And even there're some economical implications, the proposal itself isn't primary about money and cost of IPv4 address, this is technical proposal. It's about address distribution to new and existing LIRs.
As long as addresses are scarce, there is no such thing as a purely technical allocation proposal. Any allocation mechanism involves a competitive relationship among LIRs for available resources, and any policy distributes costs and benefits among the contending parties.
And we have to care about new LIRs, we need to reserve some address space for them - as lots of internet resources will be accessible only over IPv4 for long period after depletion. It's about survivance of free allocatable IPv4 address space as long as possible.
I agree with this concern, but you seem unaware of the possibilities of strategic behavior by LIRs. Consider: LIR 1, an incumbent, proves it needs a /16 to meet demand caused by growth in the number of its existing customers. LIR 2, a startup, also proves it needs a /16 to start up Your policy privileges any actor in the category LIR 2 and penalizes actors in category LIR 1. Question 1: why are the customers of LIR 2 more important than the customers of LIR 1? Question 2: why wouldn't LIR 1 form a new company and call it a startup to get privileged access to addresses? Or, might LIR 3, LIR 1's long standing competitor, form a new LIR to gain an advantage in the competition for resources? One could argue for your position by noting that LIRs who already have some blocks of ipv4 are in a position to economize on and/or NAT those addresses, whereas an ISP without any can't do that. That provides some answer to Q1. But it doesn't deal with the problems around Q2.