Hi Tom,
Thanks for the response. I actually agree -- probably
should have written that competition was never more than one of many
reasons that someone (anyone) *might have* supported those earlier
transitions. That said, if you look back at my original response you'll
note that I was actually arguing *against* transition rationales based
narrowly on "competition" questions. The alternative that I proposed
was transition to preserve the "openness of the internet addressing and
routing system," especially to new entrants.
Sure! I particularly like the idea, for instance, of using LISP or
other similar technology to enable end systems to move within the
topology without having to pollute the global BGP table. But I do feel
a Hal Varien moment coming on: are incentives aligned for the right
things to happen? If not, can they be so aligned? Our earlier work
pointed out that there is a limit to the efficacy of RIR policies. So
what tools do we really have? Again, returning to the LISP example,
it's a technology advance that is a potential Over-The-Top play that
could align interests (not that I've done the analysis, but that's my
off-the-cuff thought, something to be wary about).
I think that the majority of reasons for supporting the
previous transitions (i.e., previous impositions of new technical
requirements on incumbent network operators), as well as for supporting
IPv6, would fit neatly under this rubric. And while your own
description of the past circumstances didn't use those specific terms,
I believe that the phenomena of "proliferation of class Cs being
allocated" and "class Bs running out" that you referred to were both
driven in part by demand from initial allocation seekers, a.k.a. "new
entrants" -- i.e., we agree on this point.
Of course, during any given duration the majority of newly
allocated/assigned IP addresses are probably going to "incumbents"
(subsequent allocation seekers), but that's consistent with patterns of
growth in every other industry, i.e., it's basically a demographic of
statistical artifact of cumulative growth processes (granted, one that
can be influenced by various policies). The important distinction, at
least until now, is that the growth/IP addressing demand of incumbents
was not incompatible with the continued openness of the addressing and
routing system to non-incumbents/new entrants.
And of course, I wouldn't have expected these sorts of arguments to
figure prominently in IETF et al. meetings and discussion back in the
1980s-1990s. In the main, we're not a bunch of economists and policy
makers by profession -- and even those of us who are generally know
better than to phrase our technology and policy advocacy in such alien
and unsympathetic terms... most of us anyway.
Well but as you know there were some discussions along these lines in
the CIDRD/BGPD working groups. However, there are limits as to how far
those discussions can reasonably go in that forum. One thing I would
draw your attention to was a paper in
this year's WEIS conference by Richard Clayton that contains an
economic analysis of SHIM6. His parting question from his presentation
was whether RFCs should contain Economics Considerations sections.
However, even if "openness of the internet addressing and
routing system" was never the most popular/resonant rallying cry for
specific technology changes, that doesn't mean that this general idea
wasn't an important motivator or an influential part of the unspoken
context. And even if that sounds implausible too, it still doesn't mean
that the *fact* that such openness was preserved, intentionally or
otherwise, didn't play an important role in the success of the system
to date. Although the verdict of history is never truly final, to me
industry openness looks a lot like a universal correlate (i.e., a
necessary if not sufficient cause) behind the durability of industry
self-governance. If that turns out to be true, then there could be a
lot more at stake in the current transition tussle than just the fate
of the IP address registries.
I don't think anyone can deny that openness was an important motivator
for Internet technologies. We merely need to look at all of the OTHER
protocols that have gone by the wayside to see that it is so. But I
think what we saw was that Opennness was something to be capitalized
upon by one group of vendors, to entice customers, and to disrupt
certain market players. It certainly was not regulated. And indeed if
we look at security and authentication technology, the desire to play
King of the Mountain has IMHO long stalled improvements in consumer
authentication.
Eliot