On May 4, 2011, at 1:45 PM, Martin Millnert wrote:
It's not about "not seeing a risk" as much as it is about _making sure_, in the very design of the system, that it is *not possible* to abuse. Or at the very least extremely hard (global conspiracy kind of hard), to abuse.
That would lend a bit more credit to the system.
That would mean, of course, that no revocation of any certificate from any single central authority can affect routing on multiple networks.
Martin - Given the validation that some operators already perform based on information in RIPE Database (including whois and rpsl), doesn't the same potential for network disruption due to misplaced governmental action exist today? I am trying to discern if your concern is regarding the theoretical existence of such risks, or the specifically the addition of RPKI because your view it as a more accessible mechanism for abuse? Thanks! /John