-----Original Message----- What is most striking to me is that we had a finite but significant supply of resources in the past, and we doled them out according to operational need. That made sense to me. Eliminate the operational needs requirement during a rationing phase just doesn't make sense to me.
The problem you are overlooking, McTim, is that in this end-game phase there will be hundreds if not thousands of organizations with operational needs and it will be the high bidder that gets it in the end. For all practical purposes we can assume that anyone who bothers to bid for the resource has some kind of need for it. Do you seriously think there is a major likelihood of lots of people making winning bids for number blocks just for the heck of it? Given the incredible flexibility and even subjectivity of the concept of "operational need" we are adding massive bureaucratic costs and delays but the gain achieved is completely unclear to me. I note that the secondary market for radio spectrum resources in the U.S. and elsewhere does not require acquirers to prove to anyone that they "need" it, yet there is no big problem with the way it has worked.
I also think that if adopted, this proposal would preclude an inter-RIR transfer market in that the "needs test" is required in the other regions, and that would mean that the RIPE region policies would not be "compatible" as called for in the other regions transfer policies.
This can change...