November 2015 - anti-abuse-wg

Re: [anti-abuse-wg] WHOIS (AS204224)
by Sascha Luck [ml] 06 Nov '15

06 Nov '15

On Fri, Nov 06, 2015 at 12:46:44PM -0500, Jeffrey Race wrote: >I said that the mechanism by which the >internet operates was slackly designed and >is slackly operated so has become a cesspool of >criminality. Yes. In the same way that roads have been designed without police checkpoints every few 100 metres, so they have become the favoured means of transportation for criminals. In the same way that cities have not been designed as prisons, so they have become "cesspools of criminality". In the same way that phone networks have been designed without positive vetting of all users and (until recently) without the means to record any and all conversations, so they are/were used daily by criminals. Had the internet been designed like a corporate LAN with strict access controls, it would not exist today. rgds, Sascha Luck

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] WHOIS (AS204224)
by Sascha Luck [ml] 06 Nov '15

06 Nov '15

On Fri, Nov 06, 2015 at 11:57:18AM -0500, Jeffrey Race wrote: >>The internet resource management mechanism as managed by RIRs and >>LIRS is "of a criminal nature", do I understand you correctly? > >The mechanism is the internet Uhuh. I guess it's just as well that barely any operators seem to read this list. They may be less than happy to learn that they are all criminals. rgds, Sascha Luck

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] WHOIS (AS204224)
by Sascha Luck [ml] 06 Nov '15

06 Nov '15

On Fri, Nov 06, 2015 at 10:01:33AM -0500, Jeffrey Race wrote: >At present the internet is a cesspool of crime without >effective mechanisms of accountability and traceability. An As an, albeit small, part of the Internet, I take exception to this statement. >outsider viewing this thread (and the dozens of others I've been >monitoring for more than a decade) would find remarkable the >unspoken assumption of their discussions: how to make life >trouble-free for the registration and contracting bodies, even >though this makes inevitable the criminal nature of the >mechanism they are charged with managing. The internet resource management mechanism as managed by RIRs and LIRS is "of a criminal nature", do I understand you correctly? >With a proper goal in mind ("Develop our mechanisms so the >internet is no longer a cesspool of crime") the kind of >discussion below ("We can't consider that because it would be a >lot of work and some people would become upset") would be out of >bounds. What discussion is out-of-bounds is not for you to determine, sir. >The matter of the "defining discussion goal" will have to be >taken up in order to make progress on this list's putative >purpose of "anti-abuse." Had you read the charter of this WG, you would have learned that its purpose is to *discuss* abuse, not to stamp it out. And I will say again, you will NOT define what the goals or contents of discussion in this WG are. rgds, Sascha Luck > >Jeffrey Race > > >On Fri, 6 Nov 2015 13:49:01 +0000, Sascha Luck [ml] wrote: > >>On Fri, Nov 06, 2015 at 11:56:51AM +0100, denis wrote: >>> >>>Add to that all the possible language issues and I am not sure >>>how you will expect the RIPE NCC to validate all this personal >>>contact data with people who they have no relationship with >>>and who may have never heard of the RIPE NCC or RIPE. Anyone >>>who receives an email from an organisation they have never >>>heard of, possibly in a language they don't understand, asking >>>to validate personal information...well you know how that will >>>be treated these days. >> >>I've occasionally done db cleanup death-marches for customers >>where I've created/updated/deleted 100 or so objects in a >>single day. (usually with contact data relating to the LIR >>which does have a contract with the NCC) Is the idea seriously >>that someone doing this will have to field 100 phone calls or >>reply to 100 emails over the day? >> >>What about the numerous LIRs who do their resource management >>programatically, without human input? >> >>IMO, such actions would actually discourage proper resource >>management and lower the quality of the db. >> >>>Also bear in mind a single data validation is quite pointless. >>>What is valid today may not be tomorrow. So you cannot trust >>>data that was validated yesterday. To have any benefit this >>>data would have to be routinely re-validated. Given the >>>quantity of personal data sets in the RIPE Database (we are >>>talking millions), many of whom have never heard of the RIPE >>>NCC, to ask them to undertake this exercise would result in >>>the RIPE NCC being reported to many law enforcement >>>authorities for phishing. >> >>Not even considering the inevitable members' revolt. >> >>rgds, Sascha Luck >> > > >

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unsubscribe
by Paul Skram 06 Nov '15

06 Nov '15

I don't have time to read your endless bickering and insults. You people need to learn how to effectively communicate.

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Solving the issue of rogue ROUTE objects in the RIPE Database
by ripedenis＠yahoo.co.uk 06 Nov '15

06 Nov '15

HI all I am going to have one last go at solving this problem. I challenge anyone/everyone to tell me why this is such a stupid idea, technically impossible to do, won't solve any of the issues partially or fully. Then I can shut up about it and go away. If you can't condemn the idea then support it. Lets fix this issue once and for all, stop this endless discussion about rogue ROUTE objects and get on with life. So here is my 4 step proposal that I believe could be implemented within a month. If we implemented this you can be sure that all ROUTE objects in the RIPE Database were created with the knowledge and approval of the related resource holders. I believe that is the desired goal. STEP 1 Any ROUTE object submitted for creation in the RIPE Database involving an out of region resource (address space and/or ASN) where that out of region resource does not exist in the authoritative RIR database (has not been allocated or assigned), reject the creation. The RIPE NCC mirrors the operational data from all the other 4 RIRs. These mirrors are updated daily as well as the RIRs daily stats. It is easy to determine if a resource is registered in the authoritative database. STEP 2 For those ROUTE objects from STEP 1 where the out of region resource does exist, hold the object creation as pending. The mechanism for doing this already exists in the RIPE Database software as it is used for multiple authentications. Lookup the out of region resource(s) in the authoritative database(s) and find the contacts for that resource. Send a notification to those contacts informing them of the pending ROUTE object creation in the RIPE Database. The notification mechanism already exists in the RIPE Database software. If they don't approve, do nothing and the creation request will time out after a week and the object will not be created. If they do approve, respond in some way (many technical options for doing this that the RIPE NCC can choose from). If appropriate approval(s) are received within a week, create the ROUTE object. STEP 3 On a daily basis, for each ROUTE object in the RIPE Database that relates to an out of region resource, check for the continued existence of that resource in the appropriate RIR database. If it no longer exists, delete the ROUTE object from the RIPE Database. STEP 4 This is a one off cleanup of existing ROUTE objects. For all ROUTE objects currently in the RIPE Database that relate to an out of region, existing resource, send the appropriate notifications. For any that no response is received within a week, delete the ROUTE object from the RIPE Database. cheers denis

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AS's with route objects for undelegated space
by Richard Clayton 06 Nov '15

06 Nov '15

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I have read recent discussion here about AS204224 with interest... ... what seems to have escaped notice is rather temporary nature of the dubious route objects inserted into the RIPE database by AS204224. At the time of writing there are no such objects present, whereas at 03:45 this morning there were 5 such objects. That's a pattern that has continued for some time ... I noted the "now you see it, now you don't" behaviour a while back and have paid close attention for about a week. I speculate that, because a while ago I opened a ticket about AS204224, the RIPE NCC people are currently playing whack-a-mole in their own database system :( That is they are removing the route objects, and once they go home for the day AS204224 puts the objects back again! <https://www.lightbluetouchpaper.org/2015/11/02/ongoing-badness-in-the- ripe-database/> The alternative explanation is some sort of inherent shyness by the maintainers of AS204224 which causes them to remove their route objects when the sun rises ... It's been observed here that AS204224 is not alone, but I don't see a complete analysis... I think a full list of AS's which have a similar modus operandi (recently inserted route objects for undelegated space) would be (data is from 03:45 today, the count is of prefixes that are for un-delegated IPv4 address space): AS21674, Recursos Numeracao Internet (24 prefixes, from July) AS200439, LLC Stadis (4 prefixes, from Nov 4th) AS200534, LLC Relax (5 prefixes, 4 from Nov 4th, 1 from June) AS201432, RapidVDS (1 prefix from May) AS204135, LLC Transmir (1 prefix from Nov 4th) AS204210, CJSC TEPLOVODOMER (1 prefix from September) AS204211, LLC Aspect (4 prefixed from early October) AS204223, LLC Tehnokom (1 prefix from 4 Nov) AS204224, CJSC Mashzavod-Marketing-Servis (5 prefixes from 4 Nov) AS204225, OJSC Kommunenergo (1 prefix from September) If you don't see route objects when you look, then the "shyness" is clearly contagious. In addition to these AS's, there's now just under 50 other AS's who also have route objects for un-delegated space. This is IMHO undesirable, but they have been in this state for many years and I doubt that it fits with the dynamic and recent pattern for the prefixes above (indeed AS21674 looks like an outlier as well, I include it for being recent). I note the wish by some not to adopt a policing role, but it does seem to me that this is civic hygiene -- there is no legitimate reason I can see for the existence of a route object for un-routeable IPv4 space and that absent some sort of special circumstances appeal, I think it is entirely appropriate to treat the published records by the RIRs of the space that they have delegated as being authoritative. - -- Dr Richard Clayton <richard.clayton(a)cl.cam.ac.uk> Director, Cambridge Cloud Cybercrime Centre mobile: +44 (0)7887 794090 Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge, CB3 0FD tel: +44 (0)1223 763570 -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: PGPsdk version 1.7.1 iQA/AwUBVjuGgeINNVchEYfiEQLKZgCfRzKhmQdpaGsgnwaoKbFLlMf1ixMAmwUp nzhiUrbQw7jfimpH5TkFp78n =25Ns -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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Whois database verification
by Karl-Josef Ziegler 05 Nov '15

05 Nov '15

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] WHOIS (AS204224)
by Sascha Luck [ml] 04 Nov '15

04 Nov '15

On Wed, Nov 04, 2015 at 11:30:50AM -0500, Jeffrey Race wrote: >From an engineering standpoint you absolutely must have >at least one redundant channel, with an acknowledgement >mechanism (e.g. registered mail). But fax is also possible for this >because the receipt is stamped with date/time of reception. This >is easily monitored for continuing validity using the kind of automated >checks I mentioned recently; no human involvement required at >sending end, only at the receiving end to return the token (manually, >ensuring that someone is actually managing the public resource >in his care). As Denis explained in his mail, this channel exists as far as the NCC is concerned (at least for members). It's the Billing Contact which is contacted at least annually and the token returned is "money". If it isn't returned, 120 days later the LIR becomes an ex-LIR. rgds, Sascha Luck

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Mimecast.com
by James Hoddinott 04 Nov '15

04 Nov '15

It looks like the same issue for cozahosts.com & wetmy.com so I have fixed those up too now. Is there a larger list of domains that you are seeing this issue with? I can do a more bulk review and fix up if you want to get those to me. Looking some more into the 'why' here, it looks like it relates to a bunch of data from Spamcop reports although these domains have been flagged as spammy in our system for some time so full samples are hard to come by now. The one sample I have been able to dig up shows: Received: from ns3.ox.co.za ([209.17.190.102]:34366) by web.hostacc.com with esmtp (Exim 4.85) (envelope-from <shawna_bean(a)ctfilter.com>) id 1ZjxSd-0004BS-DN for x; Thu, 08 Oct 2015 00:45:23 +0200 Received: from ctfilter.com (unknown [223.4.32.2]) by ns3.ox.co.za (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6BF7C68271E for <x>; Thu, 8 Oct 2015 00:43:23 +0200 (SAST) Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2015 6:44:27 +0800 From: "Shawna Bean" <shawna_bean(a)ctfilter.com> Reply-To:"Shawna Bean" <shawna_bean(a)ctfilter.com> Subject: Top Popular Pharma Active solutions It looks like our systems were getting a little too aggressive on the domains appearing in such messages so we're in the process of adjusting them to work better and not produce such FPs. -- James Hoddinott Manager, Security Operations Cloudmark > -----Original Message----- > From: anti-abuse-wg [mailto:anti-abuse-wg-bounces@ripe.net] On Behalf Of > andre(a)ox.co.za > Sent: 04 November 2015 10:41 > To: James Hoddinott > Cc: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net > Subject: [SPAM] Re: [anti-abuse-wg] Mimecast.com > > On Wed, 4 Nov 2015 10:20:51 +0000 > James Hoddinott <jhoddinott(a)cloudmark.com> wrote: > > Hi Andre, > > > Hello James :) > > > I don't think they are Evil Corp and this is little more than spam > > filtering on a role address (which you can debate ad-infinitum if you > > nope. no debate - simply broken if you advice on bounce to contact mr x > and mr x auto bounces from the same ip/address > > > like). I did spot that your replies on this thread were flagged as > > spam by us and since we provide them some services I dug in a little > > more and can see that our systems had erroneously set the domain > > hostacc.com [1] as spammy so I have fixed that up for you and I > > okay, no - not really understood or accepted? how come the same > happened to 176.9.148.244 @cozahosts.com 209.17.190.102(a)ns3.ox.co.za > wetmy.com and all the others, every time that I send request to > support@mimecast - magically: new server is also blocked... > > can you fix all my servers? surely all of my thousands of users > all over the planet did not suddenly all attack mimecast? Some systems > are on BSD, Some on Linux, Some on Unix, Some on Windows, etc > It is extremely unlikely that everything by me was compromised all > at the same time - and then ONLY to mail bomb mimecast.com... > > so, this shows me only one thing? - Malice. > > Do I (and everyone else) when they have a magical problem like this > have to post on public lists and beg? > > Or is it not occam's razor? - Simple extortion for money? > > > reckon you should now be able to send your reports in to Mimecast > > without issue (or at least, without this issue). > > > Thank you so much James, I do honestly and truly appreciate it from > the bottom of my heart. > > But I am as stubborn as my email address, I need to understand why > I need to know what is wrong, understand the situation and problem > so that it can make sense to me, Also, I think that is is important to > do things openly, so that everyone can understand what is going on > > as next week (or last week) maybe this also happened to someone else > and if we know how to respond or what the issues are, we can help others > and do the whole Kumbaya thing :) > > again thanks James :) > > andre > > > [1] This appears to be what your sending IP resolves to and what it > > HELOs as. > > >

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Re: [anti-abuse-wg] anti-abuse-wg Digest, Vol 49, Issue 8
by Marilson 04 Nov '15

04 Nov '15

By Sander Steffann >How do you propose to distinguish people/companies with bad intentions (for >some value of bad, let's assume "planning to send spam") from normal >companies? With a crystal ball or being victimized of them. As a victim - with disabled WPOISON - you may denounce and evaluate the company's behavior, but prepare to report the same spammer at the same ISP again and again and again. But you will know who is who and will archive evidence. Sander, the Ronald name is not Roland. Ronald, the situation you are describing seems to be evading taxes. All this mystery would not have intended to avoid payment of rates required by law and for years? Spam has not yet been criminalized, but tax evasion, send to prison. What Brian Krebs ex-Washington Post would say about it? “With a small bit of Googling I…” I would say, ask the Olga! You don't know who Olga is? Well, ask the RIPE! I denounced IBM-SoftLayer for Krebs. He was very condescending citing Spamhaus: “We believe that SoftLayer, perhaps in an attempt to extend their business in the rapidly-growing Brazilian market, deliberately relaxed their customer vetting procedures,” they confused greed with carelessness or wanted be sympathetic. The concern of Ronald regarding the identification of these authors is legitimate and should be a concern of those who want a clean internet. All Brazilian professional spammers appear in the WHOIS record with address and false phone. All, without exception. In whose interest is that situation? Without these data the victims of spammers feel helpless, they dont have one to turn to because the spam has not been criminalized. And in this dishonest environment the goal of ISPs is achieved by increasing the traffic on the Internet. Softlayer, IBM, Spamhaus, KrebsonSecurity são partes desse problema: http://krebsonsecurity.com/2015/10/ibm-runs-worlds-worst-spam-hosting-isp/ I wrote: >>Michele, you are certainly a clever and apparently competent person in >>your role… Sander replied: >Marilson, I find this extremely inappropriate and even disgusting. Such >personal attacks, insults and threats do not belong here (or anywhere else) Michele, you are NOT a clever and apparently competent person in your role… Tell me Sander, did you kill today, some refugee child or kicked? BTW. I'm exceedingly serious too. And, as an architect, I dont design environments to injure, irritate or damage people as you do. Mr. Fox, your activity, your actions and the consequences on the population of our planet does not give you the right to be arrogant or pass moral lesson. In your position I would die of shame. Scott Richter is part of your roll of friends? Shame on you! Brian Nisbet, my dear, Now I Know, your words sound like a poem, but you died on May 04. My condolences! There is a moral to this dastardly deed I’ll tell you in just a smidgeon, to flying fish of all species take heed it’s a tale as old as the venerable Bede be ware of organised companions. No memories Marilson -----Mensagem Original----- From: anti-abuse-wg-request(a)ripe.net Sent: Tuesday, November 03, 2015 9:00 AM To: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net Subject: anti-abuse-wg Digest, Vol 49, Issue 8 Send anti-abuse-wg mailing list submissions to anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit https://www.ripe.net/mailman/listinfo/anti-abuse-wg or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to anti-abuse-wg-request(a)ripe.net You can reach the person managing the list at anti-abuse-wg-owner(a)ripe.net When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of anti-abuse-wg digest..." Today's Topics: 1. Re: WHOIS (AS204224) (Sander Steffann) ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Message: 1 Date: Tue, 3 Nov 2015 11:48:50 +0100 From: Sander Steffann <sander(a)steffann.nl> To: "Ronald F. Guilmette" <rfg(a)tristatelogic.com> Cc: anti-abuse-wg(a)ripe.net Subject: Re: [anti-abuse-wg] WHOIS (AS204224) Message-ID: <7780CEC5-E3EF-444B-A734-8DE4DFB571EA(a)steffann.nl> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Hi Roland, > The old saying is "The best is the enemy of the good". Validation and/or > verification of RIPE WHOIS data can be improved, even though any system > which attempts to do so most probably cannot be made foolproof. Ok > No. You're still thinking in terms of constructing an iron-clad and > absolutely foolproof system that utterly prevents all fraud. I'm > suggesting a system with vastly less ambitious goals, one which would > simply check that the voice phone number for a given person or entity > listed in the RIPE WHOIS db *isn't* simply disconnected, out-of-service, > the number of a FAX machine, the number of a company or individual whose > identity has been stolen, or the number of an unrelated brothel in > Amsterdam. That alone would be a vast improvement over the current > status quo, I think. Agreed > Similarly, in the case of mailing addresses, either RIPE NCC or the LIRs > could check the data base of one of the aforementioned service bureaus > that serve that mailing industry, to see if the addresses in RIPE WHOIS > records even exist. A clever crook will still put in the address of > some vacant lot somewhere, or maybe his local meat market or police > station, but at least we wouldn't be looking at "123 Galaxy St., Mars, > The Universe" and such utter nonsense as that. NASA is going to be so disappointed ;) But seriously: I agree >> My apologies. I didn't mean to imply that accuracy of the RIPE DB is a >> mere detail. That accuracy has been the reason behind quite a few >> policies! I meant to say that policy doesn't contain implementation >> details. The way a policy is implemented is left to the RIPE NCC. The >> policy just says that contact information has to be up to date. > > I want to understand. Are you saying that RIPE NCC could unilaterally > just decide to start performing phone verification of contact points > listed in the WHOIS data base? It probably would need a mandate from its members to approve the extra budget for implementing those checks etc. But I don't see why they couldn't. > Even for amateur sleuths such as myself, every additional data point > helps during an investigation. The example of AS204224 is illustrative. > If I knew for certain that someone had positively validated the phone > number when that AS has been assigned in July, then I would also know, > almost to a moral certainty, that the company itself, and not some > identity thief, was the party engaged in the recent routing hanky > panky. Understood > You are thinking about formal, government-held business records. I myself > am not. Official government business records, when available, are helpful > to investigations. But if they aren't available, then they aren't, and > that's all there is to it. You work with what you have. +1 > OK. I promise not to attach too much value to a validated phone > number. Seriously, I agree with you that checking the phone number > isn't a panacea, but it's better than nothing. Glad we're agreeing :) > I apologize. You are correct, That comment on my part was utterly > uncalled for, and I would very much like to retract it. Consider it retracted :) > But I hope that you understand my sensitivity. I do. Sometimes when discussing difficult subjects the wording can get a bit too strong. I can deal with that, and I know you have good intentions. I now understand your ideas better, and understand that you are looking for a first step in improving the database accuracy. Not looking for a complete solution as I was :) I think we reached the point where we should ask the RIPE NCC on their opinion on this and to see what they think is doable. Cheers, Sander End of anti-abuse-wg Digest, Vol 49, Issue 8 ********************************************

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