Hi Tom,

Thanks for the response. I actually agree -- probably should have written that competition was never more than one of many reasons that someone (anyone) *might have* supported those earlier transitions. That said, if you look back at my original response you'll note that I was actually arguing *against* transition rationales based narrowly on "competition" questions. The alternative that I proposed was transition to preserve the "openness of the internet addressing and routing system," especially to new entrants.

Sure!  I particularly like the idea, for instance, of using LISP or other similar technology to enable end systems to move within the topology without having to pollute the global BGP table.  But I do feel a Hal Varien moment coming on: are incentives aligned for the right things to happen?  If not, can they be so aligned?  Our earlier work pointed out that there is a limit to the efficacy of RIR policies.  So what tools do we really have?  Again, returning to the LISP example, it's a technology advance that is a potential Over-The-Top play that could align interests (not that I've done the analysis, but that's my off-the-cuff thought, something to be wary about).

I think that the majority of reasons for supporting the previous transitions (i.e., previous impositions of new technical requirements on incumbent network operators), as well as for supporting IPv6, would fit neatly under this rubric. And while your own description of the past circumstances didn't use those specific terms, I believe that the phenomena of "proliferation of class Cs being allocated" and "class Bs running out" that you referred to were both driven in part by demand from initial allocation seekers, a.k.a. "new entrants" -- i.e., we agree on this point.

Of course, during any given duration the majority of newly allocated/assigned IP addresses are probably going to "incumbents" (subsequent allocation seekers), but that's consistent with patterns of growth in every other industry, i.e., it's basically a demographic of statistical artifact of cumulative growth processes (granted, one that can be influenced by various policies). The important distinction, at least until now, is that the growth/IP addressing demand of incumbents was not incompatible with the continued openness of the addressing and routing system to non-incumbents/new entrants.

And of course, I wouldn't have expected these sorts of arguments to figure prominently in IETF et al. meetings and discussion back in the 1980s-1990s. In the main, we're not a bunch of economists and policy makers by profession -- and even those of us who are generally know better than to phrase our technology and policy advocacy in such alien and unsympathetic terms... most of us anyway.

Well but as you know there were some discussions along these lines in the CIDRD/BGPD working groups.  However, there are limits as to how far those discussions can reasonably go in that forum.  One thing I would draw your attention to was a paper in this year's WEIS conference by Richard Clayton that contains an economic analysis of SHIM6.  His parting question from his presentation was whether RFCs should contain Economics Considerations sections.

However, even if "openness of the internet addressing and routing system" was never the most popular/resonant rallying cry for specific technology changes, that doesn't mean that this general idea wasn't an important motivator or an influential part of the unspoken context. And even if that sounds implausible too, it still doesn't mean that the *fact* that such openness was preserved, intentionally or otherwise, didn't play an important role in the success of the system to date. Although the verdict of history is never truly final, to me industry openness looks a lot like a universal correlate (i.e., a necessary if not sufficient cause) behind the durability of industry self-governance. If that turns out to be true, then there could be a lot more at stake in the current transition tussle than just the fate of the IP address registries.

I don't think anyone can deny that openness was an important motivator for Internet technologies.  We merely need to look at all of the OTHER protocols that have gone by the wayside to see that it is so.  But I think what we saw was that Opennness was something to be capitalized upon by one group of vendors, to entice customers, and to disrupt certain market players.  It certainly was not regulated.  And indeed if we look at security and authentication technology, the desire to play King of the Mountain has IMHO long stalled improvements in consumer authentication.

Eliot