at doing this while largely > > excluding the RIPE NCC itself from the decision-making process, > > instead using some panel of "experts" to decide who should live > > and who should die. Whence the authority of these "experts" > > comes is not explained. The NCC Board is then, or so I surmise, > > tasked with giving this decision an air of legitimacy by > > ratifying it. Why the (unpaid) Board would even accept such a > > questionable honour, I don't know, especially in light of the > > potential liabilities. > > > > Further, the danger exists that this community is not done yet. > > Once a mechanism to terminate unwelcome behaviour is established, > > it is relatively easy to plug in any other behaviour that this > > community, or elements thereof, would like to see removed from the > > internet. > > > > In conclusio, this proposal has the potential to irredeemably > > damage the relationship the NCC has with its members and I would > > even argue that it has the potential to threaten the very > > existence of the NCC if the powers that be decide that it is > > abusing its power as a monopoly provider. > > > Very well said, +1 > > > > > > > For the avoidance of doubt, I remain in opposition, > > > > SL > > > > -- > -- > Kind regards. > Lu >

1 0

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach
by Lu Heng 23 Mar '19

23 Mar '19

When you stealing electricity the electricity company will not cut your electricity at home but report you to the policy. No one saying stealing is ok, but no one agrees electricity company should have policing power. On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 18:27 ac <ac(a)main.me> wrote: > On Sat, 23 Mar 2019 18:04:22 +0800 > Lu Heng <h.lu(a)anytimechinese.com> wrote: > > > > It’s very much like electricity company tell you if you do something > > bad we will cut you off and stop supply electricity.and yes, they > > will cut you if you stop paying them, but that doesn’t mean they can > > they also cut if you cheat by stealing electricity. > > you not talk about stealing but you and Nick talk about how use > electricity. > > use any way you like, ripe not internet police, but you no steal, okay? > > > make themselve self juridical court in any bad thing happen in this > > world. > > > not every bad thing, just administrative duty to say stealing is stealing. > > stealing not the same as using electricity to fry naughty neighbor in > chair. > > stealing is when you no pay for electricity you use to fry neighbor, see? > > you use for anything bad, this your business, ripe not judicial court, > administrative authority. > > but you no hijack, okay? > > > Internet, or registry, are starting if not already is, become part of > > base infrastructure of the society, but that does not give us any > > rights in the society to become the supreme court of the society, > > just like your water company or electricity company won’t judge you > > for what you use water or electricity for. > > > > > > > > On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 16:54 ac <ac(a)main.me> wrote: > > > > > > > > ugh, english. I do not mean external as in outside I meant external > > > as in not > > > allocated. > > > > > > for example: complaint received about 147g8oobra912cx47.com > > > > > > versus a HIJACKING complaint received about apple.com > > > > > > my argument would be that; as 147Goobra912cX.com is not allocated, > > > any complaints about such a resource is outside the scope of any > > > administrative authority - and ianal, but, some of what Nick > > > Hilliard said, may apply. Same as abuse BY a resource, when what > > > Nick Hilliard said, may also apply. > > > > > > The main point is that; > > > > > > Because: "hijacking" of a domain name (or any resource) is a direct > > > administrative issue (this is factual - as per my previous post) > > > > > > BUT > > > > > > abuse BY a domain name (or any resource) is not necessarily an > > > administrative issue at all (this is debatable/opinion) - as you > > > said "some" TLD responds some do not...and RIPE NCC is not the > > > Internet Police.... > > > > > > So, anyway, as 2019-03 deals with hijacking, this entire over reach > > > argument is factually not relevant at all > > > > > > and, more so: 2019-03 not proceeding would be counter to the ethical > > > administration of resources, a dereliction of responsibility and a > > > breach of trust implied in any such administration (as well as > > > administrative authority) > > > > > > > > > On Sat, 23 Mar 2019 08:20:01 +0000 > > > Suresh Ramasubramanian <ops.lists(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > They either find out for themselves or someone else points it out > > > > to them. In either case their responsibility continues if what > > > > you say holds good > > > > > > > > --srs > > > > > > > > ________________________________ > > > > From: anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net> on behalf of > > > > ac <ac(a)main.me> Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2019 1:44 PM > > > > To: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net > > > > Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach > > > > > > > > > > > > some of what the wg discusses are opinions and some things are > > > > scientific facts. > > > > > > > > scientific facts may change as environments and other variables > > > > change, but currently it is so that; > > > > > > > > there is NO TLD registry that will allow the ongoing random > > > > hijacking of domain names (under that TLD of course) > > > > > > > > as, this would mean that the TLD does not need to exist at all > > > > and/or it will not have any trust/value. > > > > > > > > RIPE NCC though, is factually a resource administrative authority. > > > > > > > > As such, it does need to administer resources and an integral > > > > part of that resource administration is the core responsibility > > > > implied by such administration itself and the balance of > > > > exercising such authority with the implied and direct > > > > responsibility of any such administration. > > > > > > > > Factually, the authority to allocate (or not) is administrative. > > > > > > > > I think (my opinion) is that the confusion arises due to whether a > > > > resource (whether it be a domain name, ip number, etc) is > > > > allocated, or not. When resources are allocated the > > > > administrative responsibility is not degraded, in fact a very > > > > strong argument could be made that the inverse is true: Allocated > > > > resources increases the level of administrative authority, > > > > responsibility and all of the administration aspects themselves. > > > > > > > > Now, TLD (or RIPE NCC) managing **"external"** complaints about > > > > direct abuse, is, imho, outside the scope of an administrative > > > > authority and would be the scenario Nick Hilliard refers to. Then > > > > again, this is my opinion, so I may be completely wrong (or > > > > not) :) > > > > > > > > On Sat, 23 Mar 2019 07:27:40 +0000 > > > > Suresh Ramasubramanian <ops.lists(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > There's also the interesting comparison of how some TLD > > > > > registries - many of them - act on canceling spam and phish > > > > > domains while others go to every extreme not to do so. > > > > > > > > > > --srs > > > > > > > > > > ________________________________ > > > > > From: anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net> on behalf > > > > > of ac <ac(a)main.me> Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2019 11:16 AM > > > > > To: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net > > > > > Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, 22 Mar 2019 17:13:20 +0000 > > > > > Nick Hilliard <nick(a)foobar.org> wrote: > > > > > > Regarding over-reach, the RIPE NCC was instituted as a > > > > > > numbering registry and as a supporting organisation for the > > > > > > RIPE Community, whose terms of reference are described in the > > > > > > RIPE-1 document. The terms of reference make it clear that > > > > > > the purpose of the RIPE Community and the RIPE NCC is > > > > > > internet co-ordination and - pointedly > > > > > > - not enforcement. Proposal 2019-03 goes well outside the > > > > > > scope of what the RIPE Community and the RIPE NCC were > > > > > > constituted to do, and I do not believe that the Anti Abuse > > > > > > working group has the authority to override this. > > > > > > > > > > > the wg is not overriding anything. 2019-03 is about removing > > > > > resources, in much the same way as same resources would have > > > > > been removed for payment. (RIPE NCC accounts person would > > > > > "judge" that there was no payment and resources would be > > > > > affected) > > > > > > > > > > Just because there is a decision it does not mean that such a > > > > > decision > > > > > > > > > > is "law enforcement" or judicial. > > > > > > > > > > 2019-03 is administrative > > > > > > > > > > and not legal/law/judicial > > > > > > > > > > > The second point relates to the long term consequences of the > > > > > > proposal. If the RIPE Community were to pass this policy, > > > > > > then it would direct the RIPE NCC to act as both a judiciary > > > > > > and policing agency for internet abuse. Judgement and > > > > > > enforcement of behaviour are the competence of national > > > > > > governments, courts and law > > > > > > > > > > No. You are saying the same thing, though eloquently, in a > > > > > different way and trying to link it to some future potential > > > > > hijacking by gov of RIR. > > > > > > > > > > It is not much of a decision that RIPE NCC has to make either > > > > > as: > > > > > > > > > > 1. There was hijacking > > > > > > > > > > OR > > > > > > > > > > 2. There was no hijacking > > > > > > > > > > Whether it was accidental, ongoing for long period of time and > > > > > all the other technical and scientific facts, this may require > > > > > some sort of interpretation of facts. > > > > > > > > > > But, not whether it actually happened or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > But, this is not how to handle the problem of BGP hijacking. > > > > > > Even if it had the slightest possibility of making any > > > > > > difference at a technical level (which it won't), the > > > > > > proposal would set the RIPE Community and the RIPE NCC down a > > > > > > road which I believe would be extremely unwise to take from a > > > > > > legal and political point of view, and which would be > > > > > > difficult, if not impossible to manoeuver out of. > > > > > ianal, NCC legal will surely evaluate the legal aspects, but > > > > > practically every new shell company that has to deal with > > > > > compliance and other issues is just another layer in the onion. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > -- > > Kind regards. > > Lu > > -- -- Kind regards. Lu

4 16

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach
by Lu Heng 23 Mar '19

23 Mar '19

Emm...so if someone steal your house you will take your staff back from his home without police and court? Because you “admin” your staff? Try that next time and try your best explain to the judge why you think he took your staff give you rights to become police. On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 18:50 ac <ac(a)main.me> wrote: > On Sat, 23 Mar 2019 18:29:55 +0800 > Lu Heng <h.lu(a)anytimechinese.com> wrote: > > When you stealing electricity the electricity company will not cut > > your electricity at home but report you to the policy. > > > > No one saying stealing is ok, but no one agrees electricity company > > should have policing power. > > > > bottom line: you can do what you like with your electricity but the > electricity company cannot allow you to just take any electricity as > the electricity company is responsible for the administration of the > electricity. > > not stopping you from taking someone else's electricity is not a > "policing" or "judicial" thing - it is an administrative power as this > is the primary job of the electricity company: administer the > electricity. > > otherwise why have an electricity company at all? > > just let anyone use any electricity they like. > > this is a stupid thread. > > > > > > > > On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 18:27 ac <ac(a)main.me> wrote: > > > > > On Sat, 23 Mar 2019 18:04:22 +0800 > > > Lu Heng <h.lu(a)anytimechinese.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > It’s very much like electricity company tell you if you do > > > > something bad we will cut you off and stop supply electricity.and > > > > yes, they will cut you if you stop paying them, but that doesn’t > > > > mean they can > > > > > > they also cut if you cheat by stealing electricity. > > > > > > you not talk about stealing but you and Nick talk about how use > > > electricity. > > > > > > use any way you like, ripe not internet police, but you no steal, > > > okay? > > > > make themselve self juridical court in any bad thing happen in > > > > this world. > > > > > > > not every bad thing, just administrative duty to say stealing is > > > stealing. > > > > > > stealing not the same as using electricity to fry naughty neighbor > > > in chair. > > > > > > stealing is when you no pay for electricity you use to fry > > > neighbor, see? > > > > > > you use for anything bad, this your business, ripe not judicial > > > court, administrative authority. > > > > > > but you no hijack, okay? > > > > > > > Internet, or registry, are starting if not already is, become > > > > part of base infrastructure of the society, but that does not > > > > give us any rights in the society to become the supreme court of > > > > the society, just like your water company or electricity company > > > > won’t judge you for what you use water or electricity for. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 16:54 ac <ac(a)main.me> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ugh, english. I do not mean external as in outside I meant > > > > > external as in not > > > > > allocated. > > > > > > > > > > for example: complaint received about 147g8oobra912cx47.com > > > > > > > > > > versus a HIJACKING complaint received about apple.com > > > > > > > > > > my argument would be that; as 147Goobra912cX.com is not > > > > > allocated, any complaints about such a resource is outside the > > > > > scope of any administrative authority - and ianal, but, some of > > > > > what Nick Hilliard said, may apply. Same as abuse BY a > > > > > resource, when what Nick Hilliard said, may also apply. > > > > > > > > > > The main point is that; > > > > > > > > > > Because: "hijacking" of a domain name (or any resource) is a > > > > > direct administrative issue (this is factual - as per my > > > > > previous post) > > > > > > > > > > BUT > > > > > > > > > > abuse BY a domain name (or any resource) is not necessarily an > > > > > administrative issue at all (this is debatable/opinion) - as you > > > > > said "some" TLD responds some do not...and RIPE NCC is not the > > > > > Internet Police.... > > > > > > > > > > So, anyway, as 2019-03 deals with hijacking, this entire over > > > > > reach argument is factually not relevant at all > > > > > > > > > > and, more so: 2019-03 not proceeding would be counter to the > > > > > ethical administration of resources, a dereliction of > > > > > responsibility and a breach of trust implied in any such > > > > > administration (as well as administrative authority) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, 23 Mar 2019 08:20:01 +0000 > > > > > Suresh Ramasubramanian <ops.lists(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > They either find out for themselves or someone else points it > > > > > > out to them. In either case their responsibility continues if > > > > > > what you say holds good > > > > > > > > > > > > --srs > > > > > > > > > > > > ________________________________ > > > > > > From: anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net> on > > > > > > behalf of ac <ac(a)main.me> Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2019 1:44 > > > > > > PM To: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net > > > > > > Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > some of what the wg discusses are opinions and some things are > > > > > > scientific facts. > > > > > > > > > > > > scientific facts may change as environments and other > > > > > > variables change, but currently it is so that; > > > > > > > > > > > > there is NO TLD registry that will allow the ongoing random > > > > > > hijacking of domain names (under that TLD of course) > > > > > > > > > > > > as, this would mean that the TLD does not need to exist at all > > > > > > and/or it will not have any trust/value. > > > > > > > > > > > > RIPE NCC though, is factually a resource administrative > > > > > > authority. > > > > > > > > > > > > As such, it does need to administer resources and an integral > > > > > > part of that resource administration is the core > > > > > > responsibility implied by such administration itself and the > > > > > > balance of exercising such authority with the implied and > > > > > > direct responsibility of any such administration. > > > > > > > > > > > > Factually, the authority to allocate (or not) is > > > > > > administrative. > > > > > > > > > > > > I think (my opinion) is that the confusion arises due to > > > > > > whether a resource (whether it be a domain name, ip number, > > > > > > etc) is allocated, or not. When resources are allocated the > > > > > > administrative responsibility is not degraded, in fact a very > > > > > > strong argument could be made that the inverse is true: > > > > > > Allocated resources increases the level of administrative > > > > > > authority, responsibility and all of the administration > > > > > > aspects themselves. > > > > > > > > > > > > Now, TLD (or RIPE NCC) managing **"external"** complaints > > > > > > about direct abuse, is, imho, outside the scope of an > > > > > > administrative authority and would be the scenario Nick > > > > > > Hilliard refers to. Then again, this is my opinion, so I may > > > > > > be completely wrong (or not) :) > > > > > > > > > > > > On Sat, 23 Mar 2019 07:27:40 +0000 > > > > > > Suresh Ramasubramanian <ops.lists(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > > > There's also the interesting comparison of how some TLD > > > > > > > registries - many of them - act on canceling spam and phish > > > > > > > domains while others go to every extreme not to do so. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > --srs > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ________________________________ > > > > > > > From: anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net> on > > > > > > > behalf of ac <ac(a)main.me> Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2019 > > > > > > > 11:16 AM To: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net > > > > > > > Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach > > > > > > > > > > > > > > On Fri, 22 Mar 2019 17:13:20 +0000 > > > > > > > Nick Hilliard <nick(a)foobar.org> wrote: > > > > > > > > Regarding over-reach, the RIPE NCC was instituted as a > > > > > > > > numbering registry and as a supporting organisation for > > > > > > > > the RIPE Community, whose terms of reference are > > > > > > > > described in the RIPE-1 document. The terms of reference > > > > > > > > make it clear that the purpose of the RIPE Community and > > > > > > > > the RIPE NCC is internet co-ordination and - pointedly > > > > > > > > - not enforcement. Proposal 2019-03 goes well outside the > > > > > > > > scope of what the RIPE Community and the RIPE NCC were > > > > > > > > constituted to do, and I do not believe that the Anti > > > > > > > > Abuse working group has the authority to override this. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > the wg is not overriding anything. 2019-03 is about removing > > > > > > > resources, in much the same way as same resources would have > > > > > > > been removed for payment. (RIPE NCC accounts person would > > > > > > > "judge" that there was no payment and resources would be > > > > > > > affected) > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Just because there is a decision it does not mean that such > > > > > > > a decision > > > > > > > > > > > > > > is "law enforcement" or judicial. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 2019-03 is administrative > > > > > > > > > > > > > > and not legal/law/judicial > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > The second point relates to the long term consequences of > > > > > > > > the proposal. If the RIPE Community were to pass this > > > > > > > > policy, then it would direct the RIPE NCC to act as both > > > > > > > > a judiciary and policing agency for internet abuse. > > > > > > > > Judgement and enforcement of behaviour are the competence > > > > > > > > of national governments, courts and law > > > > > > > > > > > > > > No. You are saying the same thing, though eloquently, in a > > > > > > > different way and trying to link it to some future potential > > > > > > > hijacking by gov of RIR. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > It is not much of a decision that RIPE NCC has to make > > > > > > > either as: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 1. There was hijacking > > > > > > > > > > > > > > OR > > > > > > > > > > > > > > 2. There was no hijacking > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Whether it was accidental, ongoing for long period of time > > > > > > > and all the other technical and scientific facts, this may > > > > > > > require some sort of interpretation of facts. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > But, not whether it actually happened or not. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > But, this is not how to handle the problem of BGP > > > > > > > > hijacking. Even if it had the slightest possibility of > > > > > > > > making any difference at a technical level (which it > > > > > > > > won't), the proposal would set the RIPE Community and the > > > > > > > > RIPE NCC down a road which I believe would be extremely > > > > > > > > unwise to take from a legal and political point of view, > > > > > > > > and which would be difficult, if not impossible to > > > > > > > > manoeuver out of. > > > > > > > ianal, NCC legal will surely evaluate the legal aspects, but > > > > > > > practically every new shell company that has to deal with > > > > > > > compliance and other issues is just another layer in the > > > > > > > onion. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > > > > -- > > > > Kind regards. > > > > Lu > > > > > > -- > > -- > > Kind regards. > > Lu > > -- -- Kind regards. Lu

3 2

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach
by Lu Heng 23 Mar '19

23 Mar '19

Nick are making good point. How about murder is a policy violation? How about rape is a policy violation? Putting RIPE NCC in a juridical position just not what RIPE NCC is. And start using the threat “if you do bad thing(whatever that is) we will take your IP number back” just simply a bad thing both for community as well as for the registry. It’s very much like electricity company tell you if you do something bad we will cut you off and stop supply electricity.and yes, they will cut you if you stop paying them, but that doesn’t mean they can make themselve self juridical court in any bad thing happen in this world. Internet, or registry, are starting if not already is, become part of base infrastructure of the society, but that does not give us any rights in the society to become the supreme court of the society, just like your water company or electricity company won’t judge you for what you use water or electricity for. On Sat, Mar 23, 2019 at 16:54 ac <ac(a)main.me> wrote: > > ugh, english. I do not mean external as in outside I meant external as in > not > allocated. > > for example: complaint received about 147g8oobra912cx47.com > > versus a HIJACKING complaint received about apple.com > > my argument would be that; as 147Goobra912cX.com is not allocated, any > complaints about such a resource is outside the scope of any > administrative authority - and ianal, but, some of what Nick Hilliard > said, may apply. Same as abuse BY a resource, when what Nick Hilliard > said, may also apply. > > The main point is that; > > Because: "hijacking" of a domain name (or any resource) is a direct > administrative issue (this is factual - as per my previous post) > > BUT > > abuse BY a domain name (or any resource) is not necessarily an > administrative issue at all (this is debatable/opinion) - as you said > "some" TLD responds some do not...and RIPE NCC is not the Internet > Police.... > > So, anyway, as 2019-03 deals with hijacking, this entire over reach > argument is factually not relevant at all > > and, more so: 2019-03 not proceeding would be counter to the ethical > administration of resources, a dereliction of responsibility and a breach > of trust implied in any such administration (as well as administrative > authority) > > > On Sat, 23 Mar 2019 08:20:01 +0000 > Suresh Ramasubramanian <ops.lists(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > They either find out for themselves or someone else points it out to > > them. In either case their responsibility continues if what you say > > holds good > > > > --srs > > > > ________________________________ > > From: anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net> on behalf of ac > > <ac(a)main.me> Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2019 1:44 PM > > To: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net > > Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach > > > > > > some of what the wg discusses are opinions and some things are > > scientific facts. > > > > scientific facts may change as environments and other variables > > change, but currently it is so that; > > > > there is NO TLD registry that will allow the ongoing random hijacking > > of domain names (under that TLD of course) > > > > as, this would mean that the TLD does not need to exist at all and/or > > it will not have any trust/value. > > > > RIPE NCC though, is factually a resource administrative authority. > > > > As such, it does need to administer resources and an integral part of > > that resource administration is the core responsibility implied by > > such administration itself and the balance of exercising such > > authority with the implied and direct responsibility of any such > > administration. > > > > Factually, the authority to allocate (or not) is administrative. > > > > I think (my opinion) is that the confusion arises due to whether a > > resource (whether it be a domain name, ip number, etc) is allocated, > > or not. When resources are allocated the administrative responsibility > > is not degraded, in fact a very strong argument could be made that the > > inverse is true: Allocated resources increases the level of > > administrative authority, responsibility and all of the administration > > aspects themselves. > > > > Now, TLD (or RIPE NCC) managing **"external"** complaints about direct > > abuse, is, imho, outside the scope of an administrative authority and > > would be the scenario Nick Hilliard refers to. Then again, this is my > > opinion, so I may be completely wrong (or not) :) > > > > On Sat, 23 Mar 2019 07:27:40 +0000 > > Suresh Ramasubramanian <ops.lists(a)gmail.com> wrote: > > > > > There's also the interesting comparison of how some TLD registries - > > > many of them - act on canceling spam and phish domains while others > > > go to every extreme not to do so. > > > > > > --srs > > > > > > ________________________________ > > > From: anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net> on behalf of ac > > > <ac(a)main.me> Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2019 11:16 AM > > > To: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net > > > Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach > > > > > > On Fri, 22 Mar 2019 17:13:20 +0000 > > > Nick Hilliard <nick(a)foobar.org> wrote: > > > > Regarding over-reach, the RIPE NCC was instituted as a numbering > > > > registry and as a supporting organisation for the RIPE Community, > > > > whose terms of reference are described in the RIPE-1 document. The > > > > terms of reference make it clear that the purpose of the RIPE > > > > Community and the RIPE NCC is internet co-ordination and - > > > > pointedly > > > > - not enforcement. Proposal 2019-03 goes well outside the scope of > > > > what the RIPE Community and the RIPE NCC were constituted to do, > > > > and I do not believe that the Anti Abuse working group has the > > > > authority to override this. > > > > > > > the wg is not overriding anything. 2019-03 is about removing > > > resources, in much the same way as same resources would have been > > > removed for payment. (RIPE NCC accounts person would "judge" that > > > there was no payment and resources would be affected) > > > > > > Just because there is a decision it does not mean that such a > > > decision > > > > > > is "law enforcement" or judicial. > > > > > > 2019-03 is administrative > > > > > > and not legal/law/judicial > > > > > > > The second point relates to the long term consequences of the > > > > proposal. If the RIPE Community were to pass this policy, then it > > > > would direct the RIPE NCC to act as both a judiciary and policing > > > > agency for internet abuse. Judgement and enforcement of behaviour > > > > are the competence of national governments, courts and law > > > > > > No. You are saying the same thing, though eloquently, in a different > > > way and trying to link it to some future potential hijacking by gov > > > of RIR. > > > > > > It is not much of a decision that RIPE NCC has to make either as: > > > > > > 1. There was hijacking > > > > > > OR > > > > > > 2. There was no hijacking > > > > > > Whether it was accidental, ongoing for long period of time and all > > > the other technical and scientific facts, this may require some > > > sort of interpretation of facts. > > > > > > But, not whether it actually happened or not. > > > > > > > > > > > But, this is not how to handle the problem of BGP hijacking. Even > > > > if it had the slightest possibility of making any difference at a > > > > technical level (which it won't), the proposal would set the RIPE > > > > Community and the RIPE NCC down a road which I believe would be > > > > extremely unwise to take from a legal and political point of view, > > > > and which would be difficult, if not impossible to manoeuver out > > > > of. > > > ianal, NCC legal will surely evaluate the legal aspects, but > > > practically every new shell company that has to deal with compliance > > > and other issues is just another layer in the onion. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- -- Kind regards. Lu

4 3

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach
by Suresh Ramasubramanian 23 Mar '19

23 Mar '19

They either find out for themselves or someone else points it out to them. In either case their responsibility continues if what you say holds good --srs ________________________________ From: anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net> on behalf of ac <ac(a)main.me> Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2019 1:44 PM To: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach some of what the wg discusses are opinions and some things are scientific facts. scientific facts may change as environments and other variables change, but currently it is so that; there is NO TLD registry that will allow the ongoing random hijacking of domain names (under that TLD of course) as, this would mean that the TLD does not need to exist at all and/or it will not have any trust/value. RIPE NCC though, is factually a resource administrative authority. As such, it does need to administer resources and an integral part of that resource administration is the core responsibility implied by such administration itself and the balance of exercising such authority with the implied and direct responsibility of any such administration. Factually, the authority to allocate (or not) is administrative. I think (my opinion) is that the confusion arises due to whether a resource (whether it be a domain name, ip number, etc) is allocated, or not. When resources are allocated the administrative responsibility is not degraded, in fact a very strong argument could be made that the inverse is true: Allocated resources increases the level of administrative authority, responsibility and all of the administration aspects themselves. Now, TLD (or RIPE NCC) managing **"external"** complaints about direct abuse, is, imho, outside the scope of an administrative authority and would be the scenario Nick Hilliard refers to. Then again, this is my opinion, so I may be completely wrong (or not) :) On Sat, 23 Mar 2019 07:27:40 +0000 Suresh Ramasubramanian <ops.lists(a)gmail.com> wrote: > There's also the interesting comparison of how some TLD registries - > many of them - act on canceling spam and phish domains while others > go to every extreme not to do so. > > --srs > > ________________________________ > From: anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net> on behalf of ac > <ac(a)main.me> Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2019 11:16 AM > To: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net > Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach > > On Fri, 22 Mar 2019 17:13:20 +0000 > Nick Hilliard <nick(a)foobar.org> wrote: > > Regarding over-reach, the RIPE NCC was instituted as a numbering > > registry and as a supporting organisation for the RIPE Community, > > whose terms of reference are described in the RIPE-1 document. The > > terms of reference make it clear that the purpose of the RIPE > > Community and the RIPE NCC is internet co-ordination and - pointedly > > - not enforcement. Proposal 2019-03 goes well outside the scope of > > what the RIPE Community and the RIPE NCC were constituted to do, and > > I do not believe that the Anti Abuse working group has the authority > > to override this. > > > the wg is not overriding anything. 2019-03 is about removing > resources, in much the same way as same resources would have been > removed for payment. (RIPE NCC accounts person would "judge" that > there was no payment and resources would be affected) > > Just because there is a decision it does not mean that such a decision > > is "law enforcement" or judicial. > > 2019-03 is administrative > > and not legal/law/judicial > > > The second point relates to the long term consequences of the > > proposal. If the RIPE Community were to pass this policy, then it > > would direct the RIPE NCC to act as both a judiciary and policing > > agency for internet abuse. Judgement and enforcement of behaviour > > are the competence of national governments, courts and law > > No. You are saying the same thing, though eloquently, in a different > way and trying to link it to some future potential hijacking by gov > of RIR. > > It is not much of a decision that RIPE NCC has to make either as: > > 1. There was hijacking > > OR > > 2. There was no hijacking > > Whether it was accidental, ongoing for long period of time and all the > other technical and scientific facts, this may require some sort of > interpretation of facts. > > But, not whether it actually happened or not. > > > > > But, this is not how to handle the problem of BGP hijacking. Even > > if it had the slightest possibility of making any difference at a > > technical level (which it won't), the proposal would set the RIPE > > Community and the RIPE NCC down a road which I believe would be > > extremely unwise to take from a legal and political point of view, > > and which would be difficult, if not impossible to manoeuver out of. > > > ianal, NCC legal will surely evaluate the legal aspects, but > practically every new shell company that has to deal with compliance > and other issues is just another layer in the onion. > > > > >

2 1

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach
by Suresh Ramasubramanian 23 Mar '19

23 Mar '19

There's also the interesting comparison of how some TLD registries - many of them - act on canceling spam and phish domains while others go to every extreme not to do so. --srs ________________________________ From: anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net> on behalf of ac <ac(a)main.me> Sent: Saturday, March 23, 2019 11:16 AM To: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 and over-reach On Fri, 22 Mar 2019 17:13:20 +0000 Nick Hilliard <nick(a)foobar.org> wrote: > Regarding over-reach, the RIPE NCC was instituted as a numbering > registry and as a supporting organisation for the RIPE Community, > whose terms of reference are described in the RIPE-1 document. The > terms of reference make it clear that the purpose of the RIPE > Community and the RIPE NCC is internet co-ordination and - pointedly > - not enforcement. Proposal 2019-03 goes well outside the scope of > what the RIPE Community and the RIPE NCC were constituted to do, and > I do not believe that the Anti Abuse working group has the authority > to override this. > the wg is not overriding anything. 2019-03 is about removing resources, in much the same way as same resources would have been removed for payment. (RIPE NCC accounts person would "judge" that there was no payment and resources would be affected) Just because there is a decision it does not mean that such a decision is "law enforcement" or judicial. 2019-03 is administrative and not legal/law/judicial > The second point relates to the long term consequences of the > proposal. If the RIPE Community were to pass this policy, then it > would direct the RIPE NCC to act as both a judiciary and policing > agency for internet abuse. Judgement and enforcement of behaviour > are the competence of national governments, courts and law No. You are saying the same thing, though eloquently, in a different way and trying to link it to some future potential hijacking by gov of RIR. It is not much of a decision that RIPE NCC has to make either as: 1. There was hijacking OR 2. There was no hijacking Whether it was accidental, ongoing for long period of time and all the other technical and scientific facts, this may require some sort of interpretation of facts. But, not whether it actually happened or not. > > But, this is not how to handle the problem of BGP hijacking. Even if > it had the slightest possibility of making any difference at a > technical level (which it won't), the proposal would set the RIPE > Community and the RIPE NCC down a road which I believe would be > extremely unwise to take from a legal and political point of view, > and which would be difficult, if not impossible to manoeuver out of. > ianal, NCC legal will surely evaluate the legal aspects, but practically every new shell company that has to deal with compliance and other issues is just another layer in the onion.

2 1

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)
by Carlos Friaças 23 Mar '19

23 Mar '19

Hi Erik, All, Thanks for your input. Your message was quite long, so i'll try to answer several aspects of it below, after quoting what you wrote. ======= > 1. "The official reaction to Dutch parliament was, that it was too hard > to prosecute or even find the actual people behind the hijack and they > decided not to go after them." This means they decided this time, it doesn't mean they wouldn't decide differently in a subsequent timeframe. The hijackers could easily repeat their wrongdoings? Yes, they could, with the same set of resources (same ASN and same other legitimate prefixes to support the 'operation'). It's important also to state that a different victim might feel differently and it could value extra tools in fighting this. Remember, a non-dutch victim will have some extra difficulty engaging with dutch courts because those victims will lack in knowledge about dutch law. This is also a case which involved #politics. A private company (as a victim), would probably in the first place defend their own interests and their shareholders, regardless of its country's politics. ======= > 2. "Even IF they would have proceeded .. under Dutch law, BGP Hijacking > isn't a criminal offence and as a result, not directly illegal or > criminal.. Performing a (D)DOS or breaking into a computer system is.. > but BGP hijacking as such isn't. Especially if the IP space wasn't in > use.. so nothing broke or stopped working .." So, acting at RIR level could be seen as actually filling in for a gap in Dutch law? If this is the case, good, as this gap affects people well beyond dutch (and EU) borders. Again, i think we are dismissing the relevance of the other type of victims involved... those who *receive* the hijacked routes announcements and can be easily tricked by "oh, this is the dutch parliament's space, so this should be fine" and then their packets go towards the hijacker's network/systems. That's a clear path to enable "impersonation", "fraud", and so on... ======= > 3. "So even if they would get the Bulgarian spammer/hijackers in front > of a Dutch judge .. the change was that ... they would walk, because there > was no harm done .. No law was broken, no system invaded and nothing > stopped working..." I think 2019-03's goal is not to bring more people from around the world in front of Dutch judges. :-) With this self-regulatory framework in place hijackers (and everyone) will have in writing that their actions are not tolerated by the community, and if it comes to that, their 'business model' will be somewhat affected if they need to gather/find new numbers to resume their line of 'business'. ======= > 4. "So in this case, the Italian Police (ROS) used (forced??) an Italian > ISP to hijack some IP space to regain control of their lost RAT C&C > server.. (endpoint for RAT infected machines.) This wasn't an accident > .. but was it criminal by the ISP to assist their local police ? And > what would have been the impact if they didn't... ?" While this might be indifferent for the average Internet User in Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Chile, Canada, Seychelles or Belize, and any of them might argue this line of action should have a consequence, the best way 2019-03 tries to accomodate this type of corner cases is the ratification phase. Those who will have to ratify a 2nd instance report can be provided with enough evidence (an Italian court order?) so that ratification doesn't occur. Even if this isn't the case (and no evidence is provided) or the report even disputed, the ISP can only get a warning (and the concrete consequence is out of 2019-03's scope). ======= > 5. "These are your/our tax dollars at work ... They either don't care > or are the bad actor themselves." It depends on the viewpoint and the available set of evidence. In this case it can also be argued that it was a good actor. :-) Additionally, nothing guarantees that a report/complaint is going to be issued against _every_ hijack. Also, admissible evidence (from historical routing data) will have an expiration timeframe in version 2.0. ======= > 6. "So the customers that hold an SSA or End-User Agreement (PI Holders > for IP space and AS number) look to be the 'target' of the policy, > however that leaves out the legacy resource holders.." That is unaccurate. The 'target' is everyone who intentionally performs an hijack. About the legacy resource holders, if they violate RIPE policies, i don't see why their access to NCC's Services can't be denied (permanently or temporarily?) -- that's my interpretation, but we can also have a line about that in version 2.0. If RPKI is not available for legacy resources, that might have some impact. ======= > 7. "And with the current transfer policies in place, yes it is possible > to obtain a legacy AS number and a legacy IPv4 prefix ...for yourself .. > and those can't be 'retrieved' with this policy .. And even with the > policy, it isn't the RIPE NCC that COULD de-register them as they are > not allocated by the RIPE NCC in the first place ..." Exactly. Here we agree. The only possible consequence/effect (imho) is denying access to services, based on non-compliance with RIPE policies. Anyway, 2019-03 doesn't have the "recovering" of resources back to the NCC as a goal. ======= > 8. "So Legacy holders (resources with a legacy status) are for obvious > reasons, excluded for penalties and out of reach. Also according to the > policy that specifies services to Legacy holders, as this policy doesn't > state that it wants to include and impact legacy holders." I don't agree. If you check i was one of the co-authors of 2012-07 :-) In my initial drafts for 2019-03, there was a line about legacy holders. It seems now clear it needs to be recovered for version 2.0 :-) ======= > 9. "The biggest issue what I see in this policy, is that the RIPE NCC ( > either themselves or the Exec Board. ) is desired / aimed to pull the > trigger on a membership or contractual relationship." And they could (the Exec Board) decide not to do it, due to the ratification section. But *today*, it's a tool they don't have. If you are uncomfortable with the Exec Board, would the RIPE Chair/Vice-Chair be an acceptable alternative? Or should a different set of people be selected to have control over the ratification knob? ======= > 10. "These kind of actions or decisions should be kept out of the RIPE > NCC office and the actual case and decision should be made by a court > and court order." I fully agree the NCC staff should be completely kept out of this process. I'm not entirely sure about the Exec Board, but would easily agree on an independent set of people. As you already stated, Dutch law has a loophole (ok, you might not see it as a loophole) where a BGP hijack is not illegal, so saying "come back with a court order" is something that obviously won't happen and hijacks can happily proceed without any major disturbance. ======= > 11. "If someone likes to make the case that someone is in violation, > there should be a neutral judge that should review the case and the > accuser can go to the RIPE NCC with the result .. And the RIPE NCC will > just execute based on the outcome." That's what we tried to design with 2019-03, where the "neutral judge" is a set of experts -- i.e. more than one. ======= > 12. "I can understand the sentiment or intent of the policy, but I'm > against any form of policy where the RIPE NCC or the Exec Board will be > involved in the actual decision like this as it will impact their > neutral status and the fact they are opening themselves for liability > claims." As i've written above, i'm open to suggestions about how to take the Exec Board out of the picture, so that could be incorporated in version 2.0 (please see #9 above). ======= Best Regards, Carlos

5 5

2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)
by António Manuel Araújo Da Silva Rio Costa 22 Mar '19

22 Mar '19

Hi, I express my support to the 2019-03 proposal Best Regards; António Rio Costa UTAD ICT email: acosta(a)utad.pt sip: acosta(a)voip.utad.pt ext: 4668 Tlf: +351 259350668 ___________________________________________ I do not fear computers. I fear the lack of them. "Isaac Asimov" __________________________________________________________ ---Nota de Confidencialidade--- Os dados constantes da presente mensagem são destinados apenas à(s) pessoa(s) ou entidade(s) acima referida(s), podendo conter informação CONFIDENCIAL, cuja divulgação está expressamente vedada nos termos da lei. Se não é o destinatário da mensagem, ou se ela lhe foi enviada por engano, por favor informe de imediato enviando um email para acosta(a)utad.pt e apague a mesma. --- Confidentiality Note --- The data contained in this message is intended only for the person (s) or entity (s) referred to above, and may contain CONFIDENTIAL information whose disclosure is expressly prohibited under the law. If you are not the recipient of the message, or if it was sent to you in error, please inform immediately by sending an email to acosta(a)utad.pt and delete it.

1 0

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)
by Gert Doering 22 Mar '19

22 Mar '19

Hi, On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 07:38:34AM +0000, Suresh Ramasubramanian wrote: > Ah that way. Then - > > Do we have rough consensus? If not at what point is it reached? Now this is left to the AA WG chairs to decide :-) As per the RIPE PDP, we're in "discussion phase", which is run to the end date Marco announced (too lazy to look it up). Then, the proposers decide together with the relevant WG chairs if they think it makes sense to go ahead (it does not have to have consensus, but should have some amount of support, and no counter arguments that are compelling enough to outright kill the proposal). If yes, the RIPE NCC does the Impact Analysis, and the proposal moves to review phase. At the end of the review phase, the WG chairs determine rough consensus. Here's a nice video about the phases https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies plus the link to the formal document https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-710 Gert Doering -- NetMaster -- have you enabled IPv6 on something today...? SpaceNet AG Vorstand: Sebastian v. Bomhard, Michael Emmer Joseph-Dollinger-Bogen 14 Aufsichtsratsvors.: A. Grundner-Culemann D-80807 Muenchen HRB: 136055 (AG Muenchen) Tel: +49 (0)89/32356-444 USt-IdNr.: DE813185279

4 4

2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)
by CSIRT.UMINHO Jose Ramada 21 Mar '19

21 Mar '19

Hello all. I support the 2019-03 proposal. Cumprimentos, Jose Ramada ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------- CSIRT.UMINHO - Universidade do Minho Serviços de Comunicações - Campus de Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga - Portugal Tel.: + <callto:351%20253%2060%2010%2020> 351 253 60 10 20, Fax: <callto:+351%20253%2060%2010%2029> +351 253 60 10 29 <https://csirt.uminho.pt/> https://csirt.uminho.pt | <mailto:report@csirt.uminho.pt> report(a)csirt.uminho.pt | <mailto:info@csirt.uminho.pt> info(a)csirt.uminho.pt ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- --------------------------------------------------------------- This email is confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not disclose or use the information contained in it. If you have received this mail in error, please tell us immediately by return email and delete the document --- Este e-mail foi verificado em termos de vírus pelo software antivírus Avast. https://www.avast.com/antivirus

1 0

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP
by CSIRT.UMINHO Amandio Antunes 21 Mar '19

21 Mar '19

Hi all! I support the 2019-03 proposal. Cumprimentos, Amândio Antunes ----------------------------------------------------------------- CSIRT.UMINHO Universidade do Minho Serviços de Comunicações Campus de Gualtar, 4710-057 Braga - Portugal Tel.: + 351 253 60 40 20, Fax: +351 253 60 40 21 email: amandio(a)csirt.uminho.pt | http://www.csirt.uminho.pt ----------------------------------------------------------------- This email is confidential. If you are not the intended recipient, you must not disclose or use the information contained in it. If you have received this mail in error, please tell us immediately by return email and delete the document. -- Este email é confidêncial. Se não é o destinatário do mesmo, não deve nem revelar, nem usar o seu conteúdo. Se recebeu esta mensagem por engano, por favor informe-nos Imediatamente, devolvendo e apagando este email.

1 0

2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation)
by Filipe Manuel Rebelo 21 Mar '19

21 Mar '19

Hi, I would like to express my support to the 2019-03 proposal. Regards. ________________________________ AVISO - Esta mensagem e quaisquer documentos anexos seus podem conter informa??o confidencial sujeita a sigilo profissional para uso exclusivo do(s) seu(s) destinat?rio(s). Cabe ao destinat?rio assegurar a verifica??o da exist?ncia de v?rus ou erros, uma vez que a informa??o contida pode ser intercetada ou corrompida. Se n?o for o destinat?rio, n?o dever? usar, distribuir ou copiar este e-mail, devendo proceder ? sua elimina??o e informar o emissor. ? estritamente proibido o uso, a distribui??o, c?pia ou qualquer forma de dissemina??o n?o autorizada do conte?do desta mensagem. DISCLAIMER - This message, as well as any attachments to it, may contain confidential information for exclusive use of the intended recipients. The recipients are responsible for the verification of the existence of viruses or errors, since the information transmitted could have been intercepted or in any way corrupted. If you?re not the intended recipient, you cannot use, distribute or copy this message, and you should destroy it and inform the originator of it. It?s strictly prohibited the use, distribution copy or any other form of unauthorized dissemination of this message?s content.

1 0

@EXT: 2019-03 New Policy Proposal
by Marcolla, Sara Veronica 20 Mar '19

20 Mar '19

Hi all, +1 for the proposal as is. Thank you both Carlos and Jordi for bringing this topic up for discussion. Kind regards, Sara Marcolla Europol - O3 European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3) www.europol.europa.eu ******************* DISCLAIMER : This message is sent in confidence and is only intended for the named recipient. If you receive this message by mistake, you may not use, copy, distribute or forward this message, or any part of its contents or rely upon the information contained in it. Please notify the sender immediately by e-mail and delete the relevant e-mails from any computer. This message does not constitute a commitment by Europol unless otherwise indicated. *******************

1 0

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal
by Karl-Josef Ziegler 20 Mar '19

20 Mar '19

Hello! I'm also supporting this new policy proposal. Best regards, - Karl-Josef Ziegler

1 0

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] [routing-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation) to be discussed on Anti-Abuse Working Group Mailing List
by Andrey Korolyov 19 Mar '19

19 Mar '19

> > You can find the full proposal at: > https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-03 Hey WG, out of curiosity, why neighboring ASNs are not carrying any responsibility for not filtering out a malicious advertisement from a directly-peered neighbor in the proposal? AFAIU most leaks happen because large parties are letting their ACL loose, not because some state-backed player decides to take a pick on someone's else traffic (though both variants exists). The peer who allows any prefix announcement originating from its direct neighbor is no less responsible for the hijack as the origin AS itself. Could you please suggest a possibility to include that kind of relations (determined by third parties, as currently stated for hijacker's AS in the draft) and measures against a transit/upstream in same manner as they are currently defined for a hijacker? Thanks.

3 4

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] [routing-wg] 2019-03 New Policy Proposal (BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy Violation) to be discussed on Anti-Abuse Working Group Mailing List
by Daniel Suchy 19 Mar '19

19 Mar '19

Hello, my comments: - section 4.0: Assessers should be under direct community control (voted/approved by community/members), not just defined by NCC. - section 4.0 + 7.0 should define minimal number of assessers - reported incidents (reported by web-form defined at 4.0) should be public, at least some metadata (prefix, offending ASN) to avoid duplicate reports - with indication of assessment stage on that list - Daniel On 3/19/19 1:42 PM, Marco Schmidt wrote: > Dear colleagues, > > A new RIPE Policy proposal, 2019-03, "BGP Hijacking is a RIPE Policy > Violation", is now available for discussion. > > This proposed policy is of interest to both the Anti-Abuse and Routing > working groups. The chairs of both these working groups have agreed to > keep the discussion on one single mailing list to avoid duplication, and > for formal consideration of the proposal within the RIPE Policy > Development Process. > > You are therefore requested to share your feedback on this proposal with > the Anti-Abuse mailing list. > > The goal of this proposal is to define that BGP hijacking is not > accepted as normal practice within the RIPE NCC service region. > > You can find the full proposal at: > https://www.ripe.net/participate/policies/proposals/2019-03 > > We encourage you to review this proposal and send your comments to > <anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net> before 17 April 2019. > > Kind regards, > > Marco Schmidt > Policy Officer > RIPE NCC > >

2 1

RIPE NCC Report: Law Enforcement Agency Requests 2018
by Linda Slaakweg 19 Mar '19

19 Mar '19

Dear colleagues, We have published a transparency report that details the nature of the requests we received from law enforcement agencies (LEAs) in 2018. You can find the report at: https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-715/ <https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-715/> Kind regards, Linda Slaakweg Legal Counsel RIPE NCC

3 2

Webzilla
by Ronald F. Guilmette 18 Mar '19

18 Mar '19

Perhaps some folks here might be interested to read these two report, the first of which is a fresh news report published just a couple of days ago, and the other one is a far more detailed investigative report that was completed some time ago now. https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/kenbensinger/dossier-gubarev-russian-h… https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5770258-Fti.html Please share these links widely. The detailed technical report makes it quite abundantly clear that Webzilla, and all of its various tentacles... many of which even I didn't know about until seeing this report... most probably qualifies as, and has qualified as a "bullet proof hosting" operation for some considerable time now. As the report notes, the company has received over 400,000 complaints or reports of bad behavior, and it is not clear to me, from reading the report, if anyone at the company even bothered to read any more than a small handful of those. I have two comments about this. First, I am inclined to wonder aloud why anyone is even still peering with any of the several ASNs mentioned in the report. To me, the mere fact that any of these ASNs still have connectivity represents a clear and self-evident failure of "self policing" in and among the networks that comprise the Internet. Second, its has already been a well know fact, both to me and to many others, for some years now, that Webzilla is by no means alone in the category commonly refered to as "bullet proof hosters". This fact itself raises some obvious questions. It is clear and apparent, not only from the report linked to above, but from the continuous and years-long existance of -many- "bullet proof hosters" on the Internet that there is no shortage of a market for the services of such hosting companies. The demand for "bullet proof" services is clearly there, and it is not likely to go away any time soon. In addition to the criminal element, there are also various mischevious governments, or their agents, that will always be more that happy to pay premium prices for no-questions-asked connectivity. So the question naturally arises: Other than de-peering by other networks, are there any other steps that can be taken to disincentivize networks from participating in this "bullet proof" market and/or to incentivize them to give a damn about their received network abuse complaints? I have no answers for this question myself, but I felt that it was about time that someone at least posed the question. The industry generally, and especially in the RIPE region, has a clear and evident problem that traditional "self policing" is not solving. Worse yet, it is not even discussed much, and that is allowing it to fester and worsen, over time. It would be Good if there was some actual leadership on this issue, at least from -some- quarter. So far I have not noticed any such worth commenting about, and even looking out towards the future horizon, I don't see any arriving any time soon. Regards, rfg

2 2

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Webzilla
by Fi Shing 17 Mar '19

17 Mar '19

2 1

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Google Privacy Abuse
by Fi Shing 16 Mar '19

16 Mar '19

3 4

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Google Privacy Abuse
by Fi Shing 16 Mar '19

16 Mar '19

1 0

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Google Privacy Abuse
by Fi Shing 15 Mar '19

15 Mar '19

1 0

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Google Privacy Abuse
by Esa Laitinen 14 Mar '19

14 Mar '19

On Thu, Mar 14, 2019 at 6:05 AM ac <ac(a)main.me> wrote: > HTTPS protocol, by design, is secure and private. > > The average consumer expects this to be true. > > Google had to actually go and change, in an "under cover" way, the > entire way and method that HTTPS works. This "change" is being sold as > a "good thing" to poor people and/or people with low bandwidth and that > Google is doing a "good thing" by making this change. > Dear Andre The URLs you're accessing are also available for - your ISP - your VPN provider (unless you've rolled your own) and some information is also potentially stored by - your DNS provider And Opera browser has been doing similar things when you've enabled the bandwidth savings. or am I missing something? OK. I'm ignoring here that this particular thingi is using MITM methods to do the optimization, which is for me a bit more worrying than google having access to the URLs I browse. They have them mostly anyway. But, it is a choice a user makes, it is not forced upon them. Yours, esa -- Skype: reunaesa Yahoo: reunaesa Mobile: +4178 838 57 77

2 1

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Google Privacy Abuse
by Cynthia Revström 14 Mar '19

14 Mar '19

How is this relevant to RIPE? - Cynthia Thu Mar 14 06:05:10 GMT+01:00 2019 ac <ac(a)main.me>: > On Wed, 13 Mar 2019 14:28:24 -0700 > "Ronald F. Guilmette" wrote: > > ac you wrote: > > >Now Google has apparently started saving, tracking and keeping all > > >https URL's that its chrome/chrome lite products use. > > And? > > If you don't like it, vote with your feet and use a different browser. > > If you have trouble finding any such, try googleing for "browser > > download". > > Oops! But I guess that would expose you to mind numbing and > > tragically horrible snooping on your private parts. > > Sorry. My bad. > > Regards, > > rfg > > P.S. My apologies to the list for indulging that which should not be > > indulged. > > > > I see that you are ignorant of what this actually means? > > Maybe their are other tech's that are also ignorant of what this really > means? > > HTTPS protocol, by design, is secure and private. > > The average consumer expects this to be true. > > Google had to actually go and change, in an "under cover" way, the > entire way and method that HTTPS works. This "change" is being sold as > a "good thing" to poor people and/or people with low bandwidth and that > Google is doing a "good thing" by making this change. > > I know already: Everything Google is not always what it seems and it is > a slippery slope. Soon Google will also be storing all Chrome https url's > > Now: Here is the REAL bad evil - that is coming to YOU (and Me) in the > future: > > So, Chrome, for its tracking, will be faster. > > User will think - ooh, faster = better. > > In all probability this is just the very first change in how local > software manages HTTPS url's and other browsers may be forced to do > similar EVIL as the user (sheep) experience of Chrome users will be > faster (the local device will now store the actual media and link it > with the stored URL) > > By our silence and by our acceptance of the method and how Google does > what it does we allow this business to dominate and control. > > One could also argue that not only is this abuse, but it is fraud. > > As many things Google is often misrepresented. > > It should be made clear to consumers that they are products. > > Society should step up and Governments should do much much more > > to protect the weak, the stupid and all the sheep. > > The Google users do not expect, understand or agree that all the > https url's they visit will be tracked, used and stored. > > And, this is why this is abuse and/or evil. > > Andre > > > >

2 1

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Google Privacy Abuse
by Ronald F. Guilmette 14 Mar '19

14 Mar '19

ac <ac(a)main.me> you wrote: >Now Google has apparently started saving, tracking and keeping all https >URL's that its chrome/chrome lite products use. And? If you don't like it, vote with your feet and use a different browser. If you have trouble finding any such, try googleing for "browser download". Oops! But I guess that would expose you to mind numbing and tragically horrible snooping on your private parts. Sorry. My bad. Regards, rfg P.S. My apologies to the list for indulging that which should not be indulged.

2 2

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Verification of abuse contact addresses ?
by Fi Shing 13 Mar '19

13 Mar '19

5 4

Google Privacy Abuse
by ac 13 Mar '19

13 Mar '19

Hi All, https is meant to be secure and Google pushed hard for general adoption all over the planet. The premise was that the pages users visit and user traffic would be more private. Now Google has apparently started saving, tracking and keeping all https URL's that its chrome/chrome lite products use. Google says that Cookies and other personal data is not saved on their servers. https://www.slashgear.com/chrome-lite-pages-bring-data-saver-to-https-websi… The really bad and evil part is that Google is softly softly selling the Kool-Aid (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Drinking_the_Kool-Aid ) and introducing this major, bulk and brutal invasion of privacy (to all the Google sheep/products) as something "good" and saving of bandwidth etc. Yet, technically, the products with the bandwidth issue still have little benefit in trade for this brutal invasion as they still have to download over the same slow network connection... WTF! This type of abuse is also an abuse of common sense and if Google wants to milk their sheep or track their products they should do so more directly and openly so that their products know and understand what the effect of being a google product is. Instead a big play is made that Google does not store the cookies or other personal data. Wow. Andre

1 0

Constructive Approach & Anonymity (Was RE: Verification of abuse contact addresses ? )
by Brian Nisbet 11 Mar '19

11 Mar '19

Folks, We aim for constructive discussion on the mailing list at all times and I would ask everyone to bear this in mind. I very much agree with " We make this a better world by helping with advice that empowers, not with diminish comments." I would also point out that there is no requirement for legal names to be used on the mailing list and there are many reasons in this world for anonymity. As a final point to consider, the word 'lame' isn't great as it is ableist. There are many, many other suitable words in the English language that merit examination that are much better in this context. Thanks, Brian Co-Chair, RIPE AA-WG Brian Nisbet Service Operations Manager HEAnet CLG, Ireland's National Education and Research Network 1st Floor, 5 George's Dock, IFSC, Dublin D01 X8N7, Ireland +35316609040 brian.nisbet(a)heanet.ie www.heanet.ie Registered in Ireland, No. 275301. CRA No. 20036270 > -----Original Message----- > From: anti-abuse-wg <anti-abuse-wg-bounces(a)ripe.net> On Behalf Of > Serge Droz via anti-abuse-wg > Sent: Friday 8 March 2019 10:54 > To: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net > Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Verification of abuse contact addresses ? > > Hi > > I'm fairly new here. This is a formidable task, and not easily achieved. > So kudos to RIPE for doing this. The abuse contacts already there helped me > a lot. > > I don't appreciate people who can't even stand up with their real names, just > pointing out that others are lame. > > We make this a better world by helping with advice that empowers, not with > diminish comments. > > Cheers > Serge > > > On 08.03.19 11:40, Shane Kerr wrote: > > Fi Shing, > > > > I'm sure verifying the delivery of 70k e-mails (or however many is in > > the database) can be done in a few hours. > > > > But Marco's response mentions to *correcting* the contact addresses, > > not just verifying them. That involves working with human beings, so > > it makes sense that it will take a while. > > > > Cheers, > > > > -- > > Shane > > > > On 08/03/2019 11.07, Fi Shing wrote: > >> If it takes more than a week to verify your entire database, there is > >> the first sign that something is wrong with your system. > >> > >> > >> -------- Original Message -------- > >> Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Verification of abuse contact > >> addresses ? > >> From: Marco Schmidt <mschmidt(a)ripe.net > >> <mailto:mschmidt@ripe.net>> > >> Date: Thu, March 07, 2019 10:03 pm > >> To: "Ronald F. Guilmette" <rfg(a)tristatelogic.com > >> <mailto:rfg@tristatelogic.com>>, > >> anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net <mailto:anti-abuse-wg@ripe.net> > >> > >> Hello Ronald, > >> > >> We are planning to publish an updated timeline soon. > >> > >> Ultimately, our implementation will depend of the level of > >> cooperation > >> we get from LIRs and the nature of issues that need to be fixed > >> before > >> an abuse contact can be updated (for example, some organisations > >> may > >> need to reset their maintainer password). > >> > >> Over the next few weeks we will be analysing our progress, to > >> make a > >> realistic estimation. From observations so far, we think we might > >> be > >> able to finish our initial validation of all abuse contacts > >> within six > >> months - but it is still too early to make any strong predictions. > >> > >> Kind regards, > >> Marco Schmidt > >> RIPE NCC > >> > >> > >> On 05/03/2019 21:51, Ronald F. Guilmette wrote: > >> > In message <9c95c110-d5a3-e94a-6b3c-b02030736e7c(a)ripe.net > >> <mailto:9c95c110-d5a3-e94a-6b3c-b02030736e7c@ripe.net>>, > >> > Marco Schmidt <mschmidt(a)ripe.net <mailto:mschmidt@ripe.net>> > wrote: > >> > > >> >> It is correct that the implementation phase is still ongoing. > >> Currently > >> >> we are validating all the abuse contact information referenced > >> in LIR > >> >> organisation objects. Then we will proceed with the validation > >> of abuse > >> >> contacts referenced in LIR resource objects - the example that > >> you > >> >> mentioned belongs to this group. And finally all abuse > >> contacts > >> >> referenced in End User (sponsored) objects will be validated. > >> > Thanks for the info Marco. > >> > > >> > I guess the only question I would ask is this: Is there a > >> published > >> > timeline for how this whole process is planned to play out, and > >> for > >> > when it is planned to be completed? > >> > > >> > > >> > Regards, > >> > rfg > >> > > >> > >> > > > > > > -- > Dr. Serge Droz > Member of the FIRST Board of Directors Senior Advisor ICT4Peace > https://www.first.org https://www.ict4peace.org

4 3

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Verification of abuse contact addresses ?
by Fi Shing 11 Mar '19

11 Mar '19

5 4

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Verification of abuse contact addresses ?
by Fi Shing 08 Mar '19

08 Mar '19

4 3

Verification of abuse contact addresses ?
by Ronald F. Guilmette 08 Mar '19

08 Mar '19

Sorry folks, when this topic was discussed, I confess that I wasn't really paying much attention. So now I am forced to ask: Was someone going to verify the abuse contact addresses listed in the RIPE WHOIS data base? If so, how is that project coming along? I'll tell you why I ask. It's quite simple really. Some jerk, probably Mexican, just sent me a spam wherein he was advertising for sale his list of 18 million "business" email addreses. (I can't quite tell if those are all supposed to be specifically Mexican email addrses or what... because the spam was written in Spanish, and I don't speak Spanish.) https://pastebin.com/raw/dT11krpN Note that the specific email address of mine that was spammed was one that I only used in ancient times, and only in conjunction with my activities on one specific web site. (It obviously leaked somehow.) The envelope sender address was forged to be my own. The source IP was 109.68.33.19 as you can see. So naturally, I performed a RIPE WHOIS query on that IP address and the results I got back indicated that the contact email address for spam reports was <abuse(a)meshdigital.com>. So I emailed off a report to that address. Of course, it bounced back to me immediately as undeliverable. This causes me to suspect that either (a) that stuff that I thought that I has seen previously about a project to verify abuse addresses was all just a bunch of malarkey, or else (b) that project is still unfinished and perhaps not going all that well. Could someone please enlighten me and tell me which possibility actually applies? Regards, rfg P.s. It is annoying enough to have to lookup who the bleep should receive a report about spamming from their network _and_ to have to even write such reports, when 9 time sout of ten, the sending network could have easly prevented the spam from even going out. It is just adding insult to injury when the bloody "official" abuse reporting address doesn't even actually exist. And of course, neither meshdigital.com nor meshdigital.net even have functioning web sites. Apparently this is all the work of some dolts at a company called heg.com, in Germany. Do any of you happen to know any of the clueless nitwits who work there? If so, maybe you could put me in direct touch so that I could personally apply a much needed clue-by-four.

3 5