I support this proposal. Niall

Dear all,

Following up on Filiz' announcement, I would like to ask people supporting 2007-08 to let their voices be heard on this mailing list; we can only move it forward if the wg chairs see enough support for it (and so far there has been a lot of informal support).

Thank you,

Remco van Mook

-----Original Message----- From: address-policy-wg-admin@ripe.net [mailto:address-policy-wg-admin@ripe.net] On Behalf Of Filiz Yilmaz Sent: woensdag 11 juni 2008 10:32 To: policy-announce@ripe.net Cc: address-policy-wg@ripe.net Subject: [address-policy-wg] 2007-08 Review Period extended until 9 July 2008 (Enabling Methods for Reallocation of IPv4 Resources)

PDP Number: 2007-08 Enabling Methods for Reallocation of IPv4 Resources

Dear Colleagues,

The Review Period for the proposal 2007-08 has been extended until 9 July 2008.

You can find the full proposal at:

http://www.ripe.net/ripe/policies/proposals/2007-08.html

We encourage you to review this policy proposal and send your comments to address-policy-wg@ripe.net.

Regards

Filiz Yilmaz RIPE NCC Policy Development Officer

Any opinions expressed in the email are those of the individual and not necessarily of the company. This email and any files transmitted with it are confidential and solely for the use of the intended recipient and do not constitute an offer or acceptance by Equinix, Inc., Equinix Europe Ltd or any of their group entities to buy or sell any products or services in any jurisdiction. If you have received this email in error please delete this email immediately and notify the IT manager.

This communication is sent on behalf of one of the European entities in the Equinix, Inc. Group. The ultimate holding company in Europe is Equinix Europe Ltd whose registered address is Quadrant House, Floor 6, 17 Thomas More Street, Thomas More Square, London E1W 1YW and the Company's registered number is 6293383. The registration details of other Group entities are available at www.eu.equinix.com

On Wed, Jun 11, 2008 at 12:12:36PM +0200, Remco van Mook wrote:

Following up on Filiz' announcement, I would like to ask people supporting 2007-08 to let their voices be heard on this mailing list; we can only move it forward if the wg chairs see enough support for it (and so far there has been a lot of informal support).

I support the proposal. -- Shane

click on the link in Filiz email. It takes you to a page, where after a table with miscellaneous bureaucratic info you come across a section by the name of "Summary of proposal", taking much, much less than a screenful. The details, just below the summary, take about a screenful. Joao On 11 Jun 2008, at 13:28, Randy Bush wrote:

if i could wade through all the bureaucratic wrappings and <bleep> to understand what exactly is being proposed, there is a fair chance that i would like it. as it stands, it makes geoff look up front and terse. could someone fit it in a one screen email?

randy

if you want the full unadulterated text with all the details, click on the link that reads "Draft RIPE Document". It is longer than a screenful, but it is the text and nothing but the text Joao PS: I would be eurocrazy the day I am happy with the EU ruling on what you can take as hand luggage on airplanes. Try to find that one, if you can. On 11 Jun 2008, at 14:01, Randy Bush wrote:

Joao Damas wrote:

...

click on the link in Filiz email. It takes you to a page, where after a table with miscellaneous bureaucratic info you come across a section by the name of "Summary of proposal", taking much, much less than a screenful. The details, just below the summary, take about a screenful.

thanks. that was what i meant by <bleep>

...

Summary of Proposal:

This proposal outlines a framework to migrate previously allocated IPv4 resources from one Local Internet Registry (LIR) to another LIR within the RIPE NCC Service Region.

as it says nothing about what is actually being proposed. this is followed by

...

Draft Policy Text

New Text

After receiving feedback on the first version of the proposal during the initial discussion phase, the policy text is edited and the changes that are proposed can be seen on the drafted policy document. (see "Draft RIPE Document" above).

which also says nothing. this is followed by

...

Rationale:

which gives the pros and cons of the invisible proposal.

perhaps you did not actually follow the url before recommending it? or you are sufficiently inured to eurocrazy that this actually looks like a proposal to you.

randy

a kind soul took pity on me and sent the following, on which i have a comment or two. thank you thank you thank you.

Any LIR is allowed to re-allocate complete or partial blocks of IPv4 address space that were previously allocated to them by either the RIPE NCC or the IANA. Such address space must not contain any block that is assigned to an End User.

so, i can not sell off a portion of my business that has customers in it?

Address space may only be re-allocated to another LIR that is also a member of the RIPE NCC.

note that geoff has just said he would be adding a clause in his apnic proposal that allows inter-region transfer if o the seller must be abiding by all the selling rules of their ir o the buyer must be abiding by all the buying rules of their ir

The block that is to be re-allocated must not be smaller than the minimum allocation block size at the time of re-allocation. Demonstration of need for the address space by the receiving LIR to the RIPE NCC is not required during transfers.

Re-allocation must be reflected in the RIPE Database. This re-allocation may be on either a permanent or non-permanent basis.

LIRs that receive a re-allocation from another LIR cannot re-allocate complete or partial blocks of the same address space to another LIR within 24 months of receiving the re-allocation.

if i buy a portion of someone's business (see above comment), then i can not resell it for 24 months without forcing the customers to renumber?

The re-allocation will be notified to the RIPE NCC, who will record the change of allocation. Please note that the LIR always remains responsible for the entire allocation it receives from the RIPE NCC until the re-allocation is transferred to another LIR or returned. The LIR must ensure that all policies are applied.

Re-allocated blocks will be signed to establish the current allocation owner.

Re-allocated blocks are no different from the allocations made directly by the RIPE NCC and so they must be used by the receiving LIR according to the policies described in this document.

randy

...

...

Any LIR is allowed to re-allocate complete or partial blocks of IPv4 address space that were previously allocated to them by either the RIPE NCC or the IANA. Such address space must not contain any block that is assigned to an End User. so, i can not sell off a portion of my business that has customers in it? Not if you need to break up a PA allocation to do it. But you already cannot do this with the current rules.

who said break up PA allocation? not i. the above forbids sale of a complete block when it has customers in it. [ not that i think preventing breaking a block is gonna get us much ] randy --- "Why is our *oil* under *their* sand?" "Why is the routing table over half /24s?"

As the process is consensus-oriented, rather than majority-oriented, I would find it helpful to have an authoritative summary issue-tracking statement. I'm not sure whether this should better come from either WG Co-Chair, or rather from the NCC Policy Development Office.

I agree, and I also think that we need to see a list of the names of all the people who play a role in evaluating wether or not consensus exists, and who make the consensus position into formal RIPE policy. I believe that this is the first RIPE policy change in which the issue of financial conflict of interest is a consideration. Theoretically, the people who manage the policy process could directly benefit financially from that process if they have IP address allocations from RIPE or IANA, or if they own part of a company which has such allocations. Theoretically, some of the people supporting this policy, may wish to have IP address allocation transfers outside of RIPE in order to sell their unneeded IP address without anyone knowing that they are making money from this. We cannot demand everyone participating in the consensus to reveal their potential to benefit financially from the change, but I think that it is reasonable to ask the "officials" to put their financial position on the public record. Given a scenario where LIR A has addresses which they no longer need, and LIR B needs addresses but the RIPE free pool is empty, then the only motivation that I can see for changing the current process is to allow LIR A to sell their addresses in a secret financial transaction. If LIR A no longer needs the addresses then they no longer have a technical justification for having that allocation, and under current rules they should return the addresses to RIPE. If LIR A did this, then LIR B has a chance to receive the addresses that they need. Of course, LIR C may also want those same addresses, and in that scenario, the current RIPE policy has no way to resolve the situation other than first-come, first served. But the proposed changes allow LIR A to run a secret auction and transfer the addresses to the highest bidder. Neither of these scenarios describes a "market" of any colour other than "black". It is precisely to avoid these scenarios that the EU and other jurisdictions have market regulation. This kind of regulation generally involves transparency so that the prices paid in the transaction are publicised. In many cases, the bid prices are also publicised so that we would not only know how much the winner paid in the second scenario, but we would know the bid made by the loser. Considering that IPv4 is now on the road to being obsolete, I don't see any benefit to the IP network operations community from such market scenarios. --Michael Dillon

Hi Michael,

We cannot demand everyone participating in the consensus to reveal their potential to benefit financially from the change, but I think that it is reasonable to ask the "officials" to put their financial position on the public record.

You can always ask :) I personally don't mind giving information about my position. I am currently not working for an LIR. I have a share in Computel Standby BV, which has two /21s. These are both in use, and because /21 is the minimal allocation size those blocks can't be split up. This means that Computel can't transfer any address space, and my potential personal benefit is 0. Sander Steffann APWG co-chair

...

Given a scenario where LIR A has addresses which they no longer need, and LIR B needs addresses but the RIPE free pool is empty, then the only motivation that I can see for changing the current

...

allow LIR A to sell their addresses in a secret financial

On Fri, Jun 13, 2008 at 12:47:49PM +0100, michael.dillon@bt.com wrote: process is to transaction.

This seems somewhat distorted to me.

Without the policy change, that transaction would need to be done secretly.

Without policy change, LIR A no longer has the right to those addresses since they no longer have technical justification for the size of allocation which they have. It is historical practice for RIRs to not ask for the addresses to be returned right away since there is the assumption that LIR A has the intention to use those addresses in the future and that there will be no further IP address allocation requests from LIR A until they have used the addresses. This historical practice protects the larger aggregate block size which can be announced via BGP as a single prefix. But the new policy begins with the assumption that LIR A has no intention to use these addresses in the future, otherwise why would they transfer them. Further, the new policy does not protect a single aggregated BG prefix. Under the existing policy, when an LIR no longer intends to use their IP addresses in a network they are supposed to give them back to RIPE. That is OPEN and that is DOCUMENTED. An LIR could also just sell their network and all the addresses including the extra unjustified ones. If the new owner intends to use those extra addresses, then there is no problem. This kind of transfer is OPEN and it is DOCUMENTED. Today, an LIR can sell addresses in secret if they want to. If that is not fraud then it is certainly unethical. I would be happy to see LIRs buying and selling IP addresses in this way, under the current policy, because it *IS* unethical, and it will end up with these LIRs losing the customers who want to connect with a reputable ISP that is willing to do the hard work to make IPv6 feasible as the core Internet protocol.

Big Telcos with large ranges of dynamically assigned blocks have a far easier stance here than small ISPs that would actually need to renumber customers to free a useful block.)

And yet, these companies are ETNO members and they oppose the change at the policy level. In other words, even if the engineering group in a big telco might like the idea of selling some addresses to reduce their overall costs, the regulatory relations part of the big telco is opposed to this. What is the point of introducing a new policy to benefit the big telcos when the big telcos do not want the new policy? --Michael Dillon

Even though this will give the NCC a bit more work to do, I do support this proposal. One of the main reasons being that the allocations will remain to be properly registered and are thus accountable.

I disagree that this will make anyone more accountable. As long as addresses are in use on the Internet, tools such as traceroute make it possible to identify the source of traffic, and the organization which is actually using an IP address block. In fact, I am currently sorting out an issue with SAIX in South Africa announcing, and passing traffic for someone who is using one of our IP address ranges. The fact that our address range is correctly registered in ARIN's database did not stop someone from using it on the Internet, and the fact that the user is not in any RIR database, does not prevent us from solving the problem. In fact, I suspect that most companies don't even care to make the actual user of an IP address range accountable. If the next link in the chain is accountable, i.e. the upstream of this non-accountable IP address user, then the problem can be quickly resolved. Therefore, accountability is not necessary in all cases. At the same time, RIPE can only affect accountability very indirectly with correct database entries. The history of the RIPE database and other RIR databases shows that they don't have a big impact on accountability and they also do not have a great track record for accuracy. I just do not see a connection between greater (or lesser) accountability, and a more accurate (or less accurate) RIPE database. --Michael Dillon

michael.dillon@bt.com wrote (>): I previously wrote (>>): (It is really handy that when you make a comment about something somebody says that you actually name the person so that the person can reply, it solves me having to read way too much email)_

...

Even though this will give the NCC a bit more work to do, I do support this proposal. One of the main reasons being that the allocations will remain to be properly registered and are thus accountable.

I disagree that this will make anyone more accountable.

I didn't say "more", it will remain as it is now. If there was a free invisible trade and what is in whois would not match real life then it would become a real mess and none of the information would be clear.

As long as addresses are in use on the Internet, tools such as traceroute make it possible to identify the source of traffic, and the organization which is actually using an IP address block. In fact, I am currently sorting out an issue with SAIX in South Africa announcing, and passing traffic for someone who is using one of our IP address ranges. The fact that our address range is correctly registered in ARIN's database did not stop someone from using it on the Internet, and the fact that the user is not in any RIR database, does not prevent us from solving the problem.

Analogy time: That you own a house on paper, doesn't mean that others can't use it by just breaking in and living there. You will have to enforce that differently. Route objects in the IRR's, S-BGP etc come to mind. Properly managing your network is the main thing there. Also traceroute doesn't help a thing already for 10 years due to nice tricks like Rotorouter http://seclists.org/bugtraq/1998/Aug/0091.html ;)

In fact, I suspect that most companies don't even care to make the actual user of an IP address range accountable. If the next link in the chain is accountable, i.e. the upstream of this non-accountable IP address user, then the problem can be quickly resolved.

True, which is why it is mostly good enough to have a responsive abuse contact for a block, and not an unresponsive end-user who doesn't even know what it is all about. (Fighting and avoiding abuse is my prime interest in proper records at the RIR's)

Therefore, accountability is not necessary in all cases. At the same time, RIPE can only affect accountability very indirectly with correct database entries. The history of the RIPE database and other RIR databases shows that they don't have a big impact on accountability and they also do not have a great track record for accuracy. I just do not see a connection between greater (or lesser) accountability, and a more accurate (or less accurate) RIPE database.

In cases where you see a problem with the accuracy of the database, contact the NCC and they can look into it and in most cases quickly resolve it. That is what I do when I see something funny, which does happen so every now and then. As for saying that this proposal doesn't help, nonsense, it keeps the information correct, which helps a lot more than not having that information at all. Greets, Jeroen

Remco van Mook wrote:

Dear all,

Following up on Filiz' announcement, I would like to ask people supporting 2007-08 to let their voices be heard on this mailing list; we can only move it forward if the wg chairs see enough support for it (and so far there has been a lot of informal support).

I am more than happy to note my formal support for this proposal. Brian.

Hello Per,

The draft §5.5 says: "Demonstration of need for the address space by the receiving LIR to the RIPE NCC is not required during transfers." ... Personally I'd prefer the present policies to continue, where a block must be returned to RIPE before the NCC re-allocates according to normal rules. That does not encourage the creation of a market, but has anyone yet been able to precent viable plans for a scheme able to reclaim enough addresses to support current network growth for any significant time past depletion of the free pool?

These are good questions. My feeling is that recent lessons, particularly those we heard at RIPE 55, suggest that any alternatives to 2007-08 are more troublesome than they appear, and probably more trouble than they are worth. Regarding reclamation, I'd certainly support any reclamation that would service the run rate. Leo's experience with reclaiming 14/8, however, suggests to me that even a concerted effort at the low-hanging fruit would not service a fraction of the current run rate. The main consequence of accepting 2007-08, imho, will be to create a system of transfers that will occur where we can see it, and so allow us to continue to enforce policy and maintain a meaningful WHOIS database. Crucial to that objective is that the result must be better for the user than black-market or grey-market alternatives. (The canonical example here is iTunes music store vs. p2p filesharing.) Since we rely on consensus to implement our policies, not just as a show of hands in a room but implemented in BGP filters on live routers, the method of transfers allowed by 2007-08 must pass that test. If it does not, ISPs operating as "consenting adults" may withdraw consent by agreeing their own rules between themselves, without reference to RIPE policies. If this becomes a widespread practice, we will have some difficulty maintaining policy enforcement and meaningful WHOIS in the future. I would not accept that we should legislate for a free for all for fear of getting a free for all, but we must choose our restrictions carefully so as to keep the burden on the user to the minimum. In that context, I would be wary of adding any further restrictions to 2007-08, and I support the proposal as it stands. Best regards, Dave -- Dave Wilson, Senior Network Engineer HEAnet Limited, Ireland's Education and Research Network 1st Floor, 5 George's Dock, IFSC, Dublin 1 Registered in Ireland, no 275301 tel: +353-1-660 9040 fax: +353-1-660 3666 web: http://www.heanet.ie/ H323 GDS:0035301101738 PGP: 1024D/C757ADA9

Michael Dillon said:

To get REVERSAL, where companies start returning unused IPv4 addresses, we need a lot of IPv6 deployment.

Tinkering with RIPE policies is NOT a substitute for IPv6 deployment.

I don't think anyone, least of all the authors of 2007-08, thinks that it is a substitute for IPv6 deployment. Most people feel that this is the proper solution in an ideal world. However most of us feel that IPv6 deployment to large consumer DSL networks is just not going to happen before IPv4 runs out and in that case some mechanism for recovery of unused space will be needed. Experiences with trying to get existing holders of unused space to hand it back without financial incentives (and regardless of what RIR policies say on the matter) make me pessimistic that altruism will save the day. Nigel

Leo Vegoda wrote:

I agree that there is a benefit in allowing a financial incentive to encourage transfers of address space to where it can be used more efficiently. But I think that any hope of providing enough for large consumer DSL networks to continue growing at a steady rate, let alone a similar to rate what we see now, is very optimistic.

Maybe I am unduly pessimistic about what is likely to be made available.

No, I think you are dead on the button. I can see two scenarios: 1. Despite 2007-08 we run out of v4, no market develops and we all move to v6 2. 2007-08 allows a (larger or smaller) market to develop and helps to lubricate the move to v6 as the bean counters at last see that there is a cost to not investing in it. No way is it going to free up enough v4 space to allow us to continue at the current rate of use, but then it wasn't intended to. Nigel

Randy Bush wrote:

agree wholeheartedly. but it's easy to agree with simple math :)

I'm a simple person... I like simple maths :-)

i also agree with lucy who says almost all of the trading will be done in a year or two, to get the underused space in play, and there it will stay, actually used.

I happen to share that view and if it happens then I think we have gained something valuable at very little cost. Nigel

Jay, On Jun 12, 2008, at 9:32 AM, Jay Daley wrote:

I do not support this proposal for the following reasons:

[much elided, not because I necessary agree or disagree, but simply because I wanted to get to this:]

Rival databases, based around IPv4 trading exchanges, will spring up.

Why do you believe this won't happen due the vacuum created by the lack of RIR involvement? Thanks, -drc

Randy I'd like to continue this thread because I think it goes to the heart of the issues around exhaustion, but it is not directly relevant to this policy proposal, so bearing that in mind ...

...

...

Rival databases, based around IPv4 trading exchanges, will spring up. Why do you believe this won't happen due the vacuum created by the lack of RIR involvement?

and why would a little competition at serving us, the users of all this stuff, necessarily be a bad thing?

Because I believe we should continue with open, consensus-driven, policy based allocation mechanism, not a competitive market, for all the reasons previously given.

how much is an x.509/3779 cert and an in-addr.arpa entry worth, anyway?

I think a price of 100m euros for a /8 is not unreasonable. If we were to charge pre-RIR /8s that in order for them to get cert to join global secure routing then the reclaim/reuse solution might start be very effective. Jay

Jay, On Jun 13, 2008, at 2:39 AM, Jay Daley wrote:

Because I believe we should continue with open, consensus-driven, policy based allocation mechanism,

Except there won't be an allocation mechanism. There will only be the possibility of a re-assignment mechanism since there won't be anything left to allocate. If something like 2007-08 isn't implemented, I'm curious why you believe re-assignments won't occur outside of RIPE-NCC. Regards, -drc

Jay, On Jun 13, 2008, at 2:28 AM, Jay Daley wrote:

David

...

...

Rival databases, based around IPv4 trading exchanges, will spring up. Why do you believe this won't happen due the vacuum created by the lack of RIR involvement?

I can only answer with knowledge of RIPE policy.

That's irrelevant to the question I'm asking.

For a trading exchange and rival database to develop there needs to be sufficient certainty in the transfer between two LIRs to enable a contractual agreement to be constructed.

No. For a rival database to develop (and be useful), there needs to be sufficient certainty that the transfer between two LIRs is recorded and published. What happens between the two parties to result in that transfer is irrelevant to this.

The current policy does not allow sufficient certainty because it does not allow transfers except in the extreme case of one LIR buying another LIR.

Indeed. And 2007-08 is proposing a way to allow RIPE-NCC to allow certainty in other forms of transfer. If they do not, I am curious why you believe someone else won't. Regards, -drc

euros if you want the RIPE NCC database updated". They ask me is that OK and point to the contract they have saying, "look here is a proper legal

contract enforceable in law, your trade is registered and viewable in my

database (and I am the exchange after all), RIPE NCC is just an irrelevant formality".

irritatingly there is a missing "I" in that sentence - "and I point to the contract saying ..."

David

You appear to believe that if RIPE-NCC does not implement something like 2007-08, your example won't happen. I'm curious as to why you believe this.

No I don't believe that. Without 2007-08, if no attempt is made at a stronger reclaim/reuse then slowly my example will appear and yes it will be messy. With 2008-08 my example will appear rapidly and it will be messy. Jay

On Jun 12, 2008, at 9:13 PM, David Conrad wrote:

Jay,

On Jun 12, 2008, at 9:32 AM, Jay Daley wrote:

...

I do not support this proposal for the following reasons:

[much elided, not because I necessary agree or disagree, but simply because I wanted to get to this:]

...

Rival databases, based around IPv4 trading exchanges, will spring up.

Why do you believe this won't happen due the vacuum created by the lack of RIR involvement?

Thanks, -drc

Hi David, It sounds like you're leaning toward favoring systems for recognizing inter-party transfers that are "nice" (i.e., that conform to whatever policies the community is willing to abide) because you predict that the community is unwilling to abide policies that that some members don't like -- specifically the ones that forbid inter-party transfers... So, that's a familiar kind of argument for "decriminalization" in other contexts, although I've only heard it used by people who think that the law in question was *always* inherently wrong or silly (c.f., minority rights restrictions, some kinds of victimless crimes like drug use, consensual adult sexual behavior, etc.), or else now completely anachronistic because it has no common/everyday referent in the modern world (c.f., all of the above plus feeding your horse in front of the saloon, etc). The only question -- and the one that people seem to be unwilling to engage -- is whether this particular prohibition was always inherently silly or rather important in its own right, whether the infraction to be legalized was/is trivial or truly dangerous. ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf-online-proceedings/95apr/area.and.wg.reports/ops/cidrd/cidrd.rekhter.slides.ps Was Yakov always wrong? Has something changed to make him less wrong today? Even the sale/exchange of private property between two private parties is not always a victimless crime. I can think of a variety of cases of private goods in which sales restrictions apply because of specific associated licensing requirements (e.g., cars, guns, etc.) -- which are in place themselves because of the potential for misuse (i.e., crimes with victims) of the goods in question. In all of those other cases, however, the property rights are protected, and the licensing requirements enforced, by external authorities with the means and authority and abundant willingness to actually en-force. Thought experiment: how many people would bother to register their cars, or even to get driver's licenses at all, if the "highway patrol" and it's equivalent didn't exist -- had never existed -- and if cars were invisible, ephemeral, and could vanish at will? Expecting drivers to voluntarily subject themselves to such an egregious, vulnerability- creating violation of privacy would be unrealistic, wouldn't it? How much less likely would it be if speed limits and other road-related laws had just been rescinded because people don't obey them anyway? Many assertions have been made to the effect that privatization of address space is not the intent of these proposals, so I'll happily pass over that can of worms here. It's not relevant to the above analogy anyway. As you rightly note, nature abhors a vacuum. I just think that we should take in filling one not to create other, even bigger and more serious ones. TV, speaking for self alone

On Jun 13, 2008, at 2:32 PM, David Conrad wrote:

Tom,

On Jun 13, 2008, at 9:29 AM, Tom Vest wrote:

...

It sounds like you're leaning toward favoring systems for recognizing inter-party transfers that are "nice" (i.e., that conform to whatever policies the community is willing to abide) because you predict that the community is unwilling to abide policies that that some members don't like -- specifically the ones that forbid inter-party transfers...

More or less.

Okay, that's clear enough. But it makes me even more curious about your assumptions about what will follow.

I'm interested in recognizing that:

a) there are folks who will continue to need IPv4 addresses for the foreseeable future b) there are folks who will have more IPv4 addresses than they need c) as opposed to communist nation-states, the mechanisms the RIRs have to enforce the shared dictum "to each according to need" are extremely limited and absolutely rely on "the consent of the governed", many (if not most) of which are commercial organizations generally intent on continuing to grow their businesses.

Because I do not believe the RIRs have repealed the Law of Supply and Demand, (a) and (b) will result in a market. Because of (c), the RIRs can either choose to encourage alternative registries (and making themselves irrelevant) by not recognizing the transfers that occur in that market or they can choose to perform the function of registering address assignments made between consenting parties and thereby maintaining some ability to affect address reassignment policy.

My impression is that most (rational) folks agree with (a) and (b). I gather (c) is where there is disagreement and I'm trying to understand why. Hence my question to Jay.

I guess I share that level of rationality, at least, and I don't know of anyone who has illusions about the power of RIRs to enforce anything. Perhaps Jay is like me, trying to highlight some possible consequences that the "governed" might wish to consider before consenting to go down this particular one-way street.

...

ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf-online-proceedings/95apr/area.and.wg.reports/ops/cidrd/cidrd.rekhter.slides.ps Was Yakov always wrong? Has something changed to make him less wrong today?

Yakov was attempting to demonstrate that "address ownership" is detrimental to scaling the Internet if you assume routing technology does not change. It was an argument for PA address space and against PI. This remains true, but as evidenced by the proliferation of PI policies and assignments, is largely ignored today. It is also largely irrelevant to this discussion since I (at least) am not making the assumption that service providers will be excluded from the market (indeed, I suspect they're going to be the most desperate to obtain address space since enterprises can and do sit happily behind a NAT box numbered with PA space).

I totally agree with you on this last point, which is why I assume that new entrants will immediately be priced out of the market. That in itself will probably be sufficient to bring the self-governance experiment to an end. But even if I'm too pessimistic on this point, the act of monetizing IPv4 -- and making it very very valuable, but only so long as most "real Internet resources" (users, content, etc.) are only reachable by traversing some IPv4 bottleneck(s) somewhere -- is going to incentivize those who inherit such choke points to maintain them, and thus the value of their IPv4 assets, for as close to forever as possible. It's probably safe to say that one of the minimum requirements for describing a sector as "open" or "competitive" is that new entrants do not have to pay competing incumbent for the privilege of entering, at any price that the incumbent might wish to set. Those who have accepted that a RIR-as-cartel lawsuit risk precludes other alternatives may wish to consider how to mitigate other kinds of antitrust-related legal risks as well. TV

On Fri, 2008-06-13 at 13:57 -0700, David Conrad wrote:

Tom,

On Jun 13, 2008, at 12:20 PM, Tom Vest wrote:

...

Perhaps Jay is like me, trying to highlight some possible consequences that the "governed" might wish to consider before consenting to go down this particular one-way street.

The point is, we've already gone down the one-way street. The question is whether or not we allow the RIRs to help drive or get run over.

The process of governing virtually free handouts from a resource pool and the regulation of trade in resources controlled by others are incompatible activities. 2007-08, unless it is backed by regulatory rules and means to enforce those, goes a long way towards reducing the NCC to nothing more than a rdns+whois-operator wrt IPv4. RIR's policies have so far been successful because good behaviour has been rewarded with ample supply of address-resources. Pointing fingers will not make a difference once we're out of carrots. I belive 2007-08 on its own is pointless. If there is a market there will also be someone trying to regulate it. If the RIRs want their policies to remain relevant they will have to play the game. For _example_: - Restrict buyers - Need based - No hoarding (first use what you have) - Require registered LIRs to filter disputed prefixes It will cost a lot of blood, sweat, tears and won't come cheap. The NCC may also end up having more lawyers than hostmasters, but regulation _is_ a completely different ballgame. OTOH, if we drop the ball, who do we expect to pick it up? //per

Tom Vest wrote:

The only question -- and the one that people seem to be unwilling to engage -- is whether this particular prohibition was always inherently silly or rather important in its own right, whether the infraction to be legalized was/is trivial or truly dangerous.

This strikes me as a generalization arising from a false premise - namely that the external environment has not changed in any manner, and the change is purely a change in the manner in which the address distribution function occurs. Of course that is simple not the case here, which becomes apparent in looking at the question you then posed:

ftp://ftp.ietf.org/ietf-online-proceedings/95apr/area.and.wg.reports/ops/cidrd/cidrd.rekhter.slides.ps

Was Yakov always wrong? Has something changed to make him less wrong today?

Was Yakov always wrong? no Is he less "wrong" today - dunno - he was right back then, but the environment HAS changed, so the "less wrong" question is rather irrelevant isn't it? As most folk on this planet are aware (and elsewhere too these days, considering the level of air play of this particular story :-) ), the environmental shift from the perception of abundance in IPv4 addresses at the time to a current perception of scarcity and looming exhaustion is a massive change in our environment. This percpetion is now driving industry behaviours, and I'd claim that the steady increasing address allocation rates over the past 2 - 3 years are not unconnected with this shift in perception. The observations that apparently drive much of today's consideration are: - this industry is just too large, too diverse and too bound to low margin commodity operations for much of it's Internet activities to drive (and fund) the completion a comprehensive transition to IPv6 within the timeframe available as defined by the remaining IPv4 unallocated address pools. The demand for addresses, as defined by the prevailing needs-based address distribution policies and the associated industry demand levels, appears to extend beyond the anticipated point of exhaustion of the current supply system. - this implies that there will be a continuing need for IPv4 addresses after the RIR pool has exhausted within this industry. - It is also observed that there is considerable diversity in the current value of "use" of addresses today, and it is likely that this broad diversity of exploitative value of addresses will persist. It appears that in this case once the existing supply mechanisms have been exhausted, then the supply mechanisms to meet the continued demand will come from existing holders of address space. Its also pretty clear that such supply mechanisms will not meet every last possible demand, so a regime of scarcity-based redistribution will eventuate to equilibriate supply and demand. In such scarcity-based redistribution mechanisms, those applications that place a higher exploitative value on IPv4 addresses would be capable of making a case to transfer addresses from an existing address holder who has a lower value associated with the addresses. This equilibriation is conventionally based on establishing a valuation point whereby the residual demand levels can be met in that those demands where the exploitative value is still higher that the valuation point will be satified, and those who have placed a lower valuation on meeting their demand will seek substitutes. Now all of this would be irrelevant if we were still in an environment of abundance - all those who had a case for addresses, whatever the exploitative value each party places on the addresses, could be met, in which case you get back to the proposition that the only residual 'value' of a particular address over any other is the relative ease with which it is routed - which is what Yakov's slide pack is effectively saying. But this is all basic theory of markets, isn't it Tom. I don't I've said a single thing about market valuation, exploitative values and substitution that isn't in any standard text on the theory of markets! Is routing so fragile that addresses cannot move at all? I think not. Is IPv6 so busted and NATs just so unworkable that any form of substitution is completely untenable? I think not. Are there addresses out there that are unused, or used in contexts where subtitution may take place? I believe so. So I'm left with a question or two back to Tom via this list: Why do you think that in this case the conventional mechanisms that we've use explicitly or implicitly to equilibriate demand, supply and substitution within human activity sectors for, oh, a millenium or five, in times of scarcity of supply and competing demands have to be suspended and some magic substituted in its place just for IPv4 addresses? And the second question is: Equally I'm really unclear what you see as the alternative framework to use here to address the situation. Do you believe that there are credible alternative approaches that do not involve the movement of IPv4 addresses between entities beside the "lets do a complete IPv6 transition in the next 24 months across the entire globe" approach? Geoff

On Thu, 12 Jun 2008, Jay Daley wrote:

* It breaks the policy of providing addresses to those who need them in a fair and non-discriminatory fashion because it allows LIRs to choose who gets spare addresses for arbitrary and secret reasons rather than through the open and transparent process of the RIR.

Uh, what exactly is the "open and transparent process of the RIR"? It appears to me that the process is basically, "send a secret request to RIPE NCC hostmasters, they will process (and possibly follow up) it in secret, but the only thing public and transparent is the IP block granted". The fact that you've been granted an IP address block of some size is public, but the reasoning given or the considerations taken are not. Even if after the fact an allocation causes some astonishment, there is in reality no process to get justification on why the allocation was made the way it has been. As a result, even if you'd follow all the new allocations (not very easy AFAIR), you wouldn't have a way to keep the requestors and hostmasters honest. Now, if the address allocation requests were public and open for public comment, then I could say the process is transparent. As it is, the "fairness" of the process hinges on whether RIPE NCC hostmasters are able to "equalize" the address space requestors somehow. -- Pekka Savola "You each name yourselves king, yet the Netcore Oy kingdom bleeds." Systems. Networks. Security. -- George R.R. Martin: A Clash of Kings

Shane

Imagine that I run a network. How do you propose I prove to my peers that I am the one, unique user of a given address prefix without the RIR system (or some other equivalent centralized accounting system) in place?

Nothing I said could be taken as meaning that I do not want the RIR system to stay in place. Jay